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v “Nothing as Practical as a Good Theory”
The above maxim is often attributed to psychologist Kurt Lewin. Shortly 
after his death in 1947, the psychological historian E. C. Tolman wrote of 
Lewin: “Freud the clinician and Lewin the experimentalist – these are the two 
men whose names will stand out before all others in the history of our psy-
chological era” (Marrow, 1969). Although Freud has become a household 
name, Lewin’s ideas and work are mostly unknown to the general public. 
Among psychologists, however, Kurt Lewin is well known as one of the 
founders of modern experimental social psychology and recognized for his 
early contributions in applying psychological science to real human society.
His interest in the social uses of psychological research is evident not 
only from his work on “group dynamics”—a term he coined, involving, for 
example, research on leadership, communication, and group performance—
but also from the applied research institutes he established, such as the 
Committee on Community Interrelations (McCain, 2015). Indeed, for 
Lewin, research served a double purpose: “to seek deeper explanations of 
why people behave the way they do and to discover how they may learn to 
behave better” (Marrow, 1969, p. xi; Italics added). Science was, in other 
words, a way to discover general laws of human functioning as well as a way 
to solve practical problems, a combination Lewin labeled “action research.” 
To achieve this goal, Lewin proposed, there is nothing as practical as a good 
theory—a maxim Lewin himself attributed to “a business man” he once met 
(Lewin, 1943).
For Lewin, social psychological theories were useful guides that could 
help practitioners by providing them with the tools and confidence needed for 
action (Sandelands, 1990). However, he also noted that “we will have to 
watch out that theory never breaks loose from its proper place as a servant, as 
a tool for human beings” (Lewin, 1943, p. 118). What he meant here is that a 
theory should never be accepted as providing definitive answers on how to 
address complex social problems, partly because not all theories are good 
theories (e.g., consistent, falsifiable, parsimonious, precise) and because no 
theory is necessarily true. Indeed, “it may be (partly) true, but it may also be 
(partly) false. A theory is a set of ideas meant to explain observable events. 
Appropriate scientific methods are needed to test whether or not a theory 
achieves this aim. Theories thus are the basis to expand our understanding of 
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the world” (Gieseler, Loschelder and Friese, Chap. 1, p. 6). Instead, theories 
should be used as practical guides enabling a closer examination of why and 
under what circumstances interventions may be successful in obtaining a 
desired behavioral or psychological end-state. As we shall see in the follow-
ing chapters, applying theoretical insights is difficult and its success depends 
on many factors, not least the specifics of the applied contexts.
 When Social Psychology Turned Away  
from (Applying) Theories
With the death of Lewin, the interest in the social uses of social psychological 
knowledge dwindled (for a discussion see Hill, 2006). Some of the reasons 
for this lack of interest in applied (social psychological) research were already 
identified by Lewin in 1943. For example, in these early years, properly 
developed theory was lacking, as were concise, reliable measures of social 
behavior. Lewin also recognized that a meaningful application of psychologi-
cal insights requires detailed knowledge of the specific context within which 
the application takes place. This made applied research much more time con-
suming and more expensive than experimental research in the lab. Finally, 
compared to the general laws of human functioning psychologists were look-
ing for, dealing with nongeneral, applied problems was not looked at with 
much favor by early social psychologists, or in the words of Singer and Glass 
(1975, p. 16): “To be a major contribution a study must deal with basic, not 
applied, problems.” As a consequence, social psychology often had a lot to 
say in general, but little to say in particular (Deutsch, 1975).
Another trend that developed over the years, having a detrimental effect on 
the usefulness of social psychological knowledge for applied problems, was 
a focus on “sexy-hypothesis testing” (Fiedler, 2017). Instead of testing and 
developing social psychological theories, researchers focused on the impact 
of a single causal factor (often with only two levels) on a single dependent 
variable with a focus on counter-intuitive outcomes. The predicted effects are 
binary (i.e., A affects B) rather than quantified in size (i.e., A explains X per-
cent of variance of B). Even more problematic is the observation that quite a 
few of these studies violated good scientific practices (e.g., Fiedler & 
Schwarz, 2016). Studies were often conducted with overly small sample sizes 
and researchers reverted to several questionable research practices in order to 
publish their results (for a discussion see Gieseler et al., Chap. 1). For exam-
ple, when the research was written up, researchers regularly failed to report 
all dependent measures or even conditions relevant for a finding, and reverted 
to HARKing (hypothesizing after the results are known; Kerr, 1998), leading 
authors to report unexpected findings as having been predicted from the start. 
It is highly likely that such practices have contributed to “sexy” but invalid 
findings in the psychological literature. Perhaps the most prominent example 
is Bem’s (2011) article that claimed to provide evidence for pre-cognition 
(i.e., the ability to foresee the future).
Many measures have recently been taken to address these problems. Some 
are at the methodological level, such as journals’ demands for higher 
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 statistical power and the reduction of researchers’ degrees of freedom in data 
handling (e.g., through preregistering the study, reporting all measures, con-
ditions, and cases; Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2012). Strong a priori 
theories that are cumulatively developed are likewise a powerful measure 
against this development (Fiedler, 2017). For example, if a study builds upon 
a theory, HARKing is less of an option because the hypothesis is explicitly 
stated in the theory or at least derived from it. Moreover, within a theoretical 
tradition degrees of freedom are lower, given that there are often well- 
established measures and manipulations that are used in the tradition of the 
theory. New insights in a theoretical tradition are cumulative (i.e., they add to 
what is already known) and thus less original. However, findings that relate to 
and extend what is already known are more likely to be true than those vali-
dating isolated counter-intuitive hypotheses. This is but one reason why rely-
ing on theories in the development of knowledge is important: it contributes 
to the replicability of findings and thus to valid knowledge (cf. Greenwald, 
Pratkanis, Leippe, & Baumgardner, 1986).
 The Renaissance of Applying Social Psychological 
Theories
Because social psychology studies the interaction between situational and 
dispositional forces that influence every day, normal human behavior, such 
findings have traditionally played an important role in the development of 
behavioral interventions directed at the amelioration of a wide range of issues 
across all areas of applied psychology. Indeed, social psychological knowl-
edge is increasingly recognized as central to many of the challenges the indi-
vidual, the state, and civil society faces. This is evident, for example, in 
publications by the World Health Organization recognizing the importance of 
social determinants for understanding health behavior (e.g., lifestyles, social 
norms; CSDH, 2008). As a result, social psychological findings are being 
applied across public, commercial, and charity sectors, often with the goal to 
influence people and change their behavior.
To successfully apply social psychological findings, theory is indispens-
able. Indeed, evidence suggests that interventions with a theoretical basis are 
more effective than those without a theoretical basis (e.g., Michie & Johnston, 
2012; Webb, Joseph, Yardley, & Michie, 2010). Theories are not only used to 
inform intervention design, for instance, to gain ideas what might help and 
what might not help to change behavior in a certain domain (Heath, Cooke, 
& Cameron, 2015). They also help to classify interventions according to the 
underlying concepts and in this way contribute to their effectiveness and 
inform the integration of evidence (Michie & Prestwich, 2010). Finally, and 
perhaps most closely to what Lewin or the business man had in mind: theories 
can guide practitioners and provide them with the confidence needed for 
action (Sandelands, 1990).
Social psychological theories play an increasingly important role in 
attempts to intervene in human behavior. For example, social psychological 
theorizing has been applied to generate interventions for a wide variety of 
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fields ranging from pro-environmental behavior such as energy conservation 
(e.g., Abrahamse, Steg, Vlek, & Rothengatter, 2005) to prosocial behavior 
such as blood donation (e.g., Masser, White, Hyde, & Terry, 2008). More 
generally, it has been used to facilitate the understanding of numerous phe-
nomena in the organizational contexts such as leadership (e.g., Ellemers, de 
Gilder, & Haslam, 2004) or educational settings such as students’ conflict 
regulation (e.g., Darnon, Muller, Schrager, Pannuzzo, & Butera, 2006). Many 
more examples across a variety of applied settings, such as health, political, 
or consumer behavior, are presented in each of the chapters of this book.
 The Content of This Book
In this edited volume, we bring together leading scientists in the field of 
social psychology in order to illustrate how key theories and concepts can be 
applied to benefit social and practical problems. We dive into social psycho-
logical literature to illustrate how key theories and the underlying concepts 
help to predict and explain behavior. We focus on robust theories and models 
that have been successfully applied, covering a diverse range of settings: 
from interventions in the classroom to health behavior, and from financial 
decision making to the reduction of prejudice and discriminatory behavior. 
With this volume we hope to inform and benefit professionals involved in 
behavior change. In addition, we want to prepare students of psychology and 
human behavior to apply their knowledge in later jobs.
Because theories take center stage in this volume, in Chap. 1 Gieseler, 
Loschelder, and Friese provide an answer to the fundamental question “what 
is a good theory?”. More specifically, this chapter discusses two basic ques-
tions: (1) what are criteria for evaluating the quality of a psychological the-
ory, and (2) what are criteria for evaluating the empirical evidence related to 
a theory. The chapter discusses these criteria by examining one specific the-
ory and accompanying empirical work as an illustrative example—the 
Strength Model of Self-Control (Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996; Baumeister 
& Vohs, 2016). Although necessarily incomplete, the discussed criteria can 
be applied to many theories in (social) psychological research. They are 
therefore relevant not only to basic research, but also to any applied work that 
is grounded in theory.
The rest of this book is divided in two main parts. In part I, each chapter 
discusses a specific social psychological theory and takes a two-step approach. 
First, a theoretical part will define the key concepts and summarize the the-
ory, providing evidence for its reliability and limitations from basic research. 
A second, applied part will summarize research in applied contexts and pro-
vide details about one particular study including the respective application 
setting. The aim of this first part of the book is not only to show that theories 
make meaningful predictions for real-world contexts, but also what the hur-
dles and pitfalls in applying a theory and the underlying set of concepts in a 
certain context are. In part II, the chapters take a slightly different approach. 
Because real-world problems are often highly complex, with a myriad of fac-
tors that may influence the problem under investigation, in this part chapters 
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will approach specific problems from different angles, using relevant con-
cepts and theory to engage with the applied question. The aim of the second 
part will be to show how different theoretical insights can be meaningfully 
combined in order to understand and possibly intervene in a range of social 
issues.
 Part I
The first part starts with three chapters presenting theories about motivation. 
Keller, Bieleke, and Gollwitzer present the mindset theory of action phases 
(MAP) and implementation intentions in Chap. 2. The MAP describes four 
different phases people go through during goal pursuit and the specific cogni-
tive procedures (or mindsets) activated to cope with the demands of each 
phase. Implementation intentions are if-then plans that are highly efficient in 
initiating pursuit goals in difficult situations (e.g., when opportunities are 
likely to be missed). The chapter presents a field example providing evidence 
for their effectiveness beyond the lab: in this featured study implementation 
intentions facilitated sustainable consumption.
Chapter 3, by Guy Roth, presents self-determination theory. In contrast to 
MAP, self-determination theory is not concerned with the process of goal 
pursuit but with the question whether the source of people’s motivation is 
autonomous or externally controlled—in other words whether the striving is 
determined by oneself or by others. The theory and the chapter name anteced-
ents and beneficial consequences of autonomous motivation. The external 
validity of the theory is demonstrated in a featured intervention study show-
ing that training teachers to educate students in a way that facilitates autono-
mous motivation increases this type of motivation as well as students’ 
performance.
Chapter 4, by Sassenberg and Vliek, targets yet another aspect of motiva-
tion, namely the selection of means. It presents regulatory focus theory, 
which provides insights about people’s strategies for mean selection during 
goal striving. In addition, regulatory fit theory is discussed, which states that 
engagement is higher in case there is a fit between people’s preferred strategy 
and the strategic demands of a context (e.g., when people prefer to act care-
fully and the context requires exactly that strategy). After discussion of sev-
eral applied contexts, a featured intervention study is described, showing that 
communication fitting with recipients’ preferred self-regulation strategy 
leads to more physical activity than communication not fitting recipients pre-
ferred strategy.
Following these chapters on motivation, Chaps. 5, 6, and 7 focus on a 
variety of forms of social influence. Chapter 5 by Verplanken and Orbell dis-
cusses habits and how they can be changed despite their rigidity. The authors 
describe what habits are and what they do, such as effects on information 
processing, the relationship with intentions, and the “stickiness” of habits. 
Evidence for the real-world relevance of Verplanken and Orbell’s theorizing 
comes from a study showing that moving (i.e., the change of an individual’s 
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the case of sustainable behavior (e.g., energy saving behaviors).
In Chap. 6, Mühlberger and Jonas present theorizing about motivated 
resistance against social influence (rather than unintended rigidity in the case 
of habits). The chapter discusses the concept of and theorizing about reac-
tance—a motivational state directed toward restoring or securing freedom—
that often occurs in response to undesired social influence. Several 
preconditions and consequences of reactance are discussed, followed by a 
discussion of several fields of application and an illustration of an applied 
study of reactance theory to political behavior.
The final chapter relating to social influence comes from Stok and de 
Ridder. In Chap. 7 they present the focus theory of normative conduct. Norms 
are a means of social influence as they provide individuals with decisional 
shortcuts on how to behave in certain situations. They either refer to typical 
behavior (descriptive norms) or appropriate behavior (injunctive norms). The 
chapter specifies the conditions under which norms assert an influence on 
people’s behavior. Finally, the featured intervention study provides evidence 
that norms have the power to influence people’s pro-environmental behavior, 
if they are communicated in the right way.
The next three chapters turn to social groups. In Chap. 8 Butera and Buchs 
present interdependence theory—a theory making predictions about the 
implication of the (perceived) requirement to cooperate or to compete while 
working on a task. Based on this theory the chapter discusses the precondi-
tions for successful cooperation and features a study demonstrating that these 
conditions indeed assert a positive influence on cooperation in the 
classroom.
Turning from interpersonal relations (and the interdependence structure) 
to the relation individuals have to groups as a whole, Scheepers and Ellemers 
present social identity theory in Chap. 9. This theory posits that group mem-
berships contribute to people’s self-concepts: the so-called social identity. 
The chapter presents an overview of work on social identity and its applica-
tions to health and organizational settings. The external validity of the theory 
is demonstrated in two studies describing a social identity-based intervention 
for improving intergroup relations in an educational setting.
Chapter 10 by Christ and Kauff turns from single groups to intergroup 
relations. It summarizes intergroup contact theory, which states the condi-
tions under which contact between members of different social groups con-
tribute to the improvement of the attitudes toward the respective outgroup. It 
features two studies demonstrating the successful improvement of attitudes 
toward outgroup members in heated intergroup conflicts, namely the Israeli- 
Palestinian conflict and the conflict between Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda.
The section on single theories and their application is closed by two social 
cognitive theories. Chapter 11 by Wittenbrink, Correll, and Ma takes a differ-
ent approach to intergroup relations and targets so-called implicit prejudice—
that is, the automatically activated attitudes associated with certain groups. 
The chapter summarizes the social cognitive processes by which these atti-
tudes assert an influence on people’s behavior toward members of these 
groups. A featured study is summarized showing that these attitudes have the 
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potential (among police officers) to lead to a higher likelihood to shoot an 
African American compared to a White American suspect.
Finally, in Chap. 12, Bernecker and Job present mindset theory (not to be 
confused with the mindset theory of action phases, MAP) distinguishing 
between entity mindsets—laypeople’s assumption that people’s characteris-
tics on a certain domain are stable—and incremental theorists—laypeople’s 
assumption that characteristics are malleable. The implications of these 
implicit theories across a number of domains are summarized, leading to the 
conclusion that holding an incremental theory is beneficial in many instances. 
This is illustrated in a featured intervention study showing the benefits of an 
incremental mindset for victims of bullying.
 Part II
The final three chapters form the second part of the book. Here several theo-
retical insights are used in order to understand and possibly intervene in a 
range of real-world problems. This part starts with Chap. 13 by van der Werf, 
van Dijk, Wilderjans, van Dillen on how to promote healthy financial behav-
ior (i.e., putting money aside in savings to cover unexpected and necessary 
expenses). This chapter discusses a number of (social) psychological “hur-
dles” that may contribute to many people’s failure to put money aside for 
future financial needs. The chapter closes with a discussion of two interven-
tion studies using these insights to improve people’s saving behavior.
In Chap. 14, Utz discusses the impact of social media use on people’s 
emotions. The chapter discusses a number of phenomena and theories that 
can explain why and how social media affect people’s emotions and guide 
their behavior. It features a study demonstrating that the emotions elicited by 
social media can even guide consumer behavior.
Finally, Chap. 15 by Dinnick and Noor explores what might determine 
how a group responds to the suffering it has experienced at the hand of 
another group. It introduces the concept of intergroup forgiveness and dis-
cusses its potent promise in facilitating conflicting groups to transform from 
mutual enmity to peaceful coexistence. The authors analyze the role of social 
identity, victim belief construals (the way the group frames its suffering), and 
their potential interplay as possible determinants of forgiveness. They review 
empirical research based on studies conducted with groups caught up in real- 
life conflict settings (e.g., Israel-Palestine, Northern Ireland). The chapter 
presents several theory-based intervention studies oriented toward healing 
fractured intergroup relations.
 Didactic Features
The chapters in this book are equipped with a number of didactic features that 
should ease the deep level learning of the content and the elaboration of ideas. 
First, there are boxes in the text that serve different functions. Definition 
boxes give definitions of the main constructs and thereby highlight these 
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important concepts. Each chapter also includes a short summary section at the 
end, which also highlights key content. Zooming-in boxes illustrate topics 
more in depth and, thus, provide more background or point to relevant other 
theorizing. Here, other/conflicting theoretical approaches and laboratory or 
field studies are summarized that may help to integrate the content of the 
chapter with other theories or content. If you want to zoom-in even further, 
the list of recommended readings at the end of each chapter will provide a 
guideline where to find more information about the theories and research 
questions presented in each chapter. Questions for elaboration are sup-
posed to stimulate engagement with the text and provide the opportunity to 
develop the presented literature a bit further. These are often open-ended 
questions with no definite answer, but sample responses are included at the 
end of the chapters.
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 Introduction
The present chapter differs from the others you 
will read in this book: Chapters in the first section 
present a specific theory and elaborate on 
research in applied contexts, in which the respec-
tive theory has been used. Chapters in the second 
section start out with a real-world phenomenon 
and explain how different psychological theories 
can help to better understand human behavior or 
contribute to solving real-world problems. In the 
present chapter, we take a step back and discuss 
how the quality of a theory and the quality of its 
accompanying empirical foundation can be eval-
uated. In doing so, we distinguish between two 
different perspectives, the theoretical perspective 
(Does a theory meet general criteria of a good 
theory?) and the empirical perspective (How sci-
entifically sound is the research related to a 
theory?).
In the first part of this chapter, we introduce 
the Strength Model of Self-Control (Baumeister & 
Heatherton, 1996; Baumeister & Vohs, 2016). 
The model will serve as an illustrative reference 
point throughout the chapter. It is one of the most 
prominent, researched, and debated theories in 
social psychology of the last 25 years. Using this 
concrete example hopefully renders the subsequent 
discussion of (sometimes) abstract questions and 
concepts more tangible.
4The second part of the chapter addresses basic 
questions relating to scientific theorizing, such 
as: What is a theory? Why do we need theories? 
And what makes for a good theory? We first dis-
cuss criteria for evaluating theories in general 
before applying them to the Strength Model.
In the third part, we examine criteria to evalu-
ate how theories fare on the empirical side. 
Again, we first discuss criteria for the quality of 
empirical work in general before applying them 
to the Strength Model.
 The Strength Model of Self-Control
The Strength Model of Self-Control (Baumeister 
& Heatherton, 1996; Baumeister & Vohs, 2016) 
originated from observations from everyday life: 
When reviewing a large and diverse literature, 
Baumeister and colleagues observed that people 
who have difficulties following their long-term 
goals in one life domain often experience similar 
difficulties in other domains as well. The authors 
also noticed that self-control failures tend to 
occur more frequently after long and tiring days, 
in stressful times, or when demands are unusu-
ally high. They concluded that people behave as 
if self-control was a general capacity that is lim-
ited and can be depleted.
In their Strength Model, the authors employed 
the analogy of a (self-control) muscle that 
becomes tired with use. The model makes two 
central assumptions: First, self-control draws on 
a limited resource; the exertion of self-control 
increases the probability of self-control failure in 
subsequent attempts. Second, self-control is a 
domain-general construct. An exertion of self- 
control in one domain will increase the likelihood 
of self-control failure in any other domain that 
requires self-control. The Strength Model thus 
assumes a cause-effect relation between the exer-
tion of self-control and the subsequent impair-
ment in self-control performance. Baumeister 
and colleagues referred to the state of reduced 
self-control resources as ego depletion.
One important implication of the theory’s 
assumptions is that self-control can be improved 
with practice: If self-control works like a muscle, 
the repeated exertion of self-control should lead 
to repeated states of ego depletion, but, in the 
long run, the muscle should be strengthened, and 
the overall self-control ability should improve 
(e.g., Job, Friese, & Bernecker, 2015; Muraven, 
2010; for meta-analyses, see Beames, Schofield, 
& Denson, 2017; Friese, Frankenbach, Job, & 
Loschelder, 2017). In the present chapter, we 
focus on those aspects of the Strength Model that 
are concerned with the ego depletion effect 
rather than with the trainability hypothesis.
To test the model’s core assumptions in the 
psychological laboratory, Baumeister and col-
leagues developed the sequential task paradigm: 
They had participants work on two sequential 
tasks demanding self-control and measured their 
performance in the second task as a function of 
whether the first task was high or low in self- 
control demands (e.g., Baumeister, Bratlavsky, 
Muraven, & Tice, 1998). Hundreds of studies fol-
lowing this paradigm have provided evidence for 
this ego depletion effect (for reviews and meta- 
analyses, see Baumeister & Vohs, 2016; Carter, 
Kofler, Forster, & McCullough, 2015; Hagger, 
Wood, Stiff, & Chatzisarantis, 2010; Hirt, 
Clarkson, Egan, & Eyink, 2016). For example, 
Muraven, Collins, and Neinhaus (2002) had par-
ticipants either suppress their thoughts in a first 
task (which requires self-control) or not. Those 
who exerted self-control in the first task consumed 
Definition Box
Self-Control: “Ability to override or 
change one’s inner responses, as well as to 
interrupt undesired behavioral tendencies 
(such as impulses) and refrain from acting 
on them” (Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 
2004, p. 274).
Ego Depletion Effect: A person shows 
impaired performance in self-control 
demanding tasks after she has previously 
exerted self-control (compared to a control 
group that has not exerted self-control in 
task 1).
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though participants knew they were about to do a 
driving test afterward. In another exemplary 
study, chronic dieters who suppressed their emo-
tional reactions to a sad video (a self-control 
demanding task) later consumed more ice cream 
during a product test than those who were 
instructed to react naturally while watching the 
video (Vohs & Heatherton, 2000).
Despite the seemingly abundant evidence in 
favor of the Strength Model, the model and its 
accompanying empirical work have been heavily 
criticized in recent years. These criticisms go so 
far that many researchers doubt that the ego 
depletion effect is a real phenomenon after all. 
We will elaborate on some of these issues that 
have been criticized in later parts of this chapter 
(for an overview of the debate, see Friese, 
Loschelder, Gieseler, Frankenbach, & Inzlicht, 
2019).
 Behavioral Versus Process Level 
of Psychological Phenomena
Before we turn to the discussion of criteria to 
evaluate a theory, we need to introduce an impor-
tant distinction between two different levels of 
analysis that will guide our further thinking: the 
distinction between the behavioral and the 
process level (also referred to as “functional” and 
“cognitive” level of analysis, see De Houwer, 
2011; Fig. 1.1). The behavioral level of analysis 
defines behavioral effects exclusively in terms of 
changes in elements of the environment that cause 
behavioral changes on a dependent variable. For 
instance, insulting someone increases aggressive 
behavior in the insulted person. By contrast, the 
process level of analysis refers to the underlying 
mental processes that are triggered by elements in 
the environment and are responsible for subse-
quent changes on a dependent variable. For exam-
ple, an insult may trigger anger that then translates 
into aggressive behavior. These two levels of 
analysis must not be conflated. In the words of De 
Houwer (2011, p. 201):
“… using behavioral effects as a proxy for mental 
constructs violates the general scientific principle 
that the explanandum (that which needs to be 
explained; in this case, behavioral effects) needs to 
be kept separate from the explanans (that which is 
used to explain; in this case, mental constructs; 
Hempel, 1970).”
Definition Box
Behavioral level of analysis: Defining 
behavioral effects exclusively in terms of 
elements in the environment.
→ Which elements in the environment lead 
to a certain behavior? (De Houwer, 
2011)
Process level of analysis: Examining the 
nature of underlying mental processes that 
are assumed to guide behavior/behavioral 
effects.
→ Via which underlying mental process(es) 
do certain elements in the environment 
lead to a certain behavior? (De Houwer, 
2011)
Box 1.1 Questions for Elaboration
 1. Assume the Strength Model of Self- 
Control is accurate. Think about activi-
ties in your daily life that should lead to 
depletion-like effects.
 2. Think about possible strategies that you 
could use to counteract ego depletion 
effects in your daily life. These could 
be strategies that you have used your-
self or that you may know from other 
chapters in this book (e.g., Rubicon 
model and implementation intentions, 
Keller et al., Chap. 2; Mindset theory, 
Bernecker & Job, Chap. 12).
 3. Can you think of situations when your 
self-control felt unlimited? How did these 
situations differ from when you felt 
depleted, lacking ability to self-control?
 4. Assume the Strength Model of Self- 
Control was inaccurate: The ability to 
exert self-control was not limited. What 
would your daily life and the world 
more generally look like? Any different 
from the present reality?
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both levels of analysis. On the behavioral level, it 
states that the initial exertion of self-control 
causes a subsequent impairment in self-control 
performance, linking two elements in the envi-
ronment: self-control exertion at time one and 
impaired self-control performance at time two 
(relative to a control group). On the process level, 
the model assumes that the behavioral effect is 
mediated by the depletion of an internal, limited 
resource (the nature of this resource is not further 
defined). For present purposes, the distinction is 
important as there are several other theoretical 
models beyond the Strength Model seeking to 
explain the same behavioral phenomenon (behav-
ioral level) with fundamentally different assump-
tions concerning the underlying process (process 
level; for further reading see, e.g., De Witt Huberts, 
Evers, & De Ridder, 2014; Evans, Boggero, & 
Segerstrom, 2015; Inzlicht, Schmeichel, & 
Macrae, 2014).
 Theoretical Perspective: Criteria 
to Evaluate the Quality of Theories
Having briefly described the Strength Model’s 
basic assumptions and some accompanying 
empirical evidence, let us take a step back: the 
empirical foundation aside, is the Strength Model 
a “good” theory to start with? And more gener-
ally, what makes for a good theory? In science, a 
theory constitutes one or several joined-up 
 principles that are meant to describe, explain, and 
predict a phenomenon or several related phenom-
ena (Estrada & Schultz, 2017). A theory is not 
necessarily true. It may be (partly) true, but it 
may also be (partly) false. A theory is a set of 
ideas meant to explain observable events. 
Appropriate scientific methods are needed to test 
whether or not a theory achieves this aim. 
Theories thus are the basis to expand our under-
standing of the world. For social psychologists, 
Fig. 1.1 Levels of scientific analysis for the example of 
the ego depletion effect. The behavioral level denotes the 
cause-effect relation: The exertion of self-control leads to 
subsequent impairments in self-control performance 
(gray arrow). The process level refers to the underlying 
psychological mechanisms that are triggered by the exer-
tion of self-control—that is, the mechanisms on the pro-
cess level are causally responsible for the behavioral 
effect. (White arrows via question mark; adapted from 
De Houwer, 2011)
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address individual and social problems and to 
change problematic behavior (see second section 
of this book: Combining theoretical insights: 
Addressing complex human behavior).
Taking the Strength Model as an example, one 
could say that the model’s two main assump-
tions—limited resource and domain-general con-
struct—are meant to predict and explain the 
phenomenon of impaired self-control performance 
after the exertion of self-control. This pertains to 
the psychological laboratory and to people’s 
everyday life. In the long run, if the model stands 
the test of time, interventions based on the Strength 
Model may thus address self- control failures 
across various domains often challenging self-
control such as eating, drinking, exercising, social 
interactions, and procrastination, among others.
Not all theories are good theories, however. 
And to distinguish the good from the not so good, 
there are several criteria to consider. Here, we 
focus on six criteria, namely, consistency, preci-
sion, parsimony, generality, falsifiability, and 
progress, while omitting (partly overlapping) cri-
teria such as refutability or truth (see Gawronski 
& Bodenhausen, 2015; Van Lange, 2013; see 
Table 1.1). Due to space restrictions, our list and 
discussion are necessarily incomplete. A more in- 
depth treatment can be found in Gawronski and 
Bodenhausen (2015), our primary source for this 
part of the chapter. We start each of the following 
sections by first defining the respective criterion 
and then subsequently applying the criterion to 
the Strength Model.
 Consistency
One obvious characteristic of a good theory is 
consistency with empirical observations. If a the-
ory does not correspond to empirical observa-
tions in the laboratory and/or the real world, it is 
necessary to adjust the theory (or to refute it). 
Sometimes a theory turns out to have merit only 
after some conceptual adjustment. For example, 
research may identify boundary conditions that 
specify when predictions derived from the theory 
do or do not apply. If after adjustments a theory 
still is not consistent with empirical observations 
to a satisfactory extent, it may be necessary to 
abandon the theory.
The Strength Model originates from the obser-
vation in the psychological literature that in 
everyday life people seem more likely to fail at 
controlling themselves after previously exerting 
self-control. An inconsistent observation is that 
there seem to be other situations in everyday life 
in which people appear to have no difficulty to 
Table 1.1 Selection of quality criteria that make for a good theory and their application to the Strength Model
Criterion Definition Application to the Strength Model
Consistency Correspondence to empirical 
observations in the laboratory and/or the 
real world
Hundreds of lab studies and real-world observations 
consistent with phenomenon. Inconsistent recent 
(large-scale) replications and preregistered studies
Precision Clearly defined concepts and 
operationalizations that allow for little 
stretching
Imprecise definition of self-control and the limited 
self-control resource
Parsimony Explain more with less: Use as few 
assumptions as possible to explain a 
given phenomenon
Two core assumptions—limited resource that is domain 
independent—account for a far-reaching phenomenon
Generality Favor higher explanatory breadth Model’s assumptions apply to and are observable in a 
large array of situations, contexts, and behaviors
Falsifiability Formulate assumptions so that it is 
possible to make observations prohibited 
by a theory
Imprecise formulation of self-control and underlying 
resource make it difficult to falsify some of the theory’s 
predictions
Progress Inspire new research and discoveries and 
promote theoretical progress
Theory has spurred hundreds of studies, novel 
theorizing, and methodological, scientific debates
Inspired by Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2015)
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control their impulses—even after a demanding 
previous task. These observations alone do not 
mean that the Strength Model has to be aban-
doned. Indeed, several situational and disposi-
tional moderators have been identified that 
presumably prevent or counteract ego depletion 
effects (for a review, see Loschelder & Friese, 
2016). For example, affirming core personal val-
ues (Schmeichel & Vohs, 2009) or being incen-
tivized to perform well have been shown to 
counteract ego depletion effects (Luethi et  al., 
2016; Muraven & Slessareva, 2003). In a similar 
vein, holding a subjective theory that self-control 
is non-limited (Job, Dweck, & Walton, 2010; 
Bernecker & Job, Chap. 12) or having a high 
disposition for action orientation (Gröpel, 
Baumeister, & Beckmann, 2014) has been found 
to prevent the occurrence of ego depletion. In all, 
boundary conditions are crucial and need to be 
defined well in order to account for theory- 
consistent and inconsistent findings.
Another (potentially greater) problem for the 
Strength Model stems from the increasing num-
ber of studies that fail to find ego depletion effects 
without moderating variables being able to 
explain these inconsistent data (e.g., Etherton 
et al., 2018; Lurquin et al., 2016; Osgood, 2017; 
Singh & Göritz, 2018; Vadillo, Gold, & Osman, 
2018). The empirical evidence does not seem to 
as consistently support the theoretical assump-
tions as was believed for many years. From our 
perspective, conceptual and empirical work is 
necessary to address this lack of consistency 
(especially in light of doubts about the ability 
of earlier empirical work on the model to lead 
to firm conclusions, see below and Friese et al., 
in press). Otherwise, a lack of consistency will 
seriously threaten the state of the Strength Model 
as a respected theory.
 Precision
A good theory is precise, with clearly defined 
concepts and operationalizations that allow for 
little stretching or subjective interpretation. 
The more precise the formulation of a theory and 
its background assumptions, the less ambiguous 
it is for researchers to decide which empirical 
observations are consistent versus inconsistent 
with the theory (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 
2015). Thus, precision increases the chances of 
collecting both supporting and refuting empirical 
evidence for a theory. Imprecise theories leave 
room for subjective interpretation of empirical 
findings.
Precision is not a strength of the Strength 
Model. One problem of the theory is shared with 
the field of self-control research in general: a pre-
cise (and widely accepted) definition of self- 
control is lacking. Baumeister and Vohs (2016, 
p. 70) define self-control “as processes by which 
the self intentionally alters its own responses, 
including thoughts, emotions, impulses, perfor-
mance, and behaviors, based on standards.” This 
definition encompasses a great part of what peo-
ple intentionally do when awake. But not every 
time a person intentionally alters her own 
responses to be in line with her standards, she will 
exert effortful self-control leading to depletion 
effects. For example, picture a person writing an 
official Email in line with orthography and gram-
mar. Writing requires altering one’s responses 
based on standards (the norms of orthography and 
grammar). But for someone educated enough to 
write decently, this is so low- minded that it seems 
implausible to assume that such a task will easily 
lead to discernable depletion- type effects. Thus, 
this definition of self-control may be too unspe-
cific and likely too broad. Similar points can be 
made with respect to the alternative definition of 
self-control provided in the Definition box earlier 
in this chapter. In all fairness, somewhat vague 
and imprecise conceptual definitions are nothing 
unique to the Strength Model, but a feature shared 
with many other theories and research fields in 
(social) psychology.
The imprecise definition of self-control is rel-
evant for the antecedent of impaired self-control 
(i.e., the independent variable in experimental 
studies). Here, it pertains to the behavioral level 
of analysis: What exactly are properties of a valid 
manipulation that allow for a stringent test of the 
model, independent of the behavioral effect it 
may or may not evoke?
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becomes especially apparent on the process level: 
The model postulates the reduction of a “limited 
resource” as the crucial underlying mechanism 
that is causally responsible for impaired self- 
control performance. However, the model does 
not specify the nature of this resource in any way. 
In consequence, the model remains too imprecise 
to test one of its core assumptions as it is impos-
sible to measure an unknown resource.1
The lack of precision on the behavioral and 
process level may contribute to the problems and 
reproaches that ego depletion research is facing: 
If researchers do not precisely know how to 
manipulate the exertion of self-control, it is diffi-
cult to distinguish a nonsignificant result caused 
by a wrong theory from a nonsignificant result 
caused by an unapt experimental manipulation. 
Similarly, it is impossible to provide conclusive 
evidence supporting the underlying process 
assumptions, if the model does not provide clear 
guidance about the properties of this very resource 
(or how to measure it).
 Parsimony
A good theory explains more with less. When 
developing a theory, one possibility is to start 
with observations, to abstract and generalize 
them, and to create joined-up principles (see defi-
nition above). In a next step, the theorist cuts out 
all superfluous elements. A straightforward for-
mula remains that predicts a multitude of events 
with as few assumptions as possible. Hence, 
when comparing two theories that both explain 
the same set of empirical observations, the theory 
with fewer assumptions is superior in terms of 
parsimony.
The Strength Model is very parsimonious as it 
originally made only two central assumptions 
(domain generality and limited resource). Many 
1 Some earlier studies had suggested that blood glucose 
levels may be this underlying limited resource, but this 
idea has been dismissed on both logical, physiological, 
and empirical grounds (Dang, 2016; Kurzban, 2010; 
Vadillo, Gold, & Osman, 2016; but see Ampel, Muraven, 
& McNay, 2018, for a different perspective).
(social) psychological theories make many more 
than just two central assumptions (e.g., Social 
Identity Theory, Scheepers & Ellemers, Chap. 9; 
Social Learning Theory, Bandura, 1977; General 
Aggression Model, Bushman & Anderson, 2002). 
Excessive parsimony comes with the downside 
that it may impair consistency—thus eventually 
requiring conceptual additions to a theory. Future 
research will reveal if failures to detect the ego 
depletion effect can be accounted for by such 
boundary conditions (moderators) and auxiliary 
assumptions—at the cost of parsimony. 
(Alternatively, failures to find ego depletion 
effects may also be due to problems discussed 
later in the section “Empirical perspective”).
 Generality
Generality refers to a theory’s quality to apply to 
various fields, situations, or domains of behavior. 
Although theoretical parsimony is an asset of a 
theory, explanatory breadth is as well.
The Strength Model fares very well concern-
ing this criterion: The proposed explanatory 
breadth of the model is unusually large. A wide 
array of behaviors in almost all spheres of life 
require self-control and may—if the theory is 
right—evoke ego depletion effects. Likewise, 
according to the Strength Model, exerting self- 
control may have an impact on a multitude of 
behaviors in a variety of areas, all of which 
therefore should be susceptible to ego depletion 
effects.
 Falsifiability
No matter how much empirical evidence has 
been gathered that is consistent with a theory, the 
theory can never be inductively “proven” to be 
true—it is always possible that one day an obser-
vation inconsistent with the theory emerges 
(Popper, 1959). All the more important, a theory 
has to be falsifiable. If a theory is formulated in a 
way that makes it impossible to observe some-
thing that is prohibited by the theory’s assump-
tions, it is unfalsifiable and therefore not a good 
1 What Makes for a Good Theory? How to Evaluate a Theory Using the Strength Model of Self-Control…
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theory (e.g., the claim “the exertion of self-con-
trol subsequently leads to better, poorer or 
unchanged self-control performance” would make 
the theory unfalsifiable). It is, of course, possible to 
define already mentioned auxiliary assumptions or 
boundary conditions to explain observations that 
initially appear inconsistent with the theory. 
However, every inconsistent observation must not 
lead to the development of a new auxiliary assump-
tion specifying a new exception. Especially if there 
are more exceptions to the theory than standard 
cases, a theory becomes unfalsifiable (see also cri-
terion of Parsimony).
The Strength Model states that the exertion of 
self-control impairs self-control performance. 
This claim would be falsified, if the exertion of 
self-control was consistently found to boost 
rather than to impair performance. Savani and 
Job (2017) found such a reverse ego depletion 
effect in several studies. Importantly, however, 
participants in these samples came from India 
growing up with the cultural belief that exerting 
self-control is beneficial for future self-control 
exertion. Adding “cultural belief” (or beliefs 
about the [non-]limitedness of self-control more 
generally) as a boundary condition incorporates 
these results into the larger theory.
Some other assumptions of the Strength Model, 
however, seem difficult to falsify. On the behav-
ioral level, the prediction that exerting self- control 
impairs subsequent self-control performance is dif-
ficult to falsify because due to the imprecision of 
the self-control definition, it is unclear what consti-
tutes a valid self-control manipulation and a valid 
dependent variable. Failures to replicate an effect 
can easily be dismissed by doubting the validity 
or the strength of the independent or dependent 
variables (see section on Operationalization and 
Manipulation Checks below). On the process 
level, the nature of the purported resource is 
unspecified, as mentioned earlier. Its existence 
can therefore not be falsified.
 Progress
Good theories inspire new research, lead to 
discoveries that make contributions beyond the 
previously known, and promote theoretical 
progress through refinements, sharpening, and 
the inspiration and development of (new) 
theories.
The Strength Model has successfully spurred 
progress. Hundreds of studies have been con-
ducted and endorsed the existence of the ego 
depletion effect (Hirt, Clarkson, & Jia, 2016). 
The model has been applied to many different 
spheres of psychology including consumer 
behavior (Friese, Hofmann, & Wänke, 2008; 
Vohs & Faber, 2007), neuroscience (Heatherton & 
Wagner, 2011; Luethi et  al., 2016), decision- 
making (Pocheptsova, Amir, Dhar, & Baumeister, 
2009), and work and organizations (Christian & 
Ellis, 2011), to name a few. The model also 
inspired the development of new theories explain-
ing the ego depletion effect differently (e.g., 
Central Governor Model: Evans et  al., 2015; 
Process Model: Inzlicht et  al., 2014) and more 
general theories of self-control integrating ego 
depletion as a central component (e.g., De Witt 
Huberts et al., 2014; Kotabe & Hofmann, 2015). 
Furthermore, methodological discussions trig-
gered by doubts about the robustness of the ego 
depletion effect led to advances in domains such 
as research on publication bias (Inzlicht, Gervais, 
& Berkman, 2015). In sum, the Strength Model 
was extraordinarily successful in stimulating 
both empirical work and theory across different 
fields in psychology and beyond. (Obviously, in 
and of itself this does not make a theory any more 
or less true.)
 Interim Summary
In the first part of this chapter, we introduced the 
Strength Model of Self-Control with its two main 
assumptions: domain generality and limited 
resource. We discussed the sequential task para-
digm and introduced two levels of analysis: the 
behavioral level and the process level. We pro-
ceeded with a selection of criteria to evaluate the 
quality of theories and applied these to the 
Strength Model. In the following section of the 
chapter, we turn to the examination of the quality 
of empirical research that has been conducted to 
test a theory, again using the Strength Model as 
an illustrative example.
K. Gieseler et al.
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 Empirical Perspective: Criteria 
to Evaluate Research on a Theory
We now take a look at a selection of criteria that 
help to judge the quality of empirical research 
that has been conducted on a theory. Admittedly, 
these criteria are inspired specifically by dis-
cussions about the Strength Model. They are 
therefore neither exhaustive nor representative 
for evaluating empirical work in general. 
Nevertheless, several of these criteria can readily 
be applied to evaluating research on other theo-
ries as well. For a more in-depth discussion of 
empirical work on the ego depletion effect, see 
Friese et al. (in press).
 Statistical Power
We start with the famous Jacob Cohen (1988, 
p. 1): “The power of a statistical test is the proba-
bility that it will yield statistically significant 
results [for an effect that truly exists].” To reliably 
detect an effect that truly exists, high statistical 
power is vital. Importantly, statistical power 
increases with larger effect sizes and with larger 
sample sizes (given the significance level for a 
type-I error is held constant). Thus, if statistical 
power is low, a study is less likely to detect a true 
effect. But—and maybe less intuitively—low 
statistical power also decreases the likelihood 
that a statistically significant finding reflects a true 
effect (Button et al., 2013; Christley, 2010). This 
so-called positive predictive value is lower for 
smaller effect sizes and for smaller sample sizes.
In the ego depletion literature, many studies 
have small sample sizes (Carter et  al., 2015). 
Thus, in combination with a true effect which—
by now—is assumed to be small in size, statisti-
cal power across the ego depletion literature is 
assumed to be worryingly low. When the average 
power in a literature is low, many studies are 
likely to produce nonsignificant findings even in 
the presence of a true effect. However, the vast 
majority of published ego depletion studies 
reveal significant effects (Carter et  al., 2015). 
Together, these observations limit the possibility 
to draw firm conclusions concerning the Strength 
Model based on the currently available evidence 
(see also later section on P-Hacking and 
Publication Bias).
 Operationalization and Manipulation 
Check
The process of defining an instrument to measure 
a phenomenon that is not directly observable is 
called operationalization—the resulting repre-
sentations of the phenomenon are operational 
definitions. For instance, to measure the abstract 
concept of a person’s intelligence (which is not 
directly observable), psychologists have devel-
oped many different intelligence tests that seek to 
measure and quantify the underlying construct. 
In principle, a phenomenon can have an unlim-
ited number of operational definitions (Whitley, 
2002). It is important to thoroughly develop these 
operational definitions because researchers draw 
inferences concerning the phenomena (i.e., hypo-
thetical, latent constructs; e.g., intelligence) 
based on the measurement of observable, mani-
fest variables (e.g., scores in an intelligence test). 
Only if this relationship between manifest vari-
ables and the phenomenon is trusted—if the 
operational definition fits the theory—can we 
draw conclusions concerning the hypothetical 
construct. Otherwise, if central constructs are not 
well operationalized, it is difficult to estimate the 
robustness of an effect.
Box 1.2 Questions for Elaboration
1. Think of a social psychological theory 
you know, and try to evaluate it along 
the criteria presented in this part of the 
chapter. In what respects is the theory 
you chose a good theory? Where is 
room for improvement? Discuss.
2. If you were to rank the discussed crite-
ria, which of these would you see as the 
more relevant indicators for a high- 
quality theory? Are some of these crite-
ria mutually exclusive?
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Research on the Strength Model used a large 
variety of operational definitions concerning the 
measurement and the manipulation of self- 
control (see section on Generality above). The 
Strength Model itself does not explicitly suggest 
a certain set of operational definitions, partly due 
to its generality (see Theoretical Perspective). 
Hence, there is a large variety of ego depletion 
manipulations in terms of time and content: from 
very brief manipulations such as 20 incongruent 
(depletion condition) versus 20 congruent (con-
trol condition) Stroop trials (Yam, Chen, & 
Reynolds, 2014) to completing several demand-
ing tasks in a row in the depletion condition, each 
lasting several minutes (Sjåstad & Baumeister, 
2018; Vohs, Baumeister, & Schmeichel, 2012), 
and from resisting cookies versus radishes to 
crossing out certain letters in a text (Baumeister 
et al., 1998). The same is true for the dependent 
variables: A large variety of different tasks have 
been used as dependent variable, ranging from 
executive functioning tasks like the Stroop task 
(Inzlicht & Gutsell, 2007) to arithmetic calcula-
tions (Vohs et al., 2008) via tasks involving resisting 
temptations (Christiansen, Cole, & Field, 2012; 
Friese et  al., 2008) to risk taking (Freeman & 
Muraven, 2010) and aggressive behavior (DeWall, 
Baumeister, Stillman, & Gailliot, 2007). Meta-
analytic evidence suggests that these tasks share 
a common core, albeit a rather small one 
(Duckworth & Kern, 2011). Thus, the question is, if 
and to what extent these operational definitions 
can reliably and validly manipulate and measure 
the underlying construct that the Strength Model 
posits: self-control.
A related point concerns the use of manipula-
tion checks. Manipulation checks are typically 
used to test whether an independent variable suc-
cessfully manipulated the construct of interest. 
The majority of ego depletion studies did not 
make use of manipulation checks. In a first meta- 
analysis of 198 studies (Hagger et al., 2010), only 
30% of those studies included a manipulation 
check asking for perceived difficulty of the first 
task. Out of these 30%, only about half (15.7% in 
total) asked for subjective effort, and only a little 
more than one in ten (12.6%) assessed fatigue 
after the first task. This is important to keep in 
mind: When researchers have little evidence 
whether and to what extent participants exerted 
self-control, the success of the manipulation may 
be in doubt. This, in turn, has implications for the 
falsifiability of the model: A failure to find an 
effect could be due to problems from the theoreti-
cal perspective (i.e., the model’s assumptions may 
not be correct) or from the empirical perspective 
(i.e., the model is correct, but the unsuccessful 
manipulation of the relevant constructs did not 
allow for a proper test). In the latter case, it may 
be premature to dismiss a theoretical model, even 
in light of nonsignificant findings.
 p-Hacking and Publication Bias
In recent years, several issues have been debated 
that may contribute to less-than-desirable repli-
cability and robustness of psychological science 
(e.g., Munafò et al., 2017). Two sources of bias in 
particular have received widespread attention: 
p-hacking and publication bias.
p-hacking refers to researchers engaging in 
questionable research practices to make originally 
nonsignificant analyses statistically significant. 
A nonsignificant p-value is “hacked” to signifi-
cance (see Fig.  1.2). Consequently, findings 
appear more robust than they actually are 
(Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011, 2018). 
Common p-hacks include reporting only depen-
dent variables that “worked” while omitting oth-
ers, including or excluding outliers depending 
on which analyses reveal the more desirable 
outcome, peeking at the data during data collec-
tion and stopping when the desired pattern of 
results emerges without controlling for the 
increased Type-I error rate (α error, probability 
of rejecting the null hypothesis when it is in fact 
true), or including covariates without a pre-
defined theoretical rationale. Some of these 
p-hacks are especially “efficient” in changing 
results in small samples.2
The most tangible consequence of p-hacking is 
an increase of significant findings that would not 
2 See http://shinyapps.org/apps/p-hacker/ for a vivid 
demonstration (Schönbrodt, 2015).
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have been significant without p-hacking. An original 
p-value may be nonsignificant while showing a 
(nonsignificant) tendency in the expected direc-
tion. After p-hacking, the effect size is artificially 
inflated, and the finding is significant. These false-
positive findings due to p-hacking suggest the 
presence of a true effect that in fact may not exist 
or may be smaller than suggested. One important 
consequence of p-hacking is that it may lead to an 
inflation of significant findings in a given literature 
that may contribute to convictions about the exis-
tence of a phenomenon that in fact may be much 
less reliable than it appears. Another important 
consequence of p-hacking is that it may lead to an 
overestimation of the effect size for a given phe-
nomenon that may in fact be much smaller than it 
appears.
The pervasiveness and severity of p-hacking 
is unknown and estimates vary widely (Fiedler 
& Schwarz, 2016; Hartgerink, 2017; Head, 
Holman, Lanfear, Kahn, & Jennions, 2015; John, 
Loewenstein, & Prelec, 2012). It seems safe to say 
that p-hacking has played a role in the ego deple-
tion literature (Wolff, Baumann, & Englert, 2018), 
as it has in many other psychological literatures. 
P-hacking will have contributed to the overestima-
tion of meta-analytic effect size estimates in ego 
depletion research, although it is unclear to what 
extent this is the case (Friese et al., in press). In 
addition, p-hacking likely has produced a number 
of published findings that would not have been 
significant without p- hacking (and therefore less 
likely to be published).
Publication Bias Publication bias refers to the 
observation that studies with statistically signifi-
cant results are more likely to be published than 
nonsignificant studies (Bakker, van Dijk, & 
Wicherts, 2012). The most tangible consequence 
of publication bias is the overestimation of meta- 
analytic effect size estimates, because the number 
of published studies (with often larger effect sizes; 
see above) is not adequately corrected downward 
by existing, but unavailable nonsignificant studies 
with smaller effect sizes. Thus, publication bias 
can lead to a distorted perception of the magnitude 
and robustness of research literatures.
Estimating the severity of publication bias is 
difficult, but some analysts suggest that it is gen-
erally high in the social sciences including psy-
chology (Fanelli, 2010; Fanelli, Costas, & 
Ioannidis, 2017) and also for ego depletion 
research in particular (Carter et al., 2015; Carter 
& McCullough, 2014). This is troublesome, 
Fig. 1.2 An illustrative example of p-hacking and its 
consequences. A nonsignificant effect with p = 0.112 (dot-
ted line) is p-hacked (black arrow) below the common 
0.05 significance threshold to p = 0.035 (continuous line). 
As a consequence, the size of the effect increases. 
However, the main objective in p-hacking is to obtain a 
significant result, not to increase the effect size
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because common techniques to correct for the 
influence of publication bias work poorly under 
conditions typical for psychological science (e.g., 
heterogeneity in effect sizes; Carter, Schönbrodt, 
Gervais, & Hilgard, 2017).
Taken together, p-hacking (particularly) 
increases the rates of false positives, while publi-
cation bias (particularly) increases meta-analytic 
effect size estimates. Based on the preponderance 
of statistically significant findings despite low 
power, it is plausible to assume that both p- 
hacking and publication bias have contributed 
markedly to ego depletion research. Together, 
they convey the impression of a more robust and 
replicable literature with larger effect sizes than 
is warranted. How severe exactly their influence 
is, is unfortunately impossible to determine. 
Studies using open science practices such as pre-
registration (Nosek, Ebersole, DeHaven, & 
Mellor, 2018; van ‘t Veer & Giner-Sorolla, 2016), 
open materials, and open data are less prone to the 
deleterious effects of p-hacking and publication 
bias (Munafò et  al., 2017). It should therefore 
become a habit for researchers to preregister their 
predictions on an openly accessible online forum, 
where they can also share their experimental 
materials, original data, and analysis scripts. 
Future work (not only on ego depletion) should 
embrace open science practices.
 Moderation and Mediation
Moderators can reveal important boundary con-
ditions of effects proposed by a theory (see first 
part of this chapter). They can elucidate the 
breadth of a phenomenon, reveal new differentia-
tions, and explore limits of a theory.
More than 100 studies have investigated 
moderators of the ego depletion effect (for an 
overview, see Loschelder & Friese, 2016). For 
example, incentives to perform well in a second 
self-control task can counteract ego depletion 
effects (Luethi et  al., 2016, see Fig.  1.3a; 
Muraven & Slessareva, 2003), and people who 
believe that their willpower is non-limited may 
Fig. 1.3 (a) Moderation: The relationship between inde-
pendent and dependent variable is influenced by a third 
variable, the moderator. Luethi et al. (2016), for example, 
found that the effect of the self-control manipulation on 
the performance in a Stroop task depended on whether 
participants could earn additional money depending on 
their performance in the Stroop task or not. (b) Mediation: 
The relationship between independent and dependent 
variable—the underlying process—can (partly) be 
explained by a third variable, the mediator. The Strength 
Model, for instance, assumes that the diminution of the 
self-control resource explains why after exerting self- 
control in a first task, people’s self-control performance is 
impaired in a second self-control demanding task
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be less likely to show ego depletion effects (Job 
et  al., 2010; Bernecker & Job, Chap. 12). One 
may suspect that moderator studies (that are often 
investigated in 2  ×  2 experimental designs) are 
more difficult to p-hack than two-condition stud-
ies and may therefore provide more robust 
results. However, this assumption is unlikely 
given that only one experimental condition 
would need to be p-hacked for a moderation 
pattern (Friese et al., in press). In addition, mod-
erator studies in the ego depletion literature pre-
dominantly report significant findings, but had 
low statistical power, suggesting the presence of 
p-hacking and/or publication bias.
Mediation studies are used to test assumptions 
about the underlying process of a phenomenon 
(see process level of analysis, De Houwer, 2011). 
Mediators can therefore—in principle—distin-
guish between different theoretical explanations 
of the same observations. Mediators can be mea-
sured or manipulated (e.g., Hayes, 2013; Spencer, 
Zanna, & Fong, 2005). When a proposed media-
tor is measured, the data pattern necessary to 
obtain significant mediation is more complex 
than a mean difference between two conditions. 
Mediator studies may thus—again, in principle—
be less likely to produce false positives and 
instead provide more robust evidence for a 
phenomenon.
While providing process evidence for the 
Strength Model (i.e., diminished self-control 
resource; Fig.  1.3b) is impossible because the 
assumed resource is unspecified and thus nonas-
sessable, some researchers examined other medi-
ators not specified by the Strength Model (e.g., 
Chow, Hui, & Lau, 2015; Graham, Martin Ginis, 
& Bray, 2017; Inzlicht & Gutsell, 2007). 
Considering the size of the ego depletion litera-
ture, mediator studies are rare. They commonly 
have low statistical power, too. Importantly, since 
hardly any studies on ego depletion were prereg-
istered, it is impossible to know how many medi-
ator studies were conducted but not reported at 
all or in a different manner because the mediation 
results did not turn out as expected. The existing 
evidence in the ego depletion literature is there-
fore limited. More generally, we believe that 
preregistered and theoretically grounded mediator 
studies are capable of providing stronger evidence 
for a theory as they examine an assumed mecha-
nism on the process level in addition to the 
behavioral effect.
 Meta-Analyses
Meta-analyses are a powerful tool to combine the 
results of multiple relevant studies in a research 
field (Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & Rothstein, 
2011). They shift the focus from individual stud-
ies to the broader picture. Some strengths of meta-
analyses are the higher statistical power to show 
even small effect sizes and the ability to examine 
moderators across studies that are unfeasible to 
investigate in individual studies. Despite their 
many benefits, meta-analyses have drawbacks. An 
important one is that the quality of a meta-analy-
sis crucially depends on the quality of the primary 
studies (Egger, Smith, & Sterne, 2001; Ioannidis & 
Lau, 1998). If a field features many poorly con-
ducted studies, a meta-analysis will unlikely level 
out the biases of primary studies (e.g., p-hacking; 
see also Munafò et al., 2017)—particularly, if these 
biases are systematic rather than unsystematic 
(Borenstein et  al., 2011). As mentioned earlier, 
publication bias can also distort meta-analytic 
effect size estimates. The possibilities to reliably 
correct for publication bias are limited (Carter 
et al., 2017). Nevertheless, meta-analyses currently 
are the most potent way to quantitatively summa-
rize large sets of studies (Gurevitch, Koricheva, 
Nakagawa, & Stewart, 2018).
For the ego depletion literature, a first meta- 
analysis of published studies indicated a healthy 
mean effect size of d = 0.62 (Hagger et al., 2010). 
However, a reanalysis of the same dataset found 
evidence for publication bias (Carter & 
McCullough, 2014). A second meta-analysis 
found an uncorrected smaller, but still substantial 
effect of g  =  0.43 (Carter et  al., 2015). After 
applying different techniques to correct for the 
influence of publication bias (that all have some 
shortcomings), Carter and colleagues concluded 
that there is “very little evidence that the ego 
depletion effect is a real phenomenon” (Carter 
et al., 2015, p. 796).
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Some researchers saw this meta-analysis by 
Carter et al. (2015) as the first nail in the coffin of 
ego depletion research. Others pointed out vari-
ous problems of the meta-analysis, the bias cor-
rection methods, and questioned its conclusions 
(Cunningham & Baumeister, 2016; Inzlicht et al., 
2015). In the meantime, further meta-analyses 
appeared with varying results that are difficult to 
interpret due to methodological issues (Blázquez, 
Botella, & Suero, 2017; Dang, Liu, Liu, & 
Mao, 2017; see Friese et al., in press). Overall, 
the inconvenient truth is that ego depletion 
meta- analyses served as a great tool to promote 
discussion and progress, but they did not pro-
vide unequivocal evidence for (or against) the 
ego depletion effect.
 Registered Replication Reports
Registered Replication Reports (RRR) are 
“multi-lab, high-quality replications of important 
experiments in psychological science along with 
comments by the authors of the original studies” 
(Association for Psychological Science, 2018). A 
detailed description of the study, the hypotheses, 
and the analysis plan is implemented by several 
laboratories, and the results are published inde-
pendent of the results. An RRR has thus great 
statistical power to test a central prediction of a 
theory. A limitation of RRRs is that they are (usu-
ally) restricted to replicating one specific, often 
prototypical operationalization in a research field 
(a selected “landmark study”). The ability of 
RRRs to speak to the validity of whole theories is 
therefore necessarily limited.
An ego depletion RRR (Hagger et al., 2016) 
sought to replicate one selected combination of 
manipulation and dependent variable (Sripada, 
Kessler, & Jonides, 2014). As we have seen in 
the first part of the chapter, a salient characteris-
tic of the Strength Model is its domain general-
ity assumption. Thus, the ability of this (or any 
other) specific IV-DV combination alone to dis-
prove the general ego depletion idea is limited. 
That being said, the RRR delivered a null effect 
on average. Although there was discussion 
about some methodological issues of the RRR 
(Arber et  al., 2017; Baumeister & Vohs, 2016), 
this finding posed another serious threat to ego 
depletion research.
 Discussion
In this chapter, we discussed criteria to evaluate 
the quality of theories and the empirical research 
examining these theories. Instead of reiterating 
our conclusions, we wish to briefly reflect about 
(1) the choice to abandon theories, (2) the two 
levels of analysis in general, and (3) the Strength 
Model in particular.
A psychological theory is of inferential 
nature—it makes probabilistic, imperfect predic-
tions of the future—and, as such, can never be 
proven to be true. The process of developing a 
psychological theory is hence never completed. 
It is an ongoing journey of testing, refinement, 
development, falsification, and sometimes rejec-
tion. As we tried to show in this chapter, it is 
important to distinguish between the theoretical 
perspective and the empirical perspective when 
working with theories. Failures to replicate an 
effect (or find it in the first place) can be due to 
different causes: the theory could be wrong and 
the original result was a false positive. Similarly, 
however, the theory could have merit, but the 
empirical research was not good enough to ade-
quately test it. In this case, one should take a 
close look at the complete process of putting the 
theoretical prediction to a practical test. Did the 
theory make plausible assumptions? Were opera-
tionalizations adequate? Such discussion may 
lead to important insights and sensible further 
steps for a research field. It may be more promis-
ing than a (possibly) premature decision to aban-
don a theory altogether. From the theoretical 
perspective, theories may be true after all, even if 
some empirical tests did not deliver the expected 
results.
When discussing both the criteria to evaluate 
the quality of theories and its accompanying 
empirical research, the Strength Model fared bet-
ter on some criteria than on others. Here, we wish 
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to stress that we chose the Strength Model as an 
illustrative example—not because we sought to 
promote or undermine this model—but because 
it has received considerable attention in the last 
decades (and we happen to have gained some 
knowledge on it). In addition, many of the doubts 
and criticisms that we discussed with respect to 
the Strength Model are not unique to this model; 
they generalize to several other literatures in 
social psychology and beyond. The discussion 
about the scientific implications of these observa-
tions for (social) psychology more generally goes 
past the scope of this chapter.
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 Introduction
When the then Roman general Julius Caesar 
made the decision to cross the Rubicon with his 
army, he knew that this marked a point of no 
return. He supposedly uttered that “the die has 
been cast” as he could foresee the dramatic con-
sequences – treason and the beginning of a civil 
war. However, when Heckhausen and Gollwitzer 
(1987) described the transition from a motiva-
tional (why does an individual do X?) to a voli-
tional state (how does an individual do X?) in 
goal pursuit, they chose to refer to it as crossing 
the Rubicon nonetheless. Why did they choose 
these drastic words and how does making a deci-
sion compare to the metaphorical point of no 
return?
In the research leading up to the formulation 
and the various extensions of Mindset theory of 
Action Phases (MAP; Gollwitzer, 1990, 2012; 
Gollwitzer & Keller, 2016; cf. Bernecker & Job, 
Chap. 12), researchers observed differences in 
thought content and focus before and after a deci-
sion. More specifically, one group of individuals 
deliberated about which of their many desires to 
turn into a binding goal or the pros and cons of 
one particular decision (e.g., whether or not they 
should choose psychology as their major). 
Another group of individuals already made the 
decision in favor of one goal and now planned the 
necessary steps to go forward (e.g., choosing the 
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important and necessary courses, ordering expen-
sive textbooks online). Whether the decision in 
favor of one goal had been made subsequently 
determined whether individuals partook in a rela-
tively open-minded deliberation of pros and cons 
of the goal in question or a relatively closed-
minded listing of pros in favor of the chosen goal 
(e.g., Nenkov & Gollwitzer, 2012; Taylor & 
Gollwitzer, 1995).
From its early days, MAP has been a theory of 
successful goal pursuit. It marks important transi-
tions, predicts cognitive shifts of goal- striving 
individuals, and explains when individuals com-
mit to a goal. However, not all chosen goals are 
attained. In a meta-analysis of meta-analyses 
assessing this truism, Sheeran (2002) found a 
positive correlation between intentions and 
behavior that accounts for 28% of variance in 
future behavior. However, the remaining unex-
plained variance, the so-called intention-behavior 
gap, remains large. A self- regulation strategy to 
bridge this gap is the use of implementation 
intentions (Gollwitzer, 1993, 1999, 2014). 
Implementation intentions are specific if-then 
plans that specify a critical situation (e.g., a suit-
able opportunity to act in accordance with a goal) 
and link it to a goal- directed response. Such plans 
have been shown to increase goal attainment 
rates (Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006) even among 
individuals that usually suffer from impaired 
self-regulation (e.g., children with ADHD; 
Gawrilow & Gollwitzer, 2008).
The present chapter will span both MAP and 
the self-regulation strategy of using implementa-
tion intentions. We will first outline the four 
action phases according to MAP, focus on two of 
the most-researched action phases with their 
accompanying mindsets, highlight some recent 
applications, and will then move on to implemen-
tation intentions. We will describe research on 
why they promote the rate of goal attainment, 
which features they have, and to which action 
control problems they were applied to more 
recently. We will close by summarizing an exem-
plary field study, demonstrating how the concept 
of implementation intentions opens up new 
research questions and perspectives.
 MAP
In the course of goal pursuit, people face various 
challenges but have limited capacities. 
Accordingly, they have to decide which of their 
desires are worthy to pursue and allocate 
resources like time or physical and mental effort 
to the chosen goal. People then have to initiate 
and maintain goal striving without becoming dis-
tracted by temptations or frustrated by obstacles 
and, finally yet importantly, evaluate whether 
they have reached their goal or whether further 
action is necessary. MAP proposes that each of 
these challenges arises in a specific phase in goal 
pursuit (see Fig.  2.1), and overcoming them is 
facilitated by the activation of a set of phase-typ-
ical cognitive procedures (i.e., the mindset). 
Whereas goal setting and evaluation are located 
in the motivational phases of the model, planning 
and action initiation are located in the volitional 
phases.
Definition Box
Going back to Ach (1935) and Lewin 
(1926), we propose the following 
distinction:
Motivation: The process of goal setting and 
evaluation. The focus lies on the desirability 
and feasibility of potential goals, influenced 
by the needs and motives of the goal-striv-
ing individual. Research on motivation 
answers the question of why people act, in 
which direction and with which intensity.
Volition: The will-based process of goal 
striving. The focus lies on the actual goal- 
directed behavior but also on planning 
steps that are necessary to be able to show 
goal-directed responses in the first place. 
Research on volition answers the question 
of how people act to reach their goals, 
given the opportunities and the obstacles 
they are facing.
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In the predecisional phase, people have to 
deliberate whether it is worthwhile to pursue a 
given goal. They weigh the desirability (i.e., how 
valuable it is to succeed) and the feasibility 
(i.e., how likely it is to succeed) of the competing 
options. Ultimately, individuals should choose a 
goal with high desirability and feasibility. To 
arrive at such choices, people have to remain 
open-minded, have to be realistic about their 
chance of success, and have to judge the potential 
goals in relation to each other.
When individuals make a decision, however, 
they cross the metaphorical Rubicon and cogni-
tive styles change during the transition to the pre-
actional phase. People now face the challenge to 
plan the implementation of their goal and exhibit 
an increased focus on feasibility- related informa-
tion (Kille, 2015). For challenging goals, it is 
now best to lay out and plan against what obsta-
cles have to be overcome or may arise during 
goal pursuit, energized by positively biased judg-
ments of control (Gollwitzer & Kinney, 1989) 
and expectations of goal fulfillment (Puca, 2001; 
see also mental contrasting; Oettingen, 2012). 
For easy goals, this phase may be comparatively 
short, as extensive planning would constitute a 
waste of time and other resources (Gollwitzer & 
Brandstätter, 1997).
Once plans have been laid out and suitable 
opportunities to act arise, individuals eventually 
enter the actional phase where the actual goal- 
directed behavior takes place. A focus on means 
and persistence as well as shielding one’s goal 
from temptations or other, potentially conflicting, 
goals (e.g., a dieting goal may conflict with a goal 
to befriend another person if this person invites 
you over to a BBQ; Shah, Friedman, & Kruglanski, 
2002) helps people to stay on track. If everything 
goes according to plan, the goal- directed action 
will bring the goal-striving individual closer to 
goal attainment. However, researchers have laid 
bare situations in which this is not the case. A lack 
of focus or early setbacks can, for instance, lead to 
the emergence of an action crisis (Brandstätter, 
Herrmann, & Schüler, 2013; see also recom-
mended reading), a motivational phenomenon in 
the volitional phase: once the going gets tough, 
individuals may experience their struggle as futile 
and will, over time, disengage from further goal-
directed action. They reflect on the desirability of 
the set goal or its feasibility anew (Ghassemi, 
Bernecker, Herrmann, & Brandstätter, 2017). 
For instance, Brandstätter and Schüler (2013) 
observed that an action crisis leads to less focus 
on implementation- related information but a 
greater concern regarding the costs of continuing 
versus disengaging, as well as the benefits of 
disengaging.
Lastly, when the goal-directed behavior ends, 
individuals have to evaluate whether their desired 
end state has been reached (i.e., whether the goal 
has been attained). Further action may be neces-
sary, or goal striving was futile and further action 
would simply be a waste of resources. In this 
postactional phase, a switch back to a focus on 
relatively open-minded desirability or value eval-
uations is expected to occur (Kille, 2015). For 
instance, a longitudinal study on exercising 
Fig. 2.1 The succession 
of action phases as 
proposed by MAP
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behavior (Kwan, Bryan, & Sheeran, 2018) 
demonstrated the importance of postactional 
evaluations (e.g., “did I exercise as planned?,” 
“how did exercising feel,” “how do I feel about 
myself after exercising”) predicting subsequent 
intentions and behavior: positive postactional 
evaluations were associated with setting higher 
exercise goals for the following week, which in 
turn was related to actual levels of participants’ 
subsequent exercise behavior.
 Mindsets
In each of the action phases, a set of certain cogni-
tive procedures is activated. These so-called mind-
sets help to overcome the challenges at hand. 
However, in contrast to a mere task set, which is 
the intentional attuning in order to master a given 
task (Gollwitzer, 1990, 1991), these mindsets also 
evince a moment of inertia as they have been 
shown to carry over to subsequent tasks unrelated 
to the goal that originally evoked them. In this con-
ceptualization, phenomena related to specific 
action phases can be studied by investigating the 
effects of their accompanying mindsets on other, 
unrelated tasks that offer insights in the cognitive 
functioning of individuals.
Successfully weighing the desirability and 
feasibility of different goal options necessitates 
open-minded and impartial information process-
ing. Accordingly, participants in a deliberative 
mindset have been shown to evince a broader 
span of visual attention (Büttner et al., 2014), are 
more likely to process incidentally presented 
information (Fujita, Gollwitzer, & Oettingen, 
2007), and tend to give pros and cons equal 
weight (Bayer & Gollwitzer, 2005). Moreover, 
persuasive messages that stress abstract, future 
outcomes seem to be more effective in this mind-
set (Nenkov, 2012). Participants in a deliberative 
mindset are furthermore less affected by the 
optimistic bias, that is, the tendency to see oneself 
as being less exposed to future negative life events 
than the average other (Keller & Gollwitzer, 2017; 
Taylor & Gollwitzer, 1995) but seem more tuned 
to assessing expected utilities in decision-making 
(Rahn, Jaudas, & Achtziger, 2016a).
In contrast, planning the implementation of a 
set goal would suffer from an ongoing reevalua-
tion of the desirability and the feasibility of the 
steps the individuals commit themselves to take. 
Participants in an implemental mindset thus 
evince optimistically biased judgments of their 
chance of success (Puca, 2001), exhibit stronger 
illusions of control (Gollwitzer & Kinney, 1989), 
and are more focused on details (i.e., evince a 
narrower span of visual attention; Büttner et al., 
2014). Therefore, they are more persistent in the 
face of difficulty (Brandstätter & Frank, 2002) 
and complete a task sooner while simultaneously 
correctly predicting to do so (Brandstätter, 
Giesinger, Job, & Frank, 2015).
 Applications and Developments
The inertia of mindsets can also be used to alter 
individuals’ reactions to domains entirely unre-
lated to the decision problems that originally 
evoked them. In recent research, psychologists 
have used mindsets successfully to shield partici-
pants with low socioeconomic backgrounds from 
performance decreases due to stereotype threat 
(Dennehy, Ben-Zeev, & Tanigawa, 2014), to 
alleviate overconfident judgments among male 
participants (Hügelschäfer & Achtziger, 2014), or 
to alter risk-taking behavior (Keller & Gollwitzer, 
2017; Rahn, Jaudas, & Achtziger, 2016b).
Even outside of psychology, mindset theory 
has been used to explain various phenomena. For 
instance, in their survey of 232 IT employees of 
Fortune 500 companies, Korzaan and Harris 
(2017) find that the presence of an implemental 
mindset coincided with overly optimistic judg-
ments about the success of the implementation of 
an information systems project. Moreover, 
Delanoë-Gueguen and Fayolle (2018) applied 
MAP to entrepreneurial decision-making, more 
specifically to the early stages of start-up creation. 
They suggest that individuals in an early 
Box 2.1 Question for Elaboration
When you try to think about your past goals 
and goal strivings, which aspects may be 
missing in the model?
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 motivational stage, before crossing the Rubicon, 
have different support needs than participants in a 
later volitional stage. Similarly, Jansen (2014) 
hypothesizes that shifting from a deliberative to an 
implemental mindset may contribute to a problem 
faced by medical researchers, which they term the 
therapeutic error: the discrepancy between unreal-
istically high expectations of treatment success 
and actual treatment success. Many factors are at 
work to produce these high expectations, be it 
misconceptions about medical research or a per-
vasive general optimistic bias. However, Jansen 
argues that in addition, participants of medical 
research who exhibit a therapeutic error are asked 
to make their judgments after they already con-
sented to taking part in research (i.e., after the 
decision had been made). She thus concludes that 
heightened expectations may be caused by the 
predominant mindset and that it is important to 
include risk and benefit assessments of eligible 
persons in the predecisional phase as well to be 
able to assess misconceptions correctly.
Finally yet importantly, MAP has also been 
adapted by political scientists to describe and 
understand the path to armed conflicts (Johnson 
& Tierney, 2001). The authors observed that 
public confidence in winning typically increases 
right at the dawn of war although there is no new 
information available that would warrant such an 
increase. They account for this optimism by 
pointing to a switch in the mindsets of the 
political actors as well as the public; once the 
decision in favor of armed conflict has been 
made, the feasibility of this option is perceived to 
be higher than it (potentially) is.
 Implementation Intentions
According to MAP, setting desirable and feasible 
goals is an important prerequisite for all of our 
actions. This assumption is hardly controversial 
and widely shared, as the yearly ritual of spelling 
out New Year’s resolutions aptly demonstrates. 
Goals typically take the form of specifying wanted 
outcomes (e.g., “I want to stay fit!”) or behaviors 
(e.g., “I want to do regular workouts!”), and 
plenty of research attests to their important role for 
getting what one desires. Unfortunately, it is often 
not possible to immediately act upon and attain a 
goal – one might have to wait for good opportuni-
ties to act, deal with obstacles along the way, or act 
repeatedly over extended periods of time. The 
Rubicon model therefore comprises a planning 
phase in which people think about when, where, 
and how to perform goal-directed responses. As it 
turns out, however, planning does not come as 
naturally to people as setting goals, which might 
contribute to the notorious intention-behavior gap 
that frequently foils even the firmest resolutions. 
Attesting to this interpretation, research demon-
strates that goal attainment is substantially 
improved when people are explicitly instructed to 
furnish their goals with plans (Gollwitzer & 
Sheeran, 2006). This observation lies at the core 
of implementation intention theory (Gollwitzer, 
1993, 1999, 2014), which revolves around 
planning as a self- regulation strategy for goal 
attainment.
Box 2.2 Question for Elaboration
In the wake of limited missile strikes com-
manded by US president Donald J. Trump 
to punish the Syrian government for their 
use of chemical weapons in April of 2017, 
Dominic Tierney (2017) wrote the follow-
ing in The Atlantic:
Wars have a habit of evolving in unexpected ways 
due to a combination of psychology, domestic 
political pressures, and strategic interactions. 
Psychologists have found that the act of commit-
ting to a decision—like launching air strikes 
against Syria—can make decision-makers over-
confident that they made the right choice. [. . . .] 
After Trump crossed the Rubicon, any doubts he 
had may have been replaced by confidence—the 
kind of mindset that could easily broaden the war. 
[. . . .] For Trump, the dice are in the air.
At what point of MAP would Tierney 
have located the US president? What are 
institutional safeguards to prevent such 
overconfidence?
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Implementation intentions are if-then plans in 
which people link a critical situation to a goal- 
directed response: “If I encounter critical situation 
S, then I will perform goal-directed response R!” 
The situation in the if-part represents an opportu-
nity to act or an obstacle to goal attainment, while 
the response in the then-part represents a (mode of) 
thought, feeling, or behavior that can be instigated 
to promote goal attainment. For instance, an imple-
mentation intention could facilitate the goal to stay 
fit by specifying when, where, and how to go for 
regular runs: “When I come home from the office 
on Fridays, then I will put on my running shoes and 
go for a run in the park!” Forming implementation 
intentions is a simple and yet highly effective self-
regulation strategy. A meta- analysis involving 8461 
participants in 94 independent studies (Gollwitzer 
& Sheeran, 2006) revealed a medium-to-large 
effect size of implementation intentions on the rate 
of goal attainment (d = 0.65) beyond the effect of 
holding a goal intention (d  =  0.36; Webb & 
Sheeran, 2006). This suggests that forming imple-
mentation intentions helps people better attain their 
goals – but how can these effects be explained?
Definition Box
Goal intentions: Goal intentions specify a 
desired outcome or behavior (i.e., “I want 
to reach outcome O!” or “I want to per-
form behavior B!”). Their most important 
features are their desirability (how impor-
tant it is to attain them) and their feasibility 
(how likely it is to attain them), which 
jointly determine the degree of goal 
commitment.
Implementation intentions: Imple-
mentation intentions are if-then plans spec-
ifying when, where, and how to act toward 
a goal (i.e., “If I encounter situation S, then 
I will perform goal- directed response R!”). 
They are subordinate to goal intentions and 
are assumed to facilitate their attainment 
by automating two processes: (1) the detec-
tion of critical situations and (2) the initia-
tion of goal-directed responses.
Box 2.3 Zooming In: How to Form 
Implementation Intentions
In the literature, several ways of forming 
implementation intentions can be distin-
guished. Research on the basic cognitive 
processes of goal striving usually provides 
ready-made plans tailored to the research 
hypothesis. For instance, an if-then plan 
like “If I see an apple, then I will immedi-
ately press the left mouse button!” could be 
used to test whether implementation inten-
tions speed up behavior in a computerized 
categorization task. In more applied re-
search settings, implementation intentions 
are often conveyed as a meta-cognitive 
strategy in which participants specify their 
own critical situations and goal-directed re-
sponses. This could involve the following 
four steps:
1. Commit yourself to a goal intention.
2. Specify a critical situation for attaining 
the goal.
3. Specify a goal-directed response that 
can be performed in this situation.
4. Link the critical situation and goal-di-
rected response in an if-then format:
If _____(critical situation)_____, then 
_____(goal-directed response)_____!
As an alternative, participants are 
sometimes instructed to specify when, 
where, and how to act toward their goal 
without providing an if-then format. 
Moreover, implementation intentions can 
be combined with the self-regulation 
strategy of mental contrasting, in which 
people elaborate on their goals and on 
potential obstacles for attaining their 
goals (Oettingen & Gollwitzer, 2018). 
This combined mental contrasting with 
implementation intentions (MCII) strat-
egy is commonly conveyed as a meta-
cognitive strategy and available online 
(www.woopmylife.org).
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 Cognitive Processes and Moderators
According to implementation intention theory, 
the beneficial effects of if-then planning on goal 
attainment can be attributed to two cognitive pro-
cesses. First, specifying a critical situation in the 
if-part activates its mental representation and 
makes it cognitively more accessible. This makes 
the situation easier to remember, to detect, and to 
recognize in the environment. Second, linking 
the situation to a goal-directed response creates a 
strong mental association that allows people to 
initiate the specified response automatically as 
soon as the critical situation is encountered.
Plenty of research shows that these two pro-
cesses – accessibility of the critical situation and 
automatic response initiation  – indeed mediate 
the effects of implementation intentions on goal 
attainment (Parks-Stamm, Gollwitzer, & 
Oettingen, 2007; Webb & Sheeran, 2007). 
Consequently, implementation intentions are 
assumed to automate behavior, which makes it 
possible to shield one’s goals even from hard-to- 
control antagonistic influences. For instance, a 
study by Gollwitzer, Sheeran, Trötschel, and 
Webb (2011) showed that implementation inten-
tions alleviate automatic priming effects on 
behavior. Participants first read a fictitious scien-
tific article about the genetic similarity between 
humans and a set of animals. Crucially, this set of 
animals consisted of fast animals (e.g., cheetah, 
hare; fast prime) for some participants but of 
slow animals (e.g., slug, tortoise; slow prime) for 
others. Subsequently, all participants performed a 
computerized word classification task in which 
they had to decide quickly whether a stimulus 
was a word or a non-word. They formed an 
implementation intention to respond quickly to a 
certain stimulus: “And if the non- word ‘avenda’ 
appears, then I respond especially quickly!” The 
authors found a priming effect in unplanned situ-
ations, such that participants were slower after 
having read about slow animals rather than fast 
animals (left panel of Fig. 2.2). In planned situa-
tions, however, participants were not susceptible 
to nonconsciously primed concepts of being slow 
or of being fast and always responded quickly 
(right panel of Fig. 2.2), as specified in the imple-
mentation intention.
To demonstrate that implementation inten-
tions heighten the accessibility of planned situa-
tions, research has used paradigms in which 
Box 2.4 Question for Elaboration
Think about your past New Year’s resolu-
tions (or those of your friends). Were they 
specified as a goal intention? How could a 




















Unplanned situations Planned situations
Slow prime Fast prime
Fig. 2.2 Data from 
Experiment 1 of 
Gollwitzer et al. (2011). 
Error bars represent 
95%-CIs
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participants work on two allegedly unrelated 
tasks. In the first task, they form an if-then plan 
(e.g., “When I go to the cafeteria in the afternoon, 
then I will grab an apple!”). In a second task, it is 
then investigated whether situational cues just 
specified in the plan (e.g., cafeteria, afternoon) 
are now cognitively more accessible than neutral 
cues not specified in the plan. Indeed, it has been 
demonstrated that people with an implementation 
intention respond more quickly to planned than 
to neutral cues in a lexical decision task (Aarts, 
Dijksterhuis, & Midden, 1999; Webb & Sheeran, 
2007), which suggests that the planned cues had 
heightened accessibility. Moreover, people find it 
difficult to not attend to planned cues, even when 
this conflicts with successful task performance 
(Wieber & Sassenberg, 2006). One example 
comes from a study using an auditory task 
(Achtziger, Bayer, & Gollwitzer, 2012), in which 
participants had to respond to acoustic informa-
tion presented to one ear. The authors found that 
these responses were slower and more erroneous 
whenever information related to the planned situ-
ation was presented simultaneously to the other 
ear, as compared to neutral information. This fail-
ure to ignore plan-related information might be 
due to implementation intentions biasing even 
earliest perceptual processing toward this infor-
mation (Janczyk, Dambacher, Bieleke, & 
Gollwitzer, 2015).
Regarding the goal-directed response, research 
has focused strongly on testing whether it can be 
initiated automatically after having formed an 
implementation intention (Bargh, 1994). Indeed, 
it has been shown that the goal-directed response 
is initiated immediately upon encountering the 
planned situation (Gollwitzer & Brandstätter, 
1997; Orbell & Sheeran, 2000), even when 
cognitive resources are scarce (Brandstätter, 
Lengfelder, & Gollwitzer, 2001; Lengfelder & 
Gollwitzer, 2001), and in the absence of another 
conscious intent to act (Bayer, Achtziger, 
Gollwitzer, & Moskowitz, 2009; Schweiger 
Gallo, Pfau, & Gollwitzer, 2012; Sheeran, Webb, 
& Gollwitzer, 2005). For example, participants in 
one study (Bayer et al., 2009, Exp. 3) saw a series 
of nonsense syllables and had to either associate 
freely to them (low strain) or to repeat aloud and 
memorize them (high strain). In a concurrent go/
no-go task, they were presented with numbers 
and letters and had to press a button in case of 
number but to refrain from pressing in case of a 
letter. The authors found that participants with an 
implementation intention to respond quickly to a 
certain number in the go/no-go task indeed 
responded faster to this number than to others 
irrespective of how straining the syllable task 
was. This suggests that implementation inten-
tions made the goal-directed behavior efficient in 
the sense that it can be initiated even when cogni-
tive resources are taxed.
In a nutshell, forming implementation inten-
tions facilitates the detection of the situations 
specified in the if-then plan and automates the 
initiation of the goal-directed behavior. However, 
this does not mean that implementation inten-
tions, once formed, will always be effective. 
First, the effectiveness of implementation inten-
tions remains dependent on the underlying goal 
intention. For instance, participants who planned 
how to respond in a color-matching task (“If I see 
a card with the same color as the card at the top 
of the screen, then I will press the corresponding 
key as quickly as possible!”) refrained from per-
forming the goal-directed behavior as soon as 
doing so caused monetary losses and thus under-
mined the goal to respond quickly (Legrand, 
Bieleke, Gollwitzer, & Mignon, 2017). This sug-
gests that implementation intentions are not 
effective when they do not serve a valued goal 
(Orbell, Hodgkins, & Sheeran, 1997; Sheeran 
et  al., 2005). Research has investigated other 
determinants of the effectiveness of implementa-
tion intentions as well. As suggested by MAP, 
Box 2.5 Question for Elaboration
Making if-then plans is sometimes said to 
create “instant habits” (e.g., Gollwitzer, 1999) 
Verplanken & Orbell, Chap. 5. Think about 
how research on the cognitive processes insti-
gated by forming implementation intentions 
might have given rise to this metaphor.
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for example, implementation intentions are most 
effective when people are in an implemental 
mindset rather than a deliberative mindset 
(Wieber, Sezer, & Gollwitzer, 2014).
 Application
Implementation intentions are a self-regulation 
strategy that should help people to attain their 
goals across various domains (see also Verplanken 
& Orbell, Chap. 5). In line with this assertion, 
accumulating research shows that implementa-
tion intentions enhance goal attainment in 
domains like healthy eating (Adriaanse, Vinkers, 
De Ridder, Hox, & De Wit, 2011), engaging in 
physical activity (Bélanger-Gravel, Godin, & 
Amireault, 2013), and reducing alcohol con-
sumption (Cooke & Lowe, 2016). Moreover, 
implementation intentions are effective among 
people suffering from psychological disorders 
like dementia or depression (Toli, Webb, & 
Hardy, 2015), and they have been shown to facili-
tate cognitive processes that are important across 
domains, such as remembering to perform certain 
actions at a future point in time (Chen et  al., 
2015). These examples all pertain to applications 
in which implementation intentions have been 
studied comprehensively already and meta-ana-
lytic evidence for their beneficial effects is avail-
able (Gollwitzer, 2014).
Yet, there are still many other fields of appli-
cation for which implementation intention effects 
have to be established. One example is the ability 
to endure physical performance over extended 
periods of time, a characteristic feature of various 
Box 2.6 Zooming In: FAQ About 
Implementation Intentions
Does forming implementation intentions 
always improve goal attainment?
Implementation intentions require an 
active goal that people perceive to be both 
desirable and feasible and can thus not com-
pensate for the colloquial “lack of motiva-
tion”. In addition, implementation intentions 
will not enhance the attainment of easy 
goals, as mere goals already suffice.
Can forming implementation intentions 
have drawbacks?
Forming implementation intentions 
involves a delegation of control to specific 
situational cues. This may alleviate goal 
attainment when other situations are better-
suited (missing opportunities to act) or the 
situation requires a different response (fail-
ure to control the planned response).
Is making multiple plans better than mak-
ing only one plan?
Implementation intentions rely on an 
associative link between a situation and a 
response. This link can be weakened by 
making multiple plans for the same goal 
(e.g., linking different responses to one sit-
uation). This is less of an issue when mak-
ing plans for independent goals.
Does every if-then statement qualify as an 
implementation intention?
Implementation intentions condition a 
response on a situation in an if-then format. 
For instance, a statement like “If I do regu-
lar workouts, then I will stay fit!” is gram-
matically possible as well as logically valid 
but would not constitute an implementation 
intention because it conditions an outcome 
on a behavior.
Are forming implementation intentions and 
the implemental mindset the same thing?
Whereas MAP constitutes a theory that 
combines motivation and volition, imple-
mentation intention theory describes a self-
regulation strategy that can be used to 
achieve goals. Although often confused, 
implementation intentions are not confined 
to the preactional phase during which an 
implemental mindset is usually activated. 
For instance, implementation intentions 
like “If I have to make a decision, then I will 
deliberate thoroughly” can trigger a more 
open-minded way of processing informa-
tion during the predecisional phase.
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work-related activities (e.g., in hospitals or 
factories) and prototypically required in many 
athletic activities (e.g., running, swimming, 
cycling). Given the beneficial effects of imple-
mentation intentions in many domains and for 
diverse populations, it is plausible that people can 
use them to deal with the various self- regulation 
demands encountered during endurance tasks, 
like dealing with muscle pain, feelings of exer-
tion, fatigue, and urges to quit. In partial support 
of this reasoning, initial studies have shown that 
implementation intentions can indeed modulate 
endurance-related sensations (Bieleke & Wolff, 
2017; Wolff et al., 2018) and may even enhance 
performance (Thürmer, Wieber, & Gollwitzer, 
2017). However, implementation intentions failed 
to enhance performance in some endurance tasks 
and even had undesired effects on perceptions of 
effort and pain in one study (Bieleke & Wolff, 
2017). This suggests that implementation inten-
tions must be carefully tailored to different areas 
of applications and that their effectiveness in one 
domain cannot be simply deduced from their 
effectiveness in other domains (Wolff, Bieleke, & 
Schüler, 2019).




Appeals (Fennis, Adriaanse, 
Stroebe, & Pol, 2011)
Implementation intentions have been used in a 
number of field studies. Among others, there have 
been field studies on the effect of implementation 
intentions on attendance of cervical cancer screen-
ings (Sheeran & Orbell, 2000), fruit and vegetable 
intake (Chapman, Armitage, & Norman, 2009), 
or recycling behavior of employees (Holland, 
Aarts, & Langendam, 2006). In the following, we 
want to describe a field study testing the effect of 
implementation intentions in the domain of con-
sumer psychology. Fennis et  al. (2011) investi-
gated whether the presentation of cue- response 
links on a web page can stimulate consumers to 
spontaneously form implementation intentions 
and consequently opt for sustainable food 
products. They instructed 217 participants (mean 
age = 24.5 years, SD = 7.6 years) to visit a web 
page advocating sustainable consumption and 
assigned participants to one of four different ver-
sions of this web page.
First, for one half of the participants (goal- 
intention condition), the web page described a fair-
trade pocket guide showing ways to increase the 
sustainability of one’s consumption. For the other 
half of the participants (goal-intention + imple-
mentation intention condition), the web page addi-
tionally listed critical situations in which one 
should exhibit the goal-directed behavior of check-
ing the pocket guide. This was thought to prompt 
participants to construct if-then situation-response 
links. Second, the vividness of the information 
was manipulated within each condition. One half 
of participants (high-vividness condition) read the 
fictitious story of a female student who described 
how shocked she was upon learning about the 
unsustainable or unfair manufacturing process of 
some products (e.g., poor working conditions, 
damage to the environment). She decided to buy 
only sustainable products from now on and 
described how the use of the pocket guide will 
help her doing that. Furthermore, the critical situ-
ations to use the pocket guide were also described 
as stemming from her personal experience with 
using the guide. The other half of participants 
(low-vividness condition) received similar infor-
mation, which was presented using bullet points 
and not a personal narration of a student they 
potentially identify with. The authors hypothe-
sized that the more vivid the presentation of the 
information is, the more likely participants will be 
to adapt their behavior. Moreover, the more vivid 
and practical the cue-response links are, the more 
likely participants will form implementation 
intentions, which in turn will facilitate the attain-
ment of the goal to consume sustainably.
One week after all participants received the 
pocket guide, the experimenters contacted the 
participants and asked them to register which 
food products they bought over the week. For this 
purpose, a list of 30 different categories and the 
leading brands per category was assembled and 
distributed. Participants then indicated which 
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brands they had bought per category. Results 
show that including the cue-response link in the 
description of the pocket guide increased 
purchases of sustainable products on average by 
one item. Vividness on its own was not a 
significant factor in predicting the amount of 
sustainable purchases. However, the interaction 
between both experimental conditions reached 
statistical significance. Follow-up analyses show 
that whereas information low in vividness was less 
likely to influence consumer behavior independent 
of whether it included implementation intention-
like cue-response links or not, the inclusion of cue-
response links in highly vivid information more 
than doubled the number of sustainable product 
purchases. To rule out the alternative explanation 
that participants in the goal intention + implemen-
tation intention condition merely bought more 
products in total and thus had more sustainable 
products in their shopping carts, the authors calcu-
lated a ratio of sustainable to regular products. 
Mirroring the results on the mere amount of sus-
tainable choices, the ratio of sustainable to regu-
lar products bought by participants receiving 
information low in vividness was around 0.30 for 
both goal conditions. Participants who were in 
the goal intention + implementation intention 
condition, however, had a ratio of 0.58 meaning 
that for every two regular items, they bought one 
sustainable item.
Taken together, this field study shows that the 
self-regulation strategy of forming implementa-
tion intentions can increase goal attainment among 
participants who only read about someone else 
doing it.
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attainment.
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• Combining a critical situation with a 
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initiating action, requiring no further act 
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• Both mindset and implementation inten-
tion effects have been demonstrated in 
many domains, including health, sports, 
risk, or (social) cognition.
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 Guiding Answers to Questions 
in the Chapter
 1. Q (with Box 2.1): When you try to think about 
your past goals and goal strivings, which 
aspects may be missing in the model?
A: As a vehicle for research, MAP has to 
weigh parsimony against explanatory power. 
Thus, to be able to generalize unto a wide 
array of goal pursuits, some other aspects may 
be missing. For instance, MAP is focused on 
the cognitive aspects of goal pursuit and is 
relatively mute on emotional aspects of goal 
pursuit. Furthermore, it is directional by 
nature, proposing a fixed order in which 
phases are surpassed which may not be the 
case for every goal pursuit in daily life.
 2. Q (with Box 2.2): At what point of MAP 
would Tierney have located the US president? 
What are institutional safeguards to prevent 
such overconfidence?
A: By saying that Trump has crossed the 
Rubicon, Tierney implicates that the US presi-
dent switched from an open-minded predeci-
sional action phase to later, more 
closed-minded action phases. A sincere 
renewed deliberation of arguments in favor 
and against further investment, for instance, 
by actors who take a watchtower perspective, 
may help to prevent such overconfidence. 
In addition, turnover in responsible decision-
makers caused by term limits can lead to such 
redeliberating.
 3. Q (with Box 2.4): Think about your past New 
Year’s resolutions (or those of your friends). 
Were they specified as a goal intention? How 
could a corresponding implementation inten-
tion look like?
A: A New Year’s resolution that merely speci-
fies a desired outcome or behavior is a goal 
intention. To create an implementation inten-
tion, one needs to specify when, where, and 
how to act toward this goal in an if-then plan.
 4. Q (with Box 2.5): Making if-then plans is 
sometimes said to create “instant habits” 
(e.g., Gollwitzer, 1999). Think about how 
research on the cognitive processes insti-
gated by forming implementation intentions 
might have given rise to this metaphor.
A: The metaphor refers to the finding that if-
then planning automates behavior, such that the 
planned behavior is initiated immediately and 
efficiently when the critical situation is encoun-
tered. This resembles habitual behavior with 
the exception that the situation-behavior link is 
established with a single voluntary act rather 
than learned over time (see also Verplanken & 
Orbell, Chap. 5).
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 Introduction
Have you ever been passionate about a theoreti-
cal approach you learned in class? When the 
class ended, you may have approached the pro-
fessor to ask for clarifications, elaborations, and 
maybe additional reading materials. Later, during 
a coffee break, you discussed the ideas with your 
friends and were eager to go online to look for 
more information.
At the same time, I’m sure you remember 
other classes in which passion and eagerness 
could not describe your experience, but pressure 
and anxiety definitely could. You may have felt 
pressure to succeed because the course was man-
datory in your program and you needed a certain 
grade. You found the material uninteresting and 
meaningless. The professor lectured monoto-
nously and slowly, without distinguishing 
between the important and the unimportant. 
However, you did not dare to skip a single class 
because you wanted to make sure that you took 
all the necessary notes for the final exam. The 
course was a millstone around your neck, and 
you couldn’t wait to put it behind you. You prob-
ably studied hard before the exam to make sure 
your grade was high enough.
You may also remember another class expe-
rience where after half an hour, you found your-
self staring at the professor with no idea what 
she was talking about. You may have taken some 
40
notes but in an automatic manner without really 
paying attention; before the final exam, you 
might have read them but couldn’t remember 
anything, questioning if you were the one who 
actually wrote this stuff. It does not mean that 
you necessarily felt incompetent in this class. 
The material was not beyond your ability to 
understand. You may even have felt it was quite 
simple, even trivial.
As a high achiever and to ensure good grades 
in the three classes, you may have invested equal 
effort before the final exams. So even though you 
felt quite competent in the three classes, and you 
made efforts to succeed, your experience as a 
learner was completely different: enthusiastic and 
eager in one class, stressed and anxious in the sec-
ond, and bored and maybe even irritated in the 
third. Thus, the different experiences cannot be 
explained by different levels of ability or different 
levels of overall motivation (at least in relation to 
the final exam). It seems that in these aspects, the 
experiences are similar. However, they diverge in 
another important aspect, and that’s the topic of 
this chapter.
Self-determination theory (SDT; Ryan & 
Deci, 2017) distinguishes between the amount 
(intensity) of motivation and its quality. The 
three common experiences described here differ 
in the quality of motivation but not necessarily 
the amount or intensity. The theory specifically 
distinguishes between two types of motivations 
differing in their quality: autonomous motiva-
tion and controlled motivation. When autono-
mously motivated, people perceive themselves 
as the “origin” of their own behavior, whereas in 
controlled motivation, they perceive themselves 
as “pawns” subject to other forces. Research in 
the last three decades has demonstrated that 
autonomous motivation has an advantage over 
controlled motivation in many respects, includ-
ing better psychological health and better qual-
ity of behavior (e.g., flexible behavior versus 
rigidity).
The chapter begins by defining autonomous 
and controlled motivation and explaining their 
measurement. It turns to a discussion of the out-
comes of the different types of motivation and 
describes a portion of the large body of research 
on each. The chapter concludes with a summary 
of research on human behavior in applied settings 
and a discussion of a field study in an educational 
context.
 Types of Motivation
SDT researchers are interested in the types of 
motivations that drive behavior (Ryan & Deci, 
2000). Such research often focuses on the dis-
tinction between intrinsically and extrinsically 
motivated behavior. In the former, people do 
something because it is inherently interesting or 
enjoyable; in the latter, they are looking for a 
reward of some kind or are trying to avoid pun-
ishment (Deci & Ryan, 1985). Yet, other types 
of motivations do play a role in explaining 
behavior (Deci & Ryan, 2000). Undoubtedly, 
much of what people do involves external pres-
sure to act in a certain way, to believe specific 
ideas, and to hold specific values and opinions. 
SDT suggests that non-intrinsically motivated 
activities encouraged by others (such as parents, 
teachers, or employers) may allow different 
levels of perceived autonomy, reflecting the 
degree to which the values of the behavior have 
been internalized by the individual (Grolnick, 
Deci, & Ryan, 1997).
Advanced SDT conceptualizations of under-
lying motivations not only distinguish extrinsi-
cally and intrinsically motivated behaviors but 
also point to extrinsically motivated behaviors 
that vary in their relative autonomy level (Roth, 
Assor, Kanat-Maymon, & Kaplan, 2006; Ryan & 
Connell, 1989). These conceptualizations are 
reflected in the distinction between autonomous 
and controlled motivations. Autonomous moti-
vation involves volition and choice and includes 
intrinsic motivation and well-internalized forms 
of extrinsic motivation. In contrast, behavior 
driven by controlled motivations involves an 
external or internal sense of compulsion and 
poorly internalized forms of extrinsic  motivations 
(Grolnick et  al., 1997; Roth, Assor, Niemiec, 
Ryan, & Deci, 2009).
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 Amotivation, Controlled 
Motivation, and Autonomous 
Motivation
Amotivation denotes an absence of motivation. 
For example, an individual may not value an 
activity, may not think it will lead to a desired 
result, or may not feel capable of performing it. 
One consequence of amotivation is resentment: 
one study found amotivated individuals resented 
those agents perceived as acting on them; as a 
result, they disengaged and performed poorly 
(Roth et al., 2009).
Controlled motivation denotes behavior per-
formed under a sense of pressure or compulsion. 
The control can be either external or introjected. 
In external motivation, behavior is controlled by 
external reward and punishment, with little inter-
nalization. The behavior is maintained only in the 
presence of the controlling person (e.g., a parent, 
teacher, or employer). Introjected motivation is a 
superficial type of internalization. The individual 
takes in the externally expected behavior’s value 
but does not really accept it as his or her own. 
Acting on a sense of inner compulsion, this indi-
vidual imposes on himself/herself the same con-
tingencies of approval that the controlling person 
had previously imposed. Put otherwise, their 
self-esteem is contingent on enacting specific 
behaviors. Thus, although motivation now lies 
within the individual, it continues to be con-
trolled. For example, students with controlled 
motivation may make a considerable effort 
(large amounts of motivation) to enhance their 
self- esteem or to avoid embarrassment (introjec-
tion), or they may try to outperform other students 
because they wish to please the professor or to 
avoid sanctions (external motivation). Controlled 
motivation, reflected in feeling pressured to per-
form specific behaviors, can result in constricted 
and shallow behavioral functioning and perfor-
mance, diminished well-being, and low-quality 
behavior (e.g., Grolnick & Ryan, 1989; Roth 
et al., 2009).
Autonomous motivation denotes behaviors 
performed with a sense of volition and choice. It 
can be divided into three subtypes: identified, inte-
grated, or intrinsic. In identified motivation, an 
individual has already identified with a behavior’s 
importance to him or her and performs the behav-
ior autonomously. In integrated motivation, a 
behavior is deeply internalized and autonomous 
because it has been assimilated with other aspects 
of the self. In intrinsic motivation, an individual 
performs an activity because it is inherently inter-
esting and internalization is not needed. Altogether, 
autonomous motivation characterizes individuals 
who invest efforts because they are interested, take 
pleasure, or find value in doing so.
It is possible to view the types of motivation as 
levels of internalization of behaviors and/or val-
ues, reflecting different stages on a continuum of 
autonomy. For example, we may agree that no 
child is born with the intrinsic motivation to brush 
his/her teeth twice a day. When the parent does it 
for him/her, the regulation is purely external. 
While the child grows and can do it effectively by 
himself/herself, the parent may explain the impor-
tance of brushing teeth for oral hygiene, allowing 
him/her to identify with the value of brushing 
his/her teeth consistently and effectively. Thus, 
thanks to the parental provision of a rationale, the 
child internalizes the importance of the behavior, 
and instead of external motivation, the behavior 
becomes motivated autonomously based on identi-
fication with its value for oral hygiene. Later in the 
chapter, I will discuss contextual support for 
autonomous motivation (e.g., the parents’ provi-
sion of a rationale), but first I want to talk about 
how these different types of motivation (or levels 
of internalization) are measured.
Definition Box
Autonomous motivation: involves voli-
tion and choice and includes intrinsic moti-
vation and well-internalized forms of 
extrinsic motivation.
Controlled motivation: involves an exter-
nal or internal sense of compulsion and 




 Measurements and Outcomes 
of Autonomous and Controlled 
Motivation
Motivation has obvious application in a class-
room situation, and, here, Ryan and Connell 
(1989) were innovators. By implementing 
deCharms’s (1968) concept of the “perceived 
locus of causality,” they assessed four of the five 
types of motivations discussed above (external, 
introjected, identified, and intrinsic) by asking 
students to indicate the reasons for their actions 
in academic achievement and also in prosocial 
behavior. External motivation referred to external 
authority, fear of punishment, or rule compliance 
as reasons for behavior; introjected motivation 
referred to internal, esteem-based pressures; 
identified motivation referred to the students’ 
own values or goals; and intrinsic motivation 
referred to inherent interest and enjoyment1 
(see Table 3.1).
As they expected, when they tested the stu-
dents, Ryan and Connell (1989) found a simplex- 
like pattern of correlations among the four types 
of motivations. The simplex concept comes from 
Guttman’s (1968) Radex theory on the ordered 
relations of correlated variables, whereby the 
magnitude of the correlations among variables 
reflects their conceptual similarity. In this case, 
1 Integrated motivation is generally not examined using 
self-reports because it can be difficult to distinguish 
between identified and integrated motivations
the largest correlations were between adjacent, 
conceptually similar motivation types (e.g., iden-
tified and intrinsic), and they tapered off as the 
types became conceptually more distant. Ryan 
and Connell also created a relative autonomy 
index (RAI), an overall indicator of autonomous 
motivation, by assigning positive weights to the 
two autonomous motivations (identified, intrin-
sic) and negative weights to the two controlled 
motivations (external, introjected). Since its 
development, their approach has been used 
extensively in various domains and cultures; the 
RAI index associates positively with diverse 
desirable outcomes and negatively with undesir-
able ones (Assor, Roth, & Deci, 2004; Pelletier, 
Dion, Slovinec-D’Angelo, & Reid, 2004; Roth 
et al., 2006).
 Consequences of Autonomous 
and Controlled Motivation
Empirical research consistently shows that auton-
omous motivation predicts greater behavioral per-
sistence in the absence of external controls, higher 
quality of performance, and better emotional expe-
rience and well-being than controlled motivation. 
Because autonomously motivated individuals 
value a behavior or find it interesting and/or enjoy-
able, they experience less internal conflict about 
performing it and are more dedicated to it (Ryan & 
Deci, 2017). In contrast, controlled motivation can 
involve internal conflict and a sense of internal 
compulsion (i.e., introjected motivation; Roth, 
2008) or external conflict and a sense of external 
compulsion (i.e., external motivation) and is 
therefore related to rigid behavior, less persis-
tence, and a sense of ill- being (Pelletier et  al., 
1995; Vansteenkiste et al., 2010).
Hence, consequences of the types of motiva-
tion have been noted in quite varied domains, 
including education, relationships, health care, 
psychotherapy, religion, aging, and sports (for a 
review, see Ryan & Deci, 2017). For explanatory 
purposes, I will provide a few examples.
Ryan and Connell (1989) found autonomous 
motivation was related to positive affect and a 
proactive coping style, greater empathy, more 
Table 3.1 Measuring types of motivations: examples for 
achievement in class (Ryan & Connell, 1989)
“When I’m working on class work I do so because…”
External motivation
I’ll get in trouble if I don’t.
That’s what I’m supposed to do.
Introjected motivation
I’ll feel bad about myself if I don’t.
I’ll feel ashamed of myself if I don’t.
Identified motivation
I want to understand the subject.
I think it’s important to.
Intrinsic motivation
I enjoy it.
It’s interesting for me.
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mature moral reasoning, and more positive relat-
edness to others. In contrast, controlled motiva-
tion was related to negative affect and maladaptive 
coping, as well as anxiety magnification follow-
ing failure, suggesting controlled motivation 
makes people vulnerable when they fail to per-
form the desired activity.
In a later study, Roth (2008) found controlled 
motivation was related to ego-oriented prosocial 
helping (a helping behavior enacted for the sake 
of others’ approval and appreciation), whereas 
autonomous motivation was related to other- 
oriented helping (a helping behavior performed 
while focusing on the needs and inclinations of 
the other in need).
Evans and Bonneville-Roussy (2015) studied 
college students’ motivation for music studies. 
Interestingly, but not surprisingly, autonomous 
motivation predicted more frequent practice, 
higher quality of practice, and greater prefer-
ences for challenging parts of music. Looking at 
high schoolers, Vansteenkiste et al. (2010) found 
autonomous motivation predicted more sophisti-
cated informational processing, better distinction 
between the important and unimportant, better 
concentration (students’ ability to direct and 
maintain their attention on academic tasks), and 
better time management strategies for academic 
tasks. It was negatively related to cheating atti-
tudes and unrelated to test anxiety. Controlled 
motivation, however, was positively related to 
test anxiety and unrelated to the other outcome 
measures.
Aelterman et al. (2012) studied objective indi-
cators of physical activity among secondary school 
students as a function of their types of motivation. 
Their multilevel analysis revealed that 37% and 
63% of the variance in physical activity were 
explained by between-student and between-class 
differences, respectively. Thus, autonomous class 
motivation was positively related to between-class 
variation in physical activity.
Finally, in a study of health care, Halvari, 
Halvari, Bjørnebekk, and Deci (2012) found that 
autonomous motivation for dental home care pre-
dicted dental health behavior and oral health.
I could go on, but as the few studies mentioned 
here demonstrate, autonomous motivation is 
essential for adaptive functioning and well-being 
(for a review, see Ryan & Deci, 2017; or go 
online to selfdetermination.org). Therefore, it 
seems important to explore its antecedents. Over 
the last three decades, researchers have devel-
oped a vast theoretical and practical knowledge 
of factors supporting and frustrating autonomous 
motivation.
 Antecedents of Autonomous 
and Controlled Motivations
Can social conditions facilitate (or inhibit) auton-
omous motivation? SDT postulates that humans 
have an inherent and deeply evolved propensity 
to explore, assimilate knowledge, and develop 
new skills. They strive to integrate these new 
experiences into a harmonious sense of self 
(Deci & Ryan, 2000). But SDT also recognizes 
that the tendency to be actively involved does not 
happen automatically; in fact, some individuals 
become passive or counterproductive (Ryan & 
Deci, 2000). SDT suggests these natural propen-
sities can be supported or undermined by contex-
tual factors, including a person’s immediate 
situation and developmental history, making the 
social context a key factor in growth, integration, 
and mental health (Ryan & Deci, 2000; Van Den 
Broeck, Vansteenkiste, & De Witte, 2008). 
Specifically, SDT posits that autonomous moti-
vation is facilitated by the satisfaction of three 
primary psychological needs: competence, relat-
edness, and autonomy (Deci & Ryan, 2000; 
Ryan, 1995). Several psychological approaches 
use the concept of needs but do it very differently. 
Therefore, before I move on to the definition of 
each of these three specific needs and the contex-
tual factors that may support or frustrate them in 
the next section, I first briefly touch on some 
unique aspects of SDT’s definition of needs.
Two main approaches to psychological needs 
have been developed in the literature. One tends 
to view needs as learned during socialization 
(e.g., McClelland, 1985) and therefore differing 
in strength as a function of that learning, and the 




McClelland (1985) and others draw on the 
former theory to predict behavior. More specifi-
cally, these researchers predict variations in the 
strength of individuals’ acquired needs based on 
the social conditions creating them, test for these 
differences, and then predict various outcomes 
based on need strength. This hypothesis has been 
used to examine the consequences of different 
levels of achievement motivation (Atkinson, 
1958) and power motivation (Winter, 1973) and 
to probe the outcomes of different combinations 
of need strength. Importantly, they do not associ-
ate psychological need satisfaction with health 
and well-being.
In contrast, in the second approach, SDT 
research defines psychological needs as innate 
necessities, not acquired motives. In SDT, meeting 
these needs is considered essential for well- being. 
Therefore, a basic difference in the research 
approaches is that SDT research does not focus on 
variations in need strength. Rather, it examines the 
extent to which individuals experience basic psy-
chological need satisfaction in different social 
contexts. It also asks if different degrees of satis-
faction have different consequences. The primary 
assumption and subsequent findings reveal that in 
contexts that support basic psychological needs 
for relatedness, competence, and autonomy, indi-
viduals experience greater well-being and more 
autonomous motivation, whereas in contexts that 
frustrate these psychological needs, individuals 
experience controlled motivation or amotivation 
and ill-being.
 Basic Psychological Needs: 
Definition and Contextual Support
People are more likely to engage in an activity if 
they think they can do it (Ryan & Deci, 2000). 
Competence support, often defined as the provi-
sion of structure (versus chaos), refers to guide-
lines for behavior and involves communication of 
expectations, explanations and administration of 
consequences, and informational feedback 
(Grolnick et al., 1997). In the school setting, such 
support is essential for both students and teach-
ers. In studies of students, Skinner, Johnson, and 
Snyder (2005) and Jang, Reeve, and Deci (2010) 
demonstrated that when teachers communicate2 
well-defined expectations and give explicit direc-
tions, students’ competence and engagement are 
supported. In a study of teachers, Fernet, Austin, 
Trepanier, and Dussault (2013) found that role 
ambiguity diminishes teachers’ sense of personal 
accomplishment at school by decreasing their 
sense of competence. A role is ambiguous if an 
individual does not have enough information to 
perform it properly and does not know what is 
expected of him or her (Rizzo, House, & 
Lirtzman, 1970). Such persons are obviously less 
likely to feel competent (Cherniss, 1980).
2 It is important to distinguish between structure (compe-
tence support) and control. For an excellent discussion 
and findings disentangling structure and control in educa-
tion, see Jang et al. (2010).
Box 3.1 Questions for Elaboration
Think about a class in which the professor 
is articulate, provides clear explanations, 
and gives assignments that you can under-
stand and follow. However, the professor 
does not like to hear students’ comments 
and seems impatient when you try to 
express your opinion. When you see him/
her on campus, it seems that he/she does 
not recognize you and never greets you. 
In SDT’s conception, this professor seems 
to support your sense of competence (pro-
vides clear explanations and optimally 
challenging assignments) but does not sup-
port your sense of relatedness (ignores 
you) or autonomy (suppresses your voice). 
How do you evaluate your type of motiva-
tion in this class (autonomous versus con-
trolled)? Can you compare your experience 
and motivation in this class to other classes 




Autonomous motivation requires a sense of 
relatedness with others (Grolnick et al., 1997). 
Feelings of belonging and connection 
(Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Ryan & Deci, 
2000) are essential for motivations to become 
integrated. Put otherwise, people need a “secure 
base” with a significant other (Bowlby, 1979). If 
parents, teachers, and employers seek behaviors 
that are neither interesting nor enjoyable, indi-
viduals may be more motivated to engage in 
them if they have a relationship with a social 
agent who is affectionate, caring, and connected 
(Ryan & Deci, 2000). This type of environmen-
tal support, often defined as interpersonal 
involvement, requires the provision of warmth 
and caring and an interest in the other person’s 
activities. Ultimately, interpersonal involve-
ment may predict the internalization of extrinsi-
cally motivated behaviors (Grolnick et  al., 
1997), a hypothesis substantiated by Ryan and 
Grolnick (1986) who found that children who 
felt more connected to and cared for by their 
parents better internalized positive school-
related activities.
Autonomy is critical to internalization and 
integration. In SDT, autonomy refers to “endors-
ing one’s actions at the highest level of reflec-
tion” (Ryan & Deci, 2017). More simply stated, 
the individual’s behavioral engagement corre-
sponds with his or her personal values, interests, 
and needs. Thus, to integrate a behavior, the indi-
vidual must grasp its meaning and synthesize that 
meaning with the individual’s other goals and 
values.
Therefore, competence and relatedness may 
not suffice for autonomous motivation because 
external contingencies (rewards and punishments) 
may facilitate behavioral engagement based on 
external regulation, as long as the individual feels 
competent. Likewise, when a behavior or attitude 
is endorsed by a social group to which one feels 
related, one may enact the behavior because of a 
desire to feel affiliated to the group and to enhance 
one’s self-esteem (an introjected rather than 
autonomous regulation). However, only an envi-
ronment based chiefly on autonomy support can 
generate autonomous motivation and integration 
by allowing the person to satisfy all three primary 
psychological needs: competence, relatedness, 
and autonomy.3
Autonomy support refers to the following 
behaviors by socializing agents: taking note of 
other people’s perspectives (e.g., children, stu-
dents, employees, and partners); performing 
actions that foster choice, self-initiative, and par-
ticipation in decision-making; supplying mean-
ingful rationales and relevance; and abstaining 
from language or actions that may be experienced 
as a pressure to display a specific conduct. 
Supporting autonomy in these ways has been 
found to enhance children’s intrinsic motivation, 
facilitate well-internalized extrinsic motivation, 
prompt the experience of autonomy and authen-
ticity, and result in effective performance and psy-
chological well-being (Reeve, 2006; Roth, 2008; 
Vansteenkiste, Zhou, Lens, & Soenens, 2005).
 Autonomous Motivation in Health 
Care and Education
Given the empirical support for SDT proposi-
tions on antecedents and outcomes of the various 
types of motivation, it is not surprising that inter-
ventions have been made to promote autonomous 
3 Outside the realm of SDT, the concept of autonomy has 
often been depicted as antagonistic to relatedness and as 
equated with independence. However, the SDT definition 
of autonomy is orthogonal to independence. An extensive 
discussion of this topic may be found in Chirkov, Ryan, 
and Sheldon (2011) and Chirkov (2009).
Definition Box
Basic psychological needs (Ryan & Deci, 
2017)
Relatedness: Feeling connected and 
involved with others and having the sense 
of belonging
Competence: Feeling effective in one’s 
interactions with the social environment
Autonomy: Endorsing one’s actions at the 
highest level of reflection
3 Self-Determination Theory
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motivations in many contexts, including educa-
tion, work, and health care (Ryan & Deci, 2017). 
For example, Williams, Niemiec, Patrick, Ryan, 
and Deci (2009, 2016) conducted experimental 
studies based on SDT to evaluate the effective-
ness of an intensive tobacco dependence inter-
vention intended to support autonomy and 
perceived competence in facilitating long-term 
tobacco abstinence. Adult smokers were 
recruited into a randomized cessation induction 
trial. The results revealed that smokers in the 
intervention group were more likely to attain 
tobacco  abstinence. Furthermore, these effects 
were partially mediated by changes in both 
autonomous motivation and perceived compe-
tence over a period of 6 months. In the following 
paragraphs, I’ll describe an applied study in 
more detail that explores implications of the the-
ory for education.
Students may make efforts at school based on 
both controlled and autonomous motivation. 
However, from the research reviewed so far, it is 
clear that students whose motivation is controlled 
may suffer poorer quality of learning, for exam-
ple, relying on memorization rather than deeper 
cognitive processing (Vansteenkiste et al., 2010), 
and poorer well-being. Furthermore, controlled 
motivation, especially when characterized by 
external regulation, is based on external supervi-
sion of students’ behavior that is always limited 
to a specific time and place. Briefly stated, SDT 
has a unique implication for instruction. Under 
SDT, the teacher hopes to get to the point where 
psychological need satisfaction, rather than the 
teacher himself/herself or any other external 
contingency, drives the students’ activities in the 
classroom.
Cheon, Reeve, and Moon (2012) designed an 
experimentally based teacher-focused intervention 
to help physical education teachers be more auton-
omy supportive of their students. Nineteen teach-
ers participated in the intervention. Data were 
collected from their 1158 middle and high school 
students and from independent observers. The 
teachers in the experimental group (n = 10) partici-
pated in a three-part intervention during the spring 
semester (late February through mid- July), while 
teachers in the control group (n = 9) participated in 
the intervention experience after the study ended. 
The intervention meetings were moderated by an 
SDT professional focusing on autonomy-support-
ive teaching practices (nurturing students’ inner 
motivational resources) in physical education 
classes. Following SDT, the intervention was 
focused on the following practices: (1) consider-
ing the students’ perspective and incorporating 
students’ input and suggestions into the day’s 
instructions; (2) relying on noncontrolling lan-
guage by communicating in ways conveying 
flexibility (e.g., offering information on options) 
and minimizing pressure; (3) providing explana-
tory rationales to help students comprehend why a 
specific request or activity has a personal value; 
and (4) acknowledging negative affect in general 
and also as elicited by the teachers’ expectations 
and/or by the learning process. The first meeting 
was a 3-hour workshop on the nature of auton-
omy support. A second 2-hour meeting took 
place 6 weeks later; it focused on the teachers’ 
autonomy-supportive practices since the begin-
ning of the semester. More specifically, the 
teachers discussed advantages and pitfalls based 
on their personal experiences. Part three took place 
6 weeks later; at this session, teachers shared ideas 
about how to be autonomy supportive in physical 
education classes. Teachers in the experimental 
group completed two additional booster reflective 
activities between meetings.
Data were collected from students at three time 
points, at the beginning of the semester (after the 
first teachers’ meeting), in the middle (after the 
second teachers’ meeting), and again when the 
semester had ended. The students completed 11 
dependent measures. Two served as manipulation 
checks and nine served as students’ outcomes: 
three measures were the satisfaction of the needs 
for relatedness, competence, and autonomy, in 
addition to amotivation, autonomous motivation, 
classroom engagement, perceived skill develop-
ment, future intentions with respect to physical 
activity, and class achievements. In addition to 
students’ self-reports, the autonomy-supportive 
teaching was measured by professional raters 
who visited the classrooms after the second 
teachers’ meeting (equivalent to the students’ 
time two measurements) and provided scores 
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based on a rating sheet developed and validated 
by Reeve, Jang, Carrell, Jeon, and Barch (2004). 
Two raters, who were blind to the teachers’ exper-
imental assignments, rated each teacher. The two 
observers’ ratings were highly positively corre-
lated on each instructional behavior, allowing the 
researchers to average the two ratings into a single 
score for each of the four autonomy-supportive 
instructional behaviors.
Manipulation checks based on student reports 
and observations revealed that the teachers in the 
experimental group were more autonomy sup-
portive than the teachers in the control group. 
Since data were collected from students over 
time, the researchers were able to analyze the 
differences between groups over time. Although 
the condition main effect was significant, the 
two conditions (teachers in experimental group 
vs teachers in the control group) did not differ at 
the baseline (i.e., at the start). As expected, the 
condition X time interaction was significant; by 
that I mean perceived autonomy support 
increased significantly for the students of the 
teachers in the experimental group from the first 
to the second measurement and again from the 
second to the third measurement, but it decreased 
significantly for the students of the teachers in 
the control group.
The results of the outcome measures follow 
SDT predictions. Namely, the three measures for 
psychological need satisfaction revealed a main 
effect for condition (control group/experimental 
group), indicating that the students of teachers in 
the experimental group reported higher need sat-
isfaction than students of teachers in the control 
condition. The interaction of condition and time 
was also significant for the three measures of the 
three needs indicating that at the start, there were 
no differences between groups, but over time, the 
students of teachers in the experimental group 
reported higher need satisfaction. The results 
were similar for student reports of their autono-
mous motivation, class engagement, skill devel-
opment, future intentions, and for course 
achievement. Thus, students of the teachers in 
the experimental group showed meaningful gains 
in all six course-related outcomes that were 
assessed. Additional analysis revealed that the 
relation between condition and the six outcomes 
was mediated by a composite score of the three 
need satisfactions. These mediation paths were 
supported while controlling for the initial level 
of each outcome measure (i.e., controlling for 
the measurement at the baseline) and while 
controlling for gender and grade level.
Interestingly, Cheon and Reeve (2013) col-
lected a follow-up dataset to determine whether 
those earlier observed benefits endured 1 year 
later. Compared to teachers in the control group, 
teachers in the experimental group were more 
autonomy supportive and less controlling based 
on independent observations and on the percep-
tions of their students. Furthermore, their stu-
dents consistently reported greater autonomous 
motivation and more positive outcomes than did 
the students of teachers in the control group.
In sum, this research suggests the effectiveness 
of an SDT-based teacher-training intervention 
program and demonstrates its effectiveness for 
students’ autonomous motivation, achievements, 
engagement, and skill development.
 Concluding Remark
Let’s go back to the example that opened this chap-
ter. I asked you to think of three quite different 
classes. You were enthusiastic and eager in one, 
anxious and stressed in the second, and bored 
maybe even irritated in the third. Perhaps the sec-
ond and third professors had no idea how you were 
reacting. While the first professor either had good 
instincts or good training (or both), the others may 
have benefitted from knowledge of SDT. Or per-
haps you might have been able to do something? 
As a final remark, I would like to introduce Reeve’s 
(2013) conceptualization of students’ agentic 
engagement. It refers to the extent of students’ con-
structive contribution to the flow of the instruction 
in terms of asking questions, expressing prefer-
ences, and letting the teacher know what they want 
and need. According to Reeve, agentic engagement 
is an active way by which students may help their 
instructors become more autonomy supportive in 
their teaching. You may find more information on 
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 Introduction
When working on a task such as an assignment 
for a class, there are at least two internal rewards 
that might motivate students. First, the topic or 
theme might fit their personal preferences. They 
may, for example, be fascinated by the subject, 
value high achievement in the academic domain, 
or feel obliged to make their utmost effort. In 
this case, motivation results from individuals’ 
preferences regarding content  – their interests, 
needs, or motives. Psychological research has 
long focused on this level of analysis of motiva-
tion, and there is substantial evidence that needs 
and motives are powerful predictors of human 
behavior (Heckhausen & Heckhausen, 2008; 
Roth, Chap. 3).
A second type of reward, suggested more 
recently in the scientific literature on motivation, 
concerns the type of task involved in achieving a 
goal. According to this view, certain types of tasks 
are themselves more motivating for some than oth-
ers. An assignment regarding the same content can, 
for instance, require to read a text and to write an 
essay either summarizing the key information from 
the text or outlining the applied implication of the 
text content. The former focusses on thorough 
reading and error free rewording of the content, 
whereas the latter likewise requires thorough read-
ing but also some creativity to connect the readings 
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exam, some students might opt for a “cramming” 
method and learn all the material in a couple of 
days before the exam, whereas others are more 
comfortable gradually learning the material in a 
step-by-step manner.
As these examples illustrate, the means or 
behaviors applied to complete a task or achieve a 
goal can differ. Research on self-regulation sug-
gests that some of these so-called self-regulation 
strategies will be more motivating than others 
under specific circumstances. We define self- 
regulation as the volitional (will-based) and cog-
nitive processes individuals apply to reach 
desired states including goal striving and need 
fulfillment (Sassenberg & Woltin, 2008).
This chapter will summarize and provide an 
introduction to self-regulation. First, we will 
describe how self-regulation and self-regulation 
strategies are related to motives and other moti-
vational concepts. Second, self-regulation strate-
gies, their antecedents, and their consequences 
will be presented – with a particular focus on the 
motivational effects derived from the fit between 
individuals’ self-regulation strategies and envi-
ronmental demands. Finally, we will summarize 
research demonstrating how this regulatory fit 
can help to solve people’s motivational problems 
in applied settings, ending the chapter with a 
discussion of a field study in the context of health 
behavior (i.e., physical exercise).
 The Motivational Hierarchy: 
Motives, Goals, and Strategies
One important differentiation in research on the 
psychology of motivation concerns the difference 
between needs and motives on the one hand and 
goals on the other hand. Needs and motives are 
individual preferences for types of incentives 
(e.g., social contact in case of the affiliation 
motive). Motives refer more to the (rather cogni-
tive) preferences, while the term needs stresses 
the biological or otherwise essential basis 
(Heckhausen & Heckhausen, 2008). Goals are 
defined as desired end states (Austin & Vancouver, 
1996). They, thus, specify the preference for one 
specific event or incentive. Along these lines, 
going out for drinks or parties to meet people can 
be a goal, but the reason “behind” this behavior 
would stem from a motive to affiliate with others. 
In other words, goals refer to certain, tangible, 
events, whereas motives describe a person’s 
general preference.
Psychological research distinguishes between 
several different motives, such as the achieve-
ment, the affiliation, and the power motive. All 
these motives are generally classes of incentives, 
with the general aim to maximize satisfaction of 
some kind. Different motives may predominate as 
a result of individual or situational characteristics, 
leading to different goals and behaviors. For 
example, someone with an achievement motive 
will likely have goals such as obtaining a high 
grade, winning a game of sports, or excelling in 
their profession. Someone with an affiliation 
motive will likely have goals such as working 
together on assignments, playing team sports, or 
getting along well with their colleagues. The dis-
tinction between goals and motives illustrates that 
motives are more abstract than goals, with goals 
being subordinate to motives (see Fig. 4.1).
Achieving certain goals will also serve the 
motive the goal is derived from. Self-regulation 
summarizes the means and mental processes 
Definition Box
Self-regulation: Volitional (i.e., will-based) 
and cognitive processes individuals apply to 
reach their goals and fulfill their needs.
Self-regulation strategies: The specific 
types of behaviors and mental operations 
applied to achieve a goal or fulfill a need 
(such as thorough vs. superficial).
Definition Box
Goals: Desired state specifying a concrete 
event an individual is striving for.
Motives/Needs: Preference for types of 
incentives (e.g., social contact). Motives are 
used to describe mental states, whereas the 
term need is rather used to stress the biologi-
cal or essential nature.
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applied during goal achievement  – for instance, 
the strategies to improve gradually or to put all 
energy for a short period into a subject (i.e., 
cramming) are different strategies that could 
serve the goal to perform well in an exam. Self- 
regulation strategies are, thus, again more spe-
cific than and subordinate to goals. As alluded to 
earlier, research on motivation has traditionally 
focused on the two more abstract levels of this 
hierarchy – needs/motives and goals. In contrast, 
the strategies people use during goal striving 
received limited attention (Heckhausen & 
Heckhausen, 2008), because researchers were 
lacking an approach to treat the fast amount of dif-
ferent means and behaviors that can be applied to 
reach a goal in a way that made them accessible to 
scientific analysis (Brendl & Higgins, 1996).
The breakthrough in this respect was achieved 
when Tory Higgins (1997, 1998) formulated his 
idea of self-regulation strategies. The theories 
developed around self-regulation strategies do 
not only summarize means and behaviors, but 
they specify the antecedents and consequences of 
these categories of means and behaviors. These 
causal chains from preconditions via strategies 
(or categories of means and behaviors) allow for 




Regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1998) distin-
guishes between two independent motivational 
systems: the promotion and the prevention system. 
When the promotion system is predominantly 
active – in a so-called promotion focus – individu-
als are concerned with “ideal” states, reflected in 
a sense of hope and aspiration. Promotion-
focused individuals strive eagerly to achieve their 
goals. In other words, individuals in a promotion 
focus are in a “go for it” mode. Their predisposi-
tion is to act (ensuring against errors of omis-
sion). They try not to miss any opportunity and 
apply risky strategies, which makes them more 
likely to show behaviors that do not necessarily 
contribute to goal achievement (e.g., using the 
first but not necessarily best opportunity to make 
steps toward goal achievement). In general, indi-
viduals in a promotion focus are concerned with 
the presence or absence of positive outcomes: 
they strive for promotion success (gains) and try 
to avoid promotion failure (non-gains).
In contrast, prevention-focused individuals are 
more concerned with “ought” states, reflected in a 
sense of existing duties and obligations. They are 
highly vigilant during goal striving, try to avoid 
errors, and apply defensive strategies (e.g., show 
behaviors that almost definitely contribute to goal 
achievement). They rather refrain from taking 
action than risk making a mistake (ensuring 
against errors of commission) and are “better safe 
than sorry,” careful in their approach even if this 
seems difficult or unnecessary. In a prevention 
focus, individuals are concerned with the presence 
or absence of negative outcomes: they strive for 
prevention success (non-loss) and try to avoid pre-
vention failure (loss) (Table 4.1).
A promotion focus is activated, when individu-
als situationally pursue their ideals and when they 
see opportunities to gain something, whereas a 
prevention focus is activated when individuals are 
guided by obligations and when they are aware of 
potential losses (Fig. 4.2). Students can, for 
instance, strive to write an A in an exam. This goal 
can be pursued in a promotion or in a prevention 
focus. A promotion focus would be likely when 
the student sees the opportunity to write an A 
because she feels particularly competent regard-
ing the content; she might see the exam as a situ-
ation in which she can gain a good grade. This 
student would start out optimistically and write 
down everything that comes to mind. In contrast, 
a student might be in a prevention focus, because 




Fig. 4.1 Motivational hierarchy: from abstract motives to 
concrete strategies
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gible to partake in another important course. She 
would feel that she could lose something and will 
therefore approach the exam in a more thorough 
processing mode to avoid errors.
Fig. 4.2 In which 
regulatory focus is the 
glass half empty and 
which half full? 
© G. Altmann/Pixabay.
com
Table 4.1 Overview of regulatory focus theory







Striving: eager (use opportunities)
Events: gains vs. non-gains
Cheerfulness in case of success 
vs. dejection in case of failure
Optimism
Creative performance





Critical and punitive parenting style
Interdependent culture
Strategy: defensive
Striving: vigilant (avoid errors)
Events: non-losses vs. losses
Quiescence in case of success vs. 




Box 4.1 Zooming In: Regulatory Focus vs. 
Approach and Avoidance
For a more thorough understanding, it is 
important to distinguish between promotion 
vs. prevention focus and approach vs. avoid-
ance, respectively. Approach and avoidance 
distinguish whether an individual primarily 
focuses on approaching something subjec-
tively good or avoiding something bad. A 
student could, for instance, study with a 
focus on passing an exam or with a focus on 
not failing an exam. Approach and avoidance 
are closely related to the promotion and pre-
vention focus, respectively, but there are 
important differences. On the one hand, the 
eager striving and the focus on gains in a 
promotion focus imply approaching some-
thing good, whereas the vigilance and the 
focus on losses suggest that avoidance will 
be dominant (Shah, Brazy, & Higgins, 2004). 
However, promotion is not only about 
approaching gains but also about avoiding 
non-gains (not getting an A), and prevention 
is about avoiding losses and approaching 
non-losses (getting an A). A sports team can, 
for instance, eagerly strive (a promotion 
strategy) not to lose a game  (avoiding a nega-
tive outcome), for example, because this will 
warrant them the points they need to qualify 
for the play-offs. As this example illustrates, 
regulatory focus and approach/avoidance 
behaviors are not necessarily compatible 
such that a promotion focus is always related 
to approach behavior and prevention is 
always related to avoidance behavior.
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As this example illustrates, the two foci may 
vary situationally and may be temporarily acti-
vated using gain or loss framing. Because many 
tasks and goals can be framed in either positive 
(gain) or negative (loss) frames, researchers and 
practitioners can differentially induce the foci 
with relative ease. For example, a health message 
framing regular exercise as a good way to pro-
mote your health is likely to activate a promotion 
focus. In contrast, a health message framing reg-
ular exercise as a good way to prevent disease is 
likely to activate a prevention focus. Similarly, 
shops can charge a fee (loss) or give a discount 
(gain) when paying with credit card or cash, 
respectively (Idson, Liberman, & Higgins, 2000). 
Aside from reading messages framed in gain/
non-gain or loss/non-loss terms, experimental 
studies have also successfully used tasks such 
as reflecting on past experiences, describing 
one’s own aspirations (promotion) or obliga-
tions (prevention) and essay writing to induce 
the different foci.
The two foci may vary situationally, but also 
chronically. On a chronic level, a bolstering par-
enting style reassuring children that they can 
achieve a lot is, for example, correlated with 
children’s promotion focus. In contrast, a critical 
and punitive parenting style focusing on obliga-
tions, safety, and rules predicts children’s pre-
vention focus (Keller, 2007). Culture has also 
been found to be an important factor in shaping 
people’s regulatory focus (e.g., Lee, Aaker, & 
Gardner, 2000; Uskul, Sherman, & Fitzgibbon, 
2009). For example, a promotion focus is more 
prevalent in Western societies, which tend to 
emphasize individual uniqueness and aspirations 
to “be the best” and stand out from the crowd. 
In contrast, a prevention focus is more prevalent 
among East Asian societies (e.g., Chinese, 
Japanese), which tend to emphasize interdepen-
dence, group harmony, and a sense of obligation 
(Markus & Kitayama, 1991).
Although both foci may vary as a function of 
situational or chronic pressures, they are not 
opposites on one dimension. Theoretically, both 
foci constitute independent dimensions implying 
that how frequently an individual pursues goals 
in a promotion focus does not predict how 
frequently the same person pursues goals in a 
prevention focus (Higgins, 1997). In most mea-
sures of promotion and prevention focus (see 
Table 4.2 for an overview), the two scales are if 
anything slightly positively correlated (Higgins 
et al., 2001; Sassenberg et al., 2012).
 The Effect of Promotion 
Versus Prevention Focus
Research has shown a broad range of conse-
quences of both foci in terms of people’s motiva-
tion to complete a task and the emotions they 
experience as a result of failing or succeeding in 
achieving their goals. The effects described in 
what follows stem from research that either 
Table 4.2 How to measure self-regulatory focus
Measuring (chronic) self-regulatory focus
Example items # items Reference
Promotion
  How often have you 
accomplished things that 
got you “psyched” to 
work even harder?
  Do you often do well at 
different things that you 
try?
6 Higgins et al. 
(2001)
Prevention
  How often did you obey 
rules and regulations that 
were established by your 
parents?
  Not being careful enough 




  Nothing ventured, nothing 
gained.
  No pain, no gain.




  Better an egg today than a 
hen tomorrow.
  Better safe than sorry.
10
Promotion
  I am striving for success 
in life.






  Success sets me at ease.
  I take care to carry out my 
duties.
8
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compared an experimentally induced promotion 
to an experimentally induced prevention focus or 
correlated assessed chronic promotion and pre-
vention focus with the respective outcome mea-
sures or both.
First of all, individuals show different emo-
tions in response to success and failure depend-
ing on their regulatory focus. The scientific 
analysis of emotions typically identifies two 
dimensions of core affect (activation and pleas-
antness; Russell & Barrett, 1999) along which 
specific emotions may vary. Pleasantness refers 
to the subjective experience of “doing well.” It 
summarizes the experience of something being 
good or bad, positive or negative, or pleasant and 
unpleasant. Activation refers to the subjective 
sense of mobilization or energy. It summarizes 
the experience of one’s physiological state and 
may range from anywhere between sleepiness, 
lethargy, relaxation, attentiveness, activation, 
hyperactivation, and frenetic excitement.
In a promotion focus, self-regulation success 
(gains) leads to positive activating emotions 
(i.e., cheerful emotions such as happiness or 
pride), whereas self-regulation failure (non-
gains) leads to negative emotions with low acti-
vation (i.e., dejected emotions such as sadness 
or shame). In a prevention focus, self-regula-
tion success (non- losses) leads to positive emo-
tions with low activation (i.e., quiescence as in 
a state of relief or relaxation), whereas self-
regulation failure (losses) leads to negative acti-
vating emotions (i.e., agitation as in case of 
feeling upset or worried; Higgins, Shah, & 
Friedman, 1997).
This implies that individuals in a promotion 
focus are more activated by success (or gains) 
and other positive stimuli such as positive role 
models. Hence, they will celebrate their suc-
cesses more and be more motivated to follow the 
example of others who succeeded. However, 
individuals in a prevention focus are easier acti-
vated by failure (or losses) and other negative 
stimuli such as negative role models. In other 
words, these people will be motivated when they 
anticipate or face problems or when they see oth-
ers who failed or were harmed (Idson et al., 2000; 
Lockwood, Jordan, & Kunda, 2002; Sassenberg 
& Hansen, 2007).
Another affective consequence of regulatory 
focus concerns the sense of optimism that people 
have during goal striving. Because people in a 
promotion focus have an easier time to see 
options to act, they are often more optimistic 
about their chances of success than people in a 
prevention focus. For the same reason, 
promotion- focused individuals tend to be more 
open to change, whereas prevention-focused 
individuals have a preference for stability (Grant & 
Higgins, 2003; Liberman, Idson, Camacho, & 
Higgins, 1999).
Beside these affective consequences, there are 
also a number of cognitive consequences of the 
two foci. A promotion focus leads to better cre-
ative performance and more global or abstract 
thinking, whereas a prevention focus leads to 
better analytic performance and a more detailed 
or local processing style of information (Friedman 
& Förster, 2005; Seibt & Förster, 2004). Therefore, 
in the student assignment example at the start of 
this chapter, a student in a promotion focus is 
likely to perform better in case the assignment 
requires creativity, whereas a student in the pre-
vention focus is more likely to perform better 
when the assignment requires a thorough ana-
lytic, step-by-step approach.
Implications of regulatory focus have been 
found in many other domains. Promotion (com-
pared to prevention)-focused individuals are 
better able to imagine others’ perspective and 
recognizing others’ emotions (Sassenrath, 
Sassenberg, Ray, Scheiter, & Jarodzka, 2014). 
They are also more successful in negotiations 
(Galinsky, Leonardelli, Okhuysen, & Mussweiler, 
2005). The defensive strategy of prevention- 
focused individuals on the one hand facilitates 
their analytic performance but on the other hand 
makes them more prone to all sorts of 
 conservative biases; they stick more to their own 
decisions and show a stronger confirmation bias 
(i.e., see information supporting their own opin-
ion as more relevant than information contra-
dicting it; Molden & Hui, 2011; Sassenberg, 
Landkammer, & Jacoby, 2014).
K. Sassenberg and M. L. W. Vliek
57
Regulatory focus is a well-studied self- 
regulation strategy which asserts an influence on 
emotion, cognition, and behavior in multiple ways. 
There are a number of other self-regulation strate-
gies that are not yet that well understood, because 
research has dedicated much less attention to them. 
Box 4.3 presents one of these examples.
 Increasing Motivation 
Through Regulatory Fit
Regulatory fit is the match between a person’s 
self-regulation strategy  – being it regulatory 
focus, regulatory mode, approach/avoidance ori-
entation, or something else  – and the strategy 
they choose or have to apply to achieve a certain 
goal. Regulatory fit is high, if the preference and 
the affordances regarding self-regulation are 
matched and low if they are not. If, for example, 
a person in a prevention focus can thoroughly 
weigh the alternatives, this will be experienced as 
regulatory fit. A pressing deadline may prevent 
prevention-focused individuals from using such 
an analytic, step-by-step approach but may suit 
promotion-focused individuals better. If they can 
intuitively chose an alternative, this should be 
experienced as regulatory fit.
According to the theory of regulatory fit 
(Higgins, 2000), stronger regulatory fit leads to a 
positive experience (i.e., it enhances the percep-
tion of the value of what people are doing). As a 
result, their behavior is experienced as more 
Box 4.2 Questions for Elaboration
Individuals differ chronically in their regu-
latory focus. Think about jobs for which a 
promotion focus and a prevention focus 
would be particularly profitable. Why?
Imagine you would like to move to a new 
flat with the help of some friends. Which 
tasks would you allocate to promotion- 
focused individuals and which to preven-
tion-focused individuals and why?
Box 4.3 Zooming In: Regulatory Mode
To reach a goal, two types of actions are 
essential: making steps toward the goal and 
evaluating the current state and potential 
further steps. Regulatory mode theory 
(Kruglanski et  al., 2000) distinguishes the 
motivational states in which these actions 
are dominant in locomotion and assessment 
mode. In a locomotion mode, individuals 
feel the urgent need to act and get on. They 
are impatient with barriers, delays, etc. and 
embrace each opportunity for change and 
breaking the status quo. Locomotors are, for 
instance, open for organizational chance 
(Kruglanski, Pierro, Higgins, & Capozza, 
2007). Locomotors are doers.
In an assessment mode, in contrast, 
individuals are more reflective. They have 
a desire for perfectionism, fear errors, and 
are worried about missing out opportuni-
ties. To this end, individuals make compar-
isons and mentally simulate the outcomes 
of potential actions. As an outcome, 
assessors experience more regret in case of 
negative outcomes (e.g., a bad grade). 
Assessors are thinkers. More generally, 
assessment mode is positively associated 
with negative affect and depressive mood 
and negatively associated with subjective 
well- being, whereas locomotion is nega-
tively correlated with depressive mood 
and positively associated with positive 
mood and subjective well-being (Higgins, 
Kruglanski, & Pierro, 2003).
Definition Box
Regulatory fit: The match between an 
individual’s momentary preferred self-reg-
ulatory preferences and the self- regulation 
strategy applied in a certain situation
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 pleasurable, and individuals will thus engage 
more in it (i.e., stronger persistence and more 
effort). Individuals with a strong promotion focus 
will, for instance, feel more attracted to choices 
they made after considering positive outcomes of 
several alternatives, whereas individuals in a pre-
vention focus feel more attracted by choices they 
made after considering potential negative out-
comes (Idson, Liberman, & Higgins, 2004). This 
is because individuals in a promotion focus care 
more about gains (and non-gains), whereas indi-
viduals in a prevention focus care more about 
losses (and non-losses).
Moreover, individuals, objects, and social 
targets related to behavior high in regulatory fit 
will be evaluated more positively. For example, 
individuals with a prevention focus are attracted 
more by low power (e.g., jobs not involving 
control over other people’s situations) than 
individual in a promotion focus, because ste-
reotypically low-power groups demand their 
members to defend their safety and security 
(against those high in power). However, indi-
viduals in a promotion focus have a stronger 
preference for high power (e.g., jobs involving a 
lot of control over other people’s situation) com-
pared to those in a prevention focus, because 
groups high in power according to common ste-
reotypes provide the room to apply promotion 
strategies (e.g., be creative and try out new things, 
think globally, etc.; Sassenberg, Jonas, Shah, & 
Brazy, 2007).
The regulatory fit hypothesis, thus, describes 
a source of valence (i.e., positive evaluation) 
and motivation, which does not result from the 
fact that the behavior fits one’s needs or motives. 
In contrast, it suggests that motivation can also 
result from a fit between strategy preferences and 
behavioral opportunities. A recent meta-analysis 
(Motyka et al., 2014) has shown that regulatory 
fit effects regarding evaluation, behavioral inten-
tion, and behavior are medium in size (r about 
0.3). They thus seem to contribute substantially 
to individuals’ motivation and choice of action. 
In the following paragraph, we will illustrate 
the applied relevance and external validity of 
regulatory fit effects.
 Regulatory Fit in the Wild
Evidence for regulatory fit effects has been found 
in a number of applied fields, most notably in 
organizational settings, consumer behavior, 
health behavior, and sports performance. In this 
section, we will briefly summarize this work, 
before elaborating on a specific study in the con-
text of health behavior.
In consumer research, a large body of studies 
have tested regulatory fit effects. One main find-
ing of this literature is that regulatory fit between 
consumers’ regulatory focus and brand charac-
teristics leads to more positive evaluation of 
brands (for an overview, see Motyka et al., 2014). 
Florack and Scarabis (2006; Study 1), for exam-
ple, studied preferences for a promotion or pre-
vention advertisement message for sun lotions. 
Because sun lotion is generally bought for the 
purpose of preventing skin damage or disease, 
prevention-focused messages (e.g., use for pro-
tection) were more persuasive than promotion- 
focused messages (e.g., use for a healthy tan), and 
this was especially the case for individuals in a 
prevention focus. Similarly, participants in a study 
by Mourali and Pons (2009) were willing to pay 
more for consumer products (e.g., computers, 
printers) when a fit existed between regulatory 
focus (promotion vs. prevention) and the decision 
strategy.
Another field that has repeatedly demon-
strated regulatory fit effects is leadership research 
(for an overview, see Sassenberg & Hamstra, 
2017). Regulatory fit from regulatory focus and 
regulatory mode lead to lower turnover inten-
tions, more positive leader evaluations regarding 
effectiveness and satisfaction, and more organi-
zational citizenship behavior (Benjamin & Flynn, 
Box 4.4 Question for Elaboration
Try to create messages to advertise a dating 
website that are tailored to create regulatory 
fit in individuals with a strong promotion 
and a strong prevention focus, respectively.
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2006; Sassenberg & Hamstra, 2017). In a study 
by Hamstra, Sassenberg, Van Yperen, and Wisse 
(2014), for example, a regulatory fit between the 
regulatory focus of leaders and their group mem-
bers in a real-estate business simulation task 
made group members feel more valued by their 
leader than when no regulatory fit existed.
Regulatory fit also asserts a positive impact in 
other domains of organizational psychology. 
Applicants consider, for example, jobs fitting 
their regulatory focus more attractive (Sassenberg 
& Scholl, 2013). Promotion-focused individuals 
value jobs more when they can take the lead and 
work autonomously, for example. In contrast, 
prevention-focused individuals valued job secu-
rity more, feeling more attracted to jobs where 
they were able to continue developing, for exam-
ple, through continued job training or gaining 
useful work experience. In addition, recruiters 
are more likely to select applications with a 
motivation letter fitting their own self-regulation 
strategy (Hamstra, Van Yperen, Wisse, & 
Sassenberg, 2013).
Finally, there is evidence that regulatory fit 
effects can facilitate sports performance. If a par-
ticular activity (e.g., defense) is perceived in line 
with an athletes regulatory focus (prevention 
focus), this leads to higher performance. This has 
been demonstrated for penalty kicking in soccer 
(Plessner, Unkelbach, Memmert, Baltes, & Kolb, 
2009) and putting in golf (Kutzner, Förderer, & 
Plessner, 2013). These findings should, however, 
be considered as preliminary, because they rely 
on studies with small sample sizes.
All in all, this brief overview indicates that 
regulatory fit effects have a broad range of appli-
cations. In most empirical studies, fit from promo-
tion and fit from prevention (or fit from both 
regulatory modes) occur. However, there are also 
applications in the organizational context (Petrou, 
Demerouti, & Häfner, 2015) as well as in close 
relationships (Righetti, Finkenauer, & Rusbult, 
2011) that only found effects of regulatory fit 
from either promotion or prevention focus. At this 
point, it is not clear what caused these asymme-
tries in the findings. For applications of regulatory 
fit in field interventions, this implies that it needs 
to be thoroughly checked whether an intervention 
works equally well for participants in a prevention 
focus and those in a promotion focus.
The above summary has left out the domain in 
which the regulatory fit hypothesis has been 
applied most frequently and very successfully, 
namely, health communication.
 Self-Regulation and Regulatory Fit 
in Health Communication
Many threats to public health arise from people’s 
behaviors and lifestyles. For example, of a total of 
56.9 million deaths in 2016, 15.2 million deaths 
(27%) were caused by ischemic heart disease 
(blockage of arteries to the heart) and strokes – 
caused by factors such as smoking, drinking alco-
hol, fatty foods, and stress, in combination with a 
sedentary lifestyle (WHO, 2018). Therefore, pub-
lic health professionals try to find effective com-
munication strategies to motivate individuals to 
change their health relevant behavior (Ludolph & 
Schulz, 2015). Over the last decade or so, 
researchers have frequently made use of the idea 
of regulatory fit. To be more  precise, messages 
promoting a certain health behavior are framed in 
terms of gains (such as health promotion) or non-
losses (such as preventing illnesses) and delivered 
to recipients with a chronic or situationally 
induced promotion or prevention focus (see 
Table 4.3 examples of tailored messages). As an 
outcome of a substantial narrative review, Ludolph 
and Schulz (2015, p. 149) conclude “regulatory fit 
is a promising approach to enhance the effective-
ness of health messages.” Therefore, the remain-
der of this chapter summarizes a field study 
demonstrating the successful application of regu-
latory fit in health communication regarding a 
health behavior – here physical activity.
Latimer, Rivers et al. (2008) aimed to test the 
impact of regulatory fit in health communication. 
They experimentally varied health messages 
related to physical activity in order to increase 
physical activity among inactive individuals 
(i.e., “couch potatoes”). While the content of the 
messages was constant, their framing varied. 
They either received a gain-framed message 
emphasizing the benefits of physical activity or a 
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loss- framed message emphasizing the potential 
costs associated with not being physically active 
(e.g., “Scientists say to accumulate physical 
activity throughout the day to stay healthy or 
improve your health” vs. “Scientists say failing to 
accumulate enough physical activity throughout 
the day can lead to poor health”).
Based on the theory of regulatory fit, the 
researchers predicted that gain-framed messages 
would “fit” better with a promotion focus, 
whereas loss-framed messages would “fit” better 
with a prevention focus. As a result, after reading 
gain-framed messages, promotion-focused indi-
viduals should experience more value from regu-
lar exercise (i.e., have more positive thoughts and 
feelings about physical exercise) and engage in 
greater physical activity than prevention-focused 
individuals. In contrast, after reading loss-framed 
messages, prevention-focused individuals should 
experience more value from regular exercise 
and engage in greater physical activity than 
promotion- focused individuals.
To test these hypotheses, the researchers 
recruited a total of 206 participants (aged 
18–69 years) with a sedentary lifestyle through 
the National Cancer Institute’s (NCI) database of 
the American public (i.e., cancer survivors and 
their family and friends). Through the NCI, peo-
ple can ask questions and gain information about 
cancer by calling a toll-free number. Consenting 
callers first completed a screening interview to 
gauge if they were eligible to participate in the 
study. For example, callers with a physical 
impairment or doctor’s recommendation advis-
ing against unsupervised physical activity were 
not eligible to participate. Eligible participants 
then completed a baseline interview assessing 
their level of physical activity, after which they 
were randomly exposed to either a promotion- or 
prevention-focused message encouraging regular 
physical exercise.
Participants’ chronic regulatory focus and all 
dependent measures (i.e., perceived value of 
physical exercise and level of physical activity) 
were assessed during a second interview, 2 weeks 
later. Ideally, the assessment of the regulatory 
focus should have taken place before the inter-
vention. However, due to time restrictions during 
the first telephone session, this was not possible. 
Of the original 206 participant, only 118 com-
pleted the second interview (57%). Those who 
dropped out were more physically active before 
receiving the intervention and more likely to be 
of non-white ethnicity. Both  – the order of the 
measures and biased dropout  – are limitations 
that can often be found in field studies: organiza-
tional restrictions often prevent the application of 
an optimal design and control over the study, and 
its participants are limited.
Despite these methodological limitations, the 
findings of this field study provided support for 
the regulatory fit hypothesis. As we can see in 
Fig.  4.3, individuals with a strong prevention 
focus who received a loss-framed message 
reported that they had engaged more in physical 
activity over the last 2 weeks (i.e., a product of 
time spend on exercising and intensity of the 
exercise). The same was true for individuals with 
a strong promotion focus who received a gain- 
framed message. Importantly, these results con-
trolled for physical activity prior to receiving the 
message. This study supports the general tenet of 
Table 4.3 Samples of tailored messages regarding fruit (F) and vegetable (V) intake
Promotion-focused messages Prevention-focused messages
Optimize your health: Eat 5–9 FV every day Protect your health: Eat 5–9 FV every day
Take the 5–9 challenge: It’s a goal you can meet! Eat 4–9 FV a day – it’s what everyone ought to do!
FV contain fiber, which promotes optimal colon functioning FV contain fiber, which helps prevent colon cancer
When you’re in a hurry, have a quick and healthy breakfast When you’re in a hurry, don’t skip a healthy breakfast
Get revved up in the morning with FV Relax in the morning with FV
FV provide nutrients that promote health FV provide nutrients that help guard against disease
Achieve the 5–9 goal to look and feel your best Meet the 5–9 guideline to protect your health
Promote your health: Eat more FV today! Prevent disease: Eat more FV today!
Source: Latimer, Williams-Piehota, et al. (2008)
K. Sassenberg and M. L. W. Vliek
61
regulatory focus theory and illustrates that a 
seemingly trivial difference in the way a message 
is framed can have significant ramifications on a 
behavioral level.
Recall, however, that the researchers not only 
predicted an effect on participants’ actual physical 
activity. Indeed, regulatory fit theory suggests this 
effect occurs because the existence of fit leads 
people to attach more value to those behaviors that 
facilitate goal attainment. The findings from the 
current study also supported this claim. Thus, par-
ticipants who experience a fit between the mes-
sage and their regulatory focus reported more 
positive feelings about the message, as well as 
more positive prospective and retrospective feel-
ings associated with engaging in physical activity. 
Finally, these feelings associated with physical 
activity mediated the impact of regulatory focus 
and message type on physical activity.
In sum, the findings of this study underline 
the potential of regulatory fit for health commu-
nication, despite the limitations regarding the 
design and the attrition mentioned above. The 
fact that similar results have been reported in a 
number of studies (for a summary, see Ludolph 
& Schulz, 2015) further justifies this conclusion. 
Positive effects of messages high in regulatory 
fit have also been found for healthy snacking 
(Hong & Lee, 2007), attitudes toward organic 
food (Hsu & Chen, 2014), and many other 
health-related attitudes and choices. Thus, the 
regulatory fit hypothesis has proved to be a pow-
erful framework for health-related intervention as 




























Fig. 4.3 The effect of 
loss- versus gain-framed 
messages on people’s 
total activity
Summary
• People are not only motivated by their 
preferences regarding content  – their 
goals, motives, and needs. They also 
engage in behaviors that fit their prefer-
ences regarding processes  – their pre-
ferred self-regulatory strategies.
• In a promotion focus, individuals focus 
on gains and non-gains and pursuit 
goals applying eager, risky strategies.
• In a prevention focus, individuals focus 
on non-losses and losses and pursuit 
goals applying defensive, conservative 
strategies.
• When tasks or contexts allow individuals 
to behave in line with their self-regula-
tion  strategies, they experience regula-
tory fit and thus become more engaged 
in the task.
• These regulatory fit effects have the 
potential to increase motivation in many 
domains such as health, sports, consumer 
behavior, or work.
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 Guiding Answers to Questions 
in the Chapter
 1. Q (with Fig. 4.2): In which regulatory focus is 
the glass half empty and in which half full?
A: In a promotion focus, the glass would be 
perceived as half full due to the focus on the 
gains (here the water that is still in the glass). 
In contrast, in a prevention focus, the glass 
would be classified as half empty because of 
the focus on the losses (here the water that is 
missing in the glass).
 2. Q (with Box 4.2): Individuals differ chronically 
in their regulatory focus. Think about jobs for 
which a promotion focus and a prevention 
focus would be particularly profitable. Why?
A: Prevention focus fits jobs with a focus on 
security, where the identification of problems 
or failures is leading, or jobs focused on 
enforcement of rules and obligations. 
Promotion focus fits better with jobs focused 
on growth, where the identification of changes 
and opportunities for development is leading, 
or jobs focused on creative output.
 3. Q (with Box 4.2): Imagine you would like to 
move to a new flat with the help of some 
friends. Which tasks would you allocate to 
promotion-focused individuals and which to 
prevention-focused individuals and why?
A: Tasks that require attention to detail and 
the prevention of something going wrong 
(e.g., the handling of precious or vulnerable 
items) would better fit a prevention focus. 
Tasks that require an optimistic, positive, and 
creative approach (e.g., fitting furniture in the 
truck, decorating the house) would better fit a 
promotion focus.
 4. Q (with Box 4.4): Try to create messages to 
advertise a dating website that are tailored to 
create regulatory fit in individuals with a 
strong promotion and a strong prevention 
focus, respectively.
A: To create messages that fit the different foci, 
try to identify what people can gain or lose by 
becoming or not becoming a member of a dat-
ing site (e.g., to help people find a perfect match 
vs. to help people prevent being alone).
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 Introduction
Why do we behave as we do? Ask your colleague 
why he is driving to work instead of using public 
transport, and you are likely to hear some sensi-
ble reasons: “It gets me faster to work,” “The bus 
is unreliable,” and “I need to carry my bag.” 
While these may be genuine considerations, the 
most accurate and arguably the most honest 
answer is “that’s what I always do.” Ask an 
applied social psychologist why people behave 
as they do, and you are likely to be presented 
with a socio-cognitive model, most likely the 
theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1991). The 
basic assumption of these models is that motiva-
tion is driving our behavior and that attitudes and 
intentions are the most powerful determinants. 
However, the literature on the relation between 
attitudes and behavior has always been haunted 
by one salient finding: while intentions are rea-
sonably good predictors of future behavior, mea-
sures of past behavior consistently outperform 
this prediction and share variance with future 
behavior that is not accounted for by intentions. 
There may be many reasons for this (e.g., Ajzen, 
2002), but one is that when behavior is frequently 
executed, it may become dissociated from the 
intention it originated from. Indeed, Judith 
Ouellette and Wendy Wood (1998) demonstrated 
in a meta-analysis of studies which included 
measures of intentions, past behavior, and future 
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behavior that frequently performed behaviors 
were less strongly correlated with intentions 
compared to infrequently performed behaviors.
In this chapter we will first define what habits 
are and describe consequences of habituation. 
We then briefly discuss how habit strength can be 
measured. The remainder of this chapter is 
devoted to habit change.
 Defining Habit
In a diary study among students, Wendy Wood, 
Jeffrey Quinn, and Deborah Kashy (2002) estab-
lished that between a third and half of the 
reported behaviors were things they did almost 
daily and usually in the same location. And they 
did not spend much thinking on those behaviors: 
their thoughts wandered about 50–60% of the 
time during those episodes. Thus, repeated 
behaviors are not only prevalent; they may 
acquire a quality of automaticity (e.g., Verplanken 
& Aarts, 1999). Also, a habit is formed when 
someone repeatedly and automatically responds 
in a specific way to a specific cue in a recurrent, 
stable, context (e.g., Wood & Neal, 2007). A cue 
can be anything, for instance, time (going to the 
gym at 5 o’clock), location (buying popcorn in 
the cinema), an object (not resisting that choco-
late muffin), a person (joking with your room-
mate), a physiological state (grabbing a coke 
when thirsty), or activities (ordering a take-away 
when watching a football game). These cue-
response associations are stored in memory, and 
a response is automatically triggered upon 
encountering the cue. We are now ready for a 
definition of habits as “memory- based propensi-
ties to respond automatically to specific cues, 
which are acquired by the repetition of cue-spe-
cific behaviours in stable contexts.” (Verplanken, 
2018, p. 4). Thus, perhaps contrary to how peo-
ple talk about habits, a habit is defined as a cog-
nitive structure which involves a propensity to 
act, and not as the act itself (e.g., Wood & 
Rünger, 2016).
Let us focus still briefly on the aspect of auto-
maticity. Automaticity comes in many “flavors.” 
John Bargh (1994) distinguished four qualities 
which define automatic processes and which he 
dubbed “the four horsemen of automaticity”: lack 
of awareness, lack of intentionality, mental effi-
ciency, and difficulty to control or stop a process. 
Processes may be automatic in some or all of these 
features, and this also holds for habits (Verplanken 
& Orbell, 2003). Thus, most habits are character-
ized by a lack of awareness and conscious intent, 
are difficult not to do, and are mentally efficient, 
for instance, allowing you to multitask.
Habits are not necessarily confined to observ-
able behavior. We also have habits of thinking 
(e.g., Verplanken, Friborg, Wang, Trafimow, & 
Woolf, 2007; Watkins, 2008). Such mental habits 
follow the same principles as behavioral habits. 
Thus, habitual thoughts occur automatically upon 
being activated by cues in stable contexts. For 
instance, a person may always have certain 
thoughts when looking in the mirror, entering a 
confined space, or encountering a particular per-
son. When these thoughts are negative, such habits 
may significantly contribute to dysfunctional out-
comes such as low self-esteem (e.g., Verplanken 
et  al., 2007) or a negative body image (e.g., 
Verplanken & Tangelder, 2011).
Definition Box
Habit: Memory-based propensities to 
respond automatically to specific cues, 
which are acquired by the repetition of cue- 
specific behaviors in stable contexts.
Box 5.1 Questions for Elaboration
Make a list of things you do frequently. For 
each habit:
 1. Identify the cue which triggers the 
habitual response, for instance, with 
respect to food, study, or leisure.
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 Consequences of Habituation
Apart from being efficient and dealing with the 
regularity of everyday life, habituation has other 
consequences. One is that habits come with an 
action-oriented mindset, that is, a cognitive ori-
entation characterized by a focus on executing 
the behavior at hand. This is in contrast to a 
deliberative mindset, where the individual is 
oriented toward possibilities and alternatives, for 
instance, when one is in the process of making an 
important decision (e.g., Gollwitzer, 1990; see 
also Keller, Bieleke, & Gollwitzer, Chap. 2). 
Thus, people in a habit mindset tend not to pay 
attention to alternative courses of action or to 
information about the context in which the behav-
ior occurs.
In a research program on transportation mode 
choices, Bas Verplanken, Henk Aarts, and Ad van 
Knippenberg (1997) tested this proposition in 
two laboratory studies. Participants in the first 
study were presented with a hypothetical travel 
mode choice situation and had the opportunity to 
search information about attributes such as travel 
time or convenience for a number of travel mode 
options. Previously, the strength of their habit of 
cycling was assessed. Those who had strong 
cycling habits selected less information com-
pared to those with weak cycling habits, while 
the information habitual cyclists sought was 
predominantly about their own habit: cycling. In 
a second study, participants were presented with 
a series of unknown travel situations. Each time 
they had to “discover” the nature of those situa-
tions before making a choice of a mode of travel, 
for instance, in terms of distance, luggage, or 
weather conditions. Previously, participants’ car 
use habit was assessed. Strong car use habit par-
ticipants consistently selected less information 
than weak habit participants; in other words, 
strong habit participants needed to know less about 
the travel context in order to make up their minds 
on how to travel. This effect appeared even when 
participants were prompted to deliberate about 
every situation. These studies thus demonstrated 
that habit comes with tunnel vision, that is, a lack 
of attention to or interest in information.
Another consequence of habituation is that 
established habits are not driven anymore by con-
scious intentions. While goals and associated 
intentions may form the starting point of many 
habits, and leave their traces in our cognitive sys-
tem (e.g., Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000), those 
links may weaken or get lost altogether over 
time. Habitual acts are then merely instigated by 
the context cues that have got associated with the 
behavior, that is, without the involvement of 
goals or intentions (e.g., Wood & Rünger, 2016). 
Thus, while non-habitual behavior is under the 
control of “willpower,” habituation shifts this 
control to the context that triggers the habit. 
David Neal, Wendy Wood, Mengju Wu, and 
David Kurlander (2011) demonstrated this in the 
cinema. Participants were invited to either a cin-
ema or a campus meeting room and were given 
popcorn while watching movie trailers. The pop-
corn was either freshly cooked or old and stale. In 
addition, their habit strength of “eating popcorn 
in movie theaters” was assessed. Participants 
who had a strong popcorn habit and received 
fresh popcorn ate similar amounts compared to 
strong habit participants who received stale pop-
corn. However, this was only the case in the cin-
ema context, that is, the context in which they 
performed their habit, and not in the campus 
meeting room.
 2. Reflect on whether this habit is func-
tional or dysfunctional. Is it healthy or 
convenient? Might it have harmful 
consequences?
 3. Analyze to which extent Bargh’s (1994) 
“four horsemen” apply: lack of aware-
ness, lack of intentionality, mental effi-
ciency, and difficulty to control or stop. 
For instance, do you remember making 
a conscious decision; did you do other 
things at the same time; would it be dif-
ficult not to do?
Repeat this exercise for a habit of 
thinking.
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Finally, habits are “sticky,” in the sense of 
difficult to override. Suppose you have a strong 
habit of driving a particular route to work. One 
day you drive a friend to the airport. While being 
engaged in a conversation, you suddenly realize 
you took a turn to work instead of the airport. 
Thus, in spite of a conscious decision to act dif-
ferently from an established habit, this habit may 
still take over. This happens when you are off 
guard, in this case being engaged in the conversa-
tion with your friend. Unintentionally perform-
ing a habit under such circumstances has been 
documented as action slips (e.g., Heckhausen & 
Beckmann, 1990). Sheina Orbell and Bas 
Verplanken (2010; Study 2) conducted a survey 
among smokers in public bars 2 months before 
smoking in pubs became illegal in the UK, who 
then completed a second survey 4 months after 
the ban was introduced. The first measurement 
contained an assessment of the strength of the 
habit of smoking-while-drinking-alcohol. At fol-
low- up participants were asked to report if they 
had made accidental action slips by lighting, or 
nearly lighting, a cigarette since the ban came 
into force. Forty-two percent of the smokers 
reported to have experienced such action slips, 
and this was predicted by the strength of the pre-
viously assessed habit strength of smoking when 
drinking alcohol.
 The Measurement of Habit
It is not easy to capture constructs as elusive as 
habits. Although they are prevalent in everyday 
life, people are hardly aware of them, as you may 
have experienced if you did the exercise sug-
gested in Box 5.1. Similar to many psychological 
constructs, there are no ways we can measure 
habit objectively, so we have to rely on indirect 
indicators. Three families of measurements have 
been used to assess habit strength, observations, 
self-reports, and implicit measures (e.g., Orbell 
& Verplanken, 2018). Each type reveals a differ-
ent aspect of a habit.
Some scholars observe behavior and consider 
the frequency of occurrence as a measure of habit 
(e.g., Gram, 2010). While observable acts may be 
the outcome of a habit, behavioral frequency does 
not capture the automaticity aspect of a habitual 
action. A physician may frequently refer patients to 
the hospital, but this (hopefully) is not a habit. Also, 
systematically observing overt behavior is difficult 
and time-consuming. Another observation-based 
instrument is the response frequency measure (e.g., 
Verplanken, Aarts, van Knippenberg, & van 
Knippenberg, 1994). Participants are presented 
with multiple choice scenarios, for each of which 
they are instructed to choose an option as quickly 
as possible. The prevalence of one particular choice 
option across scenarios is taken as a measure of 
habit. Importantly, time pressure is an essential ele-
ment, which is not always easy to implement. Also, 
for each habit domain, scenarios need to be devel-
oped and tested, which renders this method some-
what cumbersome.
By far the most prevalent method of assessing 
habit strength are self-report measures. For a 
long time habit was equated with past behavioral 
frequency, which was an inheritance from the 
behaviorist school. Many studies employed one- 
item measures of the kind “How often did you do 
behavior X,” followed by response scales such as 
“never” to “always.” However, these measures 
also ignore the automaticity aspect. In addition, 
one-item measures are notoriously unreliable and 
subject to biases. Wendy Wood and colleagues 
developed the frequency-in-context measure 
Definition Box
Action-oriented mindset: A cognitive ori-
entation characterized by a focus on exe-
cuting the behavior at hand.
Deliberative mindset: A cognitive orien-
tation toward possibilities and 
alternatives.
Tunnel vision: A lack of attention to or 
interest in information.
Action slip: Unintentionally performing a 
habit.
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(e.g., Ji & Wood, 2007). This measure consists of 
a retrospective self-report of performance fre-
quency weighed by a measure of the stability of 
the performance context. The unique feature of 
this measure is the quantification of context sta-
bility. However, “context” needs to be defined in 
each instance. Neither does this measure tap into 
the automaticity aspect. The most prevalent 
instrument to date is the Self-Report Habit Index 
(SRHI; Verplanken & Orbell, 2003; see Box 5.2). 
This measure consists of 12 items, which are 
self-reports of the experience of repetition and 
automaticity. Automaticity is broken down into 
facets we discussed above: lack of awareness and 
conscious intent, the difficulty of avoiding the 
behavior, and mental efficiency. The measure is 
generic and easy to use. However, a question 
remains how well people are able to report on 
such processes. An adapted version of the SRHI, 
the Habit Index of Negative Thinking (HINT; 
Verplanken et al., 2007), is used to assess habits 
of thinking.
Finally, as habits reside as memory traces and 
manifest as automatic responses, measures that 
tap into implicit processes have been used to 
assess habit strength. One such paradigm  – the 
slips-of-action task  – capitalizes on the action 
slip phenomenon discussed above (e.g., de Wit 
et  al. 2012). Participants learn that certain cues 
are associated with rewards and others are not. 
Subsequently they are being instructed that these 
cues lead to losses instead of rewards (a so-called 
outcome devaluation paradigm). In a later test 
phase, habit strength is indicated by the failure to 
avoid responding to the initially rewarding, but 
later devalued, cues. Implicit measures are argu-
ably the closest one may get to a habit. On the 
other hand, it is often difficult to establish the 
validity of such measures.
Researchers nowadays thus have a choice 
between a number of habit measures and can select 
the measure that is most suitable in a particular 
research context. For instance, computerized tasks, 
such as the slips-of-action task, are more suitable 
in a laboratory context, while the SRHI is highly 
suitable for questionnaires. The different mea-
sures also tap into different aspects of a habit and 
may thus be selected on that basis.
Box 5.2 Zooming In: Measuring Habits 
Using the Self-Report Habit Index (SRHI)
The Self-Report Habit Index (Verplanken & 
Orbell, 2003) is a generic instrument to as-
sess habit strength. It consists of a stem 
(“Behavior X is something…”), followed by 
12 items. The stem can refer to any behavior. 
The researcher can choose to formulate this 
as general or specific as required and, if the 
researcher so wishes, may include context 
information (e.g., “Conducting Behavior X 
in Condition Y is something…”). The 12 
items assess facets of habit, including the 
experience of repetition, lack of awareness 
and conscious intent, lack of control, mental 
efficiency, and a sense of self-identity. The 
items are accompanied by Likert response 
scales (e.g., 5 or 7 point agree/disagree 
scales). Items may be slightly modified in 
order to accommodate a specific behavior or 
context (e.g., the researcher has to choose a 
time frame in item 7).
[Behavior X] is something…
 1. I do frequently.
 2. I do automatically.
 3. I do without having to consciously 
remember.
 4. That makes me feel weird if I do not do it.
 5. I do without thinking.
 6. That would require effort not to do it.
 7. That belongs to my (daily, weekly, 
monthly) routine.
 8. I start doing before I realize I’m 
doing it.
 9. I would find hard not to do.
 10. I have no need to think about doing.
 11. That’s typically “me.”
 12. I have been doing for a long time.
After checking the internal reliability of 
the scale, the researcher typically averages 
the items into an overall habit strength 
score.
Reproduced with permission from Wiley 
(license 4338760369882)
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 Perspectives on Habit Change
Almost by definition, habits are hard to change. 
The consequences of habituation we outlined 
above do not bode well for interventions that aim 
at behavior change through the provision of 
information and thus changing attitudes and 
intentions. If habits attenuate attention to infor-
mation, and if there is no link between attitudes 
and intentions and behavior, such approaches bet 
on the wrong horse when aiming at changing 
strong habits.
So how does one change habits? This is of 
course one of those million dollar questions. 
Here we discuss two perspectives. The first is a 
“micro” level perspective and focuses on the cue- 
response contingencies that constitute a habit, 
namely, the use of implementation intentions. 
The second is a more “macro” perspective, which 
capitalizes on disruptions of the habit perfor-
mance context. We will thus focus on the poten-
tial for change when contexts change, or when 
people change context, such as moving to a dif-
ferent city or location.
 Using Implementation Intentions 
to Change Habits
If we zoom in on the mechanisms of habitual 
behavior, a key element in the process is when a 
cue triggers a habitual response. The “stickiness” 
of habits becomes obvious at that very moment: 
while bypassing our aptitude to reason and delib-
erate, a habit makes us act instantly and automati-
cally. If one wishes to change habitual behavior, 
these cue-response moments should be a prime 
focus. Thus, in designing an intervention, it is of 
utmost importance to first analyze the habit con-
text and identify the key cue-response occur-
rences which are to be broken and replaced by 
new, desired, responses.
One technique that has been proposed to do 
just that is the formation of implementation 
intentions. Implementation intentions are con-
crete “IF-THEN” plans, which may put an inten-
tion into action (e.g., Gollwitzer, 1999; see also 
Keller et al., Chap. 2). The “IFs” specify condi-
tions in which action is required, in particular 
where and when to act. The “THEN” specifies the 
action itself. Implementation intentions have been 
found effective means of accomplishing goals, 
certainly given their simplicity (e.g., Gollwitzer 
& Sheeran, 2006). Implementation intentions do 
two important things when applied to changing 
habits. Firstly, they target existing cue-response 
links, that is, they break the existing habit. 
Secondly, implementation intentions specify the 
very cues and responses which, after successful 
repetitions, may form the future new habits. 
Implementation intentions may thus be consid-
ered as “instant habits” (e.g., Gollwitzer, 1999).
Sheina Orbell and Bas Verplanken (2010; 
Study 3) demonstrated that implementation 
intentions may be effective not only in creating 
new behavior but in particular instigating auto-
matic responses. Participants were provided with 
a packet of dental floss and instructions how to 
use the material. They were randomly assigned to 
an implementation intention or control condition. 
In the implementation intention condition, they 
were instructed to write down where and when 
they would floss every day, such as “After I brush 
my teeth in the evening, I will floss in front of the 
bathroom mirror.” Habit strength was assessed at 
baseline and 2 and 4 weeks later. At the end of the 
period, the remainder of participants’ flossing 
material was collected and weighed, which thus 
provided a measure of flossing behavior. There 
were two important results. The first was that, in 
line with other implementation intention studies, 
having formed implementation intentions 
resulted in more frequent flossing, which was 
established by self-reported frequency and by the 
weight of the remaining flossing materials. 
Important for the present argument, an indepen-
dent assessment of habit strength using the 
Self- Report Habit Index revealed that in the 
implementation intention condition, habit 
strength became stronger over time compared to 
the control condition (see Fig. 5.1).
Implementation intentions have been viewed 
as effective self-regulation tools. When applied 
to the formation of habits, the self-regulation 
aspect may also apply; by using implementation 
intentions to create new, desired, and durable 
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habits an individual can exert self-control in 
accomplishing important goals (e.g., Galla & 
Duckworth, 2015).
As is the case with any method, the use of 
implementation intentions has its limitations, 
especially when applied in the complex world of 
everyday life. In order to be effective, there are 
quite some conditions that need to be fulfilled 
(e.g., Adriaanse & Verhoeven, 2018): ensuring 
high motivation, formulating sufficiently specific 
IF-THEN plans, finding the critical cue that trig-
gers the habit, creating strong enough IF-THEN 
links, and staying motivated and committed to 
the plan. As can be imagined, this can easily go 
wrong.
 Habit Discontinuities
As habits are contingent on cues in the perfor-
mance context, it follows that if that context 
changes, or individuals change context, habits are 
disrupted. There are many examples of such situ-
ations. Some are small or temporary, such as a 
strike that disrupts your commute. Others are 
more profound. This is particularly the case when 
individuals go through life course changes, such 
as transitions from school to work, moving house, 
starting a family, divorce, or retirement. Context 
change may also occur at larger scales, such as 
when companies reorganize, natural disasters 
strike, or an economic downturn affects people’s 
financial resources. Whatever the scale of the 
disruption is, habits are likely to be affected and 
may no longer be feasible or useful. Or, in Kurt 
Lewin's (1947) terms, habits “unfreeze.” What 
often happens is that after a while, individuals 
find their old habits, perhaps adapted to the new 
circumstances. However, disruptions also pro-
vide opportunities for habit change. Under those 
conditions behavior change interventions might 
be more effective than in default circumstances; 
individuals may be more sensitive to (useful) 
information, for instance, about available 
options and may be “in the mood for change.” 
This has been discussed as the habit disconti-
nuity hypothesis (e.g., see for a review, 
Verplanken, Roy, & Whitmarsh, 2018).
Fig. 5.1 Habit strength of flossing as a function of imple-
mentation intentions. (Note: N  =  278; data from Orbell 
and Verplanken (2010). Habit strength was measured by 
the Self-Report Habit Index (Verplanken & Orbell, 2003). 
The bars present means and standard errors)
Definition Box 
Implementation intentions: “IF-THEN” 
plans which specify where, when, and how to 
act.
The habit discontinuity hypothesis: 
Behavior change interventions are more 
effective if delivered when an individual’s 
performance context changes, or the indi-
vidual changes from one context to another.
5 Habit and Behavior Change
72
A number of studies provided supporting 
evidence for the habit discontinuity hypothesis. 
For instance, Bas Verplanken, Ian Walker, 
Adrian Davis, and Michaela Jurasek (2008) 
conducted a survey among university employ-
ees and asked how they commuted to work. 
They also assessed their level of environmental 
concern. Unsurprisingly, environmentally con-
cerned employees were less likely to commute by 
car than environmentally less concerned employ-
ees. However, this difference was only present if 
they had moved house in the previous year (see 
Fig. 5.2). This result thus suggested that a change 
of context (relocating) may have activated pro- 
environmental values, at least among those who 
adhered to those values, which were thus enacted 
in the new situation, whereas under default 
conditions, even environmentally concerned 
 individuals did not turn those values into action. 
However, studies such as these are correlational 
in nature and therefore do not allow to draw 
causal conclusions. In the final section of this 
chapter, we discuss in more detail a field experi-
mental study (Verplanken & Roy, 2016), which 
was able to provide some stronger evidence for 
the habit discontinuity hypothesis.
The principle of using habit discontinuities to 
“shake people up” is sometimes used by retailers. 
For instance, large stores and supermarkets move 
products around every now and then. While there 
may be many reasons to do so, an important 
motive for such changes is to disrupt customers’ 
habits. Rather than entering the store and grab-
bing the products they habitually purchase, the 
new arrangements force customers to think and 
explore and expose them to parts of the store they 
otherwise would skip.
Fig. 5.2 Proportions of sustainable commuting as a func-
tion of relocation and environmental concern. (Note: 
N = 433; data from Verplanken et al. (2008); sustainable 
commuting was defined as any non-car use commuting. 
Environmental concern was measured by the New 
Environment Paradigm Scale (Dunlap, Van Liere, 
Mertig, & Emmet-Jones, 2000). The bars present means 
and standard errors)
Box 5.3 Questions for Elaboration
Disrupt an existing habit (see, for instance, 
Box 5.1), and observe what this is doing to 
you. Answer the following questions:
 1. How easy or difficult did you find dis-
rupting the habit?
 2. Did you simply stop doing it, or did you 
replace the habit with something new?
 3. Would it be easier if something in the 
context or circumstances where your 
habit usually occurs would change?
 4. Did you experience any emotions 
(e.g., anger, anxiety, relief, pride)?
 5. Will you continue with your old habit in 
the future, or will you make a definite 
change?
Habit disruptions may teach you about 
your nonconscious patterns and alert you to 
potential new solutions or better options 
than your old habit provided. The least a 
disruption may show is how prevalent and 
powerful habits are in everyday life.
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 Some Caveats
We wish to add four caveats to the habit change 
issue. The first is that breaking a habit and 
replacing it by a new behavior does not mean the 
old habits are gone. The very definition of habit 
as a memory-based propensity suggests that 
while a new behavior may be performed, the 
memory trace of the old habit may still be intact 
and may only gradually decay. This was demon-
strated in a study among employees of an organi-
zation that relocated their premises (Walker, 
Thomas, & Verplanken, 2015). A portion of 
these employees shifted to another commute 
travel mode after the relocation. Habit strength 
of the old mode was assessed a year and a half 
before the relocation, while habit strength of 
both the old and new mode were monitored after 
the relocation. These data suggested indeed that 
while habit strength for the new mode started to 
build, the old habit did not disappear abruptly, 
but decayed only gradually during the post-move 
period (see Fig. 5.3). Thus, for a certain amount 
of time, the presence of the old habit poses the 
risk of relapses, for instance, if the new behavior 
is blocked or if the motivation to uphold it 
weakens.
A second caveat is that habits may be embed-
ded in larger routines or social practices (e.g., 
Kurz, Gardner, Verplanken, & Abraham, 2015). 
For instance, binge drinking among UK young-
sters is no isolated behavior, but makes up part of 
a weekend leisure culture. Approaching such a 
behavior without taking that wider context into 
account is missing an important point and is thus 
likely to fail if behavior change is the objective. 
A largely unexplored field is the question how 
habits and social practices relate, for instance, 
how habits may create social practices and vice 
versa (e.g., Holtz, 2014).
A third caveat concerns the power of habits in 
creating and maintaining new behavior. 
Compared to the problem of breaking habits, 
habit formation has received relatively little 
attention to date, at least in applied areas focused 
on behavior change (e.g., Lally & Gardner, 
2013). However, the very features that character-
ize habits and make them difficult to change  – 
lack of awareness, the difficulty to avoid a habit, 
tunnel vision, the disconnection with intentions, 
and the “stickiness” of habits – are all features we 
would like to see new, desired, behaviors to 
obtain in order to become durable. Thus, habit 
formation, and not merely behavior change, 
should be a key objective in behavior change 
interventions (e.g., Lally, van Jaarsveld, Potts, & 
Wardle, 2010).
Finally, the behaviors we are interested in are 
often complex and consist of multiple phases and 
components (e.g., Phillips & Gardner, 2016). 
For instance, “running” involves a decision to do 
it, preparing your running gear, and the actual 
running. Each of these elements may or may not 








old habit new habit
4 weeks
Fig. 5.3 Habit strength 
of old and new habits. 
(Note: N = 112; data 
from Walker, Thomas, 
and Verplanken (2015). 
Habit strength was 
measured by the 
Self-Report Habit Index 
(Verplanken & Orbell, 
2003). The graph 
presents means and 
standard errors)
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critical element that needs to be turned into a 
habit. In the running example, this probably is the 
decision to run, rather than the execution itself, as 
we are very good in finding excuses not to run 
(e.g., Verplanken & Melkevik, 2008).
 Testing the Habit Discontinuity 
Hypothesis in a Field Experiment
Bas Verplanken and Deborah Roy (2016) tested 
the habit discontinuity hypothesis in a field 
experiment promoting sustainable behaviors 
among residents in Peterborough (UK), some of 
whom had recently relocated. The assumption 
was that relocation disrupted existing habits and 
opened a “window of opportunity” for more 
change. The hypothesis was thus tested that a 
behavior change intervention would be more 
effective among those who had relocated com-
pared to residents who had not moved house.
The researchers liaised with an organization, 
the Peterborough Environment City Trust, who 
previously had developed an intervention to pro-
mote sustainable behaviors. Members of this 
organization were trained as research officers to 
collect the data and deliver a bespoke version of 
their intervention. Participants were cold- 
contacted at the doorstep. A total of 8063 contact 
attempts were made during the day, evenings, 
and weekends; 1612 individuals were at home 
and answered the door; 800 individuals agreed to 
participate in the study. Half of these were known 
to have moved house within the previous 
6  months (“Movers”). This information was 
obtained through property websites and contacts 
with housing developers. The other half (“Non- 
movers”) were matched to the Movers on key 
characteristics, such as house size, house owner-
ship, and access to public transport. Movers and 
Non-movers were assigned to an intervention or 
no-intervention control group according to a 
clustered randomization procedure, through 
which particular areas were designated as inter-
vention or control areas.
Data were collected at two points in time. 
A baseline survey was conducted upon recruit-
ment. In the intervention condition, this survey 
served as the basis for a conversation about 
behavior change (see below). Eight weeks later 
participants received a second survey by mail, 
which constituted the post-measure. Participants 
received a £10.00 cash voucher and a lottery 
ticket for a £250.00 prize draw for submitting the 
second survey. A total of 521 (65%) participants 
completed the study.
The intervention consisted of a number of 
elements:
 1. Doorstep personal interview. Upon agree-
ment a conversation was held about behaviors 
participants considered to change or adopt. 
The research officers were trained to select 
any from seven possible levers in these con-
versations: underscore available information; 
highlight self-efficacy; raise awareness of 
environmental benefits; stress pro- 
environmental social norms; spell out finan-
cial benefits; promote a “green identity”; 
pledge to change behavior.
 2. Tailored information. Shortly after the first 
survey and the doorstep interview, partici-
pants received information about the 
behavior(s) they had shown an interest in to 
change as revealed during the interview.
 3. Newsletter. All participants received regular 
newsletters, which contained generic informa-
tion and advice related to sustainable behav-
iors, as well as on current environmental and 
volunteering projects.
 4. Sustainable goodie bag. Participants received a 
bag with free sustainability-related items, such 
as a cycling path map, bus time tables, a shower 
timer, and vegetable and flower seeds.
The main dependent variables were 25 sus-
tainable behaviors, for instance, related to water 
use (e.g., taking less than 10 minutes showers), 
energy use (e.g., washing at 30 degrees), trans-
portation (e.g., ecologically friendly driving), 
and waste (e.g., using reusable shopping bags). 
Self-reported frequencies were obtained for 
each behavior, which were averaged into a 
behavior index. The behaviors were thus 
assessed at baseline and 8 weeks later. In order 
to control for effects of other variables, at base-
line a set of well-researched determinants of 
behavior were included: habit strength, intention, 
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perceived control, personal norms, biospheric 
values, and personal involvement.
Remember that rather than testing the effec-
tiveness of an intervention, the objective was to 
test whether an intervention was more effective in 
the context of a habit discontinuity (in this case 
relocation) compared to default conditions. Thus, 
in the present study, we were interested in the 
interaction between relocation status (i.e., whether 
or not a participant had moved house) and the 
intervention (i.e., intervention versus control 
group) while controlling for all other effects (i.e., 
baseline behavioral frequency, demographic vari-
ables, and all determinants). This was tested in a 
multiple regression, where the behavioral index in 
the post-test was regressed on all baseline mea-
sures, relocation status, intervention, and the all-
important relocation x intervention interaction. 
Unsurprisingly, baseline behavior and all determi-
nants were statistically significantly correlated 
with post-test behavior. From these variables, in 
the multiple regression baseline behavior, habit 
strength, and personal involvement obtained a sta-
tistically significant regression weight, suggesting 
these variables had a unique contribution in the 
prediction of post-test behavior. Also, the inter-
vention obtained a significant regression weight, 
which suggested it was effective. The important 
result was a significant relocation x intervention 
interaction. In Fig.  5.4 simple slopes are pre-
sented, which graphically show this interaction 
and suggest that the intervention was only effec-
tive among Movers.
We analyzed the data of this study in some 
more detail, in particular with respect to the ques-
tion how long the “window of opportunity” pro-
vided by relocation would last. In other words, is 
there an optimal time frame for an intervention 
that capitalizes on a habit discontinuity? In order 
to investigate this, we distinguished among 
Movers participants who had moved within the 
previous 3  months versus 6  months. It thus 
appeared that the intervention was only effective 
among the former participants, thus suggesting 
that the “window” lasted for a period of 3 months. 
A word of caution is necessary though. Firstly, 
these effects may be highly dependent on the 
domain, behavior, type of sample, and type of dis-
continuity. Secondly, habit discontinuities may 
“open” a window even before the actual change 
takes place. For instance, in the case of moving 
house, the process of “unfreezing” may start 
already some time before the actual relocation.
A field experiment such as the one we 
described here has many challenges. We mention 
three that were poignant in the present case. The 
first concerns a balance between “purity” and 
“realism.” In order to test the habit discontinuity 
hypothesis, ideally we would have liked to have 
followed a proper randomized controlled trial, 
that is, a random allocation of participants to 
both the intervention and relocation conditions. 
As mentioned above, we employed a clustered 
randomized procedure: the intervention versus 
no- intervention conditions were assigned on the 









Fig. 5.4 Simple slopes 
representing the effect of 
the intervention for 
“Movers” and “Non- 
movers.” (Note: 
N = 521; data from 
Verplanken & Roy, 
2016)
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to prevent neighbors in different conditions 
talking to each other. As far as relocation was 
 concerned, for obvious reasons “moving house” 
cannot be randomly allocated; the best we could 
do was to match participants on key criteria. 
Thus, in order to deal with the reality of this 
context, we had to accept losing some rigor with 
respect to the design and thus to making causal 
claims.
A second challenge was to protect the quality 
of the data. Field studies can easily become 
“messy,” as researchers do not work under con-
trolled conditions such as can be accomplished in 
the laboratory. Unexpected things may happen 
during data multiple research officers, collection 
or between pre- and post-tests. Also, as we 
worked with multiple research officers, the data 
collection and interview procedures were stan-
dardized and well-trained.
Finally, the key result was a statistically signifi-
cant relocation x intervention interaction. 
However, the effect size was small. There were a 
number of possible reasons for that. Firstly, habit 
discontinuity effects may be small, and as the 
dependent variable was controlled for all major 
determinants, this may have left little variance to 
be accounted for. Secondly, while the behavioral 
index was composed of 25 behaviors, most partici-
pants probably made changes in only a few of 
those. The study thus provided a very conservative 
test. Finally, as discussed above, field studies may 
produce much “noise” in the data. Nevertheless, 
the effect we found was statistically significant 
and important as “proof of concept.”
 Conclusion
The habit concept has two faces. On the one hand, 
we struggle with what we may consider as “bad” 
habits, the things we know are unhelpful or 
unhealthy but difficult to change. But from an 
evolutionary point of view, our cognitive architec-
ture made us creatures of habit for good reasons: 
habits enable us to avoid spending valuable 
mental resources to trivial decisions. Also, if we 
manage to turn “good” behavior into habits, this 
may help to establish and maintain a better and 
healthier life. In any case, habits are interesting 
and are worth a prominent place on the rich pallet 
of themes in psychology.
Summary
• Habits are memory-based propensities 
to respond automatically to specific 
cues, which are acquired by the repeti-
tion of cue-specific behaviors in stable 
contexts.
• Habituation may lead to “tunnel vision,” 
that is, a lack of attention to or interest 
in information about the habit or the 
habit performance context.
• Habituation shifts control over behavior 
from “willpower” to the contextual cues 
which trigger the habit.
• Habits are “sticky”: even if one chooses 
to act differently, a habit may easily take 
over, such as in the form of “action 
slips.”
• Habit strength has been measured by 
means of observation, self-reports, and 
implicit measures. The Self-Report 
Habit Index (SRHI) is a prevalent 
generic 12-item self-report instrument to 
measure habit strength. The Habit Index 
of Negative Thinking (HINT) is a variant 
to measure habits of thinking.
• Implementation intentions – “IF-THEN” 
plans which specify where, when, and 
how to act  – can be used to break old 
habit cue- response associations and 
build new ones.
• The habit discontinuity hypothesis 
states that behavior change interven-
tions are more effective if delivered 
when an individual’s performance con-
text changes or the individual changes 
from one context to another.
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 Introduction
In summer 2016, a debate over Muslim women’s 
beachwear, known as burkini – a swimwear with 
body and head coverings – popped up in France. 
As a result, three cities restricted women to wear 
a burkini at the beach. The restriction of these 
women’s freedom to wear a burkini caused mixed 
reactions, but one was the “wear what you want” 
initiative which also spread on social media pic-
turing Muslim and non-Muslim women with and 
without burkinis and holding up signs with “wear 
what you want” (see Fig. 6.1).
This example illustrates how people often 
react to threats to their own or another person’s 
freedom. They fight against it urging the threat-
ening agents  – in this case the politicians  – to 
remove the threat and, thus, restore freedom. The 
impulse to fight back to freedom restrictions 
results from the experience of a motivational 
state called psychological reactance. It is char-
acterized by a strong desire to restore and secure 
the threatened freedom and actual attempts to do 
so (Brehm, 1966; Brehm & Brehm, 1981).
However, reactance does not emerge in every 
freedom-threatening situation. Importantly, only 
when people view themselves as possessing cer-
tain free behaviors and when they perceive a 
threat to those behaviors, reactance emerges. 
Moreover, people’s free behaviors are not only 
associated with certain expectation but often are 
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also connected to own values and attitudes. Thus, 
free behaviors constitute aspects of people’s self. 
Reactance aims at restoring freedom by shedding 
light on those aspects. The experience of reac-
tance therefore leads people to reflect on who 
they are and what is important to them. Being 
able to act in accordance with one’s self, for 
example, by expressing one’s own opinion, is 
related to people’s identity. It makes them aware 
of what is important to them, that they are the 
origin of their actions, and that they are able to 
act in accordance with their self. Thereby, people 
experience a sense of autonomy (Deci & Ryan, 
1985; Deci & Ryan, 2000; see also Roth, Ch. 3 
this volume).
Considering that reactance is not just a simple 
resistance against social influence attempts helps 
us to understand why the burkini example trig-
gers reactions that go beyond the simple question 
of what clothes are allowed to wear. Freedom 
threats do not only lead to resistance but also to 
questions about oneself, one’s group, and society, 
about who we are, and whether one can live in 
accordance with own values and attitudes.
The current chapter summarizes psychologi-
cal reactance theory (Brehm, 1966) which can 
explain why people sometimes “fight back,” 
meaning that they do the opposite of what they 
are supposed to do or resist the social influence of 
others. Most importantly, it elaborates on the 
value of reactance by explaining how reactance 
connects to the self and own important values.
Fig. 6.1 “Wear what you want” demonstration in London. (Photography by T. Akmen, Anadolu Agency, Getty Images; 
retrieved from https://www.vox.com/2016/8/25/12644846/burkini-ban-sexism-women-clothing-illustration-muslim-france)
Definition Box
Reactance: Reactance results from a (per-
ceived) threat to freedom. It is “a motiva-
tional state directed toward the 
re-establishment of the threatened or elimi-
nated freedom, and it should manifest itself 
in increased desire to engage in the relevant 
behavior and actual attempts to engage in it” 
(Brehm, 1966, p. 15f).
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 Reactance Theory
 Freedom and Threat to Freedom
Reactance theory (Brehm, 1966; Brehm & 
Brehm, 1981; for an overview, see Miron & 
Brehm, 2006; Steindl, Jonas, Sittenthaler, Traut- 
Mattausch, & Greenberg, 2015) describes what is 
happening within individuals when they perceive 
a threat to their freedom. For Brehm, freedom 
meant “…an individual’s belief that he or she can 
engage in a particular behavior. The freedom can 
pertain to what one does, how one does it, or 
when one does it…” (Brehm & Brehm, 1981, 
p.  358). We all expect that we possess certain 
freedoms, meaning that we can choose between 
performing and not performing a certain behav-
ior (Brehm & Brehm, 1981). Yet, in many situa-
tions in our lives, where we initially believed to 
be free, we suddenly experience that we are not 
free. For instance, citizens believe to be free in 
voting for the political party they prefer, but poli-
ticians try to manipulate them to vote for their 
platform; employees believe to be free in wearing 
what they want at work, but the company requires 
them to show up in business look; children 
believe to be free in choosing their field of study, 
but parents pressure them to study medicine; or 
women believe to be free in wearing what they 
want at public beaches, but a new law forbids 
them to wear a burkini. We perceive these situa-
tions as threats to our freedom when we cannot 
act as desired, when we feel that “some event has 
increased the difficulty of exercising the freedom 
in question” (Brehm & Brehm, 1981, p.  35). 
Consequently, something inside us generates the 
impulse to fight back. This “something” is what 
we call psychological reactance. Reactance is a 
motivational state which serves as a motivator to 
restore or secure the threatened freedom (Brehm, 
1966; Brehm & Brehm, 1981). It is a theoretical 
construct manifested in an increased subjective 
desire to exercise the threatened freedom – reac-
tance motivation – and actual behavioral attempts 
to do so, reactance striving (Brehm, 1966; Brehm & 
Brehm, 1981; Wright, Agatarap, & Mlynski, 
2015). Thus, the term “reactance” means both, 
the subjective and behavioral reactions.
 Reactance Motivation
Reactance is always accompanied by subjective 
responses, such as the experience of emotion. 
People feel uncomfortable, hostile, aggressive, 
and angry (Berkowitz, 1973; Brehm, 1966; 
Brehm & Brehm, 1981; Dillard & Shen, 2005; 
Rains, 2013). Another subjective reaction is a 
change in the attractiveness of the threatened or 
imposed outcome. People upgrade the restricted 
option or downgrade the imposed option (e.g., 
Bijvank, Konijn, Bushman, & Roelofsma, 2009; 
Brehm, 1966; Brehm & Brehm, 1981; Bushman 
& Stack, 1996; Dillard & Shen, 2005). In a clas-
sic experiment by Brehm, Stires, Sensenig, and 
Shaban (1966), participants listened to four 
records and rated how well they liked each of 
them. They were made to believe that they could 
choose one of the records as a gift but then 
learned that one of the records was unavailable. 
Results revealed that in a second rating, this 
record increased in its attractiveness. Brehm also 
mentions that people who are threatened in their 
freedom become aware of what they really want. 
They know their desires and goals and feel that 
they are their own director of behavior (increased 
self-direction; Brehm, 1966; Brehm & Brehm, 
1981). Thus, banning the burkini from beaches 
would lead some women to feel angry, to upgrade 
the burkini in its attractiveness, and to realize that 
the freedom to wear what they want is indeed 
highly important to them.
 Reactance Striving
Reactance striving can be manifested in exercis-
ing the threatened freedom (direct restoration), 
exercising a related behavior or observing others 
exercising the threatened freedom (indirect resto-
ration), aggressively forcing the threatening 
agent to remove the threat, or just letting off 
steam by reacting in an aggressive way (aggres-
sion) (Brehm, 1966; Brehm & Brehm, 1981). For 
example, forbidding teenagers to go out can lead 
to the exact opposite behavior (i.e., going out in 
secret). This is also known as the boomerang 
effect and is the direct restoration of freedom 
6 Reactance Theory
82
(Brehm, 1966). Not going out but performing a 
related and also forbidden behavior (e.g., smok-
ing) would be the indirect restoration of freedom, 
and shouting at and insulting their parents to get 
what they want would be the aggressive form of 
reactance striving. Thus, reactance striving is the 
visible reaction to freedom threats. But what 
exactly is reactance motivation itself, can we 
“see” it, and how can it be assessed?
 What Is Reactance Motivation: 
Catching the State
Although Brehm stated that reactance is “an 
intervening, hypothetical variable” that cannot be 
measured directly (Brehm & Brehm, 1981, 
p. 37), studies tried to catch reactance motivation 
with different instruments such as self-report 
measures and physiological or neuropsychologi-
cal measures.
 Self-Report Measures
Some studies have investigated reactance in the 
context of persuasion (Dillard & Shen, 2005; 
Kim, Levine, & Allen, 2013; Rains, 2013), as 
persuasive messages often pose freedom threats 
to people. Here, reactance has been conceptual-
ized as a composite of self-reported anger (e.g., 
irritated, annoyed) and negative cognition in the 
form of counterarguments. For example, in 
Dillard and Shen’s study (2005), a persuasive 
message, such as “Flossing: It’s easy. Do it 
because you have to!” (p. 152), led to a negative 
attitude toward flossing. This relationship could 
be explained via people’s experienced reactance 
which consisted of anger and negative cogni-
tions. The negative attitude further predicted peo-
ple’s behavioral intention not to floss.
Beyond the context of persuasion, studies 
view people’s reactance consisting of their self- 
reported experience of reactance (e.g., perception 
of freedom threat), their aggressive behavioral 
intentions toward the threatening agent (e.g., ruin 
his/her reputation), and their negative evaluations 
of the threatening agent (e.g., believing that he/
she takes advantage of other people) (Salzburg 
State Reactance Scale; SSR Scale; Sittenthaler, 
Traut-Mattausch, Steindl, & Jonas, 2015). In 
these studies, people’s experience of reactance is 
conceptualized as a combination of a perceived 
threat to their freedom (e.g., “How restricted 
would you feel in your freedom of choice?”) and 
their emotional experience (e.g., “How irritated 
would you feel?”). This conceptualization has 
been used in reactance studies investigating 
change situations such as political reforms, cul-
ture, and vicarious reactance and has been shown 
to explain why people react with resistance or 
with a negative attitude to restrictions (Sittenthaler 
& Jonas, 2012; Sittenthaler, Traut-Mattausch, & 
Jonas, 2015; Traut-Mattausch, Guter, Zanna, 
Jonas, & Frey, 2011; Traut-Mattausch, Jonas, 
Förg, Frey, & Heinemann, 2008).
 Physiological 
and Neuropsychological Measures
Guided by Brehm (1966), who noted that reactance 
should be accompanied by physiological arousal, 
research assessed people’s heart rate following a 
freedom threat. Results depicted that when people 
experienced a freedom threat by imagining being 
restricted from renting a flat, their heart rate 
increased immediately (Sittenthaler, Jonas, & 
Traut-Mattausch, 2016, see Box 6.2; Sittenthaler, 
Steindl, & Jonas, 2015).
Research has also considered neuropsycho-
logical parameters to directly measure reactance 
Box 6.1 Questions for Elaboration
Think about examples in your life where 
you believed that you are free but then 
were restricted in this freedom. Did you 
experience reactance? How did you react? 
What were your subjective and behavioral 
reactions?
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motivation. By using electroencephalography 
(EEG), Mühlberger, Klackl, Sittenthaler, and 
Jonas (2018) tried to more accurately capture the 
specific kind of motivation that reactance stimu-
lates. They looked at a specific indicator of moti-
vation, namely, left frontal cortical activity. This 
parameter has been found to relate to approach 
motivation (e.g., Harmon-Jones, 2003, 2004; 
Harmon-Jones & Allen, 1998)  – a motivation 
where people are energized to move toward some-
thing (Harmon-Jones, Harmon-Jones, & Price, 
2013; see also Sassenberg & Vliek, Chap. 4 this 
volume). In this research, inducing reactance in 
various ways (e.g., imagining being restricted 
from renting an apartment, remembering own 
experienced past restrictions, being commanded 
to draw specific shapes) stimulated immediate 
relative left frontal activity. This finding under-
lines Brehm’s original definition of reactance as a 
highly motivational construct by which people are 
highly motivated to approach the reestablishment 
of their freedom. Moreover, the neural processes 
depict that this motivation arises immediately 
after the threat.
In summary, reactance motivation can be cap-
tured by using self-report measures and more 
directly by physiological and neuropsychological 
measures. Those measures found that it is a state 
consisting of a person’s experienced threat, his or 
her emotional experience (e.g., anger), cognitive 
processes (e.g., negative attitude), and changes in 
physiological arousal and brain activity.
 The Determinants of Reactance
 Expectation of Freedom, Importance 
of Freedom, and Extent of Threat
Reactance does not always emerge when people’s 
free behaviors are threatened. Its emergence 
depends on people’s initial expectation to possess 
the freedom in question. Thus, reactance emerges 
only when people believe they possess a specific 
freedom, i.e., they know they have the freedom to 
do something and feel they are capable of enacting 
the behavior. Reactance also varies in its magni-
tude which depends on the subjective importance 
of the freedom (the more important the free behav-
ior, the more reactance will be aroused) and the 
perceived extent of the threat (the more freedoms 
threatened, the more reactance will be aroused) 
(Brehm, 1966; Brehm & Brehm, 1981; Wright 
et al., 2015). In our example, if women are confi-
dent to possess the freedom to wear whatever they 
want at the beach, if the freedom to wear what they 
want is in general very important to them, and if 
they perceived the restriction as highly threatening, 
reactance motivation would be very strong.
 Belief in Ability to Restore Freedom
Once reactance has been aroused, it provides peo-
ple with the motivation to fight against the threat 
and restore their freedom. As such it is an adaptive 
reaction to freedom threats because when people 
experience reactance, they feel that they are able to 
fight for their freedom. Without it, they would 
accept the restriction. Thus, it is the opposite of 
learned helplessness (Seligman, 1975) where peo-
ple do not believe in their ability to alter the 
unpleasant situation. Helpless people are rather 
passive, accept the situation as it is, or even with-
draw from it (Mikulincer, 1988; Pittman & Pittman, 
1979; Seligman, 1975; Wortman & Brehm, 
1975). When people experience reactance, they 
feel capable of altering the situation and restoring 
their freedom (Brehm & Self, 1989; Wortman & 
Brehm, 1975; Wright et  al., 2015; Wright & 
Brehm, 1989). Despite the unpleasant situation, 
they feel in charge of the situation, and they are 
highly motivated to do something about it. This 
becomes obvious in a study by Kray, Reb, Galinsky, 
and Thompson (2004). They hypothesized that 
reactance also emerges when people perceive a 
limitation to their ability to perform well in a task. 
In their study, they threatened women’s ability to 
perform by making them aware of the stereotype 
that men are better at negotiating than women. As 
a result, women reacted against this stereotype by 
achieving better negotiating outcomes than men. 
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However, this so-called stereotype reactance only 
occurred for women when they possessed suffi-
cient power to act against the stereotype. When 
they did not have sufficient power, they followed 
the stereotype by performing worse than men. 
This is in accordance with the assumption that 
reactance only emerges when people feel capable 
of altering the current situation.
 Vicarious Reactance and the Self
How people respond to freedom threats strongly 
depends on whether the threat affects important 
aspects of their self. This becomes apparent in 
research on vicarious reactance (i.e., reactance in 
response to freedom threats experienced by oth-
ers). We can also experience reactance when oth-
ers’ freedom is challenged. For instance, people 
who observed or read about a freedom threat hap-
pening to another person also indicated strong 
reactance (Andreoli, Worchel, & Folger, 1974; 
Sittenthaler et  al., 2016; Sittenthaler & Jonas, 
2012; Sittenthaler, Traut-Mattausch, & Jonas, 
2015). Think of the burkini example. Although 
the ban affected only women who usually wear a 
burkini, women all over the world wearing or not 
wearing a burkini at the beach engaged in the 
“wear what you want” discussion. Research has 
shown that both kinds of freedom threats (self- 
experienced and vicarious) lead people to experi-
ence reactance, but whether people react more to 
a self-experienced or to a vicariously experienced 
threat depends on how they define their self and 
whether the threat affects important aspects of 
their self.
A factor shaping people’s self is their cultural 
background. People from individualistic cultures, 
such as America and Western Europe, define their 
self by emphasizing their individuality and inde-
pendence from others (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). 
People from collectivistic cultures, such as Asia, 
Africa, Latin America, or Southern Europe, define 
their self in relationships and commonalities with 
others (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). A number of 
studies (Jonas et al., 2009; Sittenthaler & Jonas, 
2012; Sittenthaler, Traut-Mattausch, & Jonas, 
2015; Steindl & Jonas, 2012) found that people 
with an independent self- concept experienced 
more reactance when their individual, personal 
freedom was threatened, while people with an 
interdependent self-concept experienced more 
reactance when a collective freedom or another 
person was threatened. Thus, compared to people 
with an independent self- concept, people with an 
interdependent self- construal experience more 
vicarious reactance.
People experience both self-experienced and 
vicarious reactance, but the processes underlying 
them differ  – a freedom threat happening to 
oneself seems to evoke reactions that are more 
impulsive in nature, and a freedom threat happen-
ing to another person seems to evoke reactions 
that are more reflective in nature. This becomes 
apparent in people’s physiological and emotional- 
cognitive responses: while people who were 
restricted themselves showed an immediate 
change in heart rate and more emotional thoughts 
(e.g., annoyed, excited), people who were vicari-
ously restricted showed a delayed change in heart 
rate and more cognitive thoughts (e.g., reasons 
for freedom restriction; Sittenthaler et al., 2016; 
for details see Box 6.2).
In summary, reactance emerges when people 
believe they possess the freedom that is threat-
ened, when this freedom is important to them, 
when the perceived extent of the freedom threat 
is high, and when they feel capable of restoring 
their freedom. Whether reactance emerges or not 
also depends on people’s self, which contains 
important values, interests, and goals. This can 
explain why observing another person being 
threatened in his or her freedom can also elicit 
reactance.
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Box 6.2 Zooming In: Study on Vicarious 
Reactance
Sittenthaler et  al. (2016) proposed a process 
model to explain the mechanisms underlying 
self- and vicarious reactance. They hypothe-
sized that a freedom threat affecting a person 
directly (self-restriction) should result in a 
spontaneous physiological reaction. In con-
trast, observing another person being threat-
ened (vicarious restriction) should result in a 
delayed physiological reaction because people 
first need to reflect on the situation as they do 
not experience it themselves. They tested this 
idea in a study on 129 students (Study 2) who 
came to the laboratory and were attached sen-
sors to measure skin conductance (SC) and 
heart rate (HR). First, there was a 3-minute 
baseline measure. Next, participants read a 
scenario in which a student attempted to rent 
an apartment. For 3 minutes, they either imag-
ined a self-restriction, a vicarious restriction, 
or a neutral situation. In the self-restriction, the 
student called the landlord about an appoint-
ment for viewing the apartment. When the 
landlord learned that he was talking to a stu-
dent, he said “No, you are a student, you won’t 
get this apartment” and broke off the call. In 
the vicarious restriction, participants were 
asked to think about a former classmate who 
experienced the situation. Participants in the 
control condition were asked to imagine that 
they could rent the apartment. Finally, partici-
pants answered items assessing their reactance 
(e.g., “To what extent do you perceive the reac-
tion of the landlord as a restriction of free-
dom?”). These items revealed that participants 
in the self- as well as the vicarious restriction 
condition showed higher values than partici-
pants in the control condition, indicating that 
the mere observance of a person being 
restricted resulted in self-reported reactance. 
However, the main dependent variable was the 
differences between participants’ HR during 
imagining the scenario and during the baseline 
(immediate response), and their HR during 
answering the reactance items and during the 
baseline (delayed response) served as the main 
dependent variables. Importantly, the physio-
logical results revealed that compared to the 
vicarious and the control condition, partici-
pants in the self-restriction showed the highest 
HR for the immediate response. The vicarious 
restriction condition showed a higher HR for 
the delayed than for the immediate response. 
These findings suggest that different processes 
underlie self-experienced vs. vicarious restric-
tions: self-restrictions result in an immediate 
physiological arousal and, thus, a more impul-
sive process, whereas vicarious restrictions 
result in a delayed physiological arousal and, 
thus, a more reflective process (Fig. 6.2).
Fig. 6.2 Summary of central antecedents and consequences of psychological reactance
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 Reactance, What for?: Applications
Building on the inception of reactance theory 
where Brehm emphasized that reactance is a 
highly motivational construct, with this section, 
we aim to demonstrate the value of reactance. 
Brehm noted that “reactance is defined not sim-
ply as an unpleasant tension […] but rather a 
motivational state with a specific direction, 
namely, the recovery of freedom” (Brehm, 1966, 
p.  11). With its “energizing and behavior- 
directing properties” (Brehm & Brehm, 1981, 
p. 98), reactance gives people the energy to resist 
what they do not want and turn to what they 
indeed want. Thereby people resist social influ-
ence when it is too strong. According to 
Dickenberger and Gniech (1982), social influ-
ence attempts at first result in conformity motiva-
tion (i.e., people adjust to the influence). As the 
social influence attempt gets stronger, conformity 
increases up to the point where the person 
 perceives the influence attempt as freedom- 
threatening. Then a second motivation emerges – 
reactance – which is manifested in resistance to 
the influence attempt. The more freedom-threat-
ening the person experiences the influence, the 
more reactance people experience. A field study 
by Heilman (1976) shows that people’s resistance 
increases with an increased intensity of the influ-
ence attempt (see detailed description of the 
study below). Such resistance behavior also 
becomes evident in a large body of research on 
persuasion as persuasive attempts often elicit 
some reactance.
 Persuasion Research
Non-smoking messages, clinical advice, dietary 
restrictions, or mandatory policies to mitigate 
environmental problems stimulate reactance and 
increase the non-desired behavior. For example, a 
study by Ungar, Sieverding, Schweizer, and 
Stadnitski (2015) showed that people who were 
given an intervention to eat five portions of fruit 
and vegetables per day showed high reactance 
immediately after and still 1 week after the inter-
vention. This reactance negatively influenced 
people’s attitude toward eating five portions of 
fruit and vegetables which predicted a lower con-
sumption of fruit and vegetables even 4 months 
later. Similarly, forcing people to give up smok-
ing can have the opposite effect (Erceg-Hurn & 
Steed, 2011; Grandpre, Alvaro, Burgoon, Miller, 
& Hall, 2003; Shoham, Trost, & Rohrbaugh, 
2004). These studies show that even small inter-
ventions can evoke reactance and consequently 
miss their well-intentioned recommendations.
Persuasion attempts also lead to the opposite 
effects in relationships. Prohibiting the partner to 
drink or smoke can trigger reactance and conse-
quently be counterproductive (Shoham et  al., 
2004). Similarly, preventing one’s partner from 
attending to attractive alternative partners can 
make those alternatives even more attractive. 
DeWall, Maner, Deckman, and Rouby (2011) 
showed that implicitly limiting participants’ 
attention to attractive pictures of the other sex 
results in lower satisfaction with and commit-
ment to their actual relationship and an increased 
positive attitude toward infidelity. Thus, the com-
munication and behavior in romantic relation-
ships can benefit from studies on relationship 
reactance.
 Reduction of Reactance
In the above examples, reactance is something 
undesirable that people who design interventions 
or try to persuade others strive to reduce. Thus, 
research has tested methods to reduce or elimi-
nate reactance. For example, taking the perspec-
tive of the threatening agent to think about 
reasons for the threat (Steindl & Jonas, 2012), 
helping people realize that they are free to decide 
for themselves (Bessarabova, Fink, & Turner, 
2013; Miller et al., 2007), or forewarning them of 
a potential freedom threat (Richards & Banas, 
2015) can reduce or prevent reactance.
A method to achieve public acceptance of 
mandatory actions was tested in a study by Uhl- 
Hädicke, Klackl, Mühlberger, and Jonas (2018). 
In this study, reactance was evoked by informing 
students that they were obligated to participate 
in mandatory actions to improve the university, 
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most aimed at protecting the environment (e.g., 
collecting plastic bottles at the university). When 
they watched a movie about the pollution of the 
sea by plastic garbage, participants evaluated the 
mandatory actions to help in protecting the envi-
ronment more positively when they imagined 
themselves in the position of an individual suffer-
ing from the situation than when they imagined 
the individual suffering from the situation.
For people who try to convince others, reactance 
is undesirable. However, for those who experi-
ence reactance, it might be something desirable. 
The arising reactance can support people in fight-
ing for their values and desires (i.e., for their 
identity). As such, reactance can not only be dis-
missed as something negative but rather as a con-
struct possessing a massive motivational force 
which makes people become clear about impor-
tant aspects of their self and which provides them 
with energy to fight for those aspects. In the next 
section, we elaborate on these ideas.
 The Motivational Force of Reactance: 
Self-Direction
For recommendations that aim at increasing peo-
ple’s health, most would agree that reactance is 
something undesirable that should be prevented. 
However, there are situations where reactance is 
considered something desirable and is even made 
use of. In paradoxical interventions, behavior 
change is attempted by using directives that dis-
courage from it (for an overview, see Miron & 
Brehm, 2006). For instance, in a study attempting 
to reduce procrastination (Shoham-Salomon, 
Avner, & Neeman, 1989), students were told to 
concentrate on producing procrastination (e.g., 
sitting in front of the study material but resist 
studying). Those students high on initial reac-
tance increased their effective study time more 
than those low on initial reactance. Thus, encour-
aging reactance arousal may sometimes lead to 
the opposite effect. Looking at the findings in a 
different light, the emerging reactance might 
have supported students in returning to what they 
actually wanted, namely, studying. Brehm calls 
that increased self-direction (Brehm, 1966; 
Brehm & Brehm, 1981). A person experiencing 
reactance “will feel that he can do what he wants, 
that he does not have to do what he doesn’t want, 
and that at least in regard to the freedom in ques-
tion, he is the sole director of his own behavior” 
(Brehm, 1966, p. 9). It makes people realize what 
they want; they become aware of their priorities.
This increased self-direction was also demon-
strated in a study by De Lemus, Bukowski, 
Spears, and Telga (2015). They found that women 
who were confronted with stereotypes contra-
dicting their social identity seemed to be threat-
ened in their freedom and consequently showed 
reactant responses – traditional women supported 
a gender-specific system even more when they 
were confronted with examples of less traditional 
(counter-stereotypic) women than when they 
were confronted with examples of traditional 
(stereotypic) women. In this example, reactance 
may have provided those women with the moti-
vation to defend their self containing own impor-
tant values, attitudes, and interests. Moreover, 
think back of the burkini example in the begin-
ning. Here, reactance might have provided 
women with the motivation to fight against the 
ban. Without reactance, they might have given up 
and accepted the situation as it is. In line with 
that, reactance is associated not just with negative 
affect, such as feeling angry or uncomfortable, 
but even with activating positive affect, such as 
feeling strong and determined (Sittenthaler, 
Steindl et al., 2015). The consequences of such 
positive affect have been shown in research on 
reactance and information search (for a summary, 
see Mühlberger, Jonas, & Sittenthaler, 2017). In 
two studies, restricted participants who felt 
Box 6.3 Questions for Elaboration
Imagine that you are a politician trying to 
convince people of a new highway regula-
tion that forces drivers to adhere to a speed 
limit of 80  km/h although it has always 
been 100 km/h. How would you handle it? 
What could you do to prevent reactance?
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strong and determined behaved in a more open-
minded way  – they did not further stick to the 
restricted freedom but were interested in alter-
natives serving their overarching goal which had 
been blocked by the threat.
 Autonomy
Becoming aware of one’s self and acting in 
accordance with it resembles the concept of 
autonomy as defined within Self-Determination 
Theory (SDT; Deci & Ryan, 1985; Ryan & Deci, 
2000; see Roth, Chap. 3 this volume). Autonomy 
is a basic psychological need and best described 
as a person’s desire to be self-governed. People 
are considered autonomous when they experi-
ence themselves as the origin of their actions and 
behave in accordance with their self (Deci & 
Ryan, 1985; Deci & Ryan, 2000). This descrip-
tion of autonomy has been called reflective 
autonomy (Koestner & Losier, 1996). Researchers 
differentiate it from reactive autonomy where 
people resist coercion just to be independent and 
free from others and which has been equated with 
reactance (Koestner & Losier, 1996). Although 
freedom threats trigger reactance in the form of a 
reactive autonomy, following Brehm’s (Brehm & 
Brehm, 1981) statement that through reactance it 
becomes clear what we want, some freedom 
threats may also trigger reflective autonomy. 
People desire to be autonomous – they want to be 
their own director of behavior and to behave in 
accordance with their self. To follow this desire, 
behaving freely is important. When freedom 
threats block the desire to be autonomous, it 
becomes even more important for us to know who 
we are, what we want, and what we do not want.
Leander et al. (2016) follow this idea and note 
that reactance is not just a reflex but rather an 
opportunity to enhance one’s autonomy by hav-
ing the freedom to choose between engaging and 
not engaging in the prohibited behavior. They 
showed that individuals did not simply react 
against every influence but reacted against influ-
ence when they could infer that they thereby 
received autonomy. The authors conclude that the 
superordinate goal served by reactance is auton-
omy and not just any kind of freedom restoration. 
Therefore, some freedom threats may stimulate 
autonomy, especially those threatening important 
aspects of one’s self. Evidence that people only 
show reactance to self-relevant threats comes 
from Laurin, Kay, and Fitzsimons (2012). They 
investigated under which conditions people 
accept a freedom restriction and under which 
they resist it. They hypothesized that when a 
restriction is absolute, people attach less impor-
tance to the freedom and, thus, rationalize it. In 
contrast, when the restriction is not absolute but 
there is a chance that it will not come into effect, 
people attach more importance to the freedom 
and, thus, show reactance. Moreover, rationaliza-
tion and reactance should only emerge when 
people view the restriction as self-relevant. They 
argued that people “should feel no motivation to 
protect rights that they do not exercise, nor to 
adapt to new restrictions that do not affect them” 
(Laurin et  al., 2012, p.  206). In two studies, 
 participants read about dangerous riding situa-
tions (high speed in cities, cell phone use while 
driving). In addition, some participants read 
about a new law that would restrict people in 
their driving habits (reduced speed limits, cell 
phone ban while driving). This law was described 
as definite (absolute condition) or as coming into 
effect only if enough government officials agreed 
(non- absolute condition). A control group did not 
receive any information on implementing the 
law. Results indicated that people who read about 
an absolute restriction reported a more positive 
attitude toward the new law than the control 
group (rationalization) and those who read about 
a non-absolute restriction reported a less positive 
attitude toward the new law than the control 
group (reactance). Both effects were strongest 
when the restriction was self-relevant, for exam-
ple, when people were frequent drivers.
Summarized, people do not reflexively show 
reactance to any kind of freedom threat but only to 
self-relevant threats and thereby may receive 
autonomy. Whether autonomy is indeed the super-
ordinate goal of reactance is an open question that 
remains to be tested.
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 The Effect of the Intensity 
of the Social Influence Attempt 
on People’s Reactance Striving: 
A Field Study
A field study by Heilman (1976) investigated the 
behavioral dynamics of reactance and predicted 
that people’s resistance to an influence attempt 
(reactance striving) increases with the intensity 
of the influence attempt. Moreover, the author 
predicted that under certain conditions, i.e., when 
the threatening agent has the power to implement 
retaliation for noncompliance, resistance behav-
ior is reduced. These hypotheses were tested in 
two experiments in which pedestrians were inter-
cepted in front of a supermarket in New  York 
City. The experimenter explained that she was 
collecting signatures for a petition advocating 
price controls for meats and vegetables. She 
showed pedestrians a clipboard with the petition 
and an index card which contained the experi-
mental induction. The card contained either a 
low-pressure influence attempt (“Raymond 
T. Finster… has spoken out against this resolu-
tion and claims that it would endanger the econ-
omy”), a high-pressure influence attempt (adding 
that Mr. Finster “…has said that people abso-
lutely should not be allowed to distribute or sign 
such petitions”), or an additional retaliation threat 
added to the high-pressure influence attempt 
(“He also said that careful note will be taken of 
all who do sign”). In Experiment 1 (N = 360), Mr. 
Finster was either described as a local official 
(low-power authority) or a top-level federal offi-
cial (high-power authority). Thus, Experiment 1 
was based on a 3 (low pressure vs. high pressure 
vs. high pressure and retaliation) × 2 (low power 
vs. high power) between-subjects design with 60 
participants for each of the 6 experimental condi-
tions. Participants were randomly assigned to one 
condition. Based on reactance theory, the author 
predicted that an increase in pressure not to sign 
the petition results in an increased signing. When 
the agent threatens people by retaliation for sign-
ing, signing should increase but only when the 
agent is presented as possessing low power. 
When the agent is presented as possessing high 
power and, thus, is able to implement retaliation, 
signing should decrease.
In line with the hypotheses, the higher the pres-
sure not to sign the petition, the more participants 
signed it. However, these results occurred only 
when participants were reading statements from a 
low-power authority. When they were reading 
statements from a high-power authority, more par-
ticipants signed the petition in the high- than in the 
low-pressure condition, but fewer participants 
signed the petition in the retaliation than in the 
low- or high-pressure condition (Table 6.1).
In Experiment 1, the agent’s capability to 
retaliate was manipulated by presenting him as 
Box 6.4 Question for Elaboration
Think of examples where reactance may be 
something desirable. Did you experience 
such situations yourself?
Despite a host of studies, reactance has 
often been investigated in the laboratory 
where people had to imagine freedom- 
threatening situations and had to self-report 
their experienced reactance and intended 
behavior. Only a few studies explored reac-
tance beyond the laboratory. One example 
for a field study is presented in the next 
section.
Table 6.1 Percentage of people signing the petition in Experiment 1 (also see Heilman, 1976)
Influence attempt
Low pressure High pressure High pressure and retaliation
Power of authority Percentage Percentage p Percentage p
Low power 52 72 <0.05 88 <0.05
High power 57 77 <0.05 18 <0.05
Note: p is the significance indicator for comparing the respective condition with the low-pressure condition
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possessing high power. In Experiment 2 
(N  =  300), the author predicted that the agent 
would be perceived as being capable to retaliate 
only when the participant’s identity was known. 
Thus, Experiment 2 was based on a 3 (low pres-
sure vs. high pressure vs. high pressure and retal-
iation)  ×  2 (non-anonymous vs. anonymous) 
between-subjects design with 50 participants for 
each of the 6 experimental conditions. Participants 
received the index card containing the low- 
pressure, high-pressure, or high-pressure and 
retaliation information, but Mr. Finster was 
always described as a top-level federal official 
(high power). As a second condition, the author 
varied whether participants could remain anony-
mous. One half of the participants was required 
to sign the petition (non-anonymous; same con-
dition as “high power” in Experiment 1), and the 
other half was told that their signature was not 
necessary but that they should vaguely indicate 
where they lived (anonymous). Participants were 
randomly assigned to one condition.
The results showed the same pattern as 
Experiment 1 for the non-anonymous condition – 
more participants signed the petition when the 
social influence attempt increased from low to 
high pressure. When there was a retaliation 
threat, fewer participants signed. When people 
could remain anonymous, people’s signing rate 
was high in all three conditions (Table 6.2).
The findings by Heilman (1976) provide sup-
port for the hypothesis that reactance striving 
plays a key role when people are externally pres-
sured to refrain from doing something. They 
seem to do the opposite of what they are told, 
which is also known as the boomerang effect. 
The two experiments are carefully conducted 
field studies with a well-structured procedure and 
the measure of actual behavior. Furthermore, in a 
pilot work, an issue which was important and 
believable for the population of New York City 
was selected, and randomizing the materials 
beforehand made the experimenter blind to the 
experimental condition. Although field experi-
ments are able to observe real behavior, they 
often cannot explore the underlying mechanisms 
for the behavior. Consequently, we do not know 
whether reactance motivation, i.e., the increased 
desire to engage in the relevant behavior, is 
indeed the underlying mechanism leading to the 
boomerang effect. For testing such mediating 
variables, a self-report measure assessing, for 
example, anger and counterarguments (Dillard & 
Shen, 2005) or experience of reactance (SSR 
Scale; Sittenthaler, Traut-Mattausch, Steindl 
et al., 2015) could have been handed to partici-
pants after signing the petition.
Summarized, the findings of the study indicate 
important implications for real-life situations. 
They underline that social influence attempts and 
especially the way in which we communicate can 
lead to the opposite of what we aimed at. This is 
supported by a number of reactance studies (e.g., 
Dillard & Shen, 2005; Erceg-Hurn & Steed, 
2011; Grandpre et al., 2003; Shoham et al., 2004; 
Ungar et  al., 2015) which also report actual or 
intended boomerang effects. At the same time, 
the study points at boundary conditions of reac-
tance. An agent’s power to implement retaliation 
for noncompliance seems to counteract reactance 
motivation and leads to increased compliance but 
only when a person cannot remain anonymous.
 The Value of Reactance
Finally, why is it important to know that there is 
a construct named reactance? Reactance is a 
common and natural reaction to threats present in 
everyone’s life. We need to understand reactance 
Table 6.2 Percentage of people signing the petition in Experiment 2 (also see Heilman, 1976)
Influence attempt
Low pressure High pressure High pressure and retaliation
Anonymity of participant Percentage Percentage p Percentage p
Nonanonymous 62 84 <0.05 30 <0.05
Anonymous 78 84 >0.05 88 >0.05
Note: p is the significance indicator for comparing the respective condition with the low-pressure condition
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not just as something undesirable that needs to be 
prevented or reduced. Rather, building on 
Brehm’s emphasis on the motivational side of 
reactance, reactance can be beneficial: it plays a 
key role in forming one’s identity. It makes indi-
viduals understand their self-containing princi-
ples  – what they want and what they do not 
want – and at the same time delivers the energy to 
fight for those principles.
 Recommended Reading
Brehm, J. W. (1966). A theory of psychological 
reactance. New York, NY: Academic Press.
Brehm, J.  W., & Brehm, S.  S. (1981). 
Psychological reactance—A theory of free-
dom and control. New  York, NY: Academic 
Press.
Miron, A. M., & Brehm, J. W. (2006). Reactance 
theory—40  years later. Zeitschrift Für 
Sozialpsychologie/Journal of Psychology, 37, 
9–18. https://doi.org/10.1024/0044-3514.37.1.9
Steindl, C., Jonas, E., Sittenthaler, S., Traut- 
Mattausch, E., & Greenberg, J. (2015). 
Understanding psychological reactance: New 
developments and findings. Zeitschrift für 
Psychologie/Journal of Psychology, 223, 
205–214. https://doi.org/10.1027/2151-2604/
a000222
 Guiding Answers to Questions 
in the Chapter
 1. Q (With Box 6.1): Think about examples in 
your life where you believed that you are free 
but then were restricted in this freedom. Did 
you experience reactance? How did you react? 
What were your subjective and behavioral 
reactions?
A: With subjective reactions, we mean what 
emotions you felt and whether you liked the 
restricted freedom more because of the restric-
tion (attractiveness change). With behavioral 
reactions, we mean what you did in order to 
restore the threatened freedom.
 2. Q (With Box 6.3): Imagine that you are a 
politician trying to convince people of a new 
highway regulation that forces drivers to 
adhere to a speed limit of 80 km/h although it 
has always been 100 km/h. How would you 
handle it? What could you do to prevent 
reactance?
A: To prevent reactance, research has tested dif-
ferent methods such as perspective taking, fore-
warning of a threat, or helping people realize 
that they are free to decide for themselves. Try 
to use those methods in your attempt to con-
vince people of the new regulation.
Summary
• People believe they possess certain free-
doms. When these freedoms are threat-
ened, they can experience psychological 
reactance, a motivational state charac-
terized by the strong desire to restore 
freedom and actual behavioral attempts 
to do so.
• Reactance is manifested in reactance 
motivation and reactance striving.
• Attempts to measure reactance have 
found that it consists of an experience of 
threat, an emotional experience, cogni-
tive processes, and changes in physio-
logical arousal and brain activity.
• The emergence of reactance depends on 
the importance of the threatened free-
dom, the perceived extent of the free-
dom threat, and people’s experienced 
ability of restoring the freedom.
• People can also experience reactance on 
behalf of another person (vicarious 
reactance).
• Reactance is not negative per se but 
makes people aware of their self and sup-
ports them in fighting for what they want.
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 3. Q (With Box 6.4): Think of examples where 
reactance may be something desirable. Did 
you experience such situations yourself?
A: With desirable we mean that resisting a 
freedom threat had a positive outcome for 
you (as in paradoxical interventions) or reac-
tance made you feel strong and determined or 
made you feel aware of important priorities in 
your life.
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 Basic Theory
Human beings are social animals. They do not 
operate in a vacuum, but instead they are continu-
ously influenced by others human beings. As 
such, an individual’s emotions, attitudes, and 
behaviors cannot be viewed separately from the 
social groups they belong to. Social groups can 
be as small as a family or as large as a nation or 
religious group, and every individual belongs to 
different social groups. Every social group holds 
certain standards, expectations, and rules for 
what is “normal” and “appropriate” to feel, think, 
and do, which have an effect on all members of 
the group. These standards, expectations, and 
rules are referred to as social norms. A group’s 
social norms are often unwritten; yet, they tend to 
be deeply institutionalized in the group and fully 
internalized by the group’s members. That is, the 
social norms that exist in a given individual’s rel-
evant social group will affect that individual not 
only when there are other group members present 
(and when there is thus a direct incentive to 
adhere to the group’s norms), but also when there 
are no other group members nearby.
Definition Box
Social norms: These are the standards, 
expectations, and rules held by a social 
group for what is “normal” and “appropri-
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The influence of social norms is ubiquitous 
and is generally considered in psychology to be 
one of the essential drivers of human behavior 
(e.g., Berkowitz, 1972; Birnbaum & Sagarin, 
1976; Sherif, 1936), and social norm-based con-
cepts have long been included in models and 
theories that aim to predict human behavior (e.g., 
Bandura, 1977; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). 
However, questions were also being raised about 
the usefulness of the concept of social norms, 
with several scholars pointing out the vagueness 
and overgeneralization of the concept, as well as 
the highly inconsistent predictive value of social 
norms (e.g., Darley & Latane, 1970; Marini, 
1984; Schwartz, 1973). In response to these criti-
cisms, a theoretical refinement of the concept of 
social norms, and the manner in which they 
impact human behavior, was introduced by 
Cialdini and colleagues (Cialdini, Reno, & 
Kallgren, 1990; Cialdini, Kallgren, & Reno, 
1991; Kallgren, Reno, & Cialdini, 2000; Reno, 
Cialdini, & Kallgren, 1993). This resulted in the 
Focus Theory of Normative Conduct (Fig. 7.1). 
The Focus Theory of Normative Conduct both 
refines the definition of social norms by making a 
clear distinction between two different types of 
social norms, descriptive and injunctive social 
norms, and introduces the concept of normative 
focus to shed light on which type of social norm 
will affect people’s behavior in which type of 
situation, and why.
 Descriptive and Injunctive Social 
Norms
Human behavior in social situations stems from 
two very different motivational sources, as was 
shown as far back as 1955 by Deutsch and 
Gerard. People may be influenced by others 
because they consider these others a source of 
informational social influence – that is, the actual 
behavior of others provides information about the 
Fig. 7.1 Schematic 
representation of the 
Focus Theory of 
Normative Conduct
ate” to feel, think, and do. A group’s social 
norms are often unwritten; yet, they tend to 
be deeply institutionalized in the group and 
fully internalized by the group’s members.
Definition Box
Focus Theory of Normative Conduct: 
This theory stipulates that norms affect 
human behavior powerfully and systemati-
cally. In situations where several social 
norms are present at the same time, behav-
ior will be dictated by the focal norm, that 
is, the norm that is made salient and that 
attention is focused on. The theory further 
distinguishes between two different kinds 
of social norms: descriptive and injunctive 
norms. The theory is described in more 
detail in this section.
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normal, usual, or correct way to behave in a 
certain situation. This influences people’s behav-
ior because humans are generally motivated to be 
accurate (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004): They want 
to respond to any given situation in the most effi-
cient way possible, and how others behave pro-
vides important cues about what might be the 
most efficient or adaptive way to behave. Cialdini 
has argued that looking to others as a source of 
information offers an information-processing 
advantage and provides a so-called decisional 
shortcut (Cialdini, 1988). The Focus Theory of 
Normative Conduct refers to social norms that 
describe what is the typical or usual thing to do as 
descriptive norms. Conversely, people may also 
be influenced by others because they consider 
these others a source of normative social influ-
ence. – the expectations of others provide infor-
mation about the appropriate or desired way to 
behave in a certain situation. This influences 
people’s behavior because humans are generally 
motivated to affiliate with others (Cialdini & 
Goldstein, 2004): They want to build and main-
tain social relationships with those around them, 
to be liked and approved by others, and to avoid 
social exclusion. What other people expect pro-
vides important cues about which behaviors will 
allow one to meet these affiliation goals. The 
Focus Theory of Normative Conduct refers to 
social norms that describe what ought to be done 
as injunctive norms.
In many situations, descriptive and injunctive 
norms will be aligned. In these cases, what a 
social group believes ought to be done is also 
indeed what is being done by the group members 
(e.g., when library visitors turn silent upon 
entering the library, Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2003). 
However, the underlying motive for being silent 
in the library may still differ from one person to 
the other, and the fundamental differences 
between the two major sources of motivation are 
highly relevant both theoretically and practically, 
as we will demonstrate in the following sections. 
Important to note already here is that the infor-
mational source of social influence is more 
directly related to the behavioral decision at 
hand: People simply wish to behave in the most 
adaptive way possible and use other people’s 
behavior as a cue to inform them about that most 
adaptive way (see also Manning, 2009). The nor-
mative source of social influence, conversely, is 
at best indirectly related to the behavioral deci-
sion at hand: People are not so much looking for 
the best solution to the behavioral decision itself, 
but rather are looking to attain a more distant 
goal, namely to gain social approval and avoid 
social sanctions (even if this may lead to a subop-
timal behavioral decision). This is corroborated 
by results from a priming study (Jacobson, 
Mortensen, & Cialdini, 2011 Study 1): Priming 
people with descriptive norm-related words (e.g., 
“typical,” “usual”) led to faster responses on 
target words related to the goal of accuracy (e.g., 
“accurate,” “efficient”) compared to comparison 
non-words, whereas priming people with injunc-
tive norm-related words (e.g., “ought,” “duty”) 
led to faster response times on target words 
related to the goal of social approval (e.g., 
“approval,” “team”).
The crucial relevance of this distinction has 
been very aptly demonstrated in Asch’s 
conformity experiments (1951), in which 
participants had to perform a very simple task in 
a group setting – each group member in turn had 
to publicly provide their solution of the task. 
Unknowing to the participants, all other members 
of the group were confederates to the experiment, 
who would purposely provide a wrong answer to 
the simple task. Post hoc interviews with the true 
participants convincingly showed that participants 
could have very different reasons for going along 
with people providing a faulty answer on a very 
simple task. Participants with low self-esteem, 
for example, were genuinely confused when 
Definition Box
Descriptive norms: Social norms that 
describe what is the typical or usual thing 
to do within a certain social groups.
Injunctive norms: Social norms that 
describe what other group members think 
ought to be done.
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others provided a wrong answer and became 
unsure of their own judgment. These participants 
reported going along with others’ answer simply 
because they no longer trust their own judgment 
and considered that multiple others simply could 
not be wrong – thus using the other people as a 
source of informational social influence (see 
also Wylie, 1961; Ziller, Hagey, Smith, & Long, 
1969). Other participants, however, indicated 
being very much aware of the fact that the 
answer that was provided by the other people 
was wrong, but stated that they simply did not 
want to be the one to diverge and stand out from 
the group. For these participants, the others 
became a source of normative social influence. 
Giving a correct answer was no longer their 
main priority; rather, maintaining a sense of 
belonging to the group became the main priority 
(Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004).
 Normative Focus
In normal day-to-day situations, multiple social 
norms are typically present at the same time. 
While these may be congruent, many times they 
will also be in conflict with each other. A good 
social norms theory then, in order to have any 
practical use, should be able to make some sort of 
prediction as to which norm will affect behavior 
under which conditions. The Focus Theory of 
Normative Conduct aims to do so by introducing 
the concept of normative focus. Normative focus 
refers to the idea that any given social norm will 
only influence behavior when it is activated at the 
moment of the behavioral decision, that is, when 
that specific norm is made salient or when an 
individual’s attention is focused on that specific 
norm while choosing their path of action.
For example, multiple early studies by Cialdini 
and colleagues showed that a descriptive anti- 
littering norm (i.e., a clean environment) always 
led to less littering than a descriptive pro-littering 
norm (i.e., a littered environment), but that this 
effect became much more pronounced when the 
descriptive norm was made focal (i.e., when 
people’s attention was specifically drawn toward 
the norm; Cialdini et  al., 1990, Study 1; Reno 
et al., 1993, Study 1). Similarly, focusing people 
on an injunctive social norm not to litter led to 
lower littering than focusing people on a no-norm 
control message (Cialdini et al., 1990, Study 5). 
The same study also showed that focusing 
participants on an injunctive social norm close to 
an anti-littering norm, namely a recycling norm, 
led to lower littering than focusing them on an 
injunctive social norm that is far away from an 
injunctive anti-littering norm, such as a voting 
norm  – but littering following the voting norm 
was still lower than following a no-norm control 
message. This is in line with the idea of spreading 
activation of neural networks (e.g., Anderson, 
1983; Harvey & Enzle, 1981).
What the Focus Theory of Normative Conduct 
added to the field was a more profound under-
standing of when and why social norms would 
affect behavior, and also under which conditions 
social norms would not affect behavior. Indeed, in 
one article, Cialdini and colleagues concluded 
that “[o]ur data indicate that under naturally 
occurring conditions, if there is no salience, 
behavior will be largely unguided by normative 
considerations. […] It is misguided to expect that 
because norms are constantly in place within a 
person or culture, they are constantly in force” 
(Kallgren et  al., 2000, p.  1010–1011). This 
Box 7.1 Zooming In: A Closer Look at Asch’s 
Conformity Experiments
Many variations of the Asch’s conformity 
experiments have been performed. One 
interesting variation is the inclusion of one 
“accomplice” (one other person who also 
diverges from the group opinion). This has 
dramatic effects on the answers people pro-
vide. Interestingly, this is especially true 
for those motivated by informational social 
influence. Videos of the Asch’s conformity 
experiments, as well as more information 
on such variations of the experiment, can 
be found on YouTube by searching for 
“Asch conformity.” Heroic Imagination 
TV, for example, has created a highly infor-
mational video.
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increased insight allowed the field to move for-
ward in terms of systematic hypothesis testing, 
which in turn opened up possibilities for applying 
the concept of social norms to public behavior 
change.
An important limitation of the Focus Theory 
of Normative Conduct is that the processes 
through which a norm can become focal are not 
described sufficiently in the original theory and 
accompanying early studies of the theory. These 
studies mainly focused on quite artificial norm 
shift manipulations in highly specific and 
oversimplified settings. In real life, however, the 
contexts in which behavioral decisions are made 
are hardly ever so simple. Consider the example 
of eating behavior: Over 200 eating-related 
decisions are made each day (Wansink & Sobal, 
2007), and this is done in an environment filled 
with multiple eating-related norms, which not 
only often conflict each other (think of thin, fit 
people advertising extremely unhealthy food 
types), but also often are ambiguous, vague, or 
outdated (De Ridder, De Vet, Stok, Adriaanse, & 
De Wit, 2013). It is not easy to ascertain how in 
such complex environments, one social norm 
becomes focal over many others using the 
knowledge from the type of studies described 
earlier. Moreover, the exact procedures employed 
to make social norms focal in these early studies 
of the Focus Theory of Normative Conduct have 
been criticized for not always being empirically 
and theoretically convincing. While these issues 
limit the conclusions that can be drawn from 
these early studies on its own, a large body of 
subsequent research exists to back up the idea of 
the importance of normative focus. It is to several 
of such studies that we now turn our attention.
 Research in an Applied Context
Social norms have been used to promote desired 
behavior in a large number of applied settings, 
such as consumer behavior, health behavior 
(most notably alcohol consumption in college 
students, but also many other types of health 
behavior), and sustainable behavior. For example, 
the so-called social norms approach (Perkins & 
Berkowitz, 1986) became popular in the 1990s 
off the back of a seminal study showing that col-
lege students highly overestimated their peers’ 
alcohol abuse and acceptance of alcohol abuse, 
Box 7.2 Zooming In: Criticism of the 
Procedures to Make Social Norms Focal
The exact procedures employed to make 
social norms focal in these early studies of 
the Focus Theory of Normative Conduct 
can be criticized (as Cialdini and his col-
leagues indeed point out themselves, 
e.g., Kallgren et al., 2000) for not always 
being empirically and theoretically con-
vincing. As an illustration, consider the 
example of a norm focus manipulation dis-
cussed in this chapter, the case of a confed-
erate walking through a clean area and then 
either littering or not littering. This manipu-
lation may be interpreted by the average 
reader in a different manner than by Cialdini 
and colleagues. Their interpretation is that 
in a littered environment, a littering confed-
erate makes a descriptive pro-littering norm 
more salient than a non-littering confeder-
ate, but in clean environment, a littering 
confederate in fact makes a descriptive anti-
littering norm more salient (because it so 
obviously goes against the anti-littering 
norm stipulated by the clean environment). 
Theoretical underpinnings for this assump-
tion are weak at best. There is no convinc-
ing argumentation as to (a) why the same 
behavior of one confederate can apparently 
make opposite norms salient, (b) why litter-
ing of one person in a clean environment 
would underscore anti-littering rather than 
pro- littering, and (c) why the one-time 
behavior of one single person would con-
stitute a powerful norm shift manipulation 
in the first place (generally, social norms 
are thought to have to stem from a group 
of people).
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and that these misperceptions influenced college 
students’ own drinking attitudes and behavior 
approximate to the perceived norm (Perkins & 
Berkowitz, 1986). Such misperceptions (labeled 
as “pluralistic ignorance”; Toch & Klofas, 1984) 
occur both in relation to problem behaviors 
(which are usually overestimated) and protective 
behaviors (which are usually underestimated).
The idea of the social norms approach was that, 
by presenting more accurate descriptive norms 
through campaigns, these misperceptions would 
be corrected and alcohol abuse (or other problem-
atic behaviors) would be reduced. Such interven-
tions are easy to implement and inexpensive, and it 
is therefore not surprising that the basic concept 
was quickly adopted in many other policy 
domains as well. However, the popularity of 
social norm-based interventions is not supported 
by a strong and consistent record of efficacy. 
With regard to college students’ alcohol con-
sumption, for example, positive effects (Turner, 
Perkins, & Bauerle, 2008), no effects (Granfield, 
2005), and even counterproductive effects of 
social norms interventions have been reported 
(Campo & Cameron, 2006; Clapp, Lange, Russel, 
Shillington, & Voas, 2003).
One of the reasons for this might be that many 
of these social norm-based interventions moved 
away from the original approach of correcting 
misperceived norms toward the use of manipu-
lated, made-up norms to affect behavior. In any 
case, the substantial variation in effectivity sug-
gests that social norm interventions are not a 
“quick-and-dirty” panacea for all who wish to 
instigate behavior change  – rather, attention 
should be paid to how and when social norms can 
instigate behavior change, and what are important 
moderators of the effect of social norms (Burchell, 
Rettie, & Patel, 2013; Rimal & Real, 2003). 
We will discuss two important moderators in 
detail below in the following text.
 Self-Regulatory Resources
A first crucial moderator of social norm effects is 
the extent to which people have access to self- 
regulatory resources when they are exposed to a 
norm (Jacobson et al., 2011). It has been sug-
gested that the availability of self- regulatory 
resources when exposed to social norms plays a 
crucial role in determining whether these social 
norms become focal, and thus affect one’s behav-
ior, or not (Jacobson et al., 2011). As already dis-
cussed earlier, descriptive norms provide 
informational social influence that is directly 
related to the behavioral decision at hand, 
whereas injunctive norms provide normative 
social influence that is directly related to the 
more distant goal of social affiliation, and only 
indirectly related to the behavioral decision at 
hand. It has been shown that self-regulatory 
capacity interacts very differently with these two 
underlying motives.
Under conditions of low self-regulatory 
capacity (or similar “fast” types of processing; 
cf. Kahneman, 2011), people’s decision-making 
tends to be less well thought-through and more 
automatic. In such instances, quick heuristics 
that help make effective, adaptive decisions are 
highly helpful, and this is exactly what descrip-
tive social norms offer (remember that Cialdini 
has referred to descriptive social norms as “deci-
sional shortcuts”). When self-regulatory capac-
ity is higher (or when people have the opportunity 
Box 7.3 Question for Elaboration
You have been assigned to design a strategy 
for less alcohol consumption on campus. 
What would you prefer: using a descriptive 
norm or an injunctive norm?
Definition Box 
Self-regulatory resources: The capacity 
that people have to exert effortful control 
over their inner states and external behav-
iors (Vohs & Baumeister, 2016; 
Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007; see also 
Gieseler, Loschelder, & Friese, Chap. 1 
this volume). This capacity has been 
shown to be limited, that is, people do not 
always have ample self-regulatory capac-
ity available at any given moment.
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and the motivation for “slow” thinking; cf. 
Kahneman, 2011), people might rely more on 
other factors, such as their own values and goals, 
to come to a behavioral decision, and descriptive 
norms may thus play a less crucial role. These 
ideas have been corroborated by various studies 
in multiple domains.
For example, it has been shown (Jacobson 
et  al., 2011, Studies 3 and 4) that, under condi-
tions of low self-regulatory capacity, college stu-
dents were more likely to comply to a 
time-consuming request when that request was 
framed as a descriptive norm (along the lines of 
“most other students in past instances have cho-
sen to comply with this request”). On the other 
hand, when self-regulatory capacity was high, 
college students were more likely to comply with 
the request when it was framed as an injunctive 
norm (along the lines of “most students felt that 
people should comply with this request”). 
Similarly, in the health domain, students who 
were made cognitively busy (and who thus had 
limited effortful processing capacity available) 
were more likely to express intent to join an early-
morning physical activity program when this pro-
gram was advertised as a popular program that 
many students were signing up for. Conversely, 
students who were provided more effortful pro-
cessing capacity were more likely to express 
intent to join the program when it was advertised 
as a program that others thought reflected impor-
tant values and important personal qualities 
(Kredentser, Fabrigar, Smith, & Fulton, 2012). 
Salmon, Fennis, De Ridder, Adriaanse, and De 
Vet (2014) showed that people were more likely 
to pick a healthy type of food promoted by a 
descriptive social norm only when these people 
had low self- regulatory capacity available – when 























Fig. 7.2 Self-regulatory 
capacity affects food 
choice after exposure to 
a social norm. The 
choice for healthy 
products that were 
advertised by a 
descriptive social norm 
(the “social proof 
heuristic”) was affected 
by available self- 
regulatory capacity in 
the study by Salmon 
et al. (2014, p. 107)
Box 7.4 Zooming In: Human Cognitive 
Processing
Human cognitive processes are guided by 
two parallel systems. System 1, the “fast 
system”, provides quick, intuitive, and 
automatic reactions and guides our deci-
sion-making most of the time. System-1 
decisions do not require much cognitive 
effort; they are guided by habits and heuris-
tics. System 2, the “slow system”, is acti-
vated less often and requires substantial 
cognitive effort. This system provides 
deliberate, reasoned reactions.




Simple decisions Complex decisions
Error-prone Reliable
High capacity Low capacity
7 The Focus Theory of Normative Conduct
102
Jacobson, Mortensen, Jacobson, and Cialdini 
(2015) brilliantly completed this picture by show-
ing that the effectiveness of injunctive norms on 
people’s behavior was moderated by the trait of 
impulse restraint; that is, less impulsive people 
were more likely to be affected by injunctive 
norm messages.
 Relationship with the Norm Referent 
Group
The relationship that an individual has with the 
social group from which a given social norm 
stems, the norm referent group, also plays an 
important role in determining whether a social 
norm becomes focal and will affect behavioral 
decisions. Social identity theory and self- 
categorization theory (e.g., Turner, 1999; 
Scheepers & Ellemers, Chap. 9 this volume) 
stipulate that one’s self-concept consists of 
multiple identities, reflecting different roles that 
people take on in different social groups. 
Performing the behaviors that are congruent with 
a given social group validates one’s sense of 
belonging to that group, and in that sense boosts 
self-identity.
Building upon these premises, the referent 
informational influence model (Terry & Hogg, 
1996) stipulates that a social group’s behaviors 
and expectations will affect an individual only to 
the extent that an individual identifies with that 
social group. If this condition is not met, what 
people stemming from that group do themselves, 
or expect others to do, should have a much less 
significant influence on people’s behavior. It is 
important to note that identification with a group 
is not the same as belonging to the group per se: 
All people are part of in-groups which they do 
not feel particularly strongly connected to (e.g., 
“humankind”; “people with blonde hair”), but it 
is unlikely that they also identify with these 
groups extremely strongly, and therefore, it is 
unlikely that a norm stemming from such groups 
will affect people’s behavior significantly.
The importance of identification with the 
norm referent group has been established primar-
ily for the effect of descriptive social norms. 
Recycling intentions (Terry, Hogg, & White, 
1999), intentions to use sun protection (Terry & 
Hogg, 1996), binge drinking (Johnston & White, 
2003), and eating behavior (Stok, De Ridder, De 
Vet, & De Wit, 2012) were all affected by descrip-
tive social norms stemming from an in-group – 
but only when the participants identified strongly 
with that in-group. For injunctive social norms, 
less research is available that investigates the role 
of identification, but Yun and Silk (2011) showed 
that the role of identification was less relevant for 
injunctive social norms than for descriptive social 
norm effects.
 Using Descriptive or Injunctive Social 
Norms To Instigate Behavior Change
Cialdini and colleagues posit that of the two types 
of social norms, injunctive social norms are most 
useful for those wishing to promote behavior 
change in others (e.g., Cialdini et al., 1991; Reno 
et al., 1993). Their position is based on the idea 
that making a descriptive norm salient is only 
beneficial when the behavior of most other peo-
ple is in the desired direction. For example, when 
wishing to promote fruit consumption among the 
general public, focusing them on the reigning 
descriptive norm would be useful only if most of 
the public already consume a lot of fruit. After 
all, if this is not the case, the descriptive norm 
would actually be to not eat that much fruit, and 
this might have detrimental rather than health- 
promotive effects (that this is indeed possible is 
shown by, for example, Sieverding, Decker, & 
Zimmerman, 2010, and Stok et al., 2012). They 
further stipulate that an injunctive norm, on the 
other hand, can be put to use in any given situa-
tion, because the socially driven motivations that 
Box 7.5 Question for Elaboration
The railway station wants people to litter 
less while they are waiting for trains on the 
platform. In what way, would it help the 
waiting passengers to identify with a social 
group?
F. M. Stok and D. T. D. de Ridder
103
underlie injunctive norm effects play a role 
regardless of what others are actually doing. 
However, recent theorizing and empirical evi-
dence challenge the idea that injunctive norms 
are by definition more useful in multiple ways.
For example, recent insights indicate that when 
the majority of people are not yet showing the 
desired behavior, descriptive norms can be formed 
instead around what most people would like to do 
(Sunstein, 1996) or around the fact that the num-
ber of people performing the desired behavior is 
increasing (called “trending norms”; Mortensen 
et al., in press). Moreover, there may be situations 
where injunctive norms actually lead to less opti-
mal outcomes. Injunctive social norms do have a 
pushy component, wherein they tell people what 
they should be doing. The risk with such norms, 
especially when the socially approved option does 
not align with what the individual might person-
ally value, is that it creates a feeling of resistance 
or reactance (Brehm, 1966; see Mühlberger & 
Jonas, Chap. 6 this volume) in the individual. 
There is research suggesting that injunctive social 
norms do hold this risk (e.g., Bosson, Parrott, 
Swan, Kuchynka, & Schramm, 2015; Stok, De 
Vet, De Wit, Renner, & De Ridder, 2015) and that 
this may, under certain circumstances, cause 
injunctive social norms to be less effective than 
descriptive social norms or to even be counterpro-
ductive (e.g., Stok et al., 2014).
 Detailed Discussion of One Study
One of the most-cited articles (well over 1500 
citations) that describes effects of social norms 
on people’s behavior is the one in which two 
studies on towel reuse by hotel guests are 
described by Goldstein, Cialdini, and Griskevicius 
(2008). Having hotel guests use their towel more 
than once saves energy and water, reduces the 
amount of polluting detergent released into the 
environment, and as such is important from an 
Box 7.6 Zooming In: Why Descriptive Social 
Norms Should Be Communicated with Care
Many desired behaviors (such as recycling, 
being physically active, and adhering to 
speed limits) are performed less often than 
we as a society would hope. Similarly, 
many undesired behaviors (such as aggres-
sion, overeating, and crossing red traffic 
lights) are performed too often. A common, 
and understandable, response of policy 
makers is to alert the public to these figures 
with the intention of instigating behavior 
change, thus communicating that, for 
example, cancer screen attendance is too 
low, or that a large majority of children are 
consuming too many soft drinks. 
Unfortunately, however, there are strong 
indications that such communications do 
not lead to behavior change in the desired 
direction. From the perspective of the 
Focus Theory of Normative Conduct, this 
is actually understandable: When it is com-
municated, for example, that only few peo-
ple wear sunscreen when going outside, the 
average person may simply conclude that it 
is thus “normal” not to wear sunscreen and 
that they can simply continue doing so. 
Even more detrimental effects might occur 
in the few people who were initially apply-
ing sunscreen correctly: They might actu-
ally stop doing so, to conform to the group’s 
standards. Such effects have been shown 
for intentions to attend cancer screening 
(Sieverding and colleagues, 2010) as well 
as for fruit consumption (Stok, De Ridder, 
De Vet, & De Wit, 2014). When the current 
behavior is not up to the desired standards, 
therefore, these “normative facts” should 
be communicated with great care!
Box 7.7 Question for Elaboration
The Netherlands Nutrition Centre has previ-
ously launched a healthy eating campaign 
with the slogan “80% knows [about healthy 
food], 20% eats it.” Is this a good campaign 
strategy?
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environmental perspective. In addition, it helps 
hotels save money and portray themselves as 
environmentally friendly. The two studies con-
ducted by Goldstein et al. (2008) investigate the 
effectiveness of a descriptive norm-based mes-
sage, as compared to the more traditional “help 
save the environment” message that is the stan-
dard message used by hotels, to encourage towel 
reuse by its guests. The second study additionally 
investigates how the use of different norm refer-
ent groups moderates the effect of the descriptive 
norm message. A strong suit of the two studies is 
that they were conducted in the field, that is, in a 
real hotel with regular hotel guests as the 
(unknowing) participants.
The first study employed a between-subjects 
design. Over the course of 80 days, one of two 
messages was displayed on a towel rack hanger 
placed in the bathrooms of hotel rooms of a 
“midsized, midpriced hotel in the Southwest that 
was part of a national chain” (Goldstein et  al., 
2008, p. 473). The hotel had 190 rooms, which 
were randomly assigned to a descriptive norm- 
based message or a standard pro-environmental 
message (Table 7.1). The towel rack hangers (see 
Fig.  7.3) also provided detailed instructions for 
guests about how to indicate their willingness to 
reuse their towel (i.e., by hanging them on the 
towel rack or over the shower curtain rod). On the 
back of the hanger, information was provided on 
the benefits of towel reuse for the environment 
(e.g., saving water and preventing the release of 
detergent into the environment). Hotel room 
attendants were trained to record hotel guests’ 
towel reuse behavior through repeated instruc-
tion and provision of pictures showing the differ-
ent types of towel placement that should be 
considered as towel reuse. The behavior of guests 
staying in the hotel for a minimum of two nights 
was analyzed. For guests staying for more than 
two nights, only their towel reuse behavior of the 
first eligible day was analyzed, so as to ensure 
that each guest participated in the study only 
once. Crucially, a higher percentage of hotel 
guests staying in a room with a descriptive norm 
message on the towel rack hanger reused at least 
one towel (44.1%) than of guests in a room where 
the standard pro-environmental message was 
displayed (35.1%). The difference between these 
percentages was statistically significant as proven 
by a chi-square test.
The second study, which was conducted in the 
same hotel, dived deeper into the question of 
whose norms people are most likely to follow. 
As we have detailed earlier, identification with 
the norm referent group is an important modera-
tor of the effect of social norms, especially of 
descriptive social norms. Most often, the extent 
of identification is based on personal 
characteristics (age, gender, ethnicity, interests). 
Goldstein et  al. (2008) sought to investigate 
whether more random, contextual characteristics 
could also play a role in identification, and 
whether contextual similarity to the referent 
group would have a larger or smaller effect than 
personal similarity to the referent group. To that 
end, in addition to the two messages used in 
Study 1, three additional messages were designed, 
leading to a total of five different experimental 
conditions (Table 7.1). Contextual similarity was 
highlighted by using as norm referent group 
people who stayed in the same hotel room. Two 
other messages highlighted personal similarity 
by using as norm referent groups either fellow 
men and women or fellow citizens. Hotel rooms 
were, again, assigned to an experimental 
condition at random. Over 53 days, towel reuse 
was shown to be higher in all social norm-based 
message conditions than in the pro-environmental 
message condition. Furthermore, the norm 
stemming from the contextual similarity referent 
group, comprising people who had stayed in the 
same room, yielded higher towel reuse (49.3%) 
than the descriptive norms (42.8% on average) 
(see Fig. 7.4).
The two studies thus showed that a descriptive 
social norm message increases towel reuse behav-
ior in hotel guests as compared to a standard pro-
environmental message. As a point of criticism 
with regard to Study 2, it should be noted that the 
two personal similarity conditions were by design 
less likely to affect behavior than the contextual 
similarity condition, as they were less tailored to 
the participant: While in the contextual similarity 
condition, there was a clear, one-to-one connec-
tion between the referent group and the partici-
pant, namely, that they all stayed in the same exact 
room, the two personal similarity conditions did 
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not specify this connection on a one-to-one basis. 
The citizen- based message was a general mes-
sage, that is, it was not tailored to the participant’s 
specific city, and the gender-based message 
reported the behavior of both genders, from which 
participants then had to “self-select” the relevant 
norm. The main take-away messages from these 
two studies are thus (1) the increase in towel reuse 
after providing hotel guests with a descriptive 
norm- based message compared to a standard 
pro- environmental message, and (2) the larger 
effectivity of a descriptive norm based on a more 
contextually similar referent group, that of people 
who previously stayed in the exact same room, 
compared to a less similar group, that of people 
who previously stayed in the same hotel. Important 
to note here is that the comparison condition 
against which the descriptive norms were com-
pared was not a no-message control condition: 
The comparison was against an environment-pro-
tection message that itself also has a clear inten-
tion to influence behavior and that, as such, 
constitutes a very strict comparison condition.
Goldstein et al.’ (2008) towel reuse study has 
been replicated multiple times, and results were 
not always consistent. Some studies replicated 
the enhanced effect of social norm-based mes-
sages compared to other types of messages 
(Reese, Loew, & Steffgen, 2014; Schultz, 
Khazian, & Zaleski, 2008; Terrier & Marfaing, 
2015), whereas others did not (Bohner & 
Schlüter, 2014; Mair & Bergin-Seers, 2010). 
Crucially, two different syntheses of the body of 
literature on this topic have provided evidence for 
a small but consistent positive effect of descrip-
tive norm-based messages (regardless of level of 
identification). A Bayesian evidence synthesis 
(Scheibehenne, Jamil, & Wagenmakers, 2016) 
showed that the studies, taken together, provide 
strong support for the effect of social norms on 
towel reuse. While this evidence synthesis has 
been criticized for not taking into account ran-
dom effects (Carlsson, Schimmack, Williams, & 
Bürkner, 2017, who themselves report smaller, 
but largely still supportive, effects using Bayesian 
multilevel framework analyses with varying 
assumptions about between-study variation), a 
small but highly consistent effect was also 
reported in a more traditional meta-analysis that 
allowed for between-study heterogeneity (Nisa, 
Varum, & Botelho, 2017). Furthermore, a ran-
dom-effects meta-analysis of social influence 
effects on more general resource conservation 
(including but not limited to towel reuse) also 
found a small but consistent and significant effect 
of social norm-based messages compared to con-
trol messages (Abrahamse & Steg, 2013). Taking 
this body of evidence together, it seems fair to 
conclude that social norm-based messages have 
been proven to affect towel reuse behavior, 
although the effect is not overwhelmingly large 
compared to strict control conditions.
Fig. 7.3 The standard pro-environmental message used 
in the first towel reuse study. (Note: image replicated from 
Goldstein et al., 2008, p. 474)
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Fig. 7.4 Percentage of people reusing at least one towel per experimental condition in the second towel reuse study. 
(Note: Image replicated from Goldstein et al., 2008, p. 478)
Summary
• People’s behavior is guided by social 
norms, the often-unwritten rules of con-
duct that tend to be deeply institutional-
ized in a social group.
• Social norms that describe what is the 
typical or usual thing to do within a cer-
tain social group are called descriptive 
norms.
• Social norms that describe what other 
group members think ought to be done 
are called injunctive norms.
• Whether people’s behavior is guided 
by social norms depends on their self-
regulatory resources, that is, whether 
they have the capacity to attend to social 
norms.
• Effectiveness of social norms also 
depends on the extent that people iden-
tify with a social group.
• Both descriptive and injunctive social 
norms can be employed to design inter-
ventions for behavioral change.
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26, 1002–1012.
Mortensen, C.R., Neel, R., Cialdini, R.B., Jaeger, 
C.M., Jacobson, R.P., & Ringel, M.M. (in 
press). Trending norms: A lever for encourag-
ing behaviors performed by the minority. Social 
Psychological and Personality Science, 10, 
201–210.
Rimal, R.N., & Real, K. (2003). Understanding 
the influence of perceived norms on behaviors. 
Communication Theory, 13, 184–203.
Sunstein, C.R. (1996). Social norms and social 
roles. Columbia Law Review, 96, 903–968.
 Guiding Answers to Questions 
in the Chapter
 1. Box 7.3 Q: You have been assigned to design 
a strategy for less alcohol consumption on 
campus. What would you prefer: using a 
descriptive norm or an injunctive norm?
A: In this case a descriptive norm, informing 
students about how much students actually 
drink will probably be more effective. Alcohol 
intake is not a topic of discussion among stu-
dents and this will probably lead to false ideas 
about how much others drink (“pluralistic 
ignorance”). Correcting these inaccurate ideas 
by providing a descriptive norm could help 
reduce alcohol consumption.
 2. Box 7.5 Q: The railway station wants people 
to litter less while they are waiting for trains 
on the platform. In what way would it help for 
the waiting passengers to identify with a 
social group?
A: People are more inclined to use social 
norms as a decisional shortcut when they can 
identify with the group that advocates these 
norms. Emphasizing that railway passengers 
are responsible people who do not litter is 
therefore a good campaign strategy.
 3. Box 7.7 Q: The Netherlands Nutrition Centre 
has previously launched a healthy eating cam-
paign with the slogan “80% knows [about 
healthy food], 20% eats it.” Is this a good 
campaign strategy?
A: This campaign rests on the notion that a 
playful reminder of people not acting on their 
intentions will encourage them to eat more 
healthily. In fact, the campaign will probably 
not be effective because it emphasizes the 
minority norm that eating more healthily often 
fails. The Netherlands Nutrition Centre has 
since discontinued this campaign.
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 Introduction
We have all observed, at school, in professional 
settings and in sports, that some groups work in 
harmony, with members coordinating their 
actions and helping each other. Other groups, 
however, experience a great deal of antagonism, 
with members favoring their own interest and 
acting against each other. What explains such dif-
ferences? How can the functioning of a group be 
predicted and possibly oriented? At an individual 
level of analysis, group members may have dif-
ferent—sometimes compatible, sometimes con-
flicting—personal orientations, and be more 
pro-social or pro-self, thereby favoring joint or 
self-serving outcomes (De Cremer & Van Lange, 
2001). Group members may also hold mixed 
motives in a given situation, as a function of their 
focus on the task at hand as well as the social 
relations in the group (De Dreu, Nijstad, & van 
Knippenberg, 2008). Classmates, for instance, 
may be motivated to discover the correct solution 
to a problem in a physics lab class, and at the 
same time motivated to show their own compe-
tence to the teacher.
An individual level of analysis requires a 
strong reliance on group composition to predict 
how groups will behave (Moreland & Levine, 
1992). Groups, however, possess particular 
properties that are likely to influence group 
members’ behavior over and beyond their 
112
 personal orientation. One such property—
imposed by the environment or inherited by the 
group’s history—is goal structure that is the set 
of a group’s rules, norms, or practices that spec-
ify and influence the type of interdependence 
among individual goals (Johnson & Johnson, 
2005). Social interdependence theory posits that 
interdependence may be positive and lead to 
interactions that facilitate the attainment of all 
group members’ goals, or negative and lead to 
interactions that favor one’s goal attainment by 
hindering the goal attainment of other group 
members (Deutsch, 1949). For example, in the 
famous Robbers Cave study (Sherif, 1958), chil-
dren in a summer camp discovered that the truck 
with the day’s food was stuck, and could only be 
rescued if all the children pulled it in synchrony. 
The situation created a common goal (retrieve 
the food), superordinate as compared to indi-
vidual goals, and required coordinated interac-
tion of all children to reach that goal (for a 
discussion of the role of common goals in inter-
group contact, see Christ & Kauff, Chap. 10, 
this volume). In the same study, Sherif observed 
that other activities, such as tournaments that 
allowed to win a desired prize, required teams to 
fight with the understanding that success of one 
team required hindering the other team.
This chapter will present the tenets of social 
interdependence theory and the work that this 
theory has generated over the past 70  years. 
Then, we will show how this theory has shaped 
research on cooperative learning, and in particu-
lar research on how pupils and students share or 
not the materials and resources necessary for 
learning. Finally, we will illustrate how difficult 
it is to promote positive interdependence and 
present an intervention study designed to help in 
this endeavor.
 Social Interdependence
Social interdependence theory was born as a 
theory of cooperation and competition 
(Deutsch, 1949). Over the years, it has been 
extremely successful because, instead of 
describing cooperation and competition as sep-
arate phenomena, it allowed to understand their 
interplay by grounding their emergence in a 
common mechanism: social interdependence. 
Social interdependence is the mechanism 
whereby the outcomes of individuals in a group 
are affected by the actions of the other group 
members (see also Johnson & Johnson, 1989). 
Let us imagine two pupils in a classroom, where 
they are likely to interact and be interdepen-
dent. If the teacher has given the two pupils a 
common assignment, then they find themselves 
in a position of positive social interdependence, 
as the actions of each of them will jointly con-
tribute to the quality of the assignment. This 
example illustrates how the positive interde-
pendence introduced by the teacher can con-
tribute to cooperative behaviors and promotive 
interactions, i.e., working toward the achieve-
ment of a common goal. If, on the contrary, the 
teacher has asked the pupils to write an essay 
and told them that the best one will be pub-
lished in the school’s newsletter, the two pupils 
find themselves in a position of negative social 
interdependence, as the actions of each of them 
will hamper the goal of the other (be the one 
whose essay is published in the school’s news-
letter). This example illustrates how the nega-
tive interdependence introduced by the teacher 
might facilitate competitive behaviors and 
Definition Box
Interaction: Individuals’ coordinated 
actions that have consequences for other 
individuals’ cognitions, affects, and 
behaviors.
Goal structure: The structure consisting 
of a group’s set of rules, norms, or practices 
of a group that determines how each group 
member’s opportunities for goal achieve-
ment depend on those of other group mem-
bers, i.e., their social interdependence.
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oppositional interactions, i.e., working toward 
the achievement of one’s own goal to the detri-
ment of the other’s (Deutsch, 1949).
It is worth noting at this point that social 
interdependence is a structural property of the 
environment, namely, a set of constraints that 
affect people’s behaviors. These constraints can 
be material: The members of a rowing team are 
necessarily positively interdependent, as none 
of them can fulfill the goal of winning without 
the others (e.g., Dyson, 2001), and the students 
sitting an entrance exam with numerus clausus 
for a prestigious curriculum are necessarily neg-
atively interdependent, as the success of one 
reduces the chances of success of the others 
(e.g., Kaufman, 1994; Sommet, Pulfrey, & 
Butera, 2013). The constraints can also be sym-
bolic, for instance, the collectivistic and indi-
vidualistic culture (Triandis, 1993), or the 
self-transcendence and self- enhancement values 
(Schwartz et  al., 2012) of a given society. 
Whatever be the nature of social interdepen-
dence, this structural property of the environ-
ment exerts a strong influence on people’s 
behaviors and perceptions, resulting either in 
actual cooperation or competition—character-
ized by promotive or oppositional interactions 
(e.g., Johnson & Johnson, 1974)—or in cooper-
ative or competitive climates—characterized by 
perceived promotive or oppositional relation-
ships (e.g., Elliot, Jury, & Murayama, 2018).
Importantly, the reliance on the concept of 
social interdependence allows differentiating 
cooperation and competition from other phenom-
ena that may also be present in social settings. 
Going back to our two pupils, they may find 
themselves in a position of independence, if the 
teacher has asked them to work alone, each with 
their own materials, and evaluates their work 
based on predefined criteria. In this case, the 
actions of one do not affect the outcomes of the 
other. They may also find themselves in a posi-
tion in which one is dependent on the other, if the 
teacher has asked one pupil to help a schoolmate, 
as in tutoring. In this case, the actions of one 
affect the outcomes of the other, but not vice 
versa (Johnson & Johnson, 2005).
 Psychological Processes in Social 
Interdependence
How does social interdependence, either positive 
or negative, result in the expected outcomes, 
namely, the emergence of cooperation with its 
promotive behaviors, or competition with its 
oppositional behaviors, respectively? Three 
important processes appear to be at work in 
social interdependence (Deutsch, 1962). First, 
substitutability refers to the extent to which a 
group member’s actions can substitute for the 
actions of another group member. Let us imagine 
that our two pupils are working together on a 
joint assignment, say a report on the geography 
of India: If pupil number one completes a section 
of the assignment for pupil number two, the lat-
ter will be satisfied and will not feel the need to 
complete that section by him/herself, because in 
cooperation the partners’ actions are substitut-
Definition Box
Social interdependence: The actions and 
outcomes of individuals are affected by 
each other’s actions.
Cooperation: Positive social interdepen-
dence. The actions of each individual con-
tribute to some common goal; individual 
goals are positively associated. The success 
of one supports the likelihood of success of 
others.
Competition: Negative social interdepen-
dence. The actions of one individual hamper 
the goal of the other; individual goals are 
negatively associated. The success of one 
reduces the likelihood of success of others.
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able. If the two pupils have well understood what 
positive interdependence is about, pupil number 
two will reciprocate in a future task. This, of 
course, provided that actions are effective, that is 
functional in reaching the goal (in this example, 
to write a good report): If one partner’s actions 
are not effective, then the other will have to 
expend more effort to compensate, thereby 
thwarting cooperation’s important role of evenly 
distributing the effort. However, it is clear from 
our example that effective actions are not substi-
tutable in the case of competition: If pupil num-
ber one completes a section of the assignment 
more quickly or instead of pupil number two, 
thereby signaling greater competence to the 
teacher, pupil number two will not be satisfied 
and will feel the need to exert extra effort to 
bridge the gap.
Second, social interdependence involves 
cathexis, a substantial affective investment in the 
actions and persons involved in an interaction. In 
cooperation, positive cathexis is attached to effec-
tive actions, and negative cathexis is attached to 
ineffective actions of the partner. Indeed, effective 
actions are likely to result in reaching the group’s 
common goal, whereas ineffective actions (or 
“bungling” as Deutsch calls them) are likely to 
hinder such a goal. In competition, however, nega-
tive cathexis is attached to effective actions, and 
positive cathexis is attached to ineffective actions 
of the competitor. Indeed, effective actions of the 
competitor are likely to result in hindering one’s 
individual goal, whereas ineffective actions are 
likely to favor it. For instance, a study showed that 
under negative interdependence, participants 
actively engaged in claiming one’s self-superiority 
in terms of competence as compared to a partner 
who might have had a good point in a problem-
solving task (Butera & Mugny, 1995).
Third, inducibility refers to the reciprocal influ-
ence that partners exert on each other. This process 
is particularly important in positive social interde-
pendence. Inducibility leads the partners to engage 
in effective actions that may be useful for the com-
mon goal and refrain from actions that may inter-
fere with such a goal. Under negative social 
interdependence, competitors will try to resist 
each other’s influence in order to avoid losing 
some competitive advantage. For example, experts 
working under negative interdependence have 
been shown to resist the other’s influence, their 
expertise notwithstanding (Butera & Mugny, 
2001; Quiamzade & Mugny, 2009). In sum, social 
interdependence creates a dense affective and 
behavioral network within a group, in which group 
members develop meaningful representations, 
affects, and actions in relation to others, either 
positive or negative depending on whether group 
members are tied by cooperation or competition.
 Cooperation
Social interdependence theory has been instru-
mental in the development of a systematic theory 
of cooperation and competition. Moreover, it has 
led to the development of a long-lasting and pro-
ductive area of research that has investigated the 
mechanisms that make cooperation more effec-
tive—in terms of effort to achieve positive rela-
tionships, psychological adjustment, and social 
competence—than competition or individual work 
(Johnson & Johnson, 1989). This area of research 
has also uncovered the mechanisms that, as a 
result, lead cooperation to Promote higher produc-
tivity and achievement, better interpersonal rela-
tionships, psychological health, and self- esteem 
(Johnson & Johnson, 2015). In particular, the work 
by Johnson and Johnson (see 2009 for a review) 
has uncovered five principles that contribute to the 
effectiveness of cooperation (see Fig. 8.1).
 1. Positive interdependence. As mentioned ear-
lier, it is crucial for group members to pursue 
common goals or to consider that individual 
Box 8.1 Question for Elaboration
Imagine a cohesive and cooperative volley-
ball team. Give an example describing how 
substitutability, positive cathexis, and 
inducibility intervene during a match.
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goals are positively linked in order to work 
cooperatively (see also Sherif, 1966). Beyond 
this theoretical statement, it was demon-
strated that, indeed, positive interdependence 
yielded stronger positive effects on achieve-
ment than mere group membership (Hwong, 
Caswell, Johnson, & Johnson, 1993) or mere 
interaction (Lew, Mesch, Johnson, & Johnson, 
1986).
 2. Responsibility and accountability. If group 
members strive for the same goal, then they 
are responsible for one another, namely for 
doing their share of work and for helping the 
others. Even if the importance of such per-
sonal responsibility seems obvious, classic 
research on the phenomenon of “social loaf-
ing” has shown that people may actually work 
less in groups (e.g., Latané, Williams, & 
Harkins, 1979). More specifically, if the con-
tribution of single group members is difficult 
to assess, especially in larger groups, people 
tend to free ride and let the others do all the 
work, which results in reduced group perfor-
mance (Karau & Williams, 1993). Hence, it is 
important that personal responsibility be 
accompanied by group or individual account-
ability: If group or individual work is visible 
and easy to assess, it is also easy to assess all 







Fig. 8.1 Five principles 
that contribute to the 
effectiveness of 
cooperation. Why are 
responsibility and 
accountability important 
to cooperation? What do 
they add to positive goal 
interdependence?
Box 8.2 Zooming In: Sources of 
Interdependence
When we mentioned interdependence, we 
referred to goal interdependence, as this was 
part of Deutsch’s original formulation and is 
necessary for cooperative learning. It is 
important, however to consider other sources 
of interdependence, as they may all be used 
in a group to create effective cooperation. 
Johnson and Johnson (1989, 2009) distin-
guish three categories of interdependence: 
outcome, means, and boundary interdepen-
dence. Outcome interdependence refers to 
desired states and includes goal interdepen-
dence as well as reward interdependence: 
Indeed, a group of pupils may be interde-
pendent because they pursue the same 
goal—handing in a project or ensuring that 
all teammates learn—but also because they 
expect that all the pupils who worked on the 
same project will receive the same reward—
a common grade or the same bonus points. 
Group members may also be interdependent 
because they need to share the means 
involved in their work: They may have to 
share complementary resources (like in the 
jigsaw classroom, cf., Aronson & Patnoe, 
1997), take turns in complementary roles, or 
each be responsible for a different task in the 
same assignment. Finally, boundaries spec-
ify who is interdependent with whom, typi-
cally by specifying who is in a group 
(interdependence) and who is in another 
group (independence—unless the other 
group is an ally or a rival).
Definition Box
Social loafing: The reduced effort of people 
in groups, as compared to individual effort. 
Group members who feel unidentifiable con-
tribute less to the group.
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goals, which increases effort and commitment 
of each member. It is important to note that 
each group member should genuinely endorse 
personal responsibility for supporting the 
team’s goals, to avoid that accountability 
merely functions as extrinsic, controlled moti-
vation, bound to become inactive as soon as 
assessment and control are no longer imple-
mented (Ryan & Deci, 2000).
 3. Promotive interactions. Working coopera-
tively does not mean merely working together. 
Actual cooperation requires teammates to 
cater not only to their work but also to that of 
their partners. In particular, cooperative team-
mates trust each other and exchange needed 
resources (e.g., Toma & Butera, 2009), use 
language to construct some common knowl-
edge (Wegerif, Mercer, & Dawes, 1999), 
decenter from one’s own point of view to 
consider or even question the partner’s point 
of view (Butera & Buchs, 2005), use argu-
mentation (Muller Mirza & Perret-Clermont, 
2009), encourage others’ commitment and 
accept mutual influence (Johnson & Johnson, 
2015), and rely on explanations and cognitive 
elaboration, peer modeling, peer practice, 
peer assessment, and correction (Slavin, 
2011).
 4. Social skills. Group locomotion toward a 
common goal requires, as we have seen, a 
great deal of coordination. To facilitate such a 
complex endeavor, group members must be 
trained and acquire a set of social skills (e.g., 
Bennett, Rolheiser, & Stevahn, 1991; 
Johnson, Johnson, & Holubec, 1993), such as 
the ability to trust other group members, to 
communicate in a precise and unequivocal 
manner, and to tolerate and support other 
members (Johnson, 2009). Most importantly, 
as discussion and confrontation of points of 
view may result in the emergence of conflict, 
group members must learn how to regulate 
conflict in a constructive manner, that is by 
focusing on the task at hand and knowledge, 
rather than their relative status (Buchs, 
Butera, Mugny, & Darnon, 2004; Johnson & 
Johnson, 2007; Smith, Johnson, & Johnson, 
1981).
 5. Group processing. Group performance is pro-
moted when groups engage in group process-
ing, that is, take the time, after task completion, 
to reflect upon their actions, communications, 
decisions, and performance (Yager, Johnson, 
Johnson, & Snider, 1986). Such metacogni-
tive processes allow groups to reconsider 
decisions and avoid concurrence-seeking phe-
nomena such as social loafing, as noted ear-
lier, and “groupthink” (Janis, 1972), the 
mindset of highly homogeneous groups that 
fail to question their decisions and decision- 
making processes (see also Esser, 1998). 
Group processing is also instrumental in 
developing group efficacy, cohesion, and 
social identity (Johnson & Johnson, 2009).
These five principles have been shown to be 
crucial, but the list is not exhaustive. For instance, 
based on these elements, Topping, Buchs, Duran, 
and Van Keer (2017) proposed to place promo-
tive interaction (called constructive interactions 
by these authors, i.e., interactions that support 
learning) at the heart of cooperative methods, and 
list several other elements that contribute to the 
emergence of these constructive interactions in 
group work.
 Cooperative Learning Methods
The principles of social interdependence theory 
have been applied to many domains, in particular 
education, business, and politics. In this chapter, 
we focus on cooperative learning methods in 
educational settings, and will leave business and 
politics aside. Interested readers may refer to 
Tjosvold and Tjosvold (2015) and Johnson 
(2015), respectively.
The term “cooperative learning” includes a 
class of educational practices and pedagogical 
methods that aim at structuring group work by 
implementing the aforementioned principles of 
effective cooperation (e.g., Johnson, Johnson, & 
Holubec, 1998). For this reason, we will use the 
term “cooperative methods” hereafter, for greater 
clarity. In fact, this class of educational practices is 
not homogenous and includes a great variety of 
F. Butera and C. Buchs
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structures and methods (Johnson, Johnson, & 
Stanne, 2000; Topping et al., 2017), which may be 
used formally or informally, for one session or for 
one semester, at the classroom or at the school 
level (Johnson & Johnson, 2005). This diversity 
notwithstanding, several authors recommend that 
cooperative groups be structured through positive 
interdependence, making sure that learners feel 
responsible and accountable, that they are commit-
ted to promoting each other and to communicating 
efficiently, in a trusting atmosphere, and in groups 
that reflect upon their functioning (e.g., Topping 
et al., 2017). In other words, positive goal interde-
pendence represents both the  structure of the 
cooperation (ensuring that students actually work 
together) and the spirit of the classroom (stimulat-
ing students to take care of both their own learning 
and the learning of their classmates; Topping et al., 
2017; see also Abrami, 1995).
The success of cooperative learning has pro-
duced an impressive number of studies and appli-
cations, which have made it possible to quantify 
the effect of cooperative methods as compared to 
other methods, mainly competitive and individu-
alistic. Indeed, several meta-analyses have per-
formed an overall assessment of the effects of 
cooperative methods (Johnson & Johnson, 1989; 
Slavin, 1983), some with a focus on university 
learning (Johnson & Johnson, 2002), some with a 
focus on adolescents (Roseth, Johnson, & 
Johnson, 2008) or elementary school pupils 
(Slavin, 2015). Hattie (2008) has combined sev-
eral meta-analyses, and concluded that coopera-
tive methods has an advantage in terms of 
performance over comparable competitive meth-
ods with an effect size of d = 0.54 (with 7 meta- 
analyses and 1024 studies), as well as over 
individualistic methods with an effect size of 
d = 0.59 (with 4 meta-analyses and 774 studies). 
Thus, cooperative methods appear to be effective 
in promoting learning, more effective than com-
petitive and individualistic methods. Cooperative 
methods have been shown to promote all sorts of 
learning outcomes—from short-term and long- 
term recall of information to reasoning and 
 creativity—in a vast array of subjects (mathemat-
ics, history, arts, etc.) and competences (comput-
ing, reading, comprehension, etc.).
 Positive Interdependence 
and Social Comparison
The abovementioned discussion and the results 
from the meta-analyses reveal that cooperative 
methods can be instrumental in favoring learn-
ing, self-esteem, and interpersonal relations, but 
also that it is no magic wand: Success rate is not 
100%. Even when positive goal interdependence 
is implemented, and group members know that 
they should strive for a common purpose, social 
comparison is at work and occupies a great deal 
of the group members’ attention (cf. Butera & 
Darnon, 2017). Social comparison is a basic phe-
nomenon that assesses one’s competence in rela-
tion to that of similar others (Festinger, 1954; for 
Box 8.3  Zooming In: Positive Effects of 
Cooperative Methods
It is important to note that, in addition to 
the positive effects on learning outcomes, 
cooperative learning yields positive effects 
on self- esteem and interpersonal relations 
(e.g., Johnson & Johnson, 1989). The effects 
on self-esteem derive from the perception 
of being helpful and accepted typical of 
positive interdependence, which has also 
been shown to lead to better coping with 
stress and overall psychological and physi-
cal health (Johnson & Johnson, 2006). 
The positive effects on interpersonal rela-
tions cover a wide range of behaviors, from 
perspective taking to listening, from greater 
group cohesion to lower absenteeism and 
fewer dropouts (Johnson & Johnson, 2006). 
They also include greater acceptance of 
diversity (Sharan, 2010), from students of 
different ethnic backgrounds (Aronson & 
Patnoe, 1997) and language (Buchs, 
Margas, Cazin, Ramirez, & Fratianni, 2018) 
to students with disability (Johnson, 
Johnson, & Maruyama, 1983).
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a detailed discussion of social comparison theory 
see Utz, Chap. 14, this volume). Importantly for 
the present discussion, social comparison can be 
either inspiring or threatening for self-compe-
tence: It is inspiring when the partner may be 
considered as a source of help or information, or 
a model, and it is threatening when the partner 
may be considered as a source of humiliation or 
inferiority, or a competitor (Muller & Fayant, 
2010). It is important to note that social com-
parison can be either inspiring or threatening 
whatever the direction of the comparison, be it 
upward (comparing with a superior partner) or 
downward (comparing with an inferior partner), 
as noted by Butera and Darnon (2017; see also 
Buunk, Collins, Taylor, VanYperen, & Dakof, 
1990). Even in a cooperative setting, inspiring and 
threatening comparisons may coexist, as demon-
strated by Buchs, Butera, and Mugny (2004); 
Buchs, Pulfrey, Gabarrot, and Butera (2010); and 
more recently by Roseth, Lee, and Saltarelli 
(2019). We will develop this work in a following 
section.
The question then arises of how to ensure that 
cooperative method, which is designed to pro-
mote positive interpersonal relationships, does 
not end up rendering partners threatening to each 
other. Buchs and Butera (2001) addressed this 
question by proposing that, besides positive goal 
interdependence, it is important to efficiently 
implement other positive interdependences in 
cooperative learning, in particular resource inter-
dependence (see also Darnon, Buchs, & Butera, 
2002). They devised an experimental paradigm 
with, among others, two conditions: positive 
resource interdependence and resource indepen-
dence. In all conditions two partners were given 
two texts they were asked to learn (and help their 
partner to learn), and were informed that a learn-
ing test would take place—on the two texts—at 
the end of the learning session, and again later in 
a delayed test (positive goal interdependence). 
Each partner was in charge of presenting one text, 
while the other facilitated the presentation with 
questions, one text at a time (positive role interde-
pendence). In the positive resource interdepen-
dence condition, the two partners each received a 
different text; the two texts were complementary 
(they were both necessary for the learning test), 
but each student learned one text by reading it and 
the other by listening to the partner. In the resource 
independence condition, the two partners received 
Table 8.1 Observed dynamics elicited by information distribution
Identical information (resource 
independence)
Complementary information (positive 
resource interdependence)




Student involvement Average Strong
Type of interactions Discussion/confrontations Summary/questions/explanations
Individual accountability Average Strong
Reciprocal interdependence Weak Strong
Focus on social comparison of 
competences
Strong Weak
Partner’s competence Threatening and detrimental Welcomed and beneficial
Relevant mechanism Competence threat: competitive 
relational activities as mediator
Informational dependence: quality of 
informational input as moderator
From Buchs and Butera (2004)
Box 8.4 Questions for Elaboration
Teachers often call one of the pupils in 
front of the class to read a particularly 
well- written essay. In which circumstances 
will this pupil be inspiring? In which will 
the pupil be threatening?
F. Butera and C. Buchs
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both texts; the two partners then possessed identi-
cal information, and each student presented one 
of them to the partner, in turn. As noted by Buchs 
and Butera (2015), in positive resource interde-
pendence, as compared to resource independence, 
“knowing that the other is dependent on oneself 
for accessing some information and that oneself is 
also dependent on the partner to access some 
other information would direct students to be 
more involved in information exchange” (p. 205). 
This is also supposed to elicit a series of other 
positive dynamics, summarized in Table 8.1.
 Inspiring and Threatening Partners
The distinction between positive resource inter-
dependence and resource independence is 
important and has been shown to influence not 
only partner perception and interpersonal rela-
tions, but also learning. In a study based on the 
general paradigm outlined earlier and conducted 
with university students, Buchs, Butera, and 
Mugny (2004), Study 2) measured the partici-
pants’ perception of the partner’s competence on 
two important aspects of their interaction, 
namely, perceived competence to understand 
information and perceived competence to sum-
marize information. Learning outcomes were 
measured through a multiple-choice test with 
questions related to the texts students had to read 
and present. The questions required from the stu-
dents a thorough comprehension of the study 
matter, not just recall or recognition, and the 
questionnaire was administered 1  month after 
the experimental sessions. Results revealed that 
when dyads worked with complementary texts 
(positive resource interdependence), perceived 
partner competence was positively related to a 
delayed measure of learning, as it should be in a 
genuine cooperative learning setting. In other 
words, the more competent the partner was per-
ceived, the higher the learning outcomes score. 
Indeed, partners who are considered as more 
competent are more inspiring and more instru-
mental toward better learning. On the contrary, 
when dyads worked with identical texts (resource 
independence), perceived partner competence 
was negatively related to learning. In this case, a 
competent partner represented a threatening 
comparison  target and reduced learning. 
Importantly, these results were replicated in a 
study conducted with primary school children 
(see Buchs & Butera, 2015). In this work, actual 
performance of the partner was measured (num-
ber of correct pieces of information and explana-
tions provided), instead of perceived partner 
competence, but the results of the two studies 
followed the same pattern as the results of Buchs 
and colleagues (2004).
Buchs and Butera (2009) also provided exper-
imental evidence of this phenomenon in a study 
that manipulated the partner’s competence. A 
confederate entered the laboratory with the par-
ticipant and was assigned the role of summarizer 
for the first text, whereas the participant was to 
play the role of facilitator. The roles were reversed 
for the second text, but the measure of interest is 
the learning test for the first text. Indeed, the con-
federate had been instructed to deliver a sum-
mary that was either brilliant or average, 
depending on the condition. Even though the 
content was identical in all conditions, in the bril-
liant condition the confederate came with a very 
well-organized summary, with headings and 
well-defined technical terms. The confederate’s 
notes started with an introduction, elaborated on 
all the important notions, and concluded on the 
most important information. In the average con-
dition, the confederate came with quite a disorga-
nized summary, often went back to a previous 
matter because of omissions, and used approxi-
mate terms. The results confirmed those of Buchs 
and colleagues (2004): When the dyad worked 
with complementary texts (positive resource 
interdependence), a brilliant partner induced bet-
ter learning than an average partner, whereas 
when the dyad worked with identical texts 
(resource independence), a brilliant partner 
induced worse learning than an average partner. 
Thus, a competent partner, who should have rep-
resented an informational support in all condi-
tions, appeared to promote learning outcomes 
only in the positive interdependence condition 
(for similar findings, see Neugebauer, Ray, & 
Sassenberg, 2016).
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 Competence Threat
In the studies by Buchs and colleagues (2004) 
and Buchs and Butera (2009), the interpretation 
of results is based on the idea that, notwithstand-
ing the positive goal interdependence of a coop-
erative setting, a threatening social comparison 
may take place under resource independence, 
which would explain the detrimental effects that 
were found. A further study directly addressed 
the question of competence threat (Buchs et al., 
2010). The main experiment in this article manip-
ulated, as before, the way resources were distrib-
uted, as well as focus on social comparison, by 
allowing or not allowing students to take notes. 
The rationale for the latter manipulation was that 
notes allow direct comparison and confrontation 
of responses, which was confirmed by a pilot 
study. Results showed that a focus on social com-
parison did reduce learning, but in the resource 
independence condition and not in the positive 
resource interdependence condition. Moreover, 
and most importantly for the present contention, 
this effect was mediated by competence threat, 
namely, an aggregate measure that referred to the 
participants’ concerns regarding the social com-
parison of competences with the partner. Thus, it 
appears that resource independence, as opposed 
to positive resource interdependence, leads part-
ners to make sense of social comparison in terms 
of potential threat—a comparison that might be 
problematic for one’s competence—which 
results in reduced learning.
These results are consistent with those of Ray, 
Neugebauer, Sassenberg, Buder, and Hesse (2013, 
Study 3), where participants who were not con-
cerned by evaluative pressure (either positive or 
negative) achieved better learning outcomes when 
they were made aware of the possible positive 
resource interdependence with the partner (aware-
ness of the partner’s knowledge), than when they 
were not. To summarize, the results of Buchs et al. 
(2010) suggest that the benefits of cooperative 
learning require a carefully designed classroom 
setting to emerge: Distributing identical informa-
tion to partners (resource independence) resulted in 
competence threat and reduced learning outcomes 
even in a cooperative setting with positive goal 
interdependence that should promote learning.
 The Promotion of Cooperative 
Methods
According to Deutsch (1985), it is much easier to 
move from cooperation to competition than to 
revert from competition to cooperation. Indeed, 
in Western industrial countries, competition is 
pervasive, not only from an economic point of 
view but also when considering the dominant val-
ues of these countries. Accordingly, Schwartz 
(2007) has shown that self-enhancement values 
(wealth, power, achievement) are typical of coun-
tries with a capitalistic economy, especially those 
with more deregulated forms of capitalism (see 
also, Pulfrey & Butera, 2013). Western industrial-
ized countries are also more likely to display a 
population with independent selves, as compared 
to Eastern countries where people’s selves tend to 
be more interdependent (Markus & Kitayama, 
1991). Moreover, the functioning of educational 
institutions, from school to university, is based on 
practices that induce competition among students 
(e.g., grading; cf. Black & Wiliam, 1998; Pulfrey, 
Buchs, & Butera, 2011), and students have learned 
that setting competitive achievement goals for 
themselves may be useful to succeed (e.g., Darnon, 
Dompnier, Delmas, Pulfrey, & Butera, 2009; 
Dompnier, Darnon, Delmas, & Butera, 2008).
In such a competitive environment, it is pos-
sible that implementing cooperative learning 
might seem at loggerheads with the values and 
practices of a given educational institution, 
Box 8.5 Question for Elaboration
In professional settings, it often happens 
that employees are required to work in 
teams and are given a background training 
on the whole of the task at hand, which 
corresponds to possessing identical infor-
mation. How can a supervisor prevent that 
the inevitable issues of relative status of 
team members interfere with the work to 
be completed?
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which might reduce acceptance of this method 
or lead to its failure. Thus, cooperative methods 
cannot be merely proposed or implemented; it 
must be promoted. In this respect, Buchs (2017) 
has highlighted an important distinction within 
the elements that constitute cooperative learning. 
She explained that elements such as positive 
interdependence or accountability are important 
because they structure the way cooperative 
learning is actually organized in groups, while 
some others such as social skills, group process-
ing, and climate are important because they pre-
pare the group members to interact cooperatively. 
In other words, a rigorous cooperative structure 
should be accompanied by some training, in 
order to allow students to move from an otherwise 
competitive environment to a cooperative setting 
(see also Webb, 2009).
With this in mind, Buchs, Gilles, Antonietti, 
and Butera (2016) devised an experimental inter-
vention intended to promote cooperative learning 
in an area in which students experience great dif-
ficulties: statistics (Tomasetto, Matteucci, 
Carugati, & Selleri, 2009). The intervention was 
carried out during a statistics course, where it was 
presented as a study on how students process 
information about statistics. During a 90-minute 
workshop, students reviewed the materials from 
the previous week (set theory), worked on two 
exercises related to the theory—allegedly as a 
training for the individual learning test— and 
finally sat the learning test, which was then used 
as the main dependent variable. The learning test 
included two types of questions: (a) a replication 
of the exercises completed in the previous steps of 
the study, but using new data (data not discussed 
during the statistics lecture); and (b) completely 
new exercises that required the generalization of 
the mathematical principles of set theory to a 
real-life situation.
The independent variable was manipulated 
during the exercise phase. The individual work 
condition (independence) was a control condi-
tion in which students worked alone on their 
study materials and exercises and was intended 
as a baseline that corresponds to the most com-
mon study strategy at university. The other two 
conditions involved working cooperatively in 
dyads. In both conditions, the experimental 
instructions introduced positive goal interdepen-
dence, individual responsibility/accountability, 
and encouragement of promotive interactions 
(Fig. 8.2). The cooperative instructions condition 
only included these instructions and corre-
sponded to the basic structure implemented in 
cooperative learning. Finally, the cooperative 
interactions condition included the same three 
elements, but also introduced a “cooperative 
nudge,” which consisted of two components. (1) 
The first component was introduced by a short 
text explaining the value of cooperation and the 








 Individual work Cooperative instructions Cooperative interactions
Fig. 8.2 Learning 
outcomes as a function 
of work condition. 
(Adapted from Buchs 
et al., 2016). Note. The 
learning measure ranges 
from 0 to 6
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mentioned earlier, cooperative values are not the 
default culture of university students in Western 
countries. (2) The second component was a series 
of recommendations inviting students to display 
three cooperative skills: “(a) explain how one 
processes problems, (b) be sure to understand the 
way the partner processes problems, and (c) sug-
gest alternative ways to process problems” (Buchs 
et al., 2016, p. 965; Table 8.2). As mentioned ear-
lier, active cooperation is not the default behavior 
among students.
The results revealed a linear trend in the pattern 
of learning outcomes across the three  conditions, 
with the individual work condition scoring the 
lowest, followed by the cooperative instructions 
condition, and then by the cooperative interactions 
condition (Fig.  8.2). Interestingly, competence 
perception was also measured, through three 
items (“I realized that I had understood some 
things,” “I felt I was able to master the work,” and 
“I felt I was competent”). The results revealed 
that competence perception progressed in the 
same direction as learning outcomes, and that it 
mediated the effect of the experimental condi-
tions on learning.
To conclude, this study shows that instructors 
may be well advised to prepare students to coop-
erate, before implementing cooperative learning, 
as cooperation is neither a value nor a common 
practice in education. This conclusion illustrates 
one of the main pitfalls in the use of cooperation 
in education, namely, the difference between 
structured and unstructured cooperation. The 
work on cooperative learning has long shown that 
“spontaneous” cooperation—simply relying on 
the encouragement to cooperate—does not hap-
Table 8.2 Cooperative skills introduced in the cooperative interactions condition
How to translate cooperative skills into action How to translate cooperative skills into words
I explain how I process problems
• I’m involved in the discussion.
• I try my best to be as clear as possible.
• I explain the different steps (“I start by …, then I …”).
• I explain my rationale (“I do it because...”).
• I explain my strategies.
• I explain how I concretely do something.
I check that I understand the way my partner processes problems
• I encourage my partner to develop his/her ideas.
• I let my partner explain without stopping him/her.
• I listen to my partner’s proposition even when I 
don’t agree.
• I express my understanding (“All right, I understand”).
• I express my difficulties (“I do not understand; could 
you please explain again?”).
• I reformulate what my partner says in order to be sure 
I understand.
• I ask questions to invite my partner to be more explicit.
• I check for potential problems.
I suggest alternative ways to process the problems
• I’m involved in the discussion. • I suggest some alternatives (“and what if we started 
by… I would rather do …”)
• I propose different alternatives.
From Buchs et al. (2016), reproduced with permission
Summary
• The nature of goal structure in groups 
affects group members’ perceptions and 
behaviors, which in turn influence their 
learning outcomes.
• People interact cooperatively in groups 
when they perceive positive goal inter-
dependence, or competitively when they 
perceive negative goal interdependence. 
With independent goals, they work 
individually.
• Cooperation requires positive goal 
interdependence, but also group mem-
bers’ responsibility and accountability, 
interactions directed toward the promo-
tion of the partners, the use of social 
skills, and critical reflection upon group 
processes.
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pen in most educational and work settings: 
Cooperative methods have been developed pre-
cisely to provide a structured environment that 
facilitates cooperative communication, informa-
tion sharing, and relationships (e.g., Johnson & 
Johnson, 1999; Tjosvold, 1984). The research 
reported in this section contributed to this 
endeavor by highlighting the importance of pre-
paring students and workers to cooperate in order 
to counter, to some extent, the prevalently com-
petitive routines they have acquired. The results 
presented here show that a brief intervention may 
be effective, but Buchs et  al. (2016) also noted 
that the effect size they observed is rather small. 
This implies that longer or more frequent inter-
ventions may be needed.
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 Guiding Answers to Questions 
in the Chapter
 1. Q (with Box 8.1): Imagine a cohesive and 
cooperative volleyball team. Give an example 
describing how substitutability, positive 
cathexis and inducibility intervene during a 
match.
A: During a smash from the other team, 
player X’s effective dive to catch the ball 
reduces player Y’s need to intervene (substi-
tutability); this results in Y trusting X during 
the following action (positive cathexis) and 
avoiding to dive at the same time as X 
(inducibility).
 2. Q (with Fig. 8.1): Why are responsibility and 
accountability important to cooperation? 
What do they add to positive goal 
interdependence?
A: Because, even in a group that pursues a 
common goal, some members may be tempted 
to free ride and benefit from the group’s work 
without investing some effort.
 3. Q (with Box 8.3): Could cooperative learning 
be used to integrate migrant children in the 
host country’s regular classes?
A: Cooperative learning has been shown to be 
helpful in improving the learning and interper-
• Cooperative methods favor learning 
outcomes, psychological as well as 
social adjustment, and positive relation-
ships, as compared to competitive and 
individualistic methods.
• Cooperation is vulnerable to threatening 
social comparison: Interactions among 
group members that focus on relative 
status instead of the task may reduce the 
beneficial effects of cooperation.
• Cooperation is not socially and cultur-
ally valued in Western countries, and 
therefore cooperative learning requires 
training and promotion.
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sonal relations in groups with ethnic diversity, 
and in groups with differences in ability.
 4. Q (with Box 8.4): Teachers often call one of 
the pupils in front of the class to read a par-
ticularly well written essay. In which circum-
stances will this pupil be inspiring? Which 
will be threatening?
A: If this pupil is a possible companion (e.g., 
a future partner for an assignment), s/he will 
be perceived as a source of inspiration. If the 
pupil is a possible rival (e.g., the teacher’s 
pet), s/he will be perceived as a source of 
threat.
 5. Q (with Box 8.5): In professional settings, it 
often happens that employees are required to 
work in teams and are given a background 
training on the whole of the task at hand, 
which corresponds to possessing identical 
information. How can a supervisor prevent 
that the inevitable issues of relative status of 
team members interfere with the work to be 
completed?
A: Divide the task and the resources in comple-
mentary chunks and distribute them to different 
employees with complementary roles.
References
Abrami, P.  C. (1995). Classroom connections: 
Understanding and using cooperative learning. 
Harcourt College Pub: Fort Worth, Texas.
Aronson, E., & Patnoe, S. (1997). The jigsaw classroom: 
Building cooperation in the classroom (2nd ed.). 
New York, NY: Addison Wesley Longman.
Bennett, B., Rolheiser, C., & Stevahn, L. (1991). 
Cooperative learning: Where hearts meets mind. 
Ontario, Canada: Educational Connections.
Black, P., & Wiliam, D. (1998). Inside the black box: 
Raising standards through classroom assessment. 
London, UK: Granada Learning.
Buchs, C. (2017). Apprendre ensemble: des pistes pour 
structurer les interactions en classe (Learning together: 
Recommendations for structuring classroom interac-
tion). In M. Giglio & F. Arcidiacono (Eds.), Les inter-
actions sociales en classe: réflexions et perspectives 
(p. 2017). Berne, Switzerland: Peter Lang.
Buchs, C., & Butera, F. (2001). Complementarity of 
information and quality of relationship in cooperative 
learning. Social Psychology of Education, 4, 335–357. 
https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1011392906032
Buchs, C., & Butera, F. (2004). Socio-cognitive conflict 
and the role of student interaction in learning. New 
Review of Social Psychology, 3, 80–87.
Buchs, C., & Butera, F. (2009). Is a partner’s compe-
tence threatening during dyadic cooperative work? 
It depends on resource interdependence. European 
Journal of Psychology of Education, 24, 145–154. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03173007
Buchs, C., & Butera, F. (2015). Cooperative learning 
and social skills development. In R.  Gillies (Ed.), 
Collaborative learning: Developments in research and 
practice (pp. 201–217). New York, NY: Nova Science.
Buchs, C., Butera, F., & Mugny, G. (2004). 
Resource in(ter)dependence, student interac-
tions and performance in cooperative learning. 
Educational Psychology, 24, 291–314. https://doi.
org/10.1080/0144341042000211661
Buchs, C., Butera, F., Mugny, G., & Darnon, C. (2004). 
Conflict resolution and cognitive outcomes. Theory 
Into Practice, 43, 23–30. https://doi.org/10.1207/
s15430421tip4301_4
Buchs, C., Gilles, I., Antonietti, J. P., & Butera, F. (2016). 
Why students need to be prepared to cooperate: A 
cooperative nudge in statistics learning at university. 
Educational Psychology, 36, 956–974. https://doi.org/
10.1080/01443410.2015.1075963
Buchs, C., Margas, N., Cazin, C., Ramirez, M., & 
Fratianni, S. (2018). Des activités plurilingues dans 
une perspective coopérative pour favoriser l’équité 
dans les classes caractérisée par une forte diversité 
linguistique (Multi-lingual activities in a cooperative 
perspective promote equality in classes with a high 
linguistic diversity). Education et francophonie, 46(2), 
249–269.
Buchs, C., Pulfrey, C., Gabarrot, F., & Butera, F. (2010). 
Competitive conflict regulation and informational 
dependence in peer learning. European Journal 
of Social Psychology, 40, 418–435. https://doi.
org/10.1002/ejsp.631
Butera, F., & Buchs, C. (2005). Reasoning together: From 
focussing to decentring. In V. Girotto & P. N. Johnson- 
Laird (Eds.), The shape of reason (pp.  193–203). 
Hove, UK: Psychology Press.
Butera, F., & Darnon, C. (2017). Competence assess-
ment, social comparison and conflict regulation. In 
A. Elliot, C. Dweck, & D. Yaeger (Eds.), Handbook 
of competence and motivation (Theory and applica-
tion) (2nd ed., pp. 192–213). New York, NY: Guilford 
Press.
Butera, F., & Mugny, G. (1995). Conflict between incom-
petences and influence of a low-competence source 
in hypothesis testing. European Journal of Social 
Psychology, 25, 457–462. https://doi.org/10.1002/
ejsp.2420250408
Butera, F., & Mugny, G. (2001). Conflicts and social influ-
ences in hypothesis testing. In C. De Dreu & N. De 
Vries (Eds.), Group consensus and minority influence: 
F. Butera and C. Buchs
125
Implications for innovation (pp.  160–182). Oxford, 
UK: Blackwell.
Buunk, B.  P., Collins, R.  L., Taylor, S.  E., VanYperen, 
N.  W., & Dakof, G.  A. (1990). The affective con-
sequences of social comparison: Either direction 
has its ups and downs. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 59, 1238–1249. https://doi.
org/10.1037/0022-3514.59.6.1238
Darnon, C., Buchs, C., & Butera, F. (2002). Epistemic and 
relational conflict in sharing information during coop-
erative learning. Swiss Journal of Psychology, 61, 139–
151. https://doi.org/10.1024//1421-0185.61.3.139
Darnon, C., Dompnier, B., Delmas, F., Pulfrey, C., & 
Butera, F. (2009). Achievement goal promotion at uni-
versity: Social desirability and social utility of mas-
tery and performance goals. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 96, 119–134. https://doi.
org/10.1037/a0012824
De Cremer, D., & Van Lange, P.  A. (2001). Why pro-
socials exhibit greater cooperation than proselfs: 
The roles of social responsibility and reciprocity. 
European Journal of Personality, 15, 5–18. https://doi.
org/10.1002/per.418
De Dreu, C. K., Nijstad, B. A., & van Knippenberg, D. 
(2008). Motivated information processing in group 
judgment and decision making. Personality and 
Social Psychology Review, 12, 22–49. https://doi.
org/10.1177/1088868307304092
Deutsch, M. (1949). A theory of cooperation and com-
petition. Human Relations, 2, 129–152. https://doi.
org/10.1177/001872674900200204
Deutsch, M. (1962). Cooperation and trust: Some theoret-
ical notes. In M. R. Jones (Ed.), Nebraska symposium 
on motivation (pp.  275–319). Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press.
Deutsch, M. (1985). Distributive justice: A social psycho-
logical perspective. New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press.
Dompnier, B., Darnon, C., Delmas, F., & Butera, F. 
(2008). Achievement goals and social judgment: The 
performance-approach paradox. International Review 
of Social Psychology, 21, 247–271.
Dyson, B. (2001). Cooperative learning in an elemen-
tary physical education program. Journal of Teaching 
in Physical Education, 20, 264–281. https://doi.
org/10.1123/jtpe.20.3.264
Elliot, A. J., Jury, M., & Murayama, K. (2018). Trait and 
perceived environmental competitiveness in achieve-
ment situations. Journal of Personality, 86, 353–367. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/jopy.12320
Esser, J. K. (1998). Alive and well after 25 years: A review 
of groupthink research. Organizational Behavior and 
Human Decision Processes, 73, 116–141. https://doi.
org/10.1006/obhd.1998.2758
Festinger, L. (1954). A theory of social comparison pro-
cesses. Human Relations, 7, 117–140. https://doi.
org/10.1177/001872675400700202
Hattie, J.  (2008). Visible learning: A synthesis of 
over 800 meta-analyses relating to achieve-
ment. New  York, NY: Routledge. https://doi.
org/10.1080/01443410903415150
Hwong, N., Caswell, A., Johnson, D.  W., & Johnson, 
R. (1993). Effects of cooperative and individual-
istic learning on prospective elementary teachers’ 
music achievement and attitudes. Journal of Social 
Psychology, 133, 53–64. https://doi.org/10.1080/0022
4545.1993.9712118
Janis, I.  L. (1972). Victims of groupthink. Boston, MA: 
Houghton Mifflin.
Johnson, D.  W. (2009). Reaching out: Interpersonal 
effectiveness and self-actualization (10th ed.). Boston, 
MA: Allyn & Bacon.
Johnson, D.  W. (2015). Constructive controversy: 
Theory, research, practice. New  York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/
CBO9781316105818
Johnson, D. W., & Johnson, F. (2006). Joining together: 
Group theory and group skills (9th ed.). Boston, MA: 
Allyn & Bacon.
Johnson, D.  W., & Johnson, R.  T. (1974). Instructional 
goal structure: Cooperative, competitive, or individu-
alistic. Review of Educational Research, 44, 213–240. 
https://doi.org/10.3102/00346543044002213
Johnson, D.  W., & Johnson, R.  T. (1989). Cooperation 
and competition: Theory and research. Edina, MN: 
Interaction Book Co.
Johnson, D. W., & Johnson, R. T. (1999). Making cooper-
ative learning work. Theory Into Practice, 38, 67–73. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/00405849909543834
Johnson, D. W., & Johnson, R. T. (2002). Social interde-
pendence theory and university instruction: Theory into 
practice. Swiss Journal of Psychology, 61, 119–129. 
https://doi.org/10.1024//1421-0185.61.3.119
Johnson, D. W., & Johnson, R. T. (2005). New develop-
ments in social interdependence theory. Genetic, Social, 
and General Psychology Monographs, 131, 285–358. 
https://doi.org/10.3200/MONO.131.4.285-358
Johnson, D. W., & Johnson, R. T. (2007). Creative con-
troversy: Intellectual challenge in the classroom (4th 
ed.). Edina, MN: Interaction Book Company.
Johnson, D.  W., & Johnson, R.  T. (2009). An educa-
tional psychology success story: Social interdepen-
dence theory and cooperative learning. Educational 
Researcher, 38, 365–379. https://doi.org/10.3102/001
3189X09339057
Johnson, D.  W., & Johnson, R.  T. (2015). Theoretical 
approaches to cooperative learning. In R. M. Gillies 
(Ed.), Collaborative learning: Developments in 
research and practice (pp.  17–46). New  York, NY: 
Nova Science.
Johnson, D.  W., Johnson, R.  T., & Holubec, E. (1998). 
Cooperation in the classroom (6th ed.). Edina, MN: 
Interaction Book Company.
Johnson, D. W., Johnson, R. T., & Holubec, E. J. (1993). 
Circles of learning: Cooperation in the classroom. 
Edina, MN: Interaction Book Company.
Johnson, D. W., Johnson, R. T., & Maruyama, G. (1983). 
Interdependence and interpersonal attraction among 
8 Social Interdependence and the Promotion of Cooperative Learning
126
heterogeneous and homogeneous individuals: A theo-
retical formulation and a meta-analysis of the research. 
Review of Educational Research, 5, 5–54. https://doi.
org/10.3102/00346543053001005
Johnson, D. W., Johnson, R. T., & Stanne, M. B. (2000). 
Cooperative learning methods: A meta-analysis. 
Retrieved from http://www.co-operation.org/pages/
cl-methods.html
Karau, S., & Williams, K. (1993). Social loafing: A meta- 
analytic review and theoretical integration. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 65, 681–706. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.65.4.681
Kaufman, N. H. (1994). A survey of law school grad-
ing practices. Journal of Legal Education, 44, 
415–423.
Latané, B., Williams, K., & Harkins, S. (1979). Many 
hands make light the work: The causes and conse-
quences of social loafing. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 37, 822–832. https://doi.
org/10.1037/0022-3514.37.6.822
Lew, M., Mesch, D., Johnson, D. W., & Johnson, R. (1986). 
Positive interdependence, academic and collaborative- 
skills group contingencies and isolated students. 
American Educational Research Journal, 23, 476–488. 
https://doi.org/10.3102/00028312023003476
Markus, H. R., & Kitayama, S. (1991). Culture and the 
self: Implications for cognition, emotion, and motiva-
tion. Psychological Review, 98, 224–253. https://doi.
org/10.1037/0033-295X.98.2.224
Moreland, R. L., & Levine, J. M. (1992). The composi-
tion of small groups. In E. J. Lawler, B. Markovsky, 
C.  Ridgeway, & H.  A. Walker (Eds.), Advances in 
group processes (Vol. 9, pp.  237–280). Greenwich, 
CT: JAI Press.
Muller, D., & Fayant, M.  P. (2010). On being exposed 
to superior others: Consequences of self-threatening 
upward social comparisons. Social and Personality 
Psychology Compass, 4, 621–634. https://doi.
org/10.1111/j.1751-9004.2010.00279.x
Muller Mirza, N., & Perret-Clermont, A.-N. (Eds.). 
(2009). Argumentation and education. Theoretical 
foundations and practices. New York, NY: Springer. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-009-9176-5
Neugebauer, J., Ray, D., & Sassenberg, K. (2016). When 
being worse helps: The influence of upward social 
comparisons and knowledge awareness on learner 
engagement and learning in peer-to-peer knowledge 
exchange. Learning & Instruction, 44, 41–52. https://
doi.org/10.1016/j.learninstruc.2016.02.007
Pulfrey, C., Buchs, C., & Butera, F. (2011). Why grades 
engender performance avoidance goals: The medi-
ating role of autonomous motivation. Journal of 
Educational Psychology, 103, 683–700. https://doi.
org/10.1037/a0023911
Pulfrey, C., & Butera, F. (2013). Why neo- liberal values of 
self-enhancement lead to cheating in higher education: A 
motivational account. Psychological Science, 24, 2153–
2162. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797613487221
Quiamzade, A., & Mugny, G. (2009). Social influence 
and threat in confrontations between competent peers. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 97, 
652–666. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0015822
Ray, D., Neugebauer, J., Sassenberg, K., Buder, J., & 
Hesse, F.  W. (2013). Motivated shortcomings in 
explanation: The role of comparative self-evaluation 
and awareness of explanation recipient knowledge. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 142, 
445–457. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0029339
Roseth, C. J., Johnson, D. W., & Johnson, R. T. (2008). 
Promoting early adolescents’ achievement and 
peer relationships: The effects of cooperative, 
competitive, and individualistic goal structures. 
Psychological Bulletin, 134, 223–246. https://doi.
org/10.1037/0033-2909.134.2.223
Roseth, C.  J., Lee, Y.  K., & Saltarelli, W.  A. (2019). 
Reconsidering jigsaw social psychology: Longitudinal 
effects on social interdependence, sociocognitive con-
flict regulation, motivation, and achievement. Journal 
of Educational Psychology, 111(1), 149–169
Ryan, R.  M., & Deci, E.  L. (2000). Self-determination 
theory and the facilitation of intrinsic moti-
vation, social development, and well-being. 
American Psychologist, 55, 68–78. https://doi.
org/10.1037/0003-066X.55.1.68
Schwartz, S.  H. (2007). Cultural and individual value 
correlates of capitalism: A comparative analy-
sis. Psychological Inquiry, 18, 52–57. https://doi.
org/10.1080/10478400701388963
Schwartz, S.  H., Cieciuch, J., Vecchione, M., Davidov, 
E., Fischer, R., Beierlein, C., … Dirilen-Gumus, O. 
(2012). Refining the theory of basic individual values. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 103, 
663–688. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0029393
Sharan, Y. (2010). Cooperative learning: A diversi-
fied pedagogy for diverse classrooms. Intercultural 
Education, 21(3), 195–203. https://doi.
org/10.1080/14675981003760390
Sherif, M. (1958). Superordinate goals in the reduction 
of intergroup conflict. American Journal of Sociology, 
63, 349–356. https://doi.org/10.1086/222258
Sherif, M. (1966). In common predicament: Social psy-
chology of intergroup conflict and cooperation. 
Boston: Houghton Mifflin comp.
Slavin, R.  E. (1983). When does cooperative learning 
increase student achievement? Psychological Bulletin, 
94, 429. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.94.3.429
Slavin, R.  E. (2011). Instruction based on cooperative 
learning. In R. Mayer (Ed.), Handbook of research on 
learning and instruction (pp. 344–360). London, UK: 
Taylor and Francis.
Slavin, R.  E. (2015). Cooperative learning in elemen-
tary schools. Education 3-13: International Journal 
of Primary, Elementary and Early Years Education, 
43, 5–14. https://doi.org/10.1080/03004279.2015.96
3370
Smith, K., Johnson, D.  W., & Johnson, R.  T. (1981). 
Can conflict be constructive? Controversy versus 
concurrence seeking in learning groups. Journal 
of Educational Psychology, 73, 651. https://doi.
org/10.1037/0022-0663.73.5.651
F. Butera and C. Buchs
127
Sommet, N., Pulfrey, C., & Butera, F. (2013). Did my MD 
really go to university to learn? Detrimental effects 
of numerus clausus on self-efficacy, mastery goals 
and learning. PLoS One, 8(12), e84178. https://doi.
org/10.1371/journal.pone.0084178
Tjosvold, D. (1984). Cooperation theory and organiza-
tions. Human Relations, 37, 743–767. https://doi.
org/10.1177/001872678403700903
Tjosvold, D., & Tjosvold, M. (2015). Building the team 
organization: How to open minds, resolve conflict, 
and ensure cooperation. New  York, NY: Palgrave 
Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137479938
Toma, C., & Butera, F. (2009). Hidden profiles and con-
cealed information: Strategic information sharing 
and use in group decision making. Personality and 
Social Psychology Bulletin, 35, 793–806. https://doi.
org/10.1177/0146167209333176
Tomasetto, C., Matteucci, M. C., Carugati, F., & Selleri, 
P. (2009). Effect of task presentation on students’ 
performances in introductory statistics courses. 
Social Psychology of Education, 12, 191–211. https://
doi.org/10.1007/s11218-008-9081-z
Topping, K.  J., Buchs, C., Duran, D., & Van Keer, H. 
(2017). Effective peer learning: From principles to 
practical implementation. London, UK & New York, 
NY: Routledge.
Triandis, H. C. (1993). Collectivism and individualism as 
cultural syndromes. Cross-Cultural Research, 27, 155–
180. https://doi.org/10.1177/106939719302700301
Webb, N. M. (2009). The teacher’s role in promoting col-
laborative dialogue in the classroom. British Journal 
of Educational Psychology, 79, 1–28. https://doi.org/1
0.1348/000709908X380772
Wegerif, R., Mercer, N., & Dawes, L. (1999). From 
social interaction to individual reasoning: An 
empirical investigation of a possible sociocultural 
model and cognitive development. Learning and 
Instruction, 9, 493–516. https://doi.org/10.1016/
S0959-4752(99)00013-4
Yager, S., Johnson, R. T., Johnson, D. W., & Snider, B. 
(1986). The impact of group processing on achieve-
ment in cooperative learning groups. The Journal of 
Social Psychology, 126, 389–397. https://doi.org/10.1
080/00224545.1986.9713601
8 Social Interdependence and the Promotion of Cooperative Learning
129© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 




D. Scheepers (*) 
Leiden University, Leiden, The Netherlands 
Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands
e-mail: scheepersdt@fsw.leidenuniv.nl 
N. Ellemers 
Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands
9
Contents
 The Groups in You  129
 The Principles of Social Identity Theory  130
 Groups, Just in Their Minds  130
 From Category to Identity  131
 When a Social Identity Is Negative  133
 Applications to Health  134
 Applications to Organizational Psychology  135
 Leaders Can Define a Shared Identity  136
 What Makes for an Attractive Workplace?  137
 Going the Extra Mile  138
 Managing Diversity  138
 Intervening to Improve Intergroup Contact 
and Collaboration  139
 Recommended Reading  141
 Guiding Answers to Questions  
in This Chapter  141
 References  141
 The Groups in You
Think for a moment about the different groups 
you belong to. Which groups come to mind? 
Maybe a sports team, your gender, the community 
in which you grew-up, a group of study-friends, 
an online community where you play games, or 
the political party you voted for during the last 
elections. Or maybe you even think about a very 
abstract category, like left-handers. When reflect-
ing on these groups, what do you think about? 
And what do you feel?
When reflecting on the groups you belong to, 
you likely discover that you are not only a part of 
these groups but that these groups are also a part 
of you. That is, group membership (partly) defines 
your identity: Groups tell us who we are (and who 
we are not). Relatedly, groups also partly deter-
mine our feelings. We can have a mild, warm feel-
ing when thinking about our fellow group 
members but can also feel anger when our group 
is mistreated or guilt when in-group members 
mistreat others.
The thoughts and feelings that arise when you 
think about the groups you belong to form your 
social identity. More precisely defined, social 
identity is “that part of an individual’s self- concept 
which derives from knowledge of membership in a 
social group (or groups) together with the value or 
emotional significance attached to that member-
ship” (Tajfel, 1978, p. 63).
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The current chapter provides an overview of 
the main theoretical perspective on social iden-
tity, namely, social identity theory (SIT; Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979). SIT is a rich theoretical perspec-
tive integrating group psychology with psychol-
ogy about the self. The theory also has substantial 
practical value and has been used to analyze 
important issues in organizations and society at 
large and to design interventions. In the current 
chapter, we focus in particular on applications in 
the context of health and organizational psychol-
ogy. We conclude by describing a social identity-
based intervention for improving intergroup 
relations in an educational setting. Before 
describing these fields of application in more 
detail, in the next section, we first outline the 
principles of SIT.
 The Principles of Social Identity 
Theory
Social identity theory roughly consists of two 
parts. The first, more basic psychological part, 
describes the cognitive processes underlying 
social identity definition and the motivational 
assumption that people strive for a positive 
social identity. The second, socio-structural part 
describes how people cope with a negative 
social identity. Before discussing these two 
parts, we first provide a short historical 
 background, by describing the “minimal 
group  experiments” that stimulated the devel-
opment of SIT.
 Groups, Just in Their Minds
In the early 1970s, Henri Tajfel, a cognitive psy-
chologist at the University of Bristol, England, 
who would become the founding father of SIT, 
conducted research on the minimal criteria for 
group formation and the minimal conditions for 
in-group favoritism to occur. To this end he 
designed a clever experimental setup where groups 
were stripped-down to their basic cognitive 
essence. Students who participated in the experi-
ments were allocated to one of two groups, osten-
sibly on the basis of their preference for either the 
painter “Klee” or “Kandinsky.” This was actually 
the only information that participants had: That 
there were two groups, and they were a member of 
one of them. There was no interaction within or 
between the groups; the groups thus only existed 
in the participants’ minds, and in that sense they 
were truly “minimal.” After being assigned to one 
of the groups, participants allocated small amounts 
of money between anonymous members of the 
“Klee” and “Kandinsky” group (excluding them-
selves). The results of these resource allocations 
indicated that participants favored people of their 
own group above those who had been assigned to 
the other group (Tajfel, 1970).
Definition Box
Social Identity: “That part of an individu-
al’s self-concept which derives from his 
knowledge of his membership in a social 
group (or groups) together with the value 
or emotional significance attached to that 
membership” (Tajfel, 1978, p. 63)
Definition Box
Minimal Group: Membership of a minimal 
group is based on a relatively arbitrary crite-
rion, like being an “overestimater” or an 
“underestimator” on an estimation task or 
simply resulting from a flip of a coin (Heads, 
“group A”; Tails, “Group B”). Moreover, in 
the classic minimal group paradigm, group 
members are anonymous, and there is no 
interaction within or between the groups. As 
a result, minimal groups are purely cogni-
tive, i.e., they only exist in the minds of the 
group members. This means that minimal 
groups are socially meaningless outside the 
direct experimental context: they do not have 
a past nor a future.
D. Scheepers and N. Ellemers
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The findings of the minimal group studies 
were surprising because they conflicted with the 
main perspective on intergroup relations by the 
time: realistic conflict theory (Sherif & Sherif, 
1969). According to that perspective, real conflict 
over scarce material resources (money, housing, 
food) was necessary for intergroup conflict to 
arise. Although the participants in the minimal 
group studies allocated more money to their own 
group than to the other group, there was no way in 
which the person himself or herself could directly 
profit from this. Later studies also showed that 
such in-group bias in the minimal group paradigm 
emerges along more symbolic dimensions, for 
example, when rating the in-group and out-group 
on traits or when rating artistic products made by 
in-group and out-group members (Scheepers, 
Spears, Doosje, & Manstead, 2006). This all sug-
gested that real conflict over material resources is 
not necessary for in-group favoritism to emerge. 
But what could then account for it?
 From Category to Identity
To explain the results of the minimal group 
experiments, Tajfel proposed that the persons had 
categorized themselves as a member of the mini-
mal category they had been assigned to, the Klee 
or Kandinsky group. That is, the group had 
become part of the person’s identity. But how 
could this explain in-group favoritism? Tajfel 
argued that people strive for a positive social 
identity, just as they strive for a positive personal 
identity (the part of identity that makes you a 
relatively “unique” individual). In the absence of 
further information about the value of the group, 
showing in-group favoritism was the only way in 
which people in the minimal intergroup situation 
could positively differentiate the in-group from 
the out-group. Thus, striving for positive group 
distinctiveness, and thus a positive social identity, 
explains in-group favoritism in the minimal 
group paradigm.
The more general and basic psychological 
processes underlying social identity definition 
and striving for a positive social identity, which 
form the heart of SIT, are displayed in Fig. 9.1. 
The theory starts with the notion that social cate-
gorization, i.e., dividing the social world into 
groups, is by definition self-relevant: You always 
belong to one of the two social categories or a 
third (e.g., outsider) category. For example, when 
seeing two crowds of football fans, this may 
make salient your identification with one of these 
teams, a third team, or even with the category of 
people “not interested in football.” For each of 
these possibilities, the basic cognitive social cat-
egorization process implies a part of your iden-
tity. This self-categorization in combination with 
the motivation for a positive social identity elicits 
social comparison with relevant  out- groups 
aimed at positively differentiating the in-group 
from these out-groups (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).
Box 9.1 Questions for Elaboration: Your 
Money or Your Identity?
Social identity theory and realistic conflict 
theory stress different primary factors 
underlying intergroup attitudes: social 
identity stresses identity, whereas realistic 
conflict theory stresses material resources. 
Think for a moment about negative atti-
tudes toward migrants. Which arguments 
related to identity or instrumental factors 
are typically put forward? Then think about 
the striding European integration. Which 
instrumental or identity factors play a role 
in attitudes toward the European Union?
Box 9.2 Zooming In: Preventing 
Discrimination by Expanding “We”
Social identity theory describes how iden-
tity motives can form the basis of in-group 
favoritism. Can the same identity principles 
also be applied for intervening intergroup 
conflict? The common in-group identity 
model (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000) does 
9 Social Identity Theory
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When successfully differentiating the in-group 
in a positive way from out-groups, this contrib-
utes to a positive social identity. Such a positive 
sense of self does in turn serve basic human needs 
like the need for certainty and the need for 
self- esteem. Moreover, by partly defining the 
place of the individual in the social world, creat-
ing positive group distinctiveness also serves 
the search for meaning: it tells us who we are 
(and who we are not), where we belong, and how 
we should behave (Abrams & Hogg, 1988; 
Scheepers et al., 2006).
Thus, the basis of SIT is formed by cognitive 
processes (categorization, social comparison) in 
combination with the motivation to obtain a posi-
tive social identity. However, as illustrated with 
our opening examples, there are also important 
affective aspects to social identity. Indeed, more 
modern conceptualizations of social identity dis-
tinguish among different components of social 
identity, like cognitive components (self-catego-
rization or self- stereotyping), affective compo-
nents (self-esteem or satisfaction), and behavioral 
components (group commitment or solidarity) 
(Ellemers, Kortekaas, & Ouwerkerk, 1999; 
Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007; Ouwerkerk, 
Ellemers, & De Gilder, 1999). These different 
components are also reflected in the different 
items and scales that are typically used to mea-
sure identification (see Table 9.1).
At this point you may wonder “what’s then so 
social about social identity theory”? Indeed, 
these intrapersonal cognitive processes and 








Dividing the social world 
in different categories of 
people is always self-
relevant: You always 
belong to one of the 
groups or a third (e.g., 
outsider) group. This lays 
the basis for social 
identity.
People are motivated to 
obtain a positive social 
identity through positive 
intergroup social 
comparisons.
A positive social identity 
serves basic needs for 
certainty, self-esteem, 
and meaning.
Fig. 9.1 Social identity definition
indeed suggest they can. More specifically, 
the model shows that bias by members of 
one group (e.g., psychology students) 
toward members of another group (e.g., 
physics students) can be decreased by 
making a common identity salient (e.g., 
“Tübingen university students”). Thus, by 
expanding the inclusiveness of the in-group 
by means of a higher level of social catego-
rization, in-group bias can be decreased. 
Recent work has shown that creating a com-
mon in-group identity is particularly effec-
tive in reducing bias when it is combined 
with simultaneously stressing the ties with 
the subgroup and the overarching common 
identity (e.g., “Tübingen psychology stu-
dents”). Such “dual identities” work partic-
ularly well because they secure subgroup 
distinctiveness while at the same time creat-
ing common ground with the out-group 
(Dovidio, Gaertner, & Saguy, 2007).
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seem more or less individualistic in nature. 
However, social identity theory is truly a social 
psychological theory, because, according to the 
theory, the social context (partly) determines 
which part of (social) identity is salient at a given 
moment. For example, your identity as member 
of a sports team is more likely to be salient during 
a close game against a rival team, while your 
personal identity is more likely to be salient 
when socializing with your teammates after the 
game (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Thus, the social 
context is key to SIT in explaining which part of 
one’s (social) identity becomes salient at a given 
moment.
 When a Social Identity Is Negative
The social character of the theory is also echoed 
in the second part of social identity theory, the 
social-structural part. This part basically deals 
with the issue of how people respond to having a 
negative social identity.
One aspect in which minimal groups are mini-
mal is that they are neutral in terms of their 
valence. Natural groups, by contrast, do typically 
have evaluative connotations. That is, some 
groups are generally respected and enjoy a high 
social status (e.g., physicians), whereas other 
groups have low status, sometimes even to the 
extent that they can be regarded “stigmatized 
groups” (e.g., the unemployed). Because SIT pre-
dicts that people are generally motivated to 
achieve a positive social identity, members of low 
status groups should be motivated to improve the 
social standing of their group. By contrast, members 
of high status groups should be particularly 
motivated to protect the social standing of their 
group (Scheepers, 2009; Turner & Brown, 1978).
For example, imagine that you are a player in 
a hockey team that, for the third year in a row, 
finds itself at the bottom of the league. How 
would you feel, and what would you do? The 
group’s bad performance likely has a negative 
impact on the team members’ social identity. 
How can they cope with this threat? Social 
identity theory describes three options. The first 
one, individual mobility, involves trying as an 
individual to seek entrance to a higher status 
group like another hockey team, or even club. 
The second option, collective action, involves 
working as a group for status improvement. Your 
team may engage in team-building activities to 
increase cohesion, or schedule more training 
sessions. As a result, the team may be able to do 
better and increase its status in the next season. 
The third option is to be socially creative and to 
change the comparison group (“although we 
ended at the bottom of the second league, we are 
definitively better than those in the third league”) 
or the dimension of comparison (“although we 
are not brilliant at hockey, we are definitively the 
most fun team in the league, and hey, in the end, 
what is amateur sports all about?”).
In addition to the distinction between the dif-
ferent ways to cope with a negative social iden-
tity, SIT also specifies the factors determining 
which strategy is likely to be used. Classic SIT 
describes three socio-structural variables that 
determine which coping response is chosen: the 
permeability of group differences (is moving to 
another group possible?) and the legitimacy and 
stability of the status differences (are the status 
differences fair, and is change possible?; 
Ellemers, 1993; Tajfel & Turner, 1979).
When do people engage in collective action, 
and when do they engage in individual mobility? 
(see Fig. 9.2). For individual mobility to be pos-
sible in the first place, the group must be perme-
able, which is the case for sports teams but less so 
for social categories like gender and ethnicity. 
When boundaries are closed, the stability and 
legitimacy of the status differences play an 
important role in whether one opts for collective 
Table 9.1 Different dimensions of social identification 
with typical items
Dimension Example item
Solidarity I feel committed to [in-group].
Satisfaction I am glad to be [in-group].








[In-group] people have a lot in 
common with each other.
From Leach et al. (2008)
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action or social creativity. When status differences 
are illegitimate (“the referees have been consis-
tently biased against our team”) and unstable 
(“we attracted a couple of good young players”), 
collective action will become more likely; when 
low status is legitimate and stable, however, social 
creativity becomes more likely (“we are the more 
fun team”). Thus, social identity threat is an 
important motivational principle determining, for 
example, whether one flees from the group indi-
vidually or fights the status quo as a group 
(Ellemers, 1993; Tajfel & Turner, 1979).
This concludes our description of the basic 
principles of social identity theory. In the next sec-
tions, we describe two important domains of appli-
cation of the theory: health and organizations.
 Applications to Health
Social identification has important implications 
for (improving) mental and physical health 
(Haslam, Jetten, Postmes, & Haslam, 2009). 
In this section we briefly describe two ways in 
which social identity shapes health outcomes: 
the influence of group identification on health 
behavior and the influence of group identifica-
tion on stress reduction.
Members of the lower social classes or ethnic 
minority groups suffer from more negative health 
outcomes compared to members of the middle- 
class or ethnic majority groups (e.g., Braveman, 
Egerter, & Williams, 2011). Part of this relation-
ship is explained by social identification. For 
example, research has indicated that members of 
racial minority groups in the USA were particu-
larly likely to associate health behaviors like 
exercising, eating healthy, and getting enough 
sleep, with the white middle class. As a tragic con-
sequence of this, after making their ethnic identity 
salient, ethnic minority group members showed a 
greater “health fatalism,” i.e., a belief that it will 
be of no use to engage in a more healthy lifestyle 
(Oyserman, Fryberg, & Yoder, 2007).
Social identity can also be used to stimulate 
positive health behaviors, however. A study on 
anti-smoking advertisements demonstrated that 
their effectiveness partly depends on the extent to 
which a message is framed in terms of the target’s 
social identity (Moran & Sussman, 2014). 
Participants in this online questionnaire study 
were adolescents, who first indicated on scales 
how much they identified with 11 possible peer 
groups (e.g., “emo,” “hip-hop-er,” “skater”). In 
turn they viewed an advert that displayed two 
anti-smoking beliefs (e.g., “Tobacco company 
executives have called younger adult smokers 
‘replacement smokers’”). A graphic designer had 
created 11 different versions of the adverts to fit 





















Join other team… “We are the more 
fun team!”
“Let’s go for it 
next season!”
Social-structural variables Identity management strategies
Fig 9.2 Social-structural variables and identity management strategies
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statement, two persons (an adolescent boy and 
girl) were displayed who had the prototypical 
features of a particular peer group (e.g., two typi-
cal skaters). Then, one week later the participants 
indicated their agreement with the two anti-
smoking belief statements. Results indicated that 
a stronger identification with a certain peer group 
led to more endorsement with the statements. 
Thus, “customizing” a health message to fit a tar-
get’s social identity increases the effectiveness of 
the message.
A second way in which social identification 
influences health outcomes is through its stress- 
attenuating function. For example, Haslam, 
O’Brien, Jetten, Vormedal, and Penna (2005) 
examined stress in Norwegian heart patients who 
were recovering from heart surgery in a clinic. 
Participants filled in a questionnaire measuring 
their identification with family and friends (e.g., 
“I identify with my family/friends”), received 
social support (e.g., “Do you feel you get the 
emotional support you need”?), and stress (e.g., 
“Are you stressed?”). Results indicated that iden-
tification with family and friends was inversely 
related to stress. Importantly, social identification 
was positively related to social support, and the 
negative relation between identification and 
stress was mediated by social support.
Identification may also have a positive effect 
on well-being when the group itself forms the 
basis of stress. According to the rejection identi-
fication model (Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 
1999), group-based rejection initially threatens 
one’s self-esteem, but through a strengthened 
identification with the group, the person can in 
turn cope with the stress, eventually leading to 
restored self-esteem. In line with the model, 
Branscombe and colleagues showed that when 
Black Americans thought about discrimination 
against their racial group, this initially led to 
depressed self-esteem. However, this social iden-
tity threat led in turn to a strengthened ethnic 
identification, which then led to higher self-
esteem (see Schmitt, Branscombe, Kobrynowicz, 
& Owen, 2002, for similar effects regarding gen-
der groups).
Thus, the above research suggests that a social 
identity perspective is not only useful for making 
health campaigns more effective but also for 
designing interventions to reduce stress. An obvi-
ous context for applying these insights is the work 
context, where people may experience consider-
able amounts of stress. Indeed, the work by 
Haslam et al. (2005) suggests that by raising sup-
port and social identification, teams can become 
more resilient against stress. In addition to such 
interventions for work stress, the social identity 
perspective has offered considerable insights in 
other themes in organizational psychology. These 
themes are discussed in the next section.
 Applications to Organizational 
Psychology
Most people spend a large part of their time interact-
ing with each other in groups, when they are at work 
in organizations. Accordingly, it has been argued 
that the insights offered by social identity theory can 
help understand the thoughts, feelings, and behav-
iors of individuals working in teams and organiza-
tions (e.g., Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Haslam & 
Ellemers, 2005; Haslam, Van Knippenberg, Platow, 
& Ellemers, 2003; Hogg & Terry, 2000). In this 
section, we demonstrate the added value of consid-
ering employees in terms of their group-based 
identities  – instead of treating them as separate 
individuals – in addressing a number of problems 
faced by many work organizations.
Box 9.3 Questions for Elaboration: What Do 
you Identify with at Work?
When you think about finding an organiza-
tion to work in as a professional, what 
would be most important criterion for you? 
Does this differ from what you seek in your 
current (side-)job? How happy are you 
with your employment conditions and with 
the way you are treated by your manager? 
Which is more important for your motiva-
tion to perform as best you can?
9 Social Identity Theory
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The added value of applying insights from 
social identity theory has been demonstrated for 
a range of common challenges faced by organiza-
tions (see Table 9.2), for which we will give some 
examples below. These relate to:
 (a) Cognitive categorization of the self as a 
member of the organization (How can lead-
ership connect individual employees to work 
toward common goals? When will differen-
tiation in employee rewards enhance indi-
vidual ambitions or invite protest?)
 (b) Evaluative judgments of the organization 
(Which organizational features are important 
to recruit and retain employees? Which help 
secure customer loyalty?)
 (c) Emotional commitment to the organization 
(How to motivate workers to go the extra 
mile? How to create a sense of belonging 
when employees only communicate online?)
 (d) Identity change (How to accommodate minor-
ity employees? How to secure cooperation 
through an organizational merger?)
 Leaders Can Define a Shared 
Identity
Many companies use performance evaluations 
and incentives that compare workers against each 
other, for instance, to determine who receives a 
bonus or qualifies for promotion. This is generally 
seen as a legitimate and effective system to 
motivate employees to work hard. However, the 
downside of such practices is that they foster 
competition between individuals and emphasize 
their personal identity, inviting people to think of 
themselves as individual workers, instead of as 
parts of a larger team or organization. If you work 
in a call center, for instance, where employee 
performance is rated by the speed at which you 
are able to take new calls, would you invest in 
providing the best possible service to each caller, 
so that they are satisfied and perhaps purchase 
additional services from the organization, or 
would you focus on completing each call as 
quickly as you can?
An important challenge for leadership in cases 
such as this is to help individual employees build 
and retain a sense of identification with the team 
or organization. This can enhance their willing-
ness to work toward shared goals – such as main-
taining long-term relations with satisfied 
customers (Ellemers, De Gilder, & Haslam, 
2004). Indeed, employees are more inclined to 
follow the guidance of leaders if they clearly sup-
port the preferences of their own team members 
(e.g., making sure they have enough information 
to provide satisfactory answers to questions 
they receive) and protect them against claims of 
other teams or organizational members (e.g., that 
the people at the call center work too slowly). 
Table 9.2 Organizational topics, applications, and implications of insights from social identity theory
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Leaders who are able to do this well allow workers 
to self-categorize at the group level instead of the 
individual level (Haslam & Platow, 2001).
This also implies that those with formal posi-
tions of power are not necessarily the ones who 
are most influential in guiding the organization 
and its members. The possibility they have to 
decide about business strategies, enforce 
requests, or afford resources gives them control 
over the outcomes of employees. However, it is 
the ability of leaders to connect, engage, and 
inspire others that causes employees to follow 
their guidance. More often than not, this is 
enhanced by their willingness to acknowledge 
and transform important concerns of individual 
employees (e.g., their frustration of having to 
mind the time when answering customer 
requests) and to define how shared team or orga-
nizational goals contribute to fulfilling the goals 
and ambitions of individual workers (see also 
Haslam et al., 2011).
 What Makes for an Attractive 
Workplace?
Unfortunately, many organizations have a limited 
view on what determines the value people attach to 
their place of work. Human resources and recruit-
ing officers tend to emphasize material gains, such 
as personal career opportunities, compensation 
packages, or other employee benefits when recruit-
ing new employees. However, different studies 
have found that these are not the only things that 
matter. Instead, the main thing people want to know 
before they apply for a job is whether this can make 
them proud of their organizational identity. 
Organizations with high prestige reflect positively 
on the self-conceptions of employees and enhance 
their identification with the organization (Smidts, 
Pruyn, & van Riel, 2001).
Organizational prestige and feelings of pride 
in belonging to the organization do not necessar-
ily depend on its financial successes or business 
reputation. Instead, those who consider working 
for the organization mainly have an interest in 
knowing whether the organization supports 
important values. For instance, it has been estab-
lished that workers are more satisfied and com-
mitted to the organization when they perceive 
organizational management to be truthful in 
communicating with employees and stakeholders 
and to engage in socially responsible business 
practices (Ellemers, Kingma, Van der Burgt & 
Barreto, 2011; Van Prooijen & Ellemers, 2015). 
As a result, even individuals who work in sectors 
that are often seen as having low prestige (such as 
garbage collectors, undertakers, or sex workers) 
can take pride in their profession and identify 
with the organization that employs them, by 
focusing on important societal functions they ful-
fill, for instance, by averting public health threats, 
or by offering emotional support to lonely people 
(Ashforth & Kreiner, 1999).
Box 9.4 Zooming In: The Costs of 
Competing Against Each Other
Organizations where workers are encour-
aged to compete with each other for cus-
tomers and resources hope to optimize the 
profits and efficiency of the company in this 
way (Victor & Cullen, 1988). Studies with 
many different professional groups and 
companies across the world have revealed 
the drawbacks of this motivational strategy, 
which is typically associated with reduced 
work satisfaction and organizational com-
mitment among workers. Further, reward-
ing workers for the individual performance 
they show, without taking into account how 
they achieved this performance, has been 
found to elicit a range of unethical work 
behaviors. These include lying, stealing, 
misreporting results, falsifying reports, 
accepting bribes, and bullying in the 
company (Martin & Cullen, 2006; Simha & 
Cullen, 2012).
Definition Box
Organizational identification and com-
mitment: Although the term “organiza-
tional identification” is often used in the 
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 Going the Extra Mile
The importance of a common social identity for 
motivation and performance at work has been 
demonstrated in many studies. Again, selfish 
concerns, such as the fact that workers depend on 
each other to achieve valued outcomes, appear 
less important than a sense of emotional involve-
ment and subjective feelings of commitment to 
one’s team and the organization (see also Butera & 
Buchs, Chap. 8 this volume). This was observed, 
for instance, among Dutch soldiers on a UN 
peacekeeping mission. Here it was found that the 
more soldiers in military teams felt that they were 
respected and included, the more likely it was 
that their commanders considered the team ready 
for combat (Ellemers, Sleebos, Stam, & De 
Gilder, 2013). The power of noninstrumental fac-
tors in connecting and motivating people at work 
is further demonstrated in studies among volun-
teers. Their sense of identification and commit-
ment to the volunteer organization and its mission 
motivates them to work even without pay (e.g., 
Boezeman & Ellemers, 2008). This also means 
that it can be very costly for organizations to pre-
vent employees from developing such a sense of 
emotional involvement, for instance, by failing to 
acknowledge and include them as valued members 
of the organization. This can happen in sectors 
where it is common practice to offer flexible, 
part-time, or limited duration work contracts only 
(see also Ho, 2009). Even if this may seem a 
good way to optimize employment efficiency, 
such organizations cannot expect workers to 
develop a sense of common identity or to “go the 
extra mile” to achieve outcomes that are impor-
tant for the organization. Surely you would not 
be willing to work overtime to meet a deadline or 
help instruct new co-workers, after having been 
told your contract is not extended because some-
one with your level of experience is considered 
“too expensive” to retain.
 Managing Diversity
Even in organizations that are aware of the impor-
tance of connecting people and encouraging them 
to develop a shared identity, there may be addi-
tional difficulties to overcome. An important 
challenge in this sense is offered by changing 
management literature, this is often defined 
and measured differently than in social 
identity theory. Importantly, management 
studies often separate cognitive self-catego-
rization (which they consider to capture the 
“organizational identity” of employees) 
from emotional involvement with the orga-
nization (which they indicate as “organiza-
tional commitment”) and conclude that 
identity is less relevant than commitment to 
predict behavior in organizations. This is 
different from the notion of the “group-
based- self” in social identity theory, which 
incorporates self-categorization as well as 
commitment as essential components of a 
social identity
Box 9.5 Zooming In: The Dangers of 
Overcommitment
In itself, a strong team or organizational 
identity is no guarantee for an optimal per-
formance at work (see also Ellemers et al., 
2004). In fact, a strong shared identity may 
tempt workers to cover up each other’s 
mistakes or encourage each other to take it 
easy. At the other end of the spectrum, peo-
ple who overcommit to their work identity 
may be quite productive for a while but are 
unlikely to be able to keep this up indefi-
nitely. In the long run, the social and per-
sonal sacrifices people make when they 
focus on their work identity alone can pre-
vent them from investing in other impor-
tant identities, for instance, relating to 
family, friends, sports, or cultural activities 
(Faniko, Ellemers, Derks, & Lorenzi-
Cioldi, 2017).
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workplace realities, which are characterized by 
increasing diversity among workers. Being able 
to recruit the inputs from people with different 
cultural backgrounds, types of training, or life 
experiences can be a valuable asset to many com-
panies. However, if not managed well, such dif-
ferences in the type of knowledge and experience 
people bring to work, as well as more immedi-
ately visible differences in their gender or skin 
color, can easily become a source of misunder-
standing and divisiveness. These features that 
separate workers or cut across common team or 
organizational memberships can induce (implicit) 
discrimination and make those who differ from 
the majority feel excluded (for a discussion of 
implicit prejudice and discrimination, see 
Wittenbrink, Correll, & Ma, Chap. 11 this vol-
ume). The challenge for leadership is to make 
sure that such alternative identities are acknowl-
edged and recruited into a common overarching 
identity. This can be achieved, for instance, by 
clarifying how such differences can form a 
resource for greater flexibility and creativity 
(e.g., “we need workers who know how to digi-
talize our services”) or allow the organization to 
connect to a broader population of clients (e.g., 
“we need workers who know how to communi-
cate with non-native speakers”; Ellemers & Rink, 
2016). Thus, attempts to build a common organi-
zational identity should not ignore such differ-
ences. Instead identity-building initiatives do 
well to emphasize and enhance the different types 
of contribution workers can make to the organi-
zation and what it stands for, instead of letting 
such differences become a source of disagree-
ment and conflict.
In sum, there is considerable evidence that 
social identities are important in organizational 
contexts. At the same time, strengthening a 
common identity, for instance, through “team- 
building” activities, is no easy or foolproof solu-
tion to make workers feel connected and perform 
well. To be able to build and benefit from the 
willingness of individuals to identify with their 
place of work, organizational leaders do well to 
reconsider standard business practices that can 
undermine shared goals and common identities. 
Making people feel respected and included as 
valued organizational members  – regardless of 
their differences – making sure that organization 
and its activities can make workers proud, and 
taking care not to be too greedy in requesting that 
workers sacrifice other identities to fit in, all are 
important challenges that need to be met to be 
able to connect workers into a happy, healthy, and 
productive organization.
 Intervening to Improve Intergroup 
Contact and Collaboration
An important theme within social identity 
research is how SIT principles can be used to 
improve intergroup relations in a variety of con-
texts. One of the most influential ideas in this 
context is that creating a common in-group iden-
tity that comprises both in-group and out- group 
reduces bias toward (former) out-group members 
(Dovidio et al., 2007; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; 
see Box 9.2). For example, this idea has been 
used to understand corporate mergers, where a 
common challenge is often to unify companies 
that were previously competing against each 
other, and might have different identities, cul-
tures, and statuses. Understanding the social 
identity dynamics of such mergers is key for 
making the merger a success (Terry et al., 2001). 
Another context where SIT principles have been 
used to stimulate intergroup helping and cooper-
ation is the educational context. We conclude this 
chapter by describing a social identity interven-
tion to improve intergroup relations at schools 
and universities.
One challenge that many schools and universi-
ties currently face is the increasing diversity in 
their student populations. This diversity can take 
different forms, for example, increasing numbers 
of students with a migration background or 
increasing gender diversity in areas that were 
traditionally male-dominated (e.g., math). How 
can you stimulate a positive school climate and 
collaboration in such contexts?
Vezzali et  al. (2015) tested a common in-
group identity intervention in two educational 
settings: an elementary school setting (Study 1) 
and a university setting (Study 2). Participants in 
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the first study were native-Italian elementary 
school children. Within different classes partici-
pants were randomly assigned to one of three 
conditions. In the “common in-group condition,” 
participants imagined working together with an 
immigrant child on a competitive task against 
another dyad. This condition was compared to 
two (control) conditions: In the “imagined 
contact condition,” participants had to simply 
imagine contact with an immigrant child, without 
working together; In the “control condition,” the 
instructions were as in the common in-group 
identity condition, but the migration background 
of the interaction partner was not mentioned. 
Participants engaged in the imagining task once a 
week over a 4-week period. The context that par-
ticipants had to imagine differed from week to 
week (e.g., sports, theater play). Each time, par-
ticipants were instructed to close their eyes and 
take a third-person perspective while imagining 
the situation. One week after the final intervention 
task, intergroup helping intentions were measured 
using a questionnaire (e.g., “Think about an 
immigrant child who may have problems with 
writing an essay. Would you help him/her?”). 
Then, again 1 week after this assessment, the 
experimenter met individually with each of the 
participants and further interviewed him/her 
about helping intentions. More specifically, the 
participant was informed that a new pupil with an 
immigrant background would arrive soon at their 
school, and the participant was asked whether (s)
he would be willing to help the new child with 
integrating at school. Participants were asked 
about the number of afternoons (between 0 and 4) 
they would be willing to help out their new 
classmate.
Results on both helping measures indicated that 
participants in the common in-group identity condi-
tion were more likely to help an immigrant class-
mate than participants in the control condition. 
Helping intentions in the imagined contact condi-
tion fell in between the common in-group condition 
and the control condition (for a discussion of imag-
ined contact as a way to ameliorate intergroup rela-
tions, see Christ & Kauff, Chap. 10).
These results were replicated in a second 
study in a university context. This study used 
basically the same setup as the school study but 
also comprised a questionnaire measuring 
common in-group identity (e.g., “Do you perceive 
Italians and immigrants as members of a common 
group [residents of Italy]?”). Results indicated, 
as would be expected, that the common in-group 
identity measure indeed mediated the positive 
effects of the common in-group identity 
intervention on the willingness to engage in 
future intergroup contact.
Together these two studies illustrate the fruit-
fulness of a common identity intervention to 
improve intergroup contact and cooperation in an 
educational setting. It should be noted that 
although the intervention itself was relatively 
simple to implement, its effects were sustainable 
in that it predicted out-group helping 2 weeks 
later.
Summary
• Human beings are advanced social ani-
mals: People not only form groups; 
groups also form people. People derive 
part of their identity from the groups to 
which they belong, which is called their 
“social identity.” Social identity theory 
describes how – through social categori-
zation and comparison  – people define 
their social identity and how they strive 
for a positive social identity. The need for 
a positive and meaningful social identity 
is served by positive group distinctiveness 
which contributes to feelings of certainty 
and positive self-esteem.
• A negative social identity, for example, 
stemming from membership in a group 
with a relatively low status, is threaten-
ing. People cope with a negative social 
identity in various ways, like trying to 
improve the status of the group or seek-
ing entrance in a higher status group.
• Social identity has important implica-
tions for health psychology, for example, 
for customizing health interventions. 
Moreover, group identification can 
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 Guiding Answers to Questions 
in This Chapter
 1. Q (Box 9.1): Your Money or Your Identity?
A: Migrants can be seen as threat to the mate-
rial resources of the host society, like housing, 
healthcare, and the sustainability of social 
security programs. By bringing their cultural 
habits and religion, migrants are often also 
seen as a threat to the identity and culture of 
the host society. The European integration can 
be seen as a threat to the material resources of 
the inhabitants of certain rich countries, when 
they feel having to compensate countries with 
less well-functioning economies. Moreover, 
by seemingly blending the unique cultural 
features of member states, the European 
Union is also often seen as a threat to national 
identities.
 2. Q (Box 9.3): What Do You Identify with at 
Work?
A: People can focus on different aspects of 
their work as providing them with a source of 
identification and commitment. Many aca-
demics, for instance, primarily identify with 
their academic discipline or profession (being 
a physicist, being a historian) and may attach 
less value to the university or academic insti-
tution that employs them. Workers in large 
corporations may identify with their career 
development goals (being a management 
trainee), with their work team (IT depart-
ment), or with the organization (K-Mart). 
What people adopt as the primary focus for 
their professional identity is guided also by 
the way the organization treats them, the 
development opportunities, and career pros-
pects they receive. For instance, an organiza-
tion that only offers flexible or temporary 
contracts will have more difficulty having its 
workers develop a sense of identification with 
the organization. Likewise, leadership com-
munications and incentive programs can lead 
workers to categorize themselves differently, 
for instance, as part of a group of experts, 
work team, or organization.
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 Introduction
It has sometimes been held that merely by assem-
bling people without regard for race, color, religion, 
or national origin, we can thereby destroy stereo-
types and develop friendly attitudes. The case is not 
so simple. (Allport 1954, p. 261)
The question of how prejudice and intergroup 
conflict can be reduced has been at the forefront 
of the research agendas in social sciences for 
many years (see Paluck & Green, 2009; Tropp & 
Mallett, 2011; see also Wittenbrink, Correll, & 
Ma, Chap. 11). Not least due to the ever- 
increasing migration, and as a consequence more 
ethnically and culturally diverse societies (World 
Migration Report, 2017), the reduction of (eth-
nic) prejudice and intergroup conflict is a major 
challenge for public policy (Hewstone, 2009; 
Wagner, Christ, & Heitmeyer, 2010). Starting in 
the 1930s, social scientists proposed that inter-
group contact  – contact between members of 
different groups – provides a way to overcome 
intergroup tensions and conflict (for recent over-
views, see Pettigrew & Tropp, 2011; Al Ramiah 
& Hewstone, 2013; Wagner & Hewstone, 2012; 
for a short historical overview of intergroup con-
tact research, see Pettigrew & Tropp, 2005, 
Pettigrew, 2016). However, mutual contact 
between members of different groups is not a 
panacea for prejudice as already pointed out by 
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Gordon Allport (1954, see the starting quote). 
Allport can be considered as the originator of the 
intergroup contact theory  – in his famous and 
influential book The Nature of Prejudice, he 
summarized early research on intergroup 
contact.
The present chapter will introduce inter-
group contact theory as one of the most promi-
nent approaches to prejudice reduction within 
psychology (e.g., Brown & Hewstone, 2005; 
Pettigrew & Tropp, 2011). In the first part, we 
will answer the question whether intergroup 
contact indeed helps to overcome prejudice 
and, as a consequence, intergroup tensions. 
Moreover, we will also focus on different forms 
of intergroup contact (face-to-face contact ver-
sus indirect forms of contact). In the second 
part, we will discuss when and how intergroup 
contact works. We also focus on undesirable, 
unintended effects of intergroup contact. 
Finally, we will summarize research demon-
strating how intergroup contact theory can be 
used to develop systematic interventions aim-
ing to reduce prejudice and, as a consequence, 
improve intergroup relations, ending the chap-
ter with two examples of such interventions 
that has been implemented in the context of 
conflictual intergroup relations (i.e., in Israel 
and Rwanda).
 Does Intergroup Contact Work?
In 1954, Gordon Allport reviewed early work on 
the effects of intergroup contact. As the starting 
quote of this chapter indicates, Allport was well 
aware that intergroup contact not always reduces 
prejudice; on the contrary, it sometimes even 
might strengthen stereotypical views of outgroups 
and increases negative sentiments. He therefore 
proposed in his famous formulation of the inter-
group contact hypothesis that intergroup contact 
only reduces prejudice in situations that meet four 
optimal conditions: equal group status within the 
contact situation, common goals, intergroup 
cooperation (i.e., cooperation in working toward 
Definition Box
Intergroup contact: Actual face-to-face 
interaction between members of different 
and clearly defined groups.
Prejudice: An attitude toward a group and 
its members that, like other attitudes, has a 
cognitive component (e.g., beliefs about a 
target group), an affective component (e.g., 
dislike), and a conative component (e.g., a 
behavioral predisposition to behave nega-
tively toward the target group).
Box 10.1 Zooming In: Measuring Intergroup 
Contact and Prejudice
Intergroup contact can be assessed with 
questionnaire items measuring the quan-
tity (e.g., “How much contact do you have 
with [outgroup] at your college?”) and 
quality of contact (e.g., “To what extend 
did you experience the contact with [out-
group] as equal?”) in different life domains 
(Islam & Hewstone, 1993; for a general 
overview of contact measures, see Lolliot 
et  al., 2014). Prejudice can be measured 
with questionnaire items directly asking 
for a rather general affective evaluation of 
an outgroup (e.g., “Please describe how 
you feel about [outgroup] on a scale from 
negative to positive.”; Wright, Aron, 
McLaughlin-Volpe, & Ropp, 1997), items 
asking for more specific aspects of a cogni-
tive stereotype of the outgroup (e.g., “How 
competent are [outgroup]?”; Fiske, Cuddy, 
Glick, & Xu, 2002), or items focusing on 
behavioral intentions toward outgroups 
(e.g., “I would not be willing to have a sex-
ual relationship with a [outgroup].”; 
Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995).
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common goals), and the support of authorities, 
law, or custom (for a more elaborated discussion 
of these conditions, see Pettigrew, 1998).
Allport’s intergroup contact hypothesis 
inspired a vast amount of research with a marked 
increase in more recent years (Pettigrew, Tropp, 
Wagner, & Christ, 2011; Vezzali & Stathi, 2017). 
Based on their extensive meta-analytic synthesis 
of intergroup contact research, Pettigrew and 
Tropp (2006, p.  768) concluded that “there is 
little need to demonstrate further contact’s gen-
eral ability to lessen prejudice.” Results of the 
meta- analysis revealed a mean negative relation-
ship of r = −.21 between intergroup contact and 
prejudice corresponding to a small to medium 
effect size (Cohen, 1988), although the effect 
was smaller for minority group members com-
pared to majority group members (Tropp & 
Pettigrew, 2005).
Moreover, the effect of intergroup contact 
was larger in samples where contact was struc-
tured to meet Allport’s optimal contact condi-
tions. This finding is important when it comes to 
developing intergroup contact interventions. 
However, even when the optimal conditions 
were not explicitly incorporated, contact still 
had a prejudice- reducing effect indicating that 
these conditions are not essential in order that 
intergroup contact shows positive effects but 
generally enhance the positive effects. This facil-
itating effect of Allport’s conditions is also 
reflected in findings that show that especially 
intimate intergroup contact in form of intergroup 
friendships is able to improve intergroup attitudes 
(for a meta- analytical review, see Davies, Tropp, 
Aron, Pettigrew, & Wright, 2011).
Besides providing evidence for a robust effect 
of intergroup contact, Pettigrew and Tropp’s 
meta-analysis also revealed that most studies are 
based on cross-sectional data. Cross-sectional 
designs, however, limit the causal interpretability 
of the relation between intergroup contact and 
prejudice. Thus, one cannot exclude the possibil-
ity that the negative correlations between contact 
and prejudice found in most cross-sectional 
research are due to a selection bias: highly preju-
diced individuals avoid intergroup contact, and 
unprejudiced individuals seek out contact. 
However, both experimental (for an overview, 
Box 10.2 Question for Elaboration
Imagine you are asked to design an inter-
vention aiming at reducing prejudice 
between students belonging to different 
ethnic groups at a school.
Based on Allport’s (1954) optimal con-
ditions, what could an intergroup contact 
intervention look like?
Box 10.3 Zooming In: Meta-analytic Test of 
the Intergroup Contact Theory
In 2006, Thomas F.  Pettigrew and Linda 
R.  Tropp published a monumental meta- 
analysis on intergroup contact. In general, 
meta-analyses statistically integrate the 
results of multiple studies. In this case, 
Pettigrew and Tropp included studies on 
intergroup contact up to December 2000 
and analyzed the results of 515 studies with 
713 independent samples leading to an 
overall sample size of more than 250,000 
individuals. The selection of studies com-
prised research conducted in 38 different 
nations, across a variety of target groups 
using different methodological approaches. 
Not surprisingly, the study is one of the 
most important publications in the field and 
was cited more than 5000 times so far 
(Google Scholar, 2018). Results indicate 
that “contact effects typically generalize to 
the entire outgroup, and [that] they emerge 
across a broad range of outgroup targets 
and contact settings” (Pettigrew & Tropp, 
2006, p. 751).
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see Paluck, Green, & Green, 2018) and longitudi-
nal studies (e.g., Binder, Zagefka, Brown, & 
Leyens, 2009; Levin, van Laar, & Sidanius, 2003; 
Swart, Hewstone, Christ, & Voci, 2011) confirm 
the meta-analytical results showing that inter-
group contact indeed affects attitudes.
Intergroup contact not only reduces prejudice 
but influences a wide range of outcome measures 
including more conflict-relevant outcomes 
(Hewstone et  al., 2014) such as outgroup trust 
(e.g., Tam, Hewstone, Kenworthy, & Cairns, 
2009) and forgiveness (e.g., Hewstone, Cairns, 
Voci, Hamberger, & Niens, 2006; for a detailed 
discussion see Dinnick & Noor, Chap. 15). 
Research also demonstrated that intergroup con-
tact is especially effective for those individuals in 
need (i.e., highly prejudiced individuals; Hodson, 
Turner, & Choma, 2017).
The prejudice-reducing effect of intergroup 
contact not only generalizes beyond the mem-
bers involved in the original contact setting to 
the whole group (Primary Transfer Effect; 
see Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). Importantly, 
intergroup contact effects also generalize to 
attitudes toward other, secondary, outgroups 
not involved in the contact situation which is 
labeled as the Secondary Transfer Effect of 
 intergroup contact (e.g., Pettigrew, 2009; Tausch 
et al., 2010).
To conclude, it is now well-established that 
(positive) face-to-face contact with members of 
other groups reduces prejudicial attitudes toward 
these outgroups and even generalizes toward 
other groups.
 Different Forms of Intergroup 
Contact
Although the evidence on the effectiveness of 
face-to-face (direct) intergroup contact is promis-
ing, sometimes contact between group members 
is difficult, if not impossible (e.g., due to segrega-
tion or intense phases of intergroup conflict). 
Moreover, intergroup encounters are sometimes 
found to exacerbate intergroup bias, producing 
heightened stress, anxiety, or outgroup avoidance 
(Shelton, Dovidio, Hebl, & Richeson, 2009; 
Trawalter, Richeson, & Shelton, 2009). Recent 
work therefore suggested that even indirect forms 
of intergroup contact (e.g., knowledge of or per-
ceiving contact among others or imagined con-
tact; see Fig.  10.1) may also have a beneficial 
effect, but avoid the aforementioned limitations 
of direct intergroup contact.
The research by Wright et  al. (1997) on 
extended contact is pioneering in this regard. 
Wright and colleagues provided first empirical 
evidence that mere knowledge that an ingroup 
member has a close relationship with an outgroup 
member can improve intergroup attitudes. 
Moreover, even simply observing or being made 
aware of interactions between ingroup and out-
group members (vicarious intergroup contact) 
reduces prejudice (Vezzali, Hewstone, Capozza, 
Giovannini, & Wölfer, 2014). A recent meta- 
analysis by Zhou, Page-Gould, Aron, and 
Hewstone (2018) strongly supported the effec-
tiveness of extended and vicarious contact for 
improving outgroup attitudes. Based on 115 stud-
ies, results demonstrated a small-to-medium 
effect size for extended and vicarious contact 
(r = .25) and that these effects are over and above 
direct contact experiences. Research also showed 
that extended contact is especially effective for 
people with few direct contact experiences or 
who live in segregated rather than mixed com-
munities (Christ et al., 2010).
Based on the extended contact hypothesis, 
Christ et  al. (2014) demonstrated a contextual 
effect of intergroup contact (see Blalock, 1984). 
They showed that living in a place in which other 
ingroup members interact positively with members 
of the outgroup reduces prejudice over and above 
Definition Box
Primary Transfer Effect of intergroup 
contact: Generalization of positive atti-
tudes from the encountered outgroup mem-
ber to the outgroup as a whole.
Secondary Transfer Effect: Generalization 
of positive attitudes from one outgroup to 
other outgroups not involved in the inter-
group encounter.
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one’s own contact experiences and irrespective 
of whether one knows the ingroup members 
experiencing intergroup contact. In other words, 
even individuals who have no direct contact 
experience can benefit from living in mixed set-
tings, in which other group members have posi-
tive intergroup contact. This research also 
underlines the importance and scope of social 
norms in influencing intergroup relations as we 
will also see later when we introduce an indirect 
contact intervention by Paluck (2009).
Crisp and Turner (2009) showed that even just 
imagining intergroup contact helps to reduce 
prejudice and prepares individuals for face-to- 
face intergroup contact. What is striking is the 
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Fig. 10.1 Overview of different forms of intergroup contact
Box 10.4 Zooming In: Contextual Effects 
of Intergroup Contact (Christ et al., 2014)
Responding to calls for more attention for 
the social context of intergroup contact 
effects (e.g., Pettigrew, 2008), Christ et al. 
(2014) applied multilevel modelling to test 
a contextual effect of intergroup contact. 
Multilevel modelling allows for the simul-
taneous consideration and analysis of dif-
ferent levels of analysis in hierarchically 
structured data (e.g., survey respondents 
living in different neighborhoods/districts). 
A contextual effect of intergroup contact is 
defined as the difference between the effect 
of intergroup contact on prejudice between 
social contexts such as neighborhoods 
(the between-level effect) and the effect of 
individual-level contact within contexts 
(the within-level effect; see Raudenbush & 
Bryk, 2002). Evidence for this contextual 
effect of positive contact would indicate 
that living in a place in which other ingroup 
members interact positively with members 
of the outgroup reduces prejudice over and 
above one’s own contact experiences and 
irrespective of whether one knows the 
ingroup members experiencing intergroup 
contact. Indeed, Christ et al. (2014) found 
support for this assumption in five cross- 
sectional and two longitudinal studies. 
Moreover, the contextual effect of inter-
group contact was partly explained by 
(positive) social norms (i.e., the shared 
beliefs about the value of ethnic and cul-
tural diversity).
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in imagined contact studies. The standard 
instruction (Crisp et  al., 2009) is as follows, 
although variants and extensions have been used: 
“We would like you to take a minute to imagine 
yourself meeting [an outgroup] stranger for the 
first time. Imagine that the interaction is positive, 
relaxed and comfortable.” The key elements that 
proofed to be necessary are the simulation of an 
interaction (first sentence of the instruction) 
and the positive tone of the interaction (second 
sentence of the instruction).
Demonstrating that even with indirect inter-
group contact (knowing or perceiving intergroup 
contact of others or simply imagining an inter-
group interaction) negative attitudes can be 
improved offers a number of practical applica-
tions in form of contact interventions (Brown & 
Paterson, 2016). For instance, portraying (posi-
tive) interactions between members of different 
groups provides a promising avenue to improve 
intergroup relations on a large scale as has been 
demonstrated by the work of Paluck (2009) 
which we will summarize in more detail at the 
end of this chapter. Moreover, research shows 
that indirect contact prepares for direct contact 
(e.g., Turner & West, 2012; Wölfer et al., 2019), 
thus helping to connect groups in conflict.
 When and Why Does Intergroup 
Contact Work?
The effectiveness of direct and indirect intergroup 
contact in reducing prejudice and improving inter-
group relations has received convincing empirical 
support. But research has not only focused on the 
question whether intergroup contact helps to 
reduce prejudice and therefore improves inter-
group relations. There are also numerous studies 
that focused on the questions when and why 
intergroup contact works. These questions con-
cern the moderation and mediation of intergroup 
contact effects, respectively (see Kenworthy, 
Turner, Hewstone, & Voci, 2005).
 Moderators of Contact Effects
Starting in the 1980s, scholar debated on the 
question when contact is most likely to reduce 
prejudice. Unlike Allport (1954) who focused on 
optimal conditions that facilitate intergroup con-
tact effects, this line of research tried to identify 
the conditions for the primary transfer of inter-
group contact effects. Different models have 
been proposed with differing assumptions about 
the cognitive representation of groups that should 
be salient during the intergroup encounter. While 
the decategorization model (Brewer & Miller, 
1984) proposes that the intergroup interaction 
Box 10.5 Zooming In: Validity of Imagined 
Intergroup Contact Effects
The imagined contact hypothesis has 
inspired numerous studies, not least because 
of its simplicity. The empirical evidence 
seems to support the imagined contact 
hypothesis. A meta-analysis of 70 studies by 
Miles and Crisp (2014) found that imagined 
contact had a small to medium effect 
(d+ = 0.35) on a number of outcomes (e.g., 
explicit and implicit intergroup attitudes, 
behavioral intentions). However, the imag-
ined contact hypothesis is not left without 
critique (Bigler & Hughes, 2010; Lee & 
Jussim, 2010). Moreover, in a recent large-
scale replication attempt, the effects have 
not been supported (Klein et  al., 2014). 
Furthermore, it is still not clear how long-
lasting the effects are. There are only few 
longitudinal studies that tested the longevity 
of effects, and only among younger partici-
pants (Vezzali et al., 2015; Vezzali, Crisp, 
Stathi, & Giovannini, 2015). It is up to 
future research to get a better idea of the 
boundary conditions of imagined contact 
and to answer the question whether imag-
ined intergroup contact is a valid means for 
sustainable prejudice reduction.
Box 10.6 Question for Elaboration
Think about situations and contexts in 
which imagined intergroup contact could 
be especially useful.
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should be based on an individual level by deem-
phasizing the group categories, the recategoriza-
tion model (e.g., Gaertner, Mann, Murrell, & 
Dovidio, 1989) suggested to make a superordi-
nate “we” category salient. The evidence so far, 
however, speaks for the mutual intergroup differ-
entiation model of Hewstone and Brown (Brown 
& Hewstone, 2005; Hewstone & Brown, 1986) 
that proposes that respective group memberships 
should be salient in the contact situation. A con-
ceptual overview of the different models is 
depicted in Fig. 10.2.
Pettigrew (1998; see also Gaertner et  al., 
2000) in his formulation of an intergroup con-
tact theory integrated these different models by 
suggesting a three-stage model in which an opti-
mal contact experience is developed gradually 
(see Fig.  10.3). In the initial contact situation, 
decategorization and individuation (Brewer & 
Miller, 1984) should occur to reduce intergroup 
anxiety. In the next stage, the group categories 
should be made salient in order to allow a gen-
eralization of the individuals’ positive contact 
experiences to the outgroup as a whole 
(Hewstone & Brown, 1986). In the last and most 
optimal stage with regard to intergroup rela-
tions, recategorization (Gaertner & Dovidio, 
2000) should occur during which a perception 
of a common ingroup is achieved (see also 
Scheepers & Ellemers, Chap. 9).
Decategorization model (Brewer & Miller, 1984)
- Group categories are deemphasized during contact.
Recategorization model (Gaertner et al., 1989)
- Superordinate category salient during contact.
Mutual intergroup differentiation model
(Brown & Hewstone, 2005)
- Group categories salient during contact.
- Superordinate category salient during contact.
- Group differences and different areas of
expertise are valued. 
Fig. 10.2 Overview of models of cognitive group presentation during intergroup contact
Fig. 10.3 The three-stage model of intergroup contact (Pettigrew, 1998)
Box 10.7 Question for Elaboration
Imagine a new group of immigrants, the 
Ondereans, came to your country. You are 
planning to have several meetings with an 
Onderean. Applying Pettigrew’s three- 
stage model, how would you try to behave 
during the meetings to facilitate mutual 
liking?
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 Mediators of Contact Effects
Numerous studies examined potential mediators 
of intergroup contact effects (Brown & Hewstone, 
2005). Pettigrew and Tropp (2008) meta- 
analytically examined a subset of the studies of 
their meta-analysis on intergroup contact effects 
(Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). The results show that 
contact exerts its effect on prejudice mainly by 
reducing negative affect (e.g., intergroup anxiety) 
and by inducing positive affective processes (e.g., 
empathy and perspective taking), a result that was 
recently confirmed in a longitudinal study (Swart 
et al., 2011). Cognitive mediators (e.g., intergroup 
knowledge) seem to play a less important role.
 Undesirable and Unintended Effects 
of Intergroup Contact
Research on intergroup contact has not been left 
without critiques (e.g., Dixon, 2017). For instance, 
research on intergroup contact has been criticized 
for neglecting the outcomes of negative encoun-
ters between members of different groups (e.g., 
Dixon, Durrheim, & Tredoux, 2005). Encounters 
in which a member of one group is offended, 
threatened, or physically harmed by a member of 
a different group can be regarded as examples of 
negative intergroup contact (for more examples, 
see Hayward, Tropp, Hornsey, & Barlow, 2017). 
Although this critique is certainly justified, a dis-
cussion of the effects of negative contact is beyond 
the scope of this chapter in which we focus on the 
more common positive courses of intergroup 
encounters (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2011). However, 
research on the effects of both positive and nega-
tive intergroup contact is increasing in recent 
years (Graf & Paolini, 2017).
Moreover, Dixon, Tropp, Durrheim, and 
Tredoux (2010) criticize that most scientific work 
on intergroup contact focuses disproportionally 
on the majority group perspective, thereby 
neglecting potential negative effects that contact 
can have for members of low-status minority 
groups. A number of scholars have argued that for 
disadvantaged groups, positive intergroup contact 
might actually evoke the so-called demobilizing 
effects: positive intergroup contact might lead 
low-status minority group members to dissociate 
themselves from the needs of their group, thereby 
decreasing support for social change that would 
improve the situation for their group as a whole 
(e.g., Dixon, Durrheim, & Tredoux, 2007; Reicher, 
2007; Wright & Lubensky, 2009; for a recent over-
view of this critical position, see Durrheim & 
Dixon, 2018). Indeed, Saguy, Tausch, Dovidio, 
and Pratto (2009) demonstrated that, for low-sta-
tus groups, positive contact with high-status group 
members increased perceptions of outgroup fair-
ness and, as a consequence, decreased support for 
social change. Likewise, Dixon et al. (2007) found 
that Black South Africans who had White out-
group friends showed less support for anti-racism 
policies than Black South Africans who had no 
White friends (see also Tropp, Hawi, Van Laar, & 
Levin, 2012).
Research just started to examine conditions that 
lead to more positive intergroup relations without 
diminishing legitimate protest aimed at reducing 
inequality (e.g., Kauff, Green, Schmid, Hewstone, 
& Christ, 2016; Vezzali, Andrighetto, & Saguy, 
2016). For instance, Becker, Wright, Lubensky, 
and Zhou (2013) demonstrated that the sedative 
effect of intergroup contact (i.e., reducing collec-
tive action intentions) for minority group members 
did not occur when the high- status individual 
addressed the illegitimacy of unequal intergroup 
relations during the contact.
However, more research is needed to identify 
conditions that lead to an implementation of 
intergroup harmony without inhibiting social 
chance. One promising strategy seems to be to 
emphasize both commonalities and differences in 
the intergroup encounters (Saguy, Shchori-Eyal, 
Hasan-Aslih, Sobol, & Dovidio, 2017), a strategy 
that has been implemented in some variants of 
intergroup contact interventions as is illustrated 
in the direct contact intervention that Shani and 
Boehnke (2017) have evaluated and that we will 
introduce in more detail below.
 Intergroup Contact Interventions
Intergroup contact theory provides a clear and 
concise guideline for interventions: individuals 
from different groups have to be brought in direct 
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or indirect contact (Lemmer & Wagner, 2015). It 
is therefore not surprising that many interventions 
for reducing prejudice are based on the intergroup 
contact theory (see Wagner, Christ, & van Dick, 
2002). A recent meta-analysis by Lemmer and 
Wagner (2015) summarized the results of inter-
group contact interventions aimed at reducing eth-
nic prejudice. In this meta- analysis contact 
interventions were included that (a) have been 
implemented under naturalistic conditions outside 
the lab (e.g., in school settings) and that (b) had the 
aim to establish direct or indirect contact between 
members of different groups. Moreover, since the 
goal of the meta-analysis was to include only those 
studies that provide sufficient evidence for the 
causal effect of intergroup contact (i.e., studies 
with sufficient internal validity; see also Paluck & 
Green, 2009), only studies were included that used 
a randomized posttest only with control, a pretest-
posttest with control, or a pretest-posttest single 
group design. It is important to note that the major-
ity of studies (i.e., 85%) included in this meta-
analysis were not considered in Pettigrew and 
Tropp’s meta- analysis (2006).
Based on the inclusion criteria, 73 studies 
with 129 independent comparisons have been 
included in the meta-analysis. Overall, intergroup 
contact interventions generally resulted in 
improved intergroup attitudes (i.e., reduction in 
ethnic prejudice), both immediately and up to 
one year later, demonstrating the effectiveness of 
the implementation of either direct or indirect 
contact forms. The estimated effect sizes can be 
classified as small to medium (μ̂θ between 0.23 
and 0.39; Cohen, 1988). Moreover, results show 
that contact interventions are also effective in the 
context of protracted intergroup conflicts (e.g., 
conflict between Jewish and Palestinian Israelis, 
Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland). 
Although the effect of contact interventions was 
stronger for ethnic majorities, interventions were 
still effective for ethnic minorities.
The meta-analytic results clearly confirm that 
contact interventions are an effective means to 
reduce prejudice and, thus, intergroup tensions. 
Both direct and indirect contact interventions seem 
to be comparably effective in improving inter-
group attitudes. Importantly, contact interventions 
seem to be more effective than other prejudice 
interventions (see meta-analysis by Beelmann & 
Heinemann, 2014).
In the following, we will describe two contact 
interventions in more detail. In the first example, 
Shani and Boehnke (2017) examined the effects 
of a direct contact intervention in the context of 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In the second 
example, Paluck (2009) tested the effects of a 
radio program in which positive intergroup con-
tact was portrayed, thus providing an example for 
a contact intervention that implemented indirect 
intergroup contact.
 An Example of a Direct Contact 
Intervention
Intergroup contact theory has inspired a number 
of planned encounters between members of 
groups in conflict to contribute to reconciliation. 
For instance, intergroup encounter interventions 
between Jewish and Palestinian citizens have a 
long history in Israel (Maoz, 2004). The conflict 
between Israeli Jews and Palestinians is often 
considered as a prototype of an intractable con-
flict (Bar-Tal, 2013). Intractable conflicts are pro-
longed, chronic, and violent and are perceived by 
society members as existential, irresolvable, and 
of zero-sum nature (Bar-Tal, 2007, 2013). 
Different models of planned intergroup encoun-
ters have been applied in this context (Maoz, 
2004, 2011). The coexistence model seeks to pro-
mote positive intergroup attitudes by emphasiz-
ing commonalties and similarities between the 
two groups. Political issues in disagreement 
between the two parties are avoided. In contrast, 
in the confrontational model, group membership 
is made salient, and it is aimed to increase aware-
ness among (mainly) majority members of struc-
tural barriers for equality and to empower the 
minority members. Programs based on the con-
frontational model intend to change the construc-
tion of identity of minority and majority members, 
making Israeli Jews more aware of their dominant 
role while empowering Palestinian Arabs through 
their direct confrontation with Israeli Jews (Halabi 
& Sonnenschein, 2004).
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For both models, a number of limitations have 
been identified (Maoz, 2011). For the coexistence 
model, critiques question the focus on interper-
sonal interaction and on personal identities, while 
important issues such as the conflict between 
Israeli Jews and Palestinians and the discrimina-
tion of the Palestinian citizens of Israel are 
ignored. Recent research on the sedative effect of 
intergroup contact, as summarized above, sup-
ports this critical view. The confrontational model 
has been criticized since the direct confrontation 
can distress and alienate Israeli Jewish partici-
pants and cause negative attitudes and distrust 
toward Palestinians and toward the practice of 
encounters (Maoz, Bar-On, & Yikya, 2007).
The “face-to-face” program – a mixed-model 
encounter program  – integrates elements of the 
coexistence model as well as the confrontational 
model. Both, interpersonal and political inter-
group dynamics, are addressed within this 2-day 
structured encounter. The program is endorsed by 
the Israeli Ministry of Education and is conducted 
as an official educational activity in cooperation 
with Hebrew and Arabic high schools across the 
country. Mixed groups of about eight to ten par-
ticipants meet at neutral places and are guided by 
trained Jewish and Palestinian facilitators (for a 
detailed description, see Shani, 2015).
The encounter has two main phases aiming to 
gradually change from coexistence-focused to 
confrontational activities. On the first day, activi-
ties are implemented that aim to help participants 
to become acquainted with each other and to 
establish social relationships (e.g., talking about 
hobbies, their likes and dislikes). Later, the focus 
switches to the group level. Participants learn 
about similarities and differences between their 
cultural groups. Moreover, they discuss and con-
front mutual stereotypical perceptions. Thus, the 
activities in the first day resemble the first two 
stages of the three-stage model of Pettigrew 
(1998; see Fig.  10.3). Although most activities 
are preplanned, the program allows for free inter-
actions and non-structured discussion between 
group members in public areas. One of the aims 
of the first day is the development of affective ties 
and mutual trust between the members of both 
groups.
On the second day, “the competing national 
and political identities” (Shani, 2015, p. 101) are 
discussed. That is the groups discuss topics like 
national identity, security, discrimination, democ-
racy, and power differences between the groups. 
In other words, the activities and discussions 
focus on the core conflicts between the groups. 
Because these kinds of dialogues can be intense 
and evoke conflicting and complex emotional 
reactions among the participants, the program 
trainers try to reestablish a harmonious atmo-
sphere at the end of the encounter. In fact, the 
encounters usually end on a positive note. That is, 
participants usually exchange their contact details 
and express a willingness to maintain a friendship 
with outgroup members.
Shani and Boehnke (2017) tested the effec-
tiveness of the “face-to-face” program. Using a 
quasi-experimental design with two measure-
ment points and comparing Jewish and 
Palestinian pupils who participated in the pro-
gram with comparable pupils who did not, the 
authors found a significant intervention effect 
for the Israeli Jewish participants on measures 
such as readiness for outgroup contact and sup-
port for equals rights (see Fig. 10.4). Palestinian 
participants reported higher levels of support for 
inclusion after the encounter. Importantly, the 
intervention did not undermine the perception 
of intergroup disparities among both majority 
and minority members. In line with aforemen-
tioned findings (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2008), tests 
of mediators mainly identified affective pro-
cesses as important. That is after the encounter 
empathy increased and hatred decreased for 
Jewish participants, while for Palestinian par-
ticipants an increase in empathy and hope was 
observed.
Overall, the results demonstrate the effective-
ness of mixed-model encounters, although it was 
more effective for Israeli Jewish than for 
Palestinian participants. To conclude, the “face- 
to- face” illustrates that direct intergroup contact 
interventions are able to improve intergroup rela-
tions – even in intractable conflicts. However, as 
Shani and Boehnke (2017) point out, it is impor-
tant to develop interventions in a way that “takes 
into consideration the different preferences and 
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needs of each group, and which does not shy 
away from dealing with the problems that shape 
the relations between the groups” (p. 8).
 An Example of an Indirect Contact 
Intervention
As outlined before, indirect contact interventions 
are also promising since they can be imple-
mented with fewer resources and are therefore 
less costly. In addition, they can be implemented 
even in highly segregated contexts or contexts in 
which it is difficult to bring members from 
opposing groups together. Most importantly, 
when vicarious contact interventions are used, 
more individuals can be reached, and since social 
norms might be changed, the effect might be 
more sustainable.
Paluck (2009) conducted a study in Rwanda 
aiming at testing the influence of mass media 
(here radio) on prejudice, norms, and intergroup 
behavior. In 1994, during the Rwandan Civil War, 
members of the main majority group, the Hutu, 
mass slaughtered between 500,000 and 1,000,000 
members of the main minority group, the Tutsi. 
Naturally, Rwanda is still struggling with the con-
sequences of this genocide. Perpetrators and vic-
tims are living side by side, and, not surprisingly, 
the climate is dominated by distrust and mutual 
devaluation. Accordingly, there are numerous 
attempts to improve the relation between the 
Hutu and the Tutsi. One of them is “New Dawn,” 
a reconciliation radio soap opera involving the 
fictional story of two Rwandan ethnic groups that 
can be associated with the Hutu and Tutsi com-
munities. Characters of the radio show are por-
trayed as typical Rwandans wrestling with 
problems familiar to most of the listeners. Hence, 
listeners can easily connect with the characters 
depicted in the radio show. In Rwanda, radio is the 
most important form of media. As a consequence, 
it is likely that the program is capable of changing 
social norms. Although in her study Paluck (2009) 
didn’t approach “New Dawn” from an intergroup 
contact perspective, the intervention contains 
elements of vicarious contact. Within the soap, 
characters belonging to the two rival groups band 
together and confront leaders who support the 
use of violence. They cooperate across commu-
nity lines and promote positive norms about 
intermarriage.
Paluck (2009) studied the effects of “New 
Dawn” within a 1-year field experiment. She 
sampled 12 communities from four different 
regions in Rwanda. Each community was ran-
domly assigned to a treatment or a control condi-
tion. For each community, 40 participants were 
either exposed to “New Dawn” (treatment) or a 
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Encounter group Comparison group
Readiness for activities (Palestinians)
Pretest Posttest
Fig. 10.4 Effects of the “face-to-face” program on readi-
ness for activities with outgroup members for Jewish (left) 
and Palestinian participants (right) (Shani & Boehnke, 
2017). Note: Readiness for activities was measured with 
three items (e.g., “Indicate your interest to participate in a 
Jewish-Arab workshop.”) on a scale from 1 to 5. For Jews 
a significant interaction effect between intervention con-
dition (encounter vs. comparison group) and time (pretest 
vs. posttest) emerged (F(1, 158)  =  33.09, p  <  .001, 
η2  =  0.17). Jewish participants were more willing to 
engage in intergroup activities after the encounter than 
before the encounter (d = 0.32). For Palestinians no sig-
nificant interaction effect emerged (F(1, 255)  =  0.79, 
p = .28)
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Rwandans typically listen to the radio in groups, 
research assistants visited each community once 
a month and played four episodes of the respec-
tive radio program on a portable cassette player. 
The health program participants were asked to 
refrain from listening to “New Dawn.” They were 
promised a cassette player and tapes with all 
“New Dawn” episodes at the end of the study.
After 1 year, researchers went to the commu-
nities to gather different types of data – among 
them data from individual and group interviews 
as well as from behavioral observations. Results 
of the analyses of these data indicated that par-
ticipants who listened to the reconciliation soap 
opera displayed more cooperative intergroup 
behavior, compared with participants in a control 
condition listening to a soap opera on health 
issues. Moreover, participants in the experimen-
tal group believed that current social norms were 
more supportive of intergroup integration and 
were also more trusting of the outgroup and more 
willing to cooperate with them, even though the 
participants did not show a change in their per-
sonal beliefs with regard to the program’s message 
about prejudice and violence.
Paluck’s (2009) study illustrates that social 
norms regarding inclusion can be affected by 
observation of others’ behavior (vicarious inter-
group contact). Moreover, this research also 
demonstrates how insights from research on 
intergroup contact can be translated in a rela-
tively simple intervention that has the potential to 
affect a large number of individuals.
Box 10.8 Zooming In: Measuring Behavior in 
Paluck (2009)
In her study on the effects of the radio pro-
gram “New Dawn” in Rwanda, Elizabeth 
Levy Paluck did not only obtain data from 
self-report questionnaires or group dis-
cussions. Aiming at getting a broad pic-
ture of the effects of the intervention, she 
also gathered behavioral data. Research 
assistants documented group discus-
sions in communities about how batter-
ies and tapes for a cassette player should 
be shared among community members. 
Paluck (2009) argued that this measure 
“also captured spontaneous behavior that 
participants believed to be ‘off the record’” 
(p. 579).
Interestingly, in the control group, 
community members typically decided to 
hand the items over to the village’s local 
authority. In the experimental reconcilia-
tion groups, however, group members 
often claimed that the whole group is 
responsible for the items or that they 
should vote for a member responsible of 
managing the items. In the experimental 
groups, more comments were made about 
the groups’ ability to cooperate and inter-
act in the future (e.g., to continue to listen 
to the program together). Thus, also these 
behavioral data hint to the effectiveness of 
the intervention.
Summary
• Intergroup contact, that is, contact 
between members of different groups, 
is an effective means to reduce mutual 
prejudice and increase trust and 
forgiveness.
• Besides direct (i.e., face-to-face) inter-
group contact, other more indirect forms 
of intergroup contact such as extended, 
vicarious, and imagined contact have 
been shown to be effective.
• Different types of in- and outgroup cat-
egorization are proposed as moderators 
of intergroup contact effects.
• Reduced intergroup anxiety and 
increased empathy have been shown to 
mediate intergroup contact effects.
• Intergroup contact interventions have 
been shown to improve intergroup 
attitudes.
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 Guiding Answers to Questions 
in the Chapter
 1. Q (With Box 10.2): Imagine you are asked to 
design an intervention aiming at reducing 
prejudice between students belonging to dif-
ferent ethnic groups at schools.
Based on Allport’s (1954) optimal condi-
tions, what could an intergroup contact inter-
vention look like?
A:
 1. Students from different ethnic groups 
could work together on a certain task (e.g., 
developing a strategy to refurbish the 
school building).
 2. It should be made explicit that they have a 
common goal.
 3. When working together, students must be 
on a par with each other, that is, they need 
to have the same rights and privileges.
 4. Teachers and principals support them and 
ensure that they jointly work on the 
assigned task.
 2. Q (With Box 10.6): Think about situations 
and contexts in which imagined intergroup 
contact is especially useful.
A:
• When opportunities for contact with outgroup 
members are rare (e.g., in highly segregated 
or conflict areas), when the number of out-
group members is small (e.g., North Korean 
immigrants in the USA), or when outgroup 
members do not participate in everyday life 
(e.g., inmates)
• When ingroup members are unwilling to 
engage in direct contact with outgroup mem-
bers – either because they are strongly biased 
against outgroup members or because they are 
afraid of meeting outgroup members
• When the outcome of a direct intergroup 
contact situation is unclear (e.g., when a lan-
guage barrier exists and challenges a func-
tional interaction between members of 
different groups)
 3. Q (With Box 10.7): Imagine a new group of 
immigrants, the Ondereans, came to your 
country. You are planning to have several 
meetings with an Onderean. According to 
Pettigrew’s three-stage model, how should 
you try to behave during the meetings to facil-
itate mutual liking?
A:
• At first, try to encounter the Onderean on 
an individual level. Try to avoid thinking 
too much about his/her group member-
ship. Do not refer to your group 
membership.
• Once primary contact has been established, 
acknowledge your different backgrounds 
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and talk about differences between your 
groups.
• Finally, focus on commonalities between 
your groups. Try to think about the 
Ondereans as being part of a common 
group (e.g., people living in your country 
or humans).
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 Introduction
Soccer spectators taunt black players with mon-
key calls and bananas.1 Women on corporate 
boards are ridiculed by their male colleagues for 
allegedly being too chatty.2 And politicians in 
high office refer to immigrants as criminals and 
rapists.3 These examples of prejudice are con-
temporary, but the issue itself is a fundamental 
and all too common aspect of human interaction. 
As in these examples, prejudice can lead to delib-
erate acts of discrimination. People choose to 
derogate outgroups to elevate their ingroup’s 
status and their personal self-esteem (Hogg & 
Abrams, 1990; see Scheepers & Ellemers, 
Chap. 9); people intentionally denigrate an out-
group to preserve their ingroup power (Sidanius & 
Pratto, 1999) or in a calculated political move use 
an outgroup as a scapegoat for societal ills (Glick, 
2002). However, beyond such deliberate acts, 
where prejudice serves as a means to a particular 
end, group attitudes and stereotypes may influ-
ence judgment and behavior without any intent 








different from those of another group. For example, 
white observers perceive black faces as angrier 
than white faces with the same expression 
(Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, 2003); and they 
more readily identify an ambiguous object as a 
gun when it is in the hands of a black rather than 
a white man (Correll, Wittenbrink, Crawford, & 
Sadler, 2015). They do so even when motivated 
to be accurate, at times not even knowing that the 
target person’s group membership influences the 
outcome. This kind of implicit bias is usually 
subtle. It pales in comparison to the deliberate 
bigotry we cited at the beginning of this para-
graph. But implicit forms of prejudice can never-
theless have significant consequences, such as 
when law enforcement officers must decide 
whether an encounter is potentially hostile and 
requires the use of deadly force.
In this chapter, we provide an introduction to 
implicit forms of prejudice. We begin by defining 
prejudice and its related constructs, stereotypes, 
and discrimination. Next, we explain how preju-
dice may implicitly influence behavior and under 
what circumstances such influences are most 
likely. We conclude with a description of a 
research project that applies these theoretical 
insights to a consequential real-world problem, 
the influence of race on police officers’ use of 
lethal force.
 What Is Prejudice?
In social psychology, prejudice is broadly consid-
ered a negative attitude toward a social group and 
its members (Dovidio, Hewstone, Glick, & Esses, 
2010). However, to differentiate it more effec-
tively from related constructs, a narrower defini-
tion is usually adopted where prejudice represents 
the affective (or emotional) component of group 
attitudes. It captures the negative evaluative pre-
disposition toward a social category and its mem-
bers, the dislike felt toward the group (see Correll, 
Judd, Park, & Wittenbrink, 2010). Stereotypes, 
by contrast, encompass the cognitive (or belief) 
component of group attitudes. They consist of 
generalizations that associate category members 
with typical and distinctive attributes. The stereo-
type for academics, for instance, might hold that 
they are smart but possess limited social skills or 
that they tend to be forgetful. Lastly, discrimina-
tion makes up the behavioral component of 
group attitudes. It is commonly defined as behav-
ior toward members of a social category where 
the behavior occurs solely because of the target’s 
category membership. For example, a job appli-
cant is rejected because of her gender, despite 
having all the necessary credentials.
Naturally, prejudice, stereotypes, and discrim-
ination are closely interrelated. For example, 
while stereotypes in and of themselves can be 
negative, neutral, or positive in valence, the ste-
reotypes associated with disliked groups typi-
cally contain negatively valenced attributes. 
Likewise, the negative evaluation of a group may 
give rise to discriminatory behavior (see Christ & 
Kauff, Chap. 10).
 How Does Prejudice Shape 
Judgment and Behavior?
The characterization of prejudice as an evaluative 
predisposition emphasizes the distinction 
between prejudice and behavior. Like attitudes in 
general, prejudice represents an individual’s 
inclination to act in a particular way, not the act 
itself. So how and when does the inclination to 
act turn into actual behavior? Contemporary 
Definition Box
Prejudice: A negative evaluative predispo-
sition toward a social category and its 
members.
Stereotypes: Generalizations that associ-
ate category members with typical and/or 
distinctive attributes.
Discrimination: Behavior toward category 
members that is directed toward them 
solely because they happen to be members 
of that category.
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accounts of how attitudes shape behavior gener-
ally distinguish between three processing stages: 
(1) an initial spontaneous activation phase, (2) 
a deliberation phase, and (3) a response phase 
(e.g., Bassili & Brown, 2005, Fazio, 1990; 
Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2011; Krosnick, 
Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2005; Petty & Cacioppo, 
1986; Strack & Deutsch, 2004; Wilson, Lindsey, 
& Schooler, 2000).
 Spontaneous Activation Phase
For well-established, overlearned attitudes, evalua-
tions may be triggered automatically, without 
intent, effort, or conscious awareness. Such evalua-
tions are fast. They occur within a few hundred mil-
liseconds. They do not require any intentional 
search for relevant information, but instead are the 
result of a passive process that is set in motion auto-
matically by the attitude object (e.g., a group mem-
ber). They may even occur without awareness. 
Many empirical demonstrations of such spontane-
ous evaluations exist for social categories that are 
pervasive in social interaction, categories like 
gender (e.g., Rudman & Goodwin, 2004), race 
(e.g., Wittenbrink, Judd & Park, 1997), ethnicity 
(e.g., Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), or 
the elderly (Perdue & Gurtman, 1990).
 Deliberation Phase
The second stage of evaluative processing con-
sists of a controlled memory search for relevant 
information. This could include prior evaluations 
stored in memory (“I like the English”) as well as 
any other related associations (“polite,” “Brexit”). 
What information comes to mind at this point 
depends on its accessibility in memory, as well as 
contextual factors that may highlight certain 
information. Importantly, deliberation requires 
both motivation and opportunity, the motivation 
to explore one’s true feelings about the issue, and 
to form an accurate judgment, and an opportunity 
to do so, to attend to the issue and be able to take 
the time necessary to deliberate. Otherwise any 
initial spontaneous evaluation will directly 
impact the final evaluative response.
 Response Phase
The input from phases 1 and 2 may then shape 
any actual behavior. Often, these influences are 
explicit. That is, the response is chosen based on 
a deliberate consideration of the evaluative input, 
combined with other relevant information. For 
example, having concluded that I like the English, 
I decide to take up the invitation to visit my 
acquaintance in London. Or, alternatively, I 
might conclude that although I quite like the 
English and would like to visit, a visit is too 
expensive, or it might get me in trouble with my 
family which has been planning another trip 
instead. In either case, a response is chosen with 
deliberate consideration of the evaluative input.
In contrast, evaluative influences can also 
occur implicitly, with the person remaining 
unaware of the connection between evaluation 
and response, or at least without any intention for 
the evaluation to influence a response. As noted, 
spontaneous evaluations triggered during phase 1 
may remain outside of conscious awareness. 
Hence, any effect such evaluations might have on 
a subsequent response will remain outside of 
awareness. In addition, the opportunity to modify 
spontaneous evaluations through deliberation 
may not be available. For example, in circum-
stances where responses have to be made under 
time pressure, deliberation may not be feasible. 
We will discuss these circumstances and other 
factors that facilitate implicit influences of preju-
dice in greater detail in the next section.
Box 11.1 Zooming In: Measures of Implicit 
Prejudice
Various attitude measures exist that aim to 
capture spontaneously activated attitudes, 
free of processes that take place during 
the deliberation and response phases of 
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evaluative processing. The measures gener-
ally ask respondents to make speeded, 
split-second judgments, and they capture 
response latencies and/or response errors 
as estimates of spontaneous evaluations 
(for an overview of available measures, see 
Wittenbrink & Schwarz, 2007). Prejudice 
has been one of the main domains of appli-
cation for these measures – in part because 
the measures are meant to circumvent 
deliberation and therefore limit respon-
dents’ opportunities to intentionally mis-
represent prejudiced attitudes when they 
are deemed socially undesirable.
The IAT (Implicit Association Test; 
Greenwald et  al., 1998) is by far the most 
popular implicit measure of attitudes. In this 
task, participants classify as quickly as pos-
sible two sets of target items along two 
dimensions of judgment. For example, as an 
implicit measure of racial prejudice, the first 
set of items might consist of faces that have 
to be classified according to their race by 
pressing one of two response keys, labeled 
black and white, respectively. A second set 
of items then consists of clearly valenced 
positive and negative targets (e.g., poison, 
love). The task for this second set is to 
classify the items according to their 
valence, using response keys labeled 
pleasant and unpleasant.
During a set of critical trials, both judg-
ment tasks are combined, and the faces and 
valence items appear in random order. 
Important for the measurement, both judg-
ment tasks are performed using the same 
two response keys. Two separate blocks of 
trials vary the mapping of the racial cate-
gories on the response keys, so that each 
group label is paired once with the positive 
response key and once with the negative 
key (e.g., black-pleasant and white- 
unpleasant versus black-unpleasant and 
white-pleasant). The critical measure 
compares the response latencies for these 
two assessment blocks. Faster responses 
are used as an indicator of relative evalua-
tive preference. For example, relatively 
faster responses for trials that pair white 
with pleasant and black with unpleasant 
are considered to reflect racial prejudice 
(for a detailed review of experimental pro-
cedure and data analysis, see Greenwald, 
Nosek, & Banaji, 2003).
Implicit measures of attitudes, and the 
IAT in particular, have been criticized for 
their limited success in predicting actual 
behavior (cf., Oswald, Mitchell, Blanton, 
Jaccard, & Tetlock, 2013). Meta-analyses of 
studies linking IAT prejudice measures with 
discriminatory behavior indeed show the 
IAT to have only modest predictive validity 
(r = 0.24; Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, 
& Banaji, 2009). However, these findings 
have to be seen in context. First, explicit 
measures of prejudice don’t fare any better 
in predicting discrimination. In direct com-
parisons, they actually fare worse (r = 0.17; 
Greenwald et  al., 2009). Second, as we 
noted before, prejudice reflects merely an 
inclination to act. Its link with actual behav-
ior is conditional on a variety of factors. At 
the individual level, overall correlations 
between a person’s prejudice and specific 
behavioral choices are therefore expected to 
be modest. In contrast, when aggregating 
across many individuals, the correlations 
between implicit measures of prejudice and 
overall patterns of behavior strengthen. For 
example, US cities with overall higher levels 
of implicit racial prejudice (as measured by 
an IAT) show greater racial bias in police-
involved shootings (Hehman, Flake, & 
Calanchini, 2018). Likewise, a community’s 
overall implicit racial prejudice on the IAT 
predicts adverse health outcomes for its 
black residents (Leitner, Hehman, Ayduk, & 
Mendoza- Denton, 2016).
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 Factors that Facilitate Implicit 
Prejudice
Our discussion of how attitudes influence behav-
ior, and how such influences may occur implicitly, 
makes it clear that the title of this chapter, Implicit 
Prejudice, is a bit of a misnomer. Often, it is not 
the prejudice – the evaluative predisposition – that 
is implicit. It is the effect that prejudicial attitudes 
can have on judgment and behavior that is poten-
tially implicit (see Moors & De Houwer, 2006). 
Nevertheless, Implicit Prejudice has become a 
commonly used term to describe the phenomenon, 
and we follow this convention here.
The potential for prejudiced attitudes to oper-
ate implicitly has important theoretical and practi-
cal implications, not the least of which is that it 
bears the risk of discriminatory behavior in the 
absence of intent or possibly awareness. Even in 
circumstances where people want to be fair and 
unbiased, they may end up with bigoted judg-
ments and discriminatory behavior. There are a 
variety of factors that may promote this dissocia-
tion between intentions and actions (for additional 
detail, see Krosnick, et al., 2005).
 Time Pressure
We already mentioned one of these factors: when 
making quick, perhaps even split-second, deci-
sions, limited opportunity exists to deliberate over 
one’s true feelings and the correct course of actions 
they imply. Therefore, under time pressure the 
response is disproportionately influenced by 
information that comes to mind quickly (Bargh, 
1997; Sanbonmatsu & Fazio, 1990). That is, 
spontaneous evaluations are more likely to shape 
one’s actions, even though one would reject them 
as being irrelevant, inadmissible, or otherwise 
inapplicable for the decision at hand, if given the 
opportunity to reflect. Hence, quick responses are 
more likely to be implicitly prejudiced.
 Limited Cognitive Resources
Deliberation is effortful. It requires us to maintain 
focus, to integrate possibly disparate pieces of 
information, and to separate relevant from irrele-
vant information. People’s capacity to perform 
these cognitive operations is limited. Thus, doing 
multiple things at once interferes with people’s 
ability to perform these operations adequately, and 
the response they execute may not be the one 
intended (Govorun & Payne, 2006; Macrae, Milne, 
& Bodenhausen, 1994). Likewise, fatigue and 
periods during the daily circadian rhythm where 
arousal is lowered are associated with reduced 
cognitive processing capacity (Bodenhausen, 
1990; Ma et  al., 2013). With fewer processing 
resources available to deliberate one’s evaluation 
and response, the resulting behavior is more 
likely to be implicitly prejudiced.
 Ambiguity
Some choices are straightforward. They involve 
clear and unambiguous input with each piece of 
information pointing to the same conclusion. 
Other choices are more complex with conflicting 
and possibly incomplete information. Resolving 
the ambiguity as to what the proper evaluation 
and response should be takes additional time and 
effort. Moreover, spontaneous evaluations which 
become available early in the process may shape 
the interpretation of subsequent information. 
As a result, in situations that are high in ambiguity, 
Definition Box
Implicit Prejudice: A negative evaluative 
predisposition toward a social category that 
impacts judgment and behavior without 
awareness and/or intent.
Box 11.2 Question for Elaboration
What distinguishes implicitly operating prej-
udice from prejudice more generally?
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responses are more likely to be implicitly preju-
diced (Bodenhausen & Lichtenstein, 1987; 
Correll et al., 2015).
 Lack of Motivation
People are not always motivated to deliberate their 
options. Mindless actions may bypass deliberation 
and rely solely on spontaneous evaluations  (e.g., 
Chen, Shechter, & Chaiken, 1996; Kruglanski & 
Freund, 1983). In circumstances where people are 
less curious, or care less about the accuracy of 
their judgments, responses are more likely to be 
implicitly prejudiced as well.
 Implicit Prejudice in Practice
We began this chapter noting that prejudice 
and discrimination are an all too common 
aspect of human interaction. In the United 
States, for example, a significant wage gap con-
tinues to exist between similarly educated men 
and women working full time in the same occupa-
tion (Goldin, 2014). Likewise minority groups in 
the United States face considerable discrimina-
tion in the labor market, at levels that have 
remained virtually unchanged for the past 25 years 
(Quillian, Pager, Hexel, Midtbøen, 2017). In fact, 
the majority of blacks living in the United States 
report having personally experienced unfair treat-
ment because of their race or ethnicity (71%; Pew 
Research Center, 2016a).
One of the focal issues of the public debate on 
racial discrimination in recent years has been 
biased treatment in law enforcement and in par-
ticular the use of deadly force by police officers. 
Although the US government maintains only an 
incomplete database on the issue, estimates by 
public advocacy groups and journalists are that 
1093 civilians were killed by police in 2016 
(1146 in 2015).4 For comparison, the total number 
of civilians shot and killed in Germany with a 
quarter of the US population was 11  in 2016 
(10 in 2015).5 While the US numbers are dispro-
portionately high overall, they also show signifi-
cant racial bias. Over 24% of the shooting victims 
in 2016 were black civilians who make up just 
4 Based on estimates by the British newspaper The 
Guardian which published a database for the years 2015 
and 2016 of all cases of police-involved shooting deaths 
recorded in police records and/or public sources (The 
Guardian, 2016)
5 Report of the German Interior Ministry Conference 
(Innenministerkonferenz)
Box 11.3 Question for Elaboration
What kinds of situations can you think of 
that might be especially prone to implicit 
influences from prejudice?
Box 11.4 Zooming In: How to Measure Bias 
in Police Use of Lethal Force
Earlier, we defined discrimination as any 
behavior toward category members that is 
directed toward them solely because they 
happen to be members of that category. In 
other words, discrimination consists of 
behavior that treats members of a group 
differently than anyone who doesn’t belong 
to that group. Hence, discriminatory behav-
ior is generally defined in relation to a 
benchmark alternative: similar behavior 
directed toward people from other groups.
In determining whether officers’ use of 
lethal force is racially biased, identifying a 
proper comparison benchmark proves dif-
ficult. One possibility is to compare inci-
dent rates for different groups, relative to 
their proportion in the population. Based 
on this metric, black civilians face a signifi-
cantly greater risk of being shot by police 
than any other group in the United States. 
For every million black people in the 
United States, about six to seven are shot 
every year. This rate is substantially higher 
than the corresponding rate for whites (less 
than three per million) or Asians (close to 
one per million; The Guardian, 2016).
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13% of the US population (27% black victims 
in 2015).
The claim that police officers are prejudiced in 
their use of lethal force is especially disturbing, 
not solely because of the grave consequences to 
the victims but also because it has potentially 
corrosive effects for the perceived legitimacy of 
law enforcement institutions. Shootings of a 
minority suspect lead to mistrust among commu-
nity members and give rise to conflict between 
the community and police. In fact, blacks in the 
United States are much less likely as whites to hold 
positive views of local police. In a representative 
nationwide sample, only 14% of black respon-
dents express having a great deal of confidence in 
their police department, compared to 42% among 
whites. Only a third of blacks believe police are 
using the right amount of force, less than half of 
the response rate for whites (Pew Research 
Center, 2016b; see also Weitzer & Tuch, 2004). 
One conceivable risk is that, in response to their 
mistrust, black people may alter their own behav-
ior in interactions with police officers, becoming 
more belligerent, and thereby creating a vicious 
cycle where this belligerence leads to more 
severe use of force by police (Reisig, McCluskey, 
Mastrofski, & Terrill, 2004).
No doubt, the notion that officers sworn to 
uphold the law would deliberately prejudice their 
decisions to shoot a civilian threatens the basic 
foundations of a democratic society. However, it 
is helpful to consider the circumstances under 
which officers have to face decisions about the 
use of force: in all likelihood, these are situations 
of significant stress to the officer, who are facing 
a potential threat to their own life, in uncertain 
circumstances that can rapidly escalate, requiring 
an immediate split-second decision, without 
much opportunity for deliberation. In other 
words, these are circumstances where the offi-
cers’ cognitive resources are taxed, the situation 
is likely to be ambiguous, and decisions have to 
be made under serious time pressure – all factors 
that facilitate implicit prejudice. While we should 
expect officers to be motivated to be fair and 
accurate in their decision, the situation may 
indeed bias them to make choices the officers do 
not necessarily intend.
 First-Person-Shooter Task
Over the past 15  years, social psychological 
research has examined the effect of race on shoot-
ing decisions using videogame-like simulations. 
One frequently employed paradigm is the First-
Person-Shooter Task (FPST; Correll, Park, Judd, 
& Wittenbrink, 2002). The paradigm presents 
participants with a series of male targets, either 
One problem with this metric is that it 
assumes that all of these groups are equally 
likely to interact with police officers in ways 
that could eventually lead to the use of lethal 
force. This may not be a valid assumption. 
For example, relative to their proportion in 
the population, blacks are more likely than 
whites to be convicted of violent crime. 
They therefore may face higher base rates 
for situations where the use of force is at 
least a possibility. When benchmarking 
police-involved shooting incidents against 
estimates of the likelihood to be involved in 
serious violent offenses, Cesario and col-
leagues no longer observed racial disparities 
(Cesario, Johnson, & Terrill, 2018).
However, a challenge in benchmarking 
against race-specific base rates for crimi-
nal behavior is that estimates of such 
behavior themselves are potentially biased. 
For example, if police use race to profile 
potential suspects, arrest and conviction 
rates no longer provide accurate estimates 
of actual criminal activity (see Goff, Lloyd, 
Geller, Raphael, & Glaser, 2016). In fact, 
when benchmarking against area-specific 
estimates of criminal activity (i.e., county-
specific crime rates), racial disparities in 
police-involved shooting deaths continue to 
show significant racial bias (Ross, 2015). 
These analyses show the risk for black 
civilians in some counties to be up to 20 
times higher than that for white civilians, 
controlling for the county’s crime rates.
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black or white, holding weapons (i.e., handguns) 
or innocuous objects (i.e., wallets, cellphones). 
The task for participants is to shoot armed targets 
but avoid shooting unarmed targets. Participants 
are incentivized to make accurate decisions, but 
they have to do so under time pressure with lim-
ited opportunity to deliberate whether the target 
is indeed holding a weapon or something else. 
The task is designed to capture any implicit influ-
ences on participants’ decisions.
Specifically, the FPST presents a series of back-
ground scenes and target images over the course of 
many trials (commonly 80 to 100 trials). On each 
trial, a random number of background scenes (0–3) 
appear in rapid succession, each scene for a ran-
dom duration (500–800 milliseconds). Next, a final 
background appears. This background is then 
replaced by a target image – an image of a man 
embedded in the same background (e.g., an armed 
white man standing in the scene; see Fig.  11.1, 
right panel). The resulting effect for participants is 
that the target seems to “pop up” in the scene. 
Participants are instructed to respond as quickly as 
possible whenever a target appears via pressing one 
of two keys on a computer keyboard. If the target is 
armed, the task is to press the key labeled shoot, 
and if the target is unarmed, to press the key labeled 
don’t shoot. Importantly, across trials, the nature of 
the target image varies systematically. Half of the 
targets are armed with a handgun, and half are 
unarmed and instead carry an innocuous object, 
like a cellphone or wallet. Within each type of 
target (armed and unarmed), half of the images 
depict a black man and half a white man. To 
introduce time pressure and encourage fast 
responding, the task imposes a response window, 
during which the response has to be recorded 
(between 630 and 850  ms). Similar to popular 
videogames, correct responses earn points, and 
errors or timeouts result in penalties.
The results of some 20 FPST studies consis-
tently show racial bias in both the speed and 
accuracy with which participants can make their 
decisions. Participants are faster and more accu-
rate when shooting an armed black man rather 
than an armed white man, and faster and more 
accurate in their decisions to an unarmed white 
man rather than an unarmed black man (Correll 
et al., 2002; Correll, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 
2007; Correll, Park, Judd, Wittenbrink, Sadler, 
et al., 2007; Correll et al., 2015; see Fig. 11.2). 
Conceptually similar effects have been obtained 
in other labs with varying procedures and for 
varying ethnicities (Amodio et  al., 2004; 
Greenwald, Oakes, & Hoffman, 2003; Payne, 
2001; Plant, Peruche, & Butz, 2005; Unkelbach, 
Forgas, & Denson, 2008). Much of this research 
has been conducted with college students, but 
the effect has been replicated with community 
samples of white and black participants, as well 
as with police officers (Correll, Park, Judd, 
Wittenbrink, Sadler, et al., 2007).
The crucial point of these findings of course is 
that with just a few additional seconds of time, 
decisions are made with perfect accuracy. It is the 
limited time available to fully appreciate and 
resolve the complexity of the stimulus input and 
then execute the respective response that gives 
Fig. 11.1 Example target images for the First-Person-Shooter Task (Correll et al., 2002)
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rise to erroneous responses. Hence, the effects 
reflect implicit influences from the early sponta-
neous activation phase, where information related 
to the race of the target comes online. To make a 
correct decision, only the correct detection of the 
object held by the target matters. Any target-
related information is in and of itself irrelevant to 
the decision. But it is difficult to correct for or 
detect this spontaneous input that is associated 
with the race of the target.
Several studies from our lab have explored in 
greater detail the exact nature of this implicit 
influence. We have found that it is cultural stereo-
types associating black people with the concepts 
of danger and threat that are activated spontane-
ously. Temporarily increasing (lowering) the 
accessibility of these stereotypes exacerbates 
(reduces) racial bias in the FPST (Correll, Park, 
Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2007).
Moreover, the spontaneous danger stereotypes 
activated early in the decision process influence 
what participants conclude to see in the hands of 
the target. They are more likely to see a gun in the 












Armed Unarmed Armed Unarmed
Black Target
White Target
Fig. 11.2 Response latencies (left panel) and error rates (right panel) for armed and unarmed targets by target race in 
the First-Person-Shooter Task; Correll et al. (2002)
Box 11.5 Question for Elaboration
Given the research on racial bias in the 
FPST, what would you advise police 
departments do to limit the negative conse-
quences of implicit prejudice?
Box 11.6 Zooming In: Perception or 
Response Execution?
Spontaneously activated danger stereo-
types can influence subsequent responses 
in two principled ways. (1) They can shape 
the perceiver’s perceptions; and (2) they 
can interfere with a proper execution of the 
response.
The latter mechanism suggests that the 
stereotype has a direct influence on the deci-
sion, without impacting perception of the 
critical object. That is, stereotypic associa-
tions with threat and danger operate as a sep-
arate input that favor a shoot response, even 
in circumstances where the object is correctly 
identified as a non-weapon. In this scenario, 
object information and stereotype are in con-
flict and compete with one another for influ-
ence on the response. As the stereotype comes 
online rapidly, it may win out when decisions 
have to be made under time pressure. With 
additional time, it is possible to reconcile the 
conflicting input and to recognize that the ste-
reotype is irrelevant to the decision (Payne, 
Shimizu, & Jacoby, 2005). Additional time to 
reach a decision will only improve decision 
accuracy if it can be used to improve object 
perception. For example, if the object is visi-
ble for only a brief moment, additional time 




innocuous in the hands of a white target (Correll 
et al., 2015).
 Practical Implications
These findings on racial bias in shooting deci-
sions help us better understand why police offi-
cers may be prejudiced in their use of lethal force. 
Importantly, they point to the possibility that 
such bias can result from implicit, unintended 
influences. This form of bias reflects larger soci-
etal ills that produce and perpetuate cultural ste-
reotypes of black people as dangerous and 
threatening. Police officers are exposed to and 
influenced by these stereotypes much like every-
one else. While definitely requiring intervention 
to eliminate the bias, the explanation contrasts 
starkly with the alternative scenario where police 
officers willingly target civilians because of their 
prejudice against people of color.
In the United States, following a series of 
police-involved shootings, community unrest, 
and the emergence of the Black Lives Matter 
advocacy group, police departments and govern-
ment agencies across the country are pressured 
to take action. They have taken notice that racial 
bias may occur implicitly and are now spending 
considerable resources on possible fixes. The 
State of California and the US Department of 
Justice both independently launched mandatory 
antibias training programs for officers and for 
federal agents.
The concern is no doubt real, and interven-
tions are sorely needed. However, whether antib-
ias training programs, which aim to increase 
awareness of implicit sources of bias, are effective 
is entirely unknown. To date, there is no credible 
research available on the long-term consequences 
of such training interventions. In fact, they may 
be counterproductive in several ways.
First, deliberate efforts to avoid racial bias in 
decisions about the use of force may actually 
endanger rather than save the lives of black 
suspects. Several studies have shown that 
conscious efforts to avoid bias, for example, 
intentionally trying to respond in an egalitarian 
fashion, can actually backfire, leading to more 
bias rather than less (Liberman & Förster, 2000; 
Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, & Jetten, 1994; 
Payne, Lambert, & Jacoby, 2002).
Second, interventions that alter the way officers 
approach a potentially dangerous situation may 
endanger the lives of the officers. In a potentially 
hostile confrontation, officers often experience 
fear. Fear can be a useful cue in as much as it 
sensitizes to real threats in the environment. But 
officers who have been taught about implicit bias 
and prejudice may attempt to ignore their fear 
response. As a result, they may end up underesti-
mating real threats in an effort to avoid the 
appearance of bias.
Third, antibias training may have no effect at 
all. Compared with the other risks, we just noted 
this liability may seem trivial. But in actuality it 
may prove to be quite harmful as antibias training 
ties up significant policy and material resources. 
For decades, the public has remained largely 
uninterested in the issue of racial bias in law 
enforcement. This has finally changed, and 
government agencies face pressures to intervene 
and address the problems. But if antibias training 
has no effect, the political capital and the money 
spent will be wasted.
Hence, the most practical implication of exist-
ing research on implicit prejudice in shooting 
decisions ought to be that we need further 
research on possible intervention strategies and 
their formal evaluation.
 Important Caveats
We have illustrated how implicit prejudice can be 
a useful construct to better understand why police 
officers are biased in their use of lethal force. 
However, it is important to recognize that not all 
bias is implicit, nor is all bias necessarily 
psychological in origin. Implicit prejudice is only 
one of possibly many factors that help explain 
this complex issue.
First, not all officer actions necessarily reflect 
implicit influences. To the contrary, several of the 
recent shootings that received public attention 
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appeared to follow from deliberate acts on the 
side of the officer. In the case of Walter Scott, for 
example, who was killed in 2015  in North 
Charleston, SC, officer Michael Slager fired 
several shots from behind the victim. Scott was 
not threatening the officer, nor was he armed. 
Indeed, Slager must have known the victim was 
unarmed because, immediately after the fateful 
shots, video footage shows the officer walking 
over to Scott and planting a weapon in an appar-
ent effort to justify his own actions.6
Second, although officers make individual 
choices and are held accountable for those 
choices, their actions are also influenced by insti-
tutional, structural factors that have little to do 
with the individual officer and his or her prefer-
ences and attitudes. For example, municipalities 
rely to a good extent on revenues from citations 
for traffic violations and similar minor legal trans-
gressions. The effectiveness of police work is 
measured by statistics that capture crime and 
arrest rates. A city’s revenue needs and arrest rates 
ultimately impact officer incentives  – either 
implicitly through informal directives or patrol 
assignments or explicitly through formal quotas. 
These incentives, in turn, influence what kinds of 
interactions officers have with the community. 
Aggressive ticketing and arrest quotas are unlikely 
6 https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/apr/07/
south-carolina-police-officer-murder-charge
to foster an environment of trust between officers 
and the community. In the absence of trust, other-
wise innocuous interactions may more readily 
escalate into a hostile confrontation.
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Summary
• Prejudice is a negative predisposition 
toward a social group and its members. 
It represents an attitude, evaluation, and 
inclination to act in a particular way. 
Those acts can reflect deliberate choices 
to discriminate.
• However, for well-established, over-
learned attitudes, evaluations and related 
group stereotypes may be triggered 
automatically, without intent, effort, or 
conscious awareness. They may influ-
ence judgment and behavior implicitly, 
without any intent to discriminate or 
treat members of one group different 
from those of another group.
• Factors that promote implicit influences 
are:
 – Inadequate time to deliberate one’s 
actions
 – Limited cognitive resources because 
of fatigue or distraction
 – The ambiguity of the situation
 – Lack of motivation to act in a careful 
and accurate manner
• Police officers sometimes have to make 
important decisions about the use of 
lethal force under circumstances that 
increase the risk of implicit influences: 
these decisions can be split-second deci-
sions, made in a highly stressful situa-
tion with considerable uncertainty.
• Laboratory simulations of such deci-
sions show clear evidence of implicit 
bias from negative racial stereotypes that 
associate black people with danger: par-
ticipants are faster and more accurate 
when shooting an armed black man 
rather than an armed white man, and 
faster and more accurate in their deci-
sions to an unarmed white man rather 
than an unarmed black man.
11 Implicit Prejudice
174
Banaji, M.  R., & Greenwald, A.  G. (2013). 
Blindspot: Hidden Biases of Good People. 
New York: Delacorte Press.
Correll, J., Park, B., Judd, C. M., Wittenbrink, B., 
Sadler, M. S. & Keesee, T. (2007). Across the 
thin blue line: Police officers and racial bias in 
the decision to shoot. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 92, 1006–1023.
Payne, K. B., Vuletich, H. A., & Lundberg, K. B. 
(2017) The Bias of Crowds: How Implicit 
Bias Bridges Personal and Systemic Prejudice. 
Psychological Inquiry, 28, 233–248.
Wittenbrink, B. & Schwarz, N. (Eds.) (2007). 
Implicit measures of attitudes. New  York: 
Guilford Press.
 Guiding Answers to Questions 
in the Chapter
 1. Q1 (with Box 11.2): What distinguishes 
implicitly operating prejudice from prejudice 
more generally?
A1: Implicit prejudice refers to influences of 
prejudiced group attitudes on judgment and 
behavior that are unintended. Our judgment of 
another person may be shaped by her/his gen-
der, without us trying to take gender into 
account or even knowing that gender played 
any role in our decision. By contrast, preju-
dice can have entirely explicit effects, for 
example, judgments that we make with delib-
erate consideration of our group attitudes.
 2. Q2 (with Box 11.3): What kinds of situations 
can you think of that might be especially 
prone to implicit influences from prejudice?
A2: Any situation where people have limited 
motivation and/or opportunity to reflect upon 
their reactions. Many aspects of human inter-
action happen mindlessly where people don’t 
spend much effort to reflect on or regulate their 
behavior  – like the quick exchange with the 
clerk at the coffee shop. In other situations, 
people may be motivated to make correct judg-
ments and act in a proper fashion. Yet, the situ-
ation is such that the opportunity for reflection 
and deliberation is missing. For example, peo-
ple may lack awareness of aspects of their non-
verbal communication, precluding them to 
reflect and possibly correct what is being com-
municated. Likewise, the circumstances of the 
situation itself may curtail people’s opportu-
nity to deliberate their judgments and actions. 
When they are busy, stressed, and make deci-
sions under time pressure, people are more 
prone to show implicit bias. An overworked 
physician at a nightshift at the ER will face 
greater risk in this regard than the doctor who 
provides written consultation on the case, 
following a detailed review.
 3. Q3 (with Box 11.5): Given the research on 
racial bias in the FPST, what would you advise 
police departments do to limit the negative 
consequences of implicit prejudice?
A3: This is a trick question. To date, existing 
research on the effect of race on shooting 
decisions does not speak to the issue of inter-
vention. The research does make the case that 
implicit influences can possibly impact offi-
cer decision-making. It identifies a potential 
source for bias, one that is quite different 
from the alternative, where officers are delib-
erately prejudiced. As such, the research sug-
gests additional opportunities for intervention. 
But what those interventions are, and whether 
they are effective relative to alternative 
options available in the field cannot be 
answered by the research to date. In fact, few 
studies have explicitly investigated strategies 
to mitigate shooter bias. It is unknown how 
any such effects in the laboratory might trans-
fer to the real world.
This is an important lesson for how to prop-
erly apply scientific theory and laboratory 
research findings to real-world problems. The 
laboratory helps us to more fully understand 
the real world. But to fix a problem and change 
the world, additional research is generally 
required that translates predictions and findings 
to the specifics of a real situation. For this rea-
son, medical interventions undergo elaborate 
field tests before they receive certification.
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 Introduction
When Roger Federer says “I believe that I can still 
improve my game” (Hudson, 2014), this feels 
impressive but also somewhat odd; how can some-
body with his achievements (at the time, aged 33, 
he had already won 17 Grand Slam tournaments, 
more than any other male player in the world) still 
believe that he can improve? Could such an 
extraordinary confidence in his ability to learn and 
to improve himself be part of his unmatched suc-
cess as Grand Slam winner? Rodger Federer’s 
quote illustrates what Carol S.  Dweck called a 
growth mindset.1 It involves the passion for learn-
ing, growth, and constant self-improvement and 
makes people capable of overcoming challenges 
and setbacks through endurance and the invest-
ment of effort. It’s counterpart, the so-called fixed 
mindset, is characterized by the belief that one’s 
competencies and talents (like intelligence or cre-
ativity) are carved in stone and basically unchange-
able. According to Mindset Theory, people with a 
fixed mindset, as compared to a growth mindset, 
are more interested in proving and validating 
themselves than in actual improvement and, hence, 
more vulnerable to get discouraged by mistakes 
and setbacks.
1 The use of the term “mindset” here is different from that 
used in the Mindset Theory of Action Phases (cf. Keller, 
Bieleke, & Gollwitzer, Chap. 2).
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The development of Mindset Theory originally 
began in the 1970s when Carol S. Dweck in her 
studies observed that children reacted very differ-
ently to challenges and setbacks (Dweck, 2012a). 
While some children were easily unsettled by dif-
ficulties and desperately tried to avoid them, others 
liked challenges and were even actively seeking 
them. Being intrigued by this observation and 
searching for an explanation, the idea of “implicit 
theories” was born when she and her colleague 
Mary Bandura figured that the meaning of failure 
was dependent on children’s view of ability as 
something deep-seated and permanent or some-
thing they can develop. This insight built the start-
ing point of an extensive research program in 
which Dweck, together with her colleagues and 
students, explored the origins and consequences of 
people’s implicit theories in a variety of domains, 
such as academic and occupational achievement, 
health, or interpersonal relationships (Burnette, 
2010; Dweck, 1999, 2012a, 2012b; Molden & 
Dweck, 2006; Yeager & Walton, 2011; for meta-
analyses see Burnette, O’Boyle, VanEpps, Pollack, 
& Finkel, 2013; Sisk, Burgoyne, Sun, Butler, & 
Macnamara, 2019). In this chapter, we will first 
describe Mindset Theory and its underlying mech-
anisms in the intellectual-achievement domain and 
interpersonal domain before we turn to an applica-
tion of Mindset Theory in the context of interper-
sonal aggression.
 Incremental Versus Entity Theories
People hold implicit theories about different per-
sonal attributes such as intelligence, personality, 
moral character, willpower, or body weight 
(Burnette, 2010; Chiu, Dweck, Tong, & Fu, 1997; 
Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995; Hong, Chiu, 
Dweck, Lin, & Wan, 1999). In any case, an entity 
theory is marked by the idea that the attribute in 
question cannot willingly be changed, whereas 
an incremental theory is marked by the idea that 
it can be changed with effort (for an exception 
see Box 12.1). Importantly, these beliefs are 
about the potential to change not about the actual 
likelihood of change to occur (Yeager, 
Trzesniewski, & Dweck, 2013). That is, people 
can believe that personality can be changed, 
while they do not necessarily think that many 
people do change. It is further important to note 
that people’s implicit theories are not necessarily 
the same for different attributes. The same person 
might believe that people can grow their intelli-
gence quite substantially but that personality is a 
relatively fixed entity. This example implies 
another important feature of implicit theories, 
namely, that the agreement with an entity versus 
incremental theory is continuous. Research sug-
gests that about 40% of people clearly endorse 
either a fixed or a growth mindset. But about 20% 
of people cannot be categorized into either group 
(Dweck, 2012a). So keep in mind that when we 
talk of people holding an entity or incremental 
theory, this is a simplification, which we use to 
explain findings in a comprehensible way.
Definition Box
Mindsets (or implicit theories) are peo-
ple’s lay beliefs about the nature of human 
attributes, such as intelligence or 
personality.
Fixed mindset (or entity theory) is the 
belief that human attributes, such as intel-
ligence or personality, are fixed and cannot 
be changed.
Growth mindset (or incremental theory) 
is the belief that human attributes, such as 
intelligence or personality, are malleable 
and can be changed substantially.
Box 12.1 Zooming In: Implicit Theories 
About Willpower
While most implicit theories deal with the 
question of malleability of human attri-
butes, implicit theories about willpower 
deal with the question whether people 
believe that willpower is limited versus 
nonlimited (Job, Dweck, & Walton, 2010). 
Willpower or self- control describes people’s 
K. Bernecker and V. Job
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 Measurement of Implicit Theories
Usually, people are unaware of the beliefs they 
hold, which is why these beliefs are referred to as 
“implicit.” Still, when being asked about what 
they think, whether human attributes can change 
or not, people can easily respond to this question. 
Therefore, implicit theories are measured via 
self-report (rather than with implicit measures 
such as reaction time paradigms). In accordance 
with their field of interest, researchers have 
developed scales to assess implicit theories with 
regard to different personal attributes. Table 12.1 
shows example items for an entity and an incre-
mental theory regarding four attributes, namely, 
intelligence, personality, moral character, and 
groups. These are by far not the only attributes 
implicit theories have been studied of, but all of 
them deal with the question of malleability (see 
Box 12.1 for an exception).
 Stability of Implicit Theories
You might wonder whether people’s agreement 
with an entity versus incremental theory changes 
over time or can even be changed intentionally as 
part of an intervention. The answer is twofold. 
On the one hand, longitudinal studies usually find 
implicit theories to be relatively stable over time, 
almost similar to a personality trait (e.g., Robins & 
Pals, 2002). On the other hand, experimental 
Table 12.1 Example items for measuring implicit 
theories
Attribute Example items
Intelligence You have a certain amount of 
intelligence, and you can’t really do 
much to change it.
No matter how much intelligence you 
have, you can always change it quite a 
bit. (Reversed coded)
Personality Everyone is a certain kind of person, 
and there is not much they can do to 
really change that.




A person’s moral character is 
something very basic about them, and 
it can’t be changed much.
Groups Groups can’t really change their basic 
characteristics.
Note. Participants usually rate their agreement with each 
statement on a 6-point Likert-type scale (1  =  strongly 
agree, 6 = strongly disagree; e.g., Dweck et al., 1995)
capacity to alter their behavior, thoughts, 
and emotions in order to bring them into 
line with their own long-term goals or some 
external standard such as social expecta-
tions (e.g., Baumeister, 2002; Carver & 
Scheier, 1982; Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999; 
see also Gieseler, Loschelder, & Friese, 
Chap. 1). Some people believe that this 
capacity resembles a limited resource that 
gets depleted whenever used (limited- 
resource theory). Other people, however, 
reject this view and rather believe that using 
their willpower can even activate their men-
tal stamina and prepare them for upcoming 
challenges (nonlimited-resource theory). In 
multiple laboratory studies, Job et al. (2010) 
found that only people with a limited-
resource theory show declines in self- 
control performance given a previous 
self- control task (also known as ego-deple-
tion effect), while people with a nonlimited- 
resource theory remained a high level of 
self- control performance. Field studies also 
linked willpower theories to self-control in 
everyday life. During the final examination 
period, when self-control is most important, 
students with a limited-resource theory pro-
crastinate more, eat less healthy, and even 
earn lower grades compared to their fellow 
students with a nonlimited- resource theory 
(Job, Bernecker, Walton, & Dweck, 2015; 
Job et al., 2010).
Box 12.2 Question for Elaboration
Can you think of other attributes that people 
might have implicit theories about?
12 Mindset Theory
182
studies demonstrate that there are ways to change 
implicit theories for shorter and longer periods of 
time, depending on the intensity of the methods 
used. For instance, a mindset can be shortly induced 
by providing people with “scientific information” 
that supports one of the theories or they can be 
changed over periods of several weeks by means of 
an extensive workshop (Blackwell, Trzesniewski, 
& Dweck, 2007; Good, Aronson, & Inzlicht, 
2003; Yeager, Trzesniewski, et  al., 2013). We 
will introduce one example of a successful long-
term intervention later in this chapter when we 
talk about the application of Mindset Theory.
 Origins of Implicit Theories
So far, only a limited amount of research has 
addressed the question where implicit theories 
come from. Some studies examined the influence 
of parenting practices on children’s implicit theo-
ries about intelligence. Early research found that 
praising children for their abilities rather than for 
their effort leads children to adopt an entity theory 
(e.g., Mueller & Dweck, 1998). More recent 
research extended these findings and found that 
parents’ view of failures affect their children’s 
implicit theories via different parenting practices 
(Haimovitz & Dweck, 2016). Parents who believe 
failure is enhancing (instead of debilitating) are 
more likely to raise children who believe that 
intelligence can be changed.
This research suggests that implicit theories 
are developed early in life (e.g., Haimovitz & 
Dweck, 2016 studied fourth to fifth graders). 
However, recent research suggests that they can 
also change later in life. For instance, research 
focusing on implicit theories about willpower 
(see Box 12.1) examined change in willpower 
theories in college students over the course of one 
semester. Two studies showed that when students 
pursued personal goals for intrinsic reasons (e.g., 
out of personal interest) rather than for extrinsic 
reasons (e.g., to please others), their belief in 
nonlimited willpower increased (Sieber, 
Flückiger, Mata, Bernecker, & Job, 2019). The 
bottom line of this research is that implicit theo-
ries are at least to some extend “construed” from 
the experiences people make—a process that 
probably continues over the course of one’s life.
 Mechanisms: Implicit Theories Work 
in Meaning Systems
A considerable amount of research has been ded-
icated to the mechanisms underlying the effects 
of implicit theories. This work has shown that 
implicit theories work in so-called meaning sys-
tems (Hong et  al., 1999; Molden & Dweck, 
2006). That is, people formulate theory- consistent 
goals, and interpret the effort experienced and 
outcomes of their actions in line with their 
implicit theories. Further, based on their theories, 
they pursue different strategies to overcome dif-
ficulties. Together people’s goals, effort beliefs, 
attributions, and strategies build a coherent sys-
tem that allows a person to make sense of the 
world and make predictions based on this under-
standing. In the following, we are going to intro-
duce the four mechanisms that underlie the 
effects of implicit theories within the achieve-
ment and interpersonal domain (i.e., goals, effort 
beliefs, attributions, and strategies).
 Learning and Performance Goals
Implicit theories determine what kind of goals 
people set in achievement situations. People who 
believe that their attributes are malleable and open 
to change set so-called learning goals that are 
directed at the development of their abilities. 
People who believe that their attributes are fixed 
are on the other hand concerned with validating 
their level of ability. Accordingly, they tend to pur-
sue so-called performance goals2 (e.g., Robins & 
2 Performance goals are sometimes defined as competitive 
goals (wanting to outdo others) or as simply seeking suc-
cessful outcomes (such as high grades). However, research 
shows that these other goals do not create the same vulner-
abilities as the goal of validating ability (e.g., Grant & 
Dweck, 2003). Throughout this chapter we use the term per-
formance goals to refer to the goal of validating ability.
K. Bernecker and V. Job
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Pals, 2002). The goals individuals strive for in turn 
shape their cognitions, affect, and behavior and 
can thereby lead to different learning outcomes 
(e.g., Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Elliott & Dweck, 
1988). For instance, one study used electroenceph-
alography (EEG) to monitor brain activity associ-
ated with students’ attention to feedback while 
taking a challenging test (Mangels, Butterfield, 
Lamb, Good, & Dweck, 2006). Results showed 
that both entity and incremental theorists eagerly 
attended ability-relevant feedback about whether 
their answer to an item was correct or incorrect. 
However, compared to incremental theorists, 
entity theorists were less interested in learning-
relevant information about what the correct answer 
was (Mangels et al., 2006, see also Dweck, Good, 
& Mangels, 2004). Once their performance goals 
had been met by processing the ability-relevant 
feedback about whether their answer was correct 
or not, entity theorists felt no need to attent to the 
learning- relevant information (Mangels et  al., 
2006). Other studies have suggested that learning 
goals are related to the use of more effective strate-
gies in the face of difficulties (e.g., Elliott & 
Dweck, 1988), “deep” learning strategies to 
approach difficult course material (e.g., Grant & 
Dweck, 2003), and better performance in chal-
lenging tasks (e.g., Mueller & Dweck, 1998). 
Overall, research suggest that implicit theories 
generate different concerns of either developing 
one’s ability or to proof that one possesses a cer-
tain level of ability.
Importantly, goals are not only an important 
mechanism in the intellectual-achievement 
domain but also in the domain of interpersonal 
relationships. Rudolph (2010), for instance, 
showed that implicit theories about peer relation-
ships (whether they are fixed or can be improved 
with effort) predict the types of goals people set 
in social situations. Students holding an entity 
theory were more likely to set performance- 
oriented social goals (which are concerned with 
minimizing the risk for social failure or negative 
social judgment) rather than mastery-oriented 
social goals (which involve learning and devel-
oping relationships; Rudolph, 2010).
 Effort Beliefs
Implicit theories in the achievement-intellectual 
domain are related to people’s beliefs about 
effort. Many motivational theories are based on 
the basic assumption that effort is aversive and 
people only engage in effortful activities if they 
regard it as being worthwhile, for instance, if 
they can achieve a valued outcome (e.g., 
Kurzban, Duckworth, Kable, & Myers, 2013; 
Rollett, 1987; Wright, 1996). In line with this 
theorizing, research on implicit theories demon-
strates that the beliefs people hold about the mal-
leability of intelligence changes the meaning of 
effort. People endorsing an incremental theory 
regard effort as necessary and worthwhile for 
change. As a result they embrace situations that 
yield a challenge to their abilities—they know 
that change will not come easy and that they 
have to invest effort to grow. The meaning of 
effort differs when seen through the lens of an 
entity theory: If a person has to invest high effort 
to accomplish a task this implies a lack of ability 
or at least an insufficiency and there is nothing to 
be done about it. Thus, an entity theory gives a 
negative spin to the experience of effort and, as a 
result, drives people away from challenging situ-
ations (e.g., Blackwell et  al., 2007; Dweck & 
Leggett, 1988; Hong et al., 1999). To our knowl-
edge, effort beliefs have so far not been studied 
as mechanism driving outcomes within the inter-
personal domain.
Definition Box
Learning goals (also often referred to as 
“mastery goals”) reflect individuals’ concern 
with increasing their competence.
Performance goals reflect individuals’ 





As mentioned above, implicit theories affect how 
people make sense of challenges such as setbacks 
or failure. An entity theory drives people to attri-
bute failure to what they believe are stable char-
acteristics such as ability or traits. In contrast, an 
incremental theory leads people to attribute fail-
ures and setbacks to malleable entities such as 
effort, motivation, or aspects of the situation. 
Research shows that these differences in attribu-
tions explain why implicit theories predict differ-
ent affective and behavioral responses to failures 
and negative feedback. For instance, Hong et al. 
(1999) showed that when students received nega-
tive performance feedback, they tended to attri-
bute it to a lack of effort if they endorsed an 
incremental theory about intelligence (both when 
measured and manipulated). Accordingly, they 
took remedial action. In contrast, students with 
an entity theory attributed the feedback to a lack 
of ability and were less likely to take action to 
elevate their performance (Hong et al., 1999).
Attributions also play an important role in 
individuals’ reactions to social challenges, such 
as social exclusion or intergroup conflicts (e.g., 
Halperin & Bar-Tal, 2011; Yeager, Miu, Powers, 
& Dweck, 2013). Studies showed that entity the-
orists tend to attribute other’s behavior to their 
personality (e.g., “She behaved like that because 
she is a bad person”), while incremental theorists 
tend to make more situational attributions (e.g., 
“She behaved like that because she was in a 
rush”). These differences in attributions trig-
gered by implicit theories lead to differences in 
people’s emotional (e.g., anger, hatred) and 
behavioral (e.g., revenge seeking) reactions to 
socially adverse situations.
 Mastery-Oriented and Helpless 
Strategies
Implicit theories also predict how people respond 
to challenges: people with an incremental theory 
are persistent and invest effort to master 
 challenges and overcome setbacks—they use 
 so- called mastery-oriented strategies. In con-
trast, people with an entity theory become easily 
discouraged by setbacks and react with helpless 
or defensive strategies (Blackwell et  al., 2007; 
Hong et al., 1999; Robins & Pals, 2002). If peo-
ple believe that their abilities are fixed, setbacks 
mean that they lack certain ability. As a result 
they are less willing to invest effort in overcom-
ing the situation and try to avoid challenges. If 
people believe that they can grow their abilities, 
setbacks are interpreted as opportunities to learn 
rather than in terms of personal insufficiency. 
The idea of growth takes away negative feelings 
toward the self to dwell about and replaces them 
with a “readiness to act.” A longitudinal field 
study traced 500 college students over the course 
of their 4 years of college and found that stu-
dents with an entity theory were more likely to 
report helpless-strategies (e.g., “When I fail to 
understand something, I become discouraged to 
the point of wanting to give up.”), while students 
with an incremental theory were more likely to 
report mastery-oriented strategies (e.g., “When 
something I am studying is difficult, I try 
harder.”; Robins & Pals, 2002). Further, entity 
theorists showed a drop in self-esteem over the 
course of their college years, speaking to the 
negative implications for the self that are associ-
ated with challenges and setbacks for these stu-
dents (Robins & Pals, 2002). Other studies in the 
laboratory found that students with an (induced) 
entity theory engage in strategies that preserve 
their self-worth. For instance, they choose to 
review the work of others doing more poorly 
than themselves rather than learning from those 
doing better than themselves (Nussbaum & 
Dweck, 2008). They are also more likely to con-
sider lying or cheating in order to look better 
(Blackwell et  al., 2007; Mueller & Dweck, 
1998).
In the interpersonal domain, research has 
studied how implicit theories shape how people 
respond to experiences of social adversity or fail-
ure. For instance, when being victimized by their 
peers, students holding an entity theory about 
personality tend to react with desire for ven-
geance and aggression. In contrast, students 
holding an incremental theory choose a more 
resilient-prosocial response. For example, they 
tried to be “cool” about an incidence of victim-
ization and wanted to educate their transgressor 
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(Rudolph, 2010; Yeager & Dweck, 2012; Yeager, 
Trzesniewski, et al., 2013).
To sum up, implicit theories work in meaning 
systems and have motivational, emotional, and 
behavioral consequences on different levels. The 
two major domains—achievement and interper-
sonal—in which implicit theories have been stud-
ied largely align in the mechanisms that have 
been observed. Table 12.2 summarizes the main 
mechanisms studied for both domains. In both 
domains implicit theories are associated with dif-
ferent goals people set, they shape how adversity 
is interpreted, and which strategies people choose 
to deal with these adversities. Effort beliefs have 
been studied in the achievement domain only, 
although one could also imagine that people eval-
uate effort they experience within their relation-
ships differently, if they endorse an entity versus 
incremental theory.
 Application of Mindset Theory 
in the Context of Interpersonal 
Aggression
In the previous sections, we have described the 
basic tenets of Mindset Theory. It proposes that 
people differ in their beliefs about the malleabil-
ity of human attributes, such as intelligence and 
personality. We described research showing how 
these basic assumptions affect key outcomes in 
the intellectual-achievement domain and the 
interpersonal domain. In this last section of the 
chapter, we want to describe an intervention 
study that applied Mindset Theory to tackle the 
problem of bullying, which is present in schools 
(and workplaces) around the world. In a repre-
sentative sample of N = 15.686 US students from 
sixth to tenth grade, 30% reported moderate to 
frequent involvement in bullying. Either they bul-
lied themselves or they had been bullied (Nansel 
et  al., 2001). Further, research shows that stu-
dents who are victimized by their peers suffer in 
terms of psychological adjustment (e.g., depres-
sion, loneliness) and they are at higher risk of 
suicidality (e.g., Klomek, Marrocco, Kleinman, 
Schonfeld, & Gould, 2007; Nansel et al., 2001; 
Rudolph, 2010). These findings call for the inves-
tigation of ways to reduce the prevalence of bul-
lying and to help students cope with victimization 
by their peers.
Research suggests that applying Mindset 
Theory in this context might serve both purposes. 
Studies show that students’ implicit theories 
about personality shape their emotional and 
Table 12.2 Overview of mindset processes
Implicit theory Goal orientation Effort beliefs
Attribution of 
adversity




Entity theory Learning goals Effort as lack of 
ability




Performance goals Effort as necessary 
for growth



















Box 12.3 Question for Elaboration
Why are implicit theories often referred to 
as working in a “meaning system,” and 
what does the term describe?
Definition Box
Bullying is defined as a specific type of 
aggression in which a more powerful person 
(or group) is attacking a less powerful one 
repeatedly over time with the intention to do 
harm (Nansel et al., 2001).
12 Mindset Theory
186
behavioral response to experiences of victimiza-
tion (Yeager & Dweck, 2012). When being 
insulted or excluded by their peers, students with 
an entity theory are more likely to desire ven-
geance and aggression (Yeager & Miu, 2011; 
Yeager, Trzesniewski, Tirri, Nokelainen, & 
Dweck, 2011). Peer-victimized students also 
report more depressive symptoms, if they endorse 
an entity theory (Rudolph, 2010). For an entity 
theorist, victimization is done by “bullies,” who 
will never change, to “losers,” who will never 
change. This belief leaves victims of bullying 
hopeless about their own future, because they 
believe they will always be the ones being picked 
on. Moreover, it justifies a vengeful- aggressive 
response toward the perpetrators who are seen as 
“bad people”. An incremental theory, on the other 
hand, implies that both victims and bullies can 
change, suggesting that they might get out of their 
role eventually. This perspective opens up the 
possibility of a more prosocial- resilient reaction 
to bullying, such as educating the perpetrators 
(Yeager & Dweck, 2012; Yeager et al., 2011; see 
also Yeager & Miu, 2011).
Building upon these findings, Yeager, 
Trzesniewski, et al. (2013) designed an interven-
tion study targeting adolescents’ implicit theories 
about personality in order to help them cope with 
social adversity in their everyday life. The study 
had a pre-post control group design with a treat-
ment group, an active control group, and a no- 
treatment control group. The main hypotheses of 
the study were that an incremental theory inter-
vention would (a) reduce aggression and increase 
prosocial behavior in response to an incidence of 
peer exclusion, (b) reduce conduct problems in 
school (i.e., aggression, acting out) and (c) reduce 
depressive symptoms among peer-victimized 
students (Yeager, Trzesniewski, et al., 2013).
The researchers randomly selected a medium- 
to- large size school from a list of 20 schools in 
the San Francisco Bay Area that fulfilled differ-
ent criteria with regard to cultural diversity and 
social background. From the selected school, 
246 students from ninth and tenth grade (14–
16 years old) participated in the study (Yeager, 
Trzesniewski, et al., 2013).
An overview of the procedure is depicted in 
Fig. 12.1. Three weeks prior to and 2 weeks after, 
the intervention participants filled out surveys 
assessing some of the dependent variables (i.e., 
implicit theories about personality, aggression/
victimization, depressive symptoms). Further, 1 
month after the intervention, the researchers col-
lected behavioral responses (i.e., aggression, pro-
social behavior) to peer victimization among a 
balanced subset of 150 students. Last, 3 months 
after the intervention, 16 teachers reported 
observed reductions in conduct problems (e.g., 
acting out in class) among their students.
The intervention itself was administered in six 
sessions during students’ biology classes. 
Students were randomly assigned to one of three 
conditions: the incremental theory group, the 
coping skill group, or the no-treatment group. 
Two teams of adult paid facilitators were trained 
Fig. 12.1 Overview of the procedure of the intervention study, adapted from Yeager, Trzesniewski, et al. (2013)
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by the researchers to teach either the incremental 
theory workshop or the coping skill workshop. 
Facilitators were blind to hypotheses and post- 
intervention interviews revealed that all of them 
thought they were providing the target treatment. 
The workshops were designed to be parallel in 
many ways, for instance, with regard to materials 
and didactic methods applied.
The incremental theory workshop covered 
three segments, each of them designed to teach 
one key message via different kinds of activities. 
In the first segment, students learned basic infor-
mation about neuroanatomy and how the brain 
changes during learning. The second segment 
then focused on neural mechanisms that support 
the view that personality can change. The third 
segment focused on the translation of an incre-
mental theory into participants’ everyday life and 
covered the main message that people have dif-
ferent motivations for their actions (e.g., thoughts, 
feelings) which can also be changed. This last 
segment also corrected possible misconceptions 
(e.g., incremental theory does not suggest that 
people change all the time). The coping skill 
workshop was based on a widely used coping 
skill curriculum for high-school students 
(Frydenberg, 2010) and was shortened to parallel 
the incremental theory workshop. It was designed 
to be as enjoyable and engaging as the incremen-
tal theory workshop and used the same methods 
and in parts even provided the same information, 
for instance, information about neuroanatomy 
and how the brain learns.
To examine the effectiveness of the interven-
tion, the researchers collected both self-report and 
behavioral measures. As behavioral measure of 
aggression in response to peer exclusion, Yeager 
et  al. (2013) administered the “hot sauce para-
digm,” which had previously proven to be a valid 
measure of aggression in adolescents (Lieberman, 
Solomon, Greenberg, & McGregor, 1999). The 
testing was administered in group sessions by 
research assistances who were blind to condition 
and hypotheses. First, students played a video 
game called “Cyberball” (Williams, Cheung, & 
Choi, 2000), in which they experienced social 
exclusion. In this video game participants toss a 
ball together with two other players, who are sup-
posedly controlled by two other students in the 
room. In fact, unknowingly, participants played 
with the computer program only. After being 
thrown the ball twice in the beginning, they are 
not thrown it again. This procedure typically pro-
duces negative feelings of being socially excluded. 
Afterwards participants were asked to take part in 
a supposed “taste testing” activity, in which their 
partner has to eat all the food (i.e., hot sauce) they 
assign to him/her. They also learn that they are 
coupled up with one of the players who had previ-
ously excluded them in the ball toss game and that 
this student dislikes spicy food. The measure of 
aggression is the amount of hot sauce they assign 
to their partner. As a measure of prosocial behav-
ior, participants were asked to write a note that 
would be handed to their partner together with the 
hot sauce. These messages were later coded for 
levels of prosociality (e.g., apologizing for the hot 
sauce).
Results showed that, compared to both the 
no- treatment and the coping skill group, students 
who had received the incremental theory work-
shop assigned significantly less hot sauce and 
wrote more prosocial messages. Importantly, 
only the incremental theory workshop increased 
students’ agreement with an incremental theory 
from before to after the workshop, suggesting 
that the difference between groups can be attrib-
uted to changes in incremental theory. Further, in 
the no-treatment group, students who reported 
being victims of bullying reported more depres-
sive symptoms than non-victims. However, 
within both treatment groups, the number of 
depressive symptoms did not differ between 
victims and non-victims. This result suggests that 
Box 12.4 Questions for Elaboration
What purpose serves the active control 
group in an intervention study (the coping 
skill group in the example study)?
What might have been reasons for 
Yeager Trzesniewski, et al. (2013) to also 
include a no-treatment control group?
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both workshops (incremental theory and coping 
skills) were effective in reducing the negative 
effect of bullying on students’ psychological 
adjustment.
The study applied Mindset Theory, building 
on a large basis of studies suggesting that 
implicit theories play a crucial role in the 
response to victimization (Yeager & Dweck, 
2012; Yeager & Miu, 2011; Yeager, Miu, et al., 
2013; Yeager et al., 2011) and studies suggest-
ing that implicit theories can be changed 
(Aronson, Fried, & Good, 2002; Yeager et  al., 
2011). Note, that the researchers applied Mindset 
Theory rigorously throughout the design of their 
study. For instance, they assessed victimization 
by peers, which later served as moderator of the 
effect of the workshop on depressive symptoms 
and conduct problems. This decision was based 
on the knowledge that implicit theories are most 
important in situations when people face diffi-
culties (Blackwell et  al., 2007; Dweck, 2012b; 
Hong et  al., 1999; Sisk et  al., 2019; Yeager & 
Dweck, 2012). Whether and how this interven-
tion can be applied on a larger scale (e.g., in 
entire schools or school districts) is an interesting 
question for future research.
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Summary
• Mindset Theory proposes that people 
hold different beliefs about whether 
people can or cannot change basic psy-
chological attributes, such as their intel-
ligence or personality.
• An incremental theory refers to the 
belief that people can substantially 
change with effort, while an entity theory 
refers to the belief that human attributes 
are fixed.
• Implicit theories affect important out-
comes within the achievement and 
interpersonal domain (e.g., academic 
achievement, interpersonal aggression) 
via a set of cognitive and motivational 
processes that interact in a coherent 
“meaning system.”
• Research identified four processes that 
drive effects of implicit theories: goal 
orientation, effort beliefs (only studied 
in the achievement domain), attributions 
of setbacks or social adversity, and 
behavioral strategies to respond to 
setbacks or social adversity.
• Intervention studies have applied 
Mindset Theory to the domain of inter-
personal aggression and suggest that 
teaching adolescents an incremental the-
ory about personality (i.e., the belief that 
people can change their personality) 
helps them to respond to social adversity 
(e.g., exclusion by peers) more adap-
tively (i.e., less aggression, less depres-
sive symptoms).
K. Bernecker and V. Job
189
 Guiding Answers to Questions 
in the Chapter
 1. Question with Box 12.2: Can you think of 
other attributes that people might have implicit 
theories about?
A: Research has identified many implicit 
theories, and not all of them are dealing with 
the malleability of an attribute but most are. 
Other examples of an implicit theory are 
implicit theories about passion as something 
to be found or developed (Chen, Ellsworth, & 
Schwarz, 2015; O’Keefe, Dweck, & Walton, 
2018), implicit theories of romantic relation-
ships as being characterized by romantic 
destiny or relationship growth (Knee, 
Nanayakkara, Vietor, Neighbors, & Patrick, 
2001). Other examples are implicit theories of 
emotion regulation (Tamir, John, Srivastava, & 
Gross, 2007) and negotiation skills (Kray & 
Haselhuhn, 2007).
 2. Question with Box 12.3: Why are implicit 
theories often referred to as working in a 
“meaning system,” and what does the term 
describe?
A: The term “meaning system” describes the 
multitude of processes that research identified 
as driving effects of implicit theories, such as 
goal setting, effort beliefs, attributions, and 
strategies people use in the face of adversity. 
These processes are not independent but rather 
linked with each other and together form a 
coherent system that allows the person to 
“make sense” of the world and make predic-
tions based on this understanding. Depending 
on the implicit theory people hold, they formu-
late goals that make sense in their view (i.e., 
performance versus learning goals); they form 
coherent beliefs of effort (i.e., as signaling lack 
of ability versus conducive to change), attri-
bute their setbacks in the accordance to their 
theory (i.e., as being due to lack of ability ver-
sus effort), and follow strategies that are in line 
with their belief (i.e., helpless versus 
mastery-oriented).
 3. Question with Box 12.4: What purpose serves 
the active control group in an intervention 
study (the coping skill group in the example 
study)? What might have been reasons for 
Yeager, Trzesniewski et al.  (2013) to also 
include a no-treatment control group?
A: From a methodological point of view, an 
active control group helps researchers to 
determine whether changes in their targeted 
outcome are due to the specific intervention 
message (here an incremental theory about 
personality) and not only due to the fact that 
participants received any kind of treatment. 
From a practical viewpoint, having the active 
control group engage in a treatment that has 
been proven to be successful on the targeted 
outcome helps to compare the effectiveness of 
the intervention and therefore to determine 
which of the two is most effective (from an 
ethical standpoint, it is also better to provide 
the control group with some kind of effective, 
state- of- the-art treatment). No-treatment con-
trol groups are also often part of the design, 
because they help to control for other processes 
that might otherwise be overseen or even 
changed by the treatment (e.g., natural change 
in the outcome occurring over a period of time). 
Further, by only comparing two treatment 
groups, it is not possible to judge whether per-
haps the control treatment made things worse 
in terms of the outcome or whether there was 
any effect (e.g., if both treatments have been 
equally effective).
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 On the Importance of Having 
Money and Saving Some of It
Poor financial decision-making can have a 
long- lasting impact on individuals and society. 
Therefore it is perhaps not surprising that house-
holds’ incomes, savings, and debts are exten-
sively monitored by national and international 
organizations. A recent survey of the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) showed that, in G20 
countries, on average 22% of all respondents had 
to borrow money to make ends meet in the previ-
ous year (OECD, 2017). Furthermore, 11.6 mil-
lion adults living in the UK are categorized as 
struggling financially (Money Advice Service, 
2016), whereas almost one in five Dutch house-
holds has debts that can be considered problem-
atic (Simonse, Wilmink, & Van der Werf, 2017). 
These numbers indicate that even in countries 
considered to be well-developed and wealthy, 
many people fail to make ends meet and are at 
risk of running into financial problems.
This should be a reason for concern, because 
financial problems can cause stress, tensions 
within families, domestic violence, poor physical 
and psychological health, stigmatization, social 
isolation, and even suicide (e.g., Chapman & 
Freak, 2013; Drentea, 2000; Drentea & Lavrakas, 
2000; Lane 2016). Moreover, the impact of finan-
cial problems reaches further than the individuals 
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and families directly involved. For example, the 
financial problems of households in the 
Netherlands cost the Dutch society an estimated 
10 billion euros a year. This amount includes, 
among others, costs for debt assistance, benefit 
payments, reduced work productivity, house 
evictions, and childcare (Simonse et al., 2017).
Given the profound impact that financial prob-
lems have on individuals, their families, and soci-
ety as a whole, financial resilience (which 
includes preventing problematic debts) and finan-
cial self-reliance are of utmost importance 
(OECD, 2016; Simonse et  al., 2017). People 
should, for example, manage their money well on 
a day-to-day basis: having a budget, keeping 
records of expenses, and keeping up with pay-
ment and other financial commitments. Moreover, 
they should engage in financial planning: making 
provision for retirement, being aware of financial 
risks and opportunities, and taking effective 
actions to minimize the effects of financial risks, 
such as taking out appropriate insurances or 
putting sufficient money aside in savings (OECD, 
2016). Research by the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau of the USA (2017) underlines 
the importance of “healthy” financial behavior, 
such as sound financial planning. Their results 
showed that saving money—thereby increasing 
resilience to unexpected expenses—is one of the 
strongest predictors of financial well-being.
Although financial resilience and financial 
self-reliance are crucial for financial well-being, 
people struggle with making healthy financial 
decisions. For example, often people do not man-
age to put sufficient money aside in savings in 
order to be prepared for financial calamities. Why 
is this the case? First, there might be financial 
reasons. For example, people might simply need 
all their money to make ends meet. Especially for 
households with low (or even moderate) incomes, 
insufficient financial resources might drive low 
saving rates. Some of these low-income house-
holds, however, do manage to save money, 
whereas those with sufficient financial resources 
sometimes fail to do so (e.g., Hayhoe, Cho, 
DeVaney, Worthy, Kim, & Gorham, 2012). 
Apparently, there is more to saving than having 
the money for it. Indeed, other reasons for not 
saving often are of a more psychological nature. 
For example, saving money means sacrificing 
immediate gratification for future financial well-
being, which, in turn, means overcoming a num-
ber of psychological hurdles. In the next section, 
we will elaborate on several of these hurdles.
 Why Saving Doesn’t Come Easy
A first psychological hurdle on the road to the piggy 
bank is the optimism bias (Sharot, 2011). In gen-
eral, people are (too) “rosy” about their financial 
future. For example, they tend to overestimate their 
future income while underestimating their future 
spending and expenses (Lewis & Van Venrooij, 
1995; Norvilitis et  al., 2006; Peetz & Buehler, 
2009) and therefore fail to see the necessity of put-
ting money aside for future financial needs.
Even when people are more realistic about 
their financial future and consider the risks they 
might face, there is still no guarantee that they 
will build a financial buffer in their savings 
account. To do so would mean resisting the 
temptation of spending money now in favor of 
spending possibilities in the future, and this 
requires self-control (Thaler & Shefrin, 1981; 
see also Gieseler, Loschelder, & Friese, Chap. 1). 
Many people, however, have “self-control issues.” 
Definition Box
Optimism bias: The tendency to overesti-
mate the probability of positive events and 
underestimate the probability of negative 
events.
Box 13.1 Question for Elaboration
Have you put aside sufficient money in 
savings?
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And they know it, because they are perfectly 
willing to use a commitment device to deal with 
these issues (Rogers, Milkman, & Volpp, 2014; 
Van der Swaluw et  al., 2018). For example, to 
preempt overspending, people cut up their credit 
cards, literally freeze them in a container of 
water, or sign up for savings accounts that charge 
withdrawal penalties for early take-up (Ashraf, 
Karlan, & Yin, 2016). And banks also know it. 
Already in 1910, Dutch banks provided clients 
with “saving canisters” that could only be 
opened by the bank. Actually, people have been 
outsourcing financial self-control to their envi-
ronments for centuries, as money boxes that had 
to be broken before the valuables inside could 
be spent date back to at least the fourteenth 
century.
Another hurdle on the road to a fat piggy bank 
is that saving money requires an intertemporal 
choice—a trade-off between costs (e.g., forego-
ing current spending) and benefits (e.g., increased 
savings) that occur at different points in time. 
The problem with this is that immediate out-
comes are more valued than delayed ones 
(Loewenstein & Elster, 1992). This present bias 
can result in a spend-now-and-save-later attitude, 
which surely will not fatten a piggy bank.
Not only are present outcomes given more 
weight than future ones; losses are also more heav-
ily weighted than gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979). It is even estimated that the psychological 
pain of losses hurts roughly twice as much as gains 
yield pleasure (Kahneman, Knetch, & Thaler, 
1991). Because “losses loom larger than gains,” 
people often show loss aversion, and this places 
yet another hurdle on their road to the piggy bank. 
Once people get used to a particular level of dis-
posable income, a gain in savings does not out-
weigh the loss in disposable income.
Thus, when it comes to saving money, there is 
many a slip “twixt the cup and the lip.” The opti-
mism bias, self-control, the present bias, and loss 
aversion are all psychological hurdles that can 
withhold people from putting money aside in 
savings. On a positive note, however, these biases 
can also provide useful starting points for design-
ing interventions that steer people in the right 
direction on the way to the piggy bank, as we 
have seen when discussing commitment devices. 
To illustrate this point further, we will next 
address a “modern classic” in behavioral inter-
ventions: the Save More Tomorrow™ program.
 A SMarT Intervention
The Save More Tomorrow™ (SMarT) program is 
an intervention designed by behavioral econo-
mists Richard Thaler and Shlomo Benartzi (2004) 
Definition Box
Self-control: The ability to regulate one’s 
thoughts, emotions, and behavior in the 
face of temptations and impulses.
Commitment device: A voluntary imposed 
arrangement that restricts future behavior 
to avoid temptations.
Definition Box
Present bias: The tendency to assign more 
value to payoffs (e.g., money or goo  ds) 
that are closer to the present time when 
considering trade-offs between two future 
moments.
Definition Box
Loss aversion: People’s tendency to prefer 
avoiding losses to acquiring equivalent 
gains.
Box 13.2 Question for Elaboration
What are your personal reasons for not sav-
ing (more) and how do these reasons relate 
to the psychological hurdles described in 
this chapter?
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to help those (US) employees who wish to save 
(more) money for retirement but lack the self-
control to act on this desire. The essence of SMarT 
is that employees commit themselves in advance 
to allocating a portion of their future pay raise 
toward their retirement savings. The program has 
four core elements: (1) employees are approached 
about increasing their contribution to their retire-
ment savings plans; (2) if employees join, their 
contribution is increased beginning with their first 
salary after a raise; (3) their contribution contin-
ues to increase on each scheduled raise until it 
reaches a preset maximum; and (4) employees 
can opt out of the plan at any time.
Results of the first three implementations of 
the program showed that, (1) 78% of the employ-
ees offered the plan joined, (2) 80% of those 
enrolled in the plan remained in it, and (3) the 
average saving rates for participating employees 
increased from 3.5% to 13.6% over the course of 
40 months (Thaler & Benartzi, 2004). These find-
ings clearly demonstrate that SMarT is highly 
effective in making saving for retirement more 
attractive and easier for employees who want to 
save more.
SMarT works so well because it is built in a 
way that bypasses several psychological hurdles 
while exploiting people’s biases to create com-
mitment to the plan. To illustrate, employees are 
asked to join the program well before a scheduled 
pay raise. This means that an increase in their 
contribution is not starting now but some consid-
erable time in the future, which makes joining the 
program very attractive. Due to the optimism 
bias, employees are more optimistic about their 
ability to save in the future. In addition, employ-
ees are still able to enjoy the rewards of spending 
and discount the costs of saving (e.g., less con-
sumption now) to the future. The program also 
mitigates perceiving a reduction in income due to 
saving as a loss in disposable income, because if 
employees join, their contribution to the retire-
ment savings plan is increased beginning with 
their first pay check after their salary increased. 
By contributing a part of their pay raise, employ-
ees do not feel (as much) that they “lose” money 
when saving—actually, after each pay raise, they 
can spend more while also saving more. 
Furthermore, their contribution continues to 
increase on each scheduled pay raise until it 
reaches a preset maximum, a feature that makes 
employees’ status quo bias work to keep them in 
the plan (Kahneman et  al., 1991). Thus, by 
accounting for people’s biased perceptions of 
their present and future financial situation, 
SMarT encourages employees to start saving (and 
keep saving) for their retirement.
Putting money aside in savings, however, is 
much harder when it entails making more active 
savings decisions rather than opting in or out of a 
retirement savings plan. After all, such decisions 
rely much more heavily on people’s self-control 
capacity. In these situations, interventions target-
ing efficient goal progress monitoring might be 
particularly effective as they guide people in 
making the right behavioral adjustments at the 
right time. In what follows, we will describe one 
such intervention that was designed to aid Dutch 
households to increase their savings. Before we 
turn to the details of the intervention, we briefly 
discuss its theoretical basis.
 Setting a Saving Goal: Let’s Be More 
Specific
The road to a fat piggy bank is paved with good 
intentions. Many people want to save. Yet, their 
good intentions are often not followed up by the 
Definition Box
Status quo bias: People’s tendency, when 
choosing among alternatives, toward stick-
ing with the status quo alternative—that is, 
doing nothing or stick with their current or 
previous decision.
Box 13.3 Question for Elaboration
If your friend wants to save more, what 
would you advise her?
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necessary actions. The devil might also here be in 
the details. Research suggests that something 
may change for the better when a goal is formu-
lated in specific terms (Locke & Latham, 1990; 
Oettingen, Pak, & Schnetter, 2001). A specific 
goal provides concrete guidelines for attaining the 
goal and therefore facilitates appropriate actions 
for successful goal attainment. Moreover, a spe-
cific goal can act as a schema for making the most 
use of the available information (Ashford & 
Cummings, 1983). Saving €15,000 for a new car 
provides a concrete standard against which the 
current state of affairs can be compared and on 
which appropriate follow-up actions can be 
planned. Without a specific goal, for example, 
when saving for a rainy day, it is hard to know 
exactly what to aim for, and clear action guide-
lines for goal attainment are lacking (Sheeran & 
Webb, 2011; Triandis, 1980).
Setting a specific goal, however, is by no means 
a guarantee that the set goal will be attained. 
Several scholars have pointed out that goal prog-
ress monitoring is an important aspect of success-
ful goal attainment (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1982; 
Locke & Latham, 1990, 2002; Powers, 1973). 
Attaining a goal requires, in addition to setting a 
specific goal and planning needed actions, notic-
ing discrepancies between the goal and the current 
state of affairs and being able to “fix” discrepan-
cies (see also Keller, Bieleke, & Gollwitzer, 
Chap. 2). Whereas setting a specific goal merely 
involves adopting a standard for performance, the 
real work is probably in monitoring goal prog-
ress—periodically evaluating progress in relation 
to the set standard and closing the gap accordingly. 
Without such progress monitoring, it becomes 
impossible to identify discrepancies and, for 
example, knowing when it is necessary to exercise 
(more) self-control. A recent meta- analysis 
showed that health interventions focusing on goal 
progress monitoring are effective in attaining a 
health goal (Harkin et al., 2016). In the context of 
saving, this would mean that monitoring progress 
toward a saving goal, for example, by checking a 
savings account regularly, might facilitate success-
fully attaining a saving goal.
Goal progress monitoring, however, is not 
always a pleasant activity. Progress can be slower 
than anticipated and this might hinder continuous 
and adequate monitoring. To prevent potentially 
disheartening feedback, people might want to 
“bury their heads in the sand” and avoid relevant 
information on their goal progress (Webb, 
Chang, & Benn, 2013). In the next section, we 
will describe a behavioral intervention that was 
designed, using a goal progress monitoring 
framework, to help people attain a specific saving 
goal (Van der Werf, Van Dijk, Van der Schors, 
Wilderjans, & Van Dillen, 2019).
 An Intervention Based on Goal 
Progress Monitoring
When saving for a specific goal, goal progress 
monitoring can be done in at least two ways. First, 
monitoring can be done by people themselves, for 
example, by checking their bank accounts regu-
larly and keeping good track of savings. In the 
current digital day and age, a quick glimpse on 
one’s accounts should be sufficient to establish 
how much money has been saved already. As easy 
as this may sound, one still has to make an active 
decision to engage in monitoring progress toward 
a saving goal. Especially, when progress is 
expected to be less than hoped for, people might 
decide against it and avoid goal progress monitor-
ing as a result.
A second way of goal progress monitoring—
one that circumvents the hiatus described above—
is “outsourcing” it to an external party. Banks or 
other financial organizations could help their cus-
tomers by explicitly informing them of their 
progress toward a saving goal (e.g., via e-mail, 
SMS, or in-app messages).
To test whether such outsourcing is effective 
in helping people to attain their saving goal, we 
recruited participants via the website of the 
National Institute for Family Information 
(Nibud).1 This resulted in over 400 people regis-
tering voluntarily for participation in the study. 
1 The National Institute of Family Finance Information 
(Nibud) is a well-known and respected independent foun-
dation in the Netherlands and gives advice to households 
about all kinds of financial matters (www.nibud.nl).
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At the start of the study (July 2016), participants 
indicated their current savings and their saving 
goal for the period of the study (July–November 
2016), and were randomly assigned to the 
reminder condition, the extensive feedback con-
dition, or the control condition.
During the study, we assessed participants’ 
progress toward their saving goal four times 
through online questionnaires (in August, 
September, October, and November 2016). In 
addition to these questionnaires, participants in 
the feedback condition received feedback via 
e-mail messages three times (in August, 
September, and October 2016) about the amount 
they had saved so far, and they were reminded 
about their saving goal. Participants in the exten-
sive feedback condition received, in addition to 
this feedback, information about how much they 
still needed to save to attain their saving goal (see 
Table 13.1) and a visual illustration of their goal 
progress. Participants in the control condition did 
not receive any additional information via e-mail 
messages.
The goal progress illustration in the extensive 
feedback condition consisted of one row of ten 
“moneybags”—each representing 10% progress 
in attaining their saving goal—and participants’ 
progress was made visual by the number of 
moneybags that were colored (see Fig.  13.1). 
We added this visual illustration for two reasons. 
First, we argued that it would help information 
processing and therefore facilitate goal progress 
monitoring better (Cheema & Bagchi, 2011). 
Second, we argued that dividing a larger end goal 
into smaller subgoals would result in the experi-
ence of short-term successes on the road to a 
(longer-term) end goal and this might increase 
motivation and self-efficacy (e.g., Locke & 
Latham, 2002; but see Cheema & Bagchi, 2011).
We expected that the intervention in both 
feedback conditions would facilitate goal prog-
ress monitoring and therefore would be effective 
in helping participants to attain their saving goal. 
Moreover, for the reasons explained above, we 
expected that the intervention in the extensive 
feedback condition would be most effective.
How did our participants do? And more 
important, was our intervention effective in help-
ing them to attain their saving goal? Overall, par-
ticipants did not seem to show progress toward 
their saving goal. After 5 months, they attained, 
on average, minus 15% (!) of their saving goal 
(see Table 13.2).2 Yes, you read that correctly: 
2 Results showed that the mean of minus 15% had a stan-
dard deviation of 341%, indicating large individual differ-
ences in goal progress. Half of the participants had a goal 
progress of plus 50% or less.
Fig. 13.1 Illustration in the extensive feedback condition indicating a goal progress of 65%
Table 13.2 Percentage of goal attainment per period for the three conditions
Month 
Condition
July August September October November February
Feedback 0% −19% −36% −24% −10% +26%
Extensive feedback 0% +19% −18% −9% −21% +43%
Control 0% −16% −43% −20% −15% −23%
Feedback condition Extensive feedback condition
Dear [name] Dear [name]
You saved €[amount saved] You saved €[amount saved], only
Your saving goal is €[saving goal] €[discrepancy with saving goal] to go
Kind regards, Nibud Your saving goal is €[saving goal]
Kind regards, Nibud
Table 13.1 Messages in 
the feedback and extensive 
feedback condition
M. M. B. van der Werf et al.
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on average, participants actually had less savings 
at the end of the study in comparison to the 
beginning of our study. One reason for this find-
ing might be the time period in which the study 
was conducted. In May, many people in the 
Netherlands receive a holiday allowance (about 
8% of their yearly income). Participants might 
have temporarily put aside this extra money in 
savings until they use it for their holiday expenses, 
usually in July or August. This might explain the 
decreases in savings we observed during these 
periods and, in our view, also illustrates the opti-
mism bias. When setting their saving goal in July, 
participants most likely were aware of their 
upcoming holiday expenses, but they clearly 
underestimated how much they would spend in 
these periods.
More interesting, however, is whether our 
goal progress intervention was effective in 
increasing the progress. The results of our 
analyses,3 however, did not show a statistically 
significant difference in goal progress between 
the three conditions, for the period July to 
November 2016. To examine whether the lack of 
statistically significant differences in goal prog-
ress between the three conditions could be due to 
the relatively short duration of our study, we 
decided to add an additional post-intervention 
assessment of goal progress. Three months after 
our initial study was completed, we invited those 
participants who filled out all five questionnaires 
during the intervention for a follow-up assess-
ment, and 261 completed this in February 2017 
(note that participants did not receive feedback 
via e-mail messages in the period from November 
to February). Our analyses of this 3 months’ 
follow-up showed that participants in the exten-
sive feedback condition had attained more of 
their initial saving goal than those in the control 
3 We used multilevel modelling to examine the change in 
percentage of goal attainment over time. This technique 
can deal with the hierarchical nature of the data (i.e., mea-
surements nested within participants). Condition and the 
interaction between condition and time were our indepen-
dent variables. Age, gender, household income, and expe-
rienced financial scarcity were added to the model as 
covariates (results concerning these covariates are dis-
cussed in Van der Werf et al., 2019).
condition (see Table 1.2), a difference that was 
marginally statistically significant (p  =  0.058). 
There was a similar pattern, although not statisti-
cally significant, for participants in the feedback 
condition.
In sum, testing our intervention based on goal 
progress monitoring did not yield clear evidence 
for its effectiveness in helping people to attain 
their saving goal. Although results of our study 
did not show a statistically significant short-term 
effect, we did find a marginal statistically signifi-
cant effect of the extensive feedback condition on 
a longer term. In hindsight, we can only speculate 
why we obtained the results we did. A first reason 
why we found little or no differences between 
our three conditions might concern the partici-
pants included in the study. Remember that they 
voluntarily signed up for a study on saving. This 
might have led to a selection of participants who, 
at the start of the study, were already motivated to 
put money aside in savings. It could well be that 
our intervention has little added value for (more) 
motivated savers as they might already monitor 
their savings themselves. If our participants were 
already motivated to save, this did not increase 
their savings from July to November. Actually, 
on average, their savings decreased during this 
period. More research is needed to test whether 
our intervention is (more) effective when using 
other samples of participants and perhaps other 
periods of the year.
A second reason why the intervention was less 
effective than expected might be that participants 
in the control condition were also steered toward 
goal progress monitoring. Although these partici-
pants were not provided with additional informa-
tion via e-mail messages, they did receive monthly 
questionnaires to indicate their savings. Hence, 
participants in the control condition were attend-
ing to their savings at least once a month, which 
might have already facilitated goal progress moni-
toring. This could have reduced the (intended) dif-
ference between the control and intervention 
conditions and makes it harder to detect the effec-
tiveness of our intervention. Future research is 
needed to test this possibility. One possibility is to 
conduct an intervention study in collaboration 
with a bank or another organization that has 
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access to savings data, which makes it unnecessary 
to work with questionnaires.
The above two reasons shed some light on why 
the intervention was not effective during the first 5 
months of the study. The findings, however, did 
suggest that, after 8 months, participants in the 
extensive feedback condition were more success-
ful at attaining their saving goal. It should again be 
noted that this result only approached statistical 
significance and more research is needed to make 
a stronger argument, but it does raise the question 
why extensive feedback could be (more) effective 
on a longer term. Again, we can only speculate on 
the reasons why. One possibility is related to the 
goal gradient effect, that is, an increase in motiva-
tion to attain a goal when the goal nears comple-
tion (Hull, 1934). It could be that the visual 
illustration (“moneybags”) of goal progress makes 
participants experience coming closer and closer 
to their saving goal, which might have increased 
their commitment to the goal and their motivation 
to attain it. Consequently, it could be that, when 
after 5 months the e-mail messages with explicit 
feedback on their goal progress stopped, they con-
tinued saving for a longer period than participants 
in the other two conditions. To test this possibility, 
more research is also needed.
 Conclusion
Putting money aside in savings does not come 
easy for people. Next to overcoming the neces-
sary financial constraints, it requires jumping 
several psychological hurdles, such as the opti-
mism bias, self-control, the present bias, loss 
aversion, and goal progress monitoring, and 
therefore people could need some help on the 
road to the piggy bank. Behavioral interventions 
using insights from social psychology and behav-
ioral economics can provide useful assistance in 
steering people into the right direction. The pos-
sibilities for assistance are many, and designing, 
testing, and, subsequently, implementing (effec-
tive) financial interventions will not only result in 
increased retirement savings or a €15,000 car but 
will also help people to become more financially 
resilient and self-reliant and thereby contributing 
to happier and more fulfilling lives.
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Summary
• People often find it difficult to put money 
aside in savings. This is, at least partly, 
because they perceive their financial 
future too optimistically, lack sufficient 
self-control, overvalue immediate out-
comes, and weigh losses more heavily 
than gains.
• In the USA, where saving for retirement 
is not obligatory, the Save More 
Tomorrow™ (SMarT) program is a 
highly effective intervention for increas-
ing employees’ contribution to their 
retirement savings plans.
• The crux of SMarT is that it bypasses 
several psychological hurdles (e.g., the 
optimism bias, self-control, and loss 
aversion) and exploits others (e.g., the 
status quo bias) in order to increase sav-
ings for retirement.
• Testing an intervention based on goal 
progress monitoring did not yield clear 
evidence for its effectiveness in helping 
people to attain their saving goal. The 
results of this study, however, hinted at 
the possibility of a longer-term effect. 
Until more research is conducted, the 
jury is still out.
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happiness. New Haven, CT, US: Yale 
University Press.
The Behavioural Insights Team. (2017). EAST: 
Four simple ways to apply behavioural 
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Vol 5, No 1.
 Guiding Answers to Questions 
in the Chapter
 1. Q (With Box 13.1): Have you put aside suffi-
cient money in savings?
A: How much savings are sufficient is depen-
dent upon your personal situation, and there 
are online tools available that will give you a 
personal advice (e.g., see the Money Advice 
Service’s website). Nibud advises to hold also 
a financial buffer in your savings account to 
make sure that you can pay unexpected, larger, 
and necessary expenses directly without hav-
ing to take out a loan of adjust your lifestyle. 
To start building a financial buffer, Nibud rec-
ommends to put aside, each month, 10% of 
your income in savings until you reach your 
advised buffer.
 2. Q (With Box 13.2): What are your personal 
reasons for not saving (more) and how do 
these reasons relate to the psychological hur-
dles described in this chapter?
A: Reasons such as “At the moment, I don’t 
necessarily need savings” or “I’ll save more 
when I’m older and earn more money” are 
related to the optimism bias. A reason such as 
“At the start of the month, I always want to 
save some money, but by the end I just spend 
it all” is related to self- control. Whereas rea-
sons such as “I really need my money more 
now than in the future” or “It would mean 
missing out on a lot of fun things when I have 
to cut my spending in order to save” are related 
to the present bias and loss aversion.
 3. Q (With Box 13.3): If your friend wants to 
save more, what would you advise her?
A: There are a few “smart” ways of putting 
money aside in savings without feeling it so 
much directly. For example, transfer automati-
cally, each month, a set amount to your sav-
ings account (via your online or mobile 
banking); transfer additional income (e.g., 
holiday allowance, 13th month salary, or a 
financial windfall) to your savings account 
before you spend (some of) it; save with a spe-
cific goal in mind; put (part of) your savings 
on an account that is not connected to mobile 
banking—this makes it more difficult to trans-
fer money in your savings account (back) to 
your checking account. 
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 Introduction
If you are one of the 2.2 billion active Facebook 
users, you might regularly check your Facebook 
newsfeed. Intermixed with news or posts from 
celebrities and brands, you then see what your 
friends are up to: having fun at a party, going on a 
weekend trip, and posting a picture with their 
partner or a gorgeous-looking selfie. How do 
these messages affect you? Are you happy for 
your Facebook friends or do you experience 
envy? Taking these questions as a starting point, 
this chapter will summarize the literature on the 
impact of social media use on emotions and dis-
cuss (studies) on its implications for marketing.
Checking the latest updates on social media 
has become part of a daily routine for many peo-
ple: Instagram reports 800 million monthly active 
users (Statista, 2018), and the Chinese platform 
Weibo reports 441 million users.1 Many of these 
users check the platforms daily, and the updates 
on social media are mostly positive, cool, and 
entertaining (Barash, Duchenaut, Isaacs, & 
Bellotti, 2010; Utz, 2015). Researchers therefore 
have wondered how reading these positive 
updates affects the emotions of users (Krasnova, 
Wenninger, Widjaja, & Buxmann, 2013; Lin & 
Utz, 2015). The potential negative effects have 
1 https://expandedramblings.com/index.php/weibo-user- 
statistics/
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received a great deal of attention; reading posts 
on social media is assumed to reduce well-being 
because the posts elicit envy (Krasnova et  al., 
2013; Verduyn, Ybarra, Résibois, Jonides, & 
Kross, 2017). But emotions also influence con-
sumer behavior. Most platforms are free for the 
users, but make money from advertising. 
Facebook alone made roughly 40 billion dollars 
from advertising in 2017.2 Understanding how 
social media use influences emotions should thus 
also pay off for companies.
This chapter will review several social- 
psychological theories that help to explain how 
social media use influences emotions. It will also 
demonstrate the applied relevance of this knowl-
edge by summarizing research showing how 
social media-triggered envy influences consumer 
behavior. The chapter starts with a discussion of 
social media and their affordances, before emo-
tions are briefly defined. The effects of social 
media use on emotions are then discussed from 
two perspectives: first from the perspective of the 
person who shares the emotion and second from 
the perspective of the person who reads social 
media updates. In a final step, the influence of 
emotions on consumer behavior and implications 
for brands are discussed.
 Social Media
The most popular forms are social network 
sites (SNS) such as Facebook, but also weblogs 
or microblogging services such as Twitter fall 
under this umbrella term. Social media are 
characterized by the user-generated content and 
the (semi-)public nature of conversations. 
Content can be produced by everyone by sim-
ply typing some text into a box when prompted 
to do so by questions such as “What’s on your 
mind, <username>?”. Photos can easily be added. 
Messages go usually to a large group of people. 
On Twitter, contributions are (by default) even 




Social media platforms change frequently; 
some early SNS (e.g., Friendster, Hyves) do no 
longer exist. Moreover, the existing SNS change 
rapidly. To analyze and predict the effects of 
social media, it is therefore more helpful to 
look at the affordances (see Box 14.1) the SNS 
provide than to look at a specific feature or 
platform.
Definition Box
Social Network Sites: “networked com-
munication platforms in which partici-
pants (1) have uniquely identifiable 
profiles that consist of user- supplied con-
tent, content provided by other users, and/
or system-provided data; (2) can publicly 
articulate connections that can be viewed 
and traversed by others; and (3) can con-
sume, produce, and/or interact with 
streams of user-generated content pro-
vided by their connections on the site” 
(Ellison & Boyd, 2013, p. 157).
Box 14.1 Zooming In: Affordances
The concept of affordances was coined by 
Gibson (1977), a perception psychologist 
who studied animals and argued that 
objects afford certain uses to animals. A 
rock can be perceived as something to sit 
on, as building material, or as a weapon. 
Thus, how objects are used does not depend 
so much on their qualities (e.g., hard, 
sharp), but on the perceived affordances 
(to sit, to throw). People can differ in how 
they perceive the affordances of social 
media (e.g., visibility, persistence). Whereas 
one person might perceive the high visibility 
of content on social media as encourage-
ment for an idealized  self- presentation in 
front of a large audience, another person 
might be discouraged from posting publicly 
by the same affordance.
S. Utz
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Visibility to a larger audience and persistence – 
the Internet never forgets  – are affordances that 
characterize most social media. For people who are 
concerned about their privacy, these affordances 
are a reason for posting only few and/or not very 
personal status updates (Utz, 2015). For people 
scoring high on narcissism or need for popularity 
(Buffardi & Campbell, 2008; Utz, Tanis, & 
Vermeulen, 2012), the same affordances make 
social media an optimal platform for presenting 
themselves in an idealized way because they can 
easily reach a large audience. The affordance of 
editability allows them additionally to carefully 
curate their self- presentation (Hogan, 2010).
Thus, due to their specific affordances, social 
media are platforms on which people present the 
positive sides of their life. This holds even more for 
Instagram, a photo sharing platform on which the 
majority of photos depict beautiful happy people 
engaging in healthy activities (Deighton- Smith & 
Bell, 2017). Moreover, these overly positive self-
presentations are pushed into a user’s feed thus 
increasing exposure to positive messages. The 
question is therefore which emotional responses 
posting or reading these overwhelmingly positive 
posts elicits. Before we discuss these questions, a 
short introduction into emotions is given.
 Emotions
One issue of research on emotions is that there 
are many definitions and theories of emotion 
(Scherer, 2005). Early theories (e.g., James, 
1884) considered the physiological reactions 
(e.g., crying, trembling) as the basis of an emo-
tion. According to this view, people feel sad 
because they cry. Appraisal theories, in contrast, 
assume that the evaluation and interpretation of 
situations play a central role in the experience of 
emotions (Arnold, 1960; Lazarus, 1991).
The first appraisal theory stems from Arnold 
(1960) (see Fig. 14.1). When a specific situation 
occurs, people appraise its consequences for 
themselves (good/bad) which then leads to an 
emotion and an action. For example, being left by 
your partner would be appraised first as bad and 
then trigger the emotion sadness and physiologi-
cal reactions such as crying and actions such as 
withdrawal.
Lazarus (1991) developed this model further 
and distinguished between primary appraisals, 
which influence the evaluation of an event, and 
secondary appraisals, which influence the evalua-
tion of potential actions. Primary appraisals deal 
with the question whether the event is in conflict 
(negative emotion) or in accordance (positive 
emotion) with an individual’s goals, as well as 
the relevance and ego relation of this goal. For 
example, when you are in a restaurant and the 
waiter doesn’t serve you, it might depend on 
whether you are very hungry (in conflict with 
goal) or mainly there to socialize with friends 
(no conflict) whether you experience anger. 
Secondary appraisals address the question of 
blame or how the individual can deal with the 
situation. Is the restaurant simply very crowded 
or do you think the waiter ignores you on 
purpose? Do you think you can change something 
about the situation? This would determine how 
you deal with the situation – whether you would 
wait, yell at the waiter, or write a negative review 
about the restaurant.
Fig. 14.1 Arnold’s appraisal theory of emotion
Definition Box
Appraisal: Appraisals are the evaluations 
of events in the environment. Emotions are 
not simply determined by physiological 
arousal, but by the interpretation of the 
situation.
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The next section will discuss how sharing 
experiences on social media affects the emotions 
of the persons who post on social media.
 Capitalization
Capitalization describes the process of sharing 
positive events with (close) others (Gable & Reis, 
2010). People are in general more likely to share 
positive (vs. negative) news with close others – not 
only because positive events are more prevalent 
(Gable & Haidt, 2005) but also because of the 
intrapersonal and interpersonal benefits of sharing 
positive emotions (Gable & Reis, 2010).
Two intrapersonal and one interpersonal 
mechanism have been identified (see Gable & 
Reis, 2010, for a review): first, sharing positive 
experiences intensifies the salience and memora-
bility of positive events, which is desirable in 
itself. Second, sharing requires a reflection pro-
cess which helps people to find meaning in the 
event, which further increases positive emotions. 
Third, the positive reactions of (close) others 
strengthen the relationship, which also triggers 
positive emotions.
Capitalization studies usually did not (explic-
itly) take the medium into account, but due to the 
large proportion of positive updates on social 
media (Barash et al., 2010; Utz, 2015), the capi-
talization framework is well suited for this con-
text. On social media, posts are often shared with 
a larger group. Addressing a larger group might 
increase the appraisal that the event is important. 
Carefully editing the post might foster the reflec-
tion process.
Choi and Toma (2014) examined the effects of 
sharing emotions across a number of media chan-
nels, including social media. They conducted a 
daily diary study in which participants indicated 
either for the most important positive or the most 
important negative event of the day on which 
channel(s) they have shared it. Positive and nega-
tive affect after sharing was measured as well. 
The effects of sharing were identical across chan-
nels: people experienced more positive affect 
after sharing positive events and more negative 
affect after sharing negative events. The finding 
that there are no differences between the chan-
nels contradicts the idea that sharing (semi-)
publicly on social media further increases the 
salience of the experience and fosters the reflec-
tion process.
Sharing with many others on social media 
might have interpersonal effects. Scissors, Burke, 
and Wengrovitz (2016) looked at the role of likes 
received and found that the number of likes was 
less important than from whom people received 
likes. The majority expected likes from close 
friends or their partner, indicating that the 
relationship strengthening effect of capitalization 
occurs mainly with close others.
Taken together, these studies show that capi-
talization processes also occur on social media. 
Sharing positive news with friends strengthens 
positive emotions. However, close friends still 
matter most for the intensification of positive 
emotions. For the person who shares experiences 
on social media, the intrapersonal and interper-
sonal benefits seem to be the same as for sharing 
face-to-face or on traditional media. How about 
the person who reads these social media posts?
 Emotional Contagion
One possible explanation how posts on social 
media could influence emotions is emotional con-
tagion (Hatfield, Walster, & Berscheid, 1978). 
Emotional contagion means that people take over 
the emotions displayed by others, especially by 
close others. This can happen without conscious 
awareness by automatically mimicking others, 
thus not necessarily requiring appraisals (Hatfield, 
Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1993). Emotional conta-
gion has also been shown in computer- mediated 
communication. Hancock, Gee, Ciaccio, and Lin 
(2008) induced negative mood in one group of 
chat participants and observed that they used 
Definition Box
Capitalization: The sharing of positive 
events with (close) others
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fewer and sadder words and that this pattern and 
the corresponding negative affect were picked up 
by chat interaction partners.
 The Field Approach
Studying emotional contagion on social media is 
not easy because naturally occurring emotions are 
difficult to detect and lab experiments are often 
artificial. Kramer, Guillory, and Hancock (2014) 
cooperated with Facebook and conducted a mas-
sive field experiment in which they manipulated 
the newsfeed of roughly 700,000 Facebook users. 
They created four conditions: in one group, each 
post containing negative words such as “sad” was 
removed with a likelihood between 10% and 90%; 
in another group, the same percentage of posts 
containing positive words was removed. In the two 
control groups, the identical percentage of posts 
was blocked, but at random. This was done to 
compare the effect of reduction in information 
with reduction in positivity or negativity. 
Subsequently, Kramer et  al. (2014) tracked the 
posts from the users and analyzed the number of 
positive and negative words. They found a signifi-
cant increase of positive words and a decrease in 
negative words (compared to the control condi-
tion) in the negativity-reduced group and the 
reverse pattern in the positivity-reduced group and 
took this as evidence for emotional contagion. 
Although significant through the large sample, the 
effect was however very small; only 0.1% of the 
subsequent posts changed.
This experiment has been heavily criticized 
(see Panger (2016) for an excellent review; the fol-
lowing sections are a summary of his analysis). 
Most criticism has addressed ethical concerns: the 
participants did not know that they were part of an 
experiment and never gave their informed consent; 
the study did also not undergo a review process by 
an ethics committee. More relevant for the ques-
tion which emotions are triggered by social media 
use are the methodological concerns.
First, there are problems with the internal 
validity of the study. Removing positive posts 
not only reduces the proportion of positive posts 
but also increases the proportion of negative posts. 
It is thus difficult to say whether the observed 
effects are due to reduced positivity or increased 
negativity.
A second criticism is the measure of emo-
tions. LIWC, the Linguistic Inquiry and Word 
Count (Pennebaker, Francis, & Booth, 2007), 
was used for inferring the emotions. LIWC is a 
computer program that can calculate the percent-
age of words that correspond to certain emotions 
from a pre-defined dictionary. Although LIWC is 
in general a well-recognized tool, it is less clear 
how well it can deal with short social media 
posts. Tools such as SentiStrength (http://
sentistrength.wlv.ac.uk/) that were specifically 
developed for the analysis of sentiment in short 
social media posts reveal better results than the 
more general LIWC (Buttliere, 2017).
Moreover, it has not been controlled whether 
people first posted what they had experienced and 
then read their newsfeed or whether they first read 
their newsfeed and then posted. Emotional conta-
gion effects can only occur if people first read what 
their Facebook friends have written. Thus, the 
limited internal validity reduces the contribution of 
this field study, although it has a high external 
validity that is due to the natural setting.
 The Survey Approach
Lin and Utz (2015) used alternative methods to 
examine emotional contagion on social media. In 
a first exploratory survey, they asked participants 
to log into Facebook and to answer a series of 
questions on the four most recent status updates in 
their newsfeed. Among others, participants indi-
cated how negative vs. positive the content of the 
post was and which emotions it elicited. One goal 
of this survey was to get information on the preva-
lence of positive and negative emotions. The sec-
ond goal was to explore the relationship with tie 
strength, i.e., relational closeness (see Fig.  14.2 
for the research model). Similar to capitalization 
research, it was expected that emotional conta-
gion effects are stronger with increasing closeness 
(i.e., tie strength).
With regard to the first goal, getting informa-
tion on the prevalence of emotions, the results 
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showed that positive emotions prevailed. From 
the 598 status updates that did not stem from 
Facebook pages or celebrities (provided by 207 
participants), 64% elicited happiness, whereas 
only 12.4% elicited envy and 11% jealousy. With 
regard to the second goal, a significant interac-
tion between tie strength and positivity of the 
posts occurred for happiness. The more positive 
the update, the happier was the reader. This effect 
was stronger for closer relationships. That is, par-
ticipants reacted more extremely with the corre-
sponding emotion to positive and negative posts 
from close friends than from acquaintances. 
Appraisals have not been measured in this study, 
but one can assume that people appraised positive 
events in the life of their friends also as positive 
for themselves.
Thus, this pattern supports the predictions from 
emotional contagion research. A methodological 
limitation is that it was impossible to hold the con-
tent of the posts from close friends and acquain-
tances constant in a survey; it could be that the 
Facebook algorithm selects different types of 
posts for different Facebook friends and that it is 
the content of the post that drives happiness.
 The Experimental Approach
To overcome this limitation, Lin and Utz (2015) 
conducted an experiment in which all participants 
were exposed to the same vacation picture (see 
Fig.  14.3). Tie strength was manipulated by 
letting people think either of a close friend, a 
friend, or an acquaintance on Facebook. 
Participants filled in some filler questions about 
the target and the friendship history to make the 
relationship more salient. Next, they were 
instructed to imagine that this Facebook friend 
had posted the vacation picture and to indicate 
their emotions.
As can be seen in Fig. 14.4 (columns for hap-
piness), the experiment revealed the same pattern 
as the survey: the happy vacation picture induced 
happiness in the readers, and it did so even more 
when the photo was supposedly posted by a close 
friend. A limitation is that the situation was rather 
artificial; some participants might have thought 
about a friend who would never go on a hiking 
vacation, reducing the credibility of the 
manipulation.
Nevertheless, across three different methods (a 
massive field experiment, a survey, an experi-
ment), the same pattern emerged: people experi-
ence happiness when reading positive posts of 
(close) others. There is thus support for emotional 
contagion on social media. Nevertheless, there 
were also incidents of negative emotions (envy, 
jealousy) as reaction to positive posts that cannot 
be explained by emotional contagion. We there-
fore turn to social comparison theory in the next 
section.
 Social Comparison Theory
Social media provide people with information 
about others: to which bars they go, what 
clothes they wear, or where they spend their 
vacations. When reading such information, 
Fig. 14.2 Research 
model by Lin and Utz 
(2015, p. 31)
Box 14.2 Question for Elaboration
A joy shared is a joy doubled, a trouble 
shared is a trouble halved. Does this prov-




people usually compare themselves with these 
others. This so-called social comparison is a fun-
damental process (Festinger, 1954). The results 
of social comparisons have also been linked to 
emotions since they influence appraisals. Smith 
(2000) summarized the different possible reac-
tions (see Fig. 14.5).
The first distinction we can identify in Fig. 14.5 
is the comparison direction, being either upward 
or downward. Upward comparisons occur when 
the comparison target performs better or is richer 
or more attractive than oneself; downward com-
parisons occur when the comparison target per-
forms worse and is poorer or less attractive than 
Fig. 14.3 Emotion-evoking picture used as stimulus material in Lin and Utz (2015)
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Fig. 14.4 The effects of 
tie strength on emotions 
(Lin & Utz, 2015)
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oneself. A recent meta- analysis (Gerber, Wheeler, 
& Suls, 2018) showed that contrastive emotions 
are the dominant reaction (e.g., envy if another 
person is performing better and schadenfreude if 
another person is performing worse), but both, 
positive and negative emotions, have been found 
for both comparison directions (Buunk, Collins, 
Taylor, VanYperen, & Dakof, 1990). Appraisals 
based on the other two dimensions are important 
to determine the triggered emotion: the focus, 
which can be primarily on the self, the other, or on 
both interaction partners, and the desirability of 
the outcome for the self and the other person.
For example, when a competing candidate gets 
the job you applied for (an undesirable outcome 
for the self), the emotion depends on whether the 
focus of your appraisals about the situation is 
purely on what the other has, on what you don’t 
have, or on both. When you focus only on your-
self, i.e., your poor performance in the job inter-
view, you might experience shame. An exclusive 
focus on the other results in resentment. When 
you focus on what the other has but also on what 
you lack (dual focus), envy is likely. Envy is a 
negative emotion that “arises when another person 
lacks another’s superior quality, achievement or 
possession and either desires it or wishes that the 
other lacked it” (Parrott & Smith, 1993, p. 908).
When it comes to social comparison processes 
on social media, the majority of studies have 
focused on envy (see Appel, Gerlach, & Crusius, 
2016, for a review). Recently, research started to 
go beyond Smith (2000) by distinguishing between 
benign envy and malicious envy (Van de Ven, 
Fig. 14.5 Social 
comparison-based 




Zeelenberg, & Pieters, 2009). Benign envy is 
defined as a levelling-up motivation; the focus is 
on the envied object or state, and benign envy 
motivates people to work harder toward reaching the 
envied object or state (van de Ven, Zeelenberg, & 
Pieters, 2011). Malicious envy in contrast is a 
levelling-down motivation; the focus is on the 
envied person, and it is characterized by wishing 
ill to the envied person.
In the experiment described above by Lin and 
Utz (2015), benign and malicious envy were 
measured as well. The holiday can be perceived 
as a desirable outcome for the other, and  – at 
least at the moment  – undesirable for oneself, 
and might thus trigger (malicious) envy. When 
the holiday is perceived as a desirable and reach-
able goal for oneself, the post should elicit 
benign envy, even more so for close friends 
because these are usually more similar and there-
fore more relevant comparison targets. In line 
with the latter argument, participants reported 
higher levels of benign envy for posts from 
(close) friends than for posts from weak acquain-
tances (Fig. 14.4). Levels of malicious envy were 
very low, probably because holidays are not 
perceived as underserved, an important appraisal 
for malicious envy.
De Vries, Möller, Wieringa, Eigenraam, and 
Hamelink (2018) proposed an approach how the 
often-contradicting predictions from emotional 
contagion and social comparison theory can be 
brought together. They suggested that social 
comparison orientation, the chronic tendency of 
people to compare themselves with others 
(Gibbons & Buunk, 1999), determines whether 
people are happy when their social media friends 
are happy or whether they experience envy. 
Participants were either exposed to positive or 
neutral Instagram posts. Social comparison ori-
entation was measured. For people high in social 
comparison orientation, the contrastive pattern 
predicted by the social comparison perspective 
was found: participants showed lower levels of 
positive affect when exposed to positive posts. 
People low in social comparison orientation 
showed the opposite pattern: in line with the 
emotional contagion perspective, they showed 
higher positive affect when exposed to positive 
posts (vs. neutral posts). Social comparison 
orientation is thus a moderator that can explain 
which of the two opposing theories applies for a 
specific individual  – those low in social 
comparison orientation seem to share the 
emotions displayed on social media, whereas 
those high in social comparison orientation rather 
show contrasting emotions.
 Taking into Account 
the Affordances of Social Media
The studies reported so far used existing social- 
psychological theories and argued that they also 
hold on social media, without taking the 
affordances of social media discussed in the 
beginning of this chapter into account. 
Affordances have been taken into account in 
research on jealousy evoked by social media 
posts. Jealousy is the “negative response to the 
actual, imagined or expected emotional or sexual 
involvement of the partner with someone else” 
(Buunk, 1997, p.  998). Especially anxious 
jealousy, i.e., ruminating about potential actions 
Box 14.3 Zooming In: Benign Versus 
Malicious Envy
Although envy usually has a negative con-
notation, it can also have a motivating role, 
and researchers started therefore to focus on 
the antecedents and consequences of benign 
vs. malicious envy. The appraisal of deserv-
edness is important: malicious envy is more 
likely to occur when the advantage of the 
envied person is perceived as undeserved; 
benign envy is more likely when the advan-
tage of the other is perceived as deserved 
and the situation as controllable (the indi-
vidual can reach the same object/state). 
Malicious envy is more similar to envy in 
the Smith (2000) model, whereas benign 
envy has similarity with inspiration in the 
upward assimilative emotions quadrant.
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of the partner, is negatively related to relationship 
quality (Barelds & Barelds-Dijkstra, 2007).
When it comes to jealousy triggered by social 
media, Muise, Christofides, and Desmarais (2009) 
argued that Facebook makes more information 
about the partner and his/her interactions with 
potential rivals  – comments, likes, or pictures – 
visible than ever before. This visibility and public 
display can also influence the appraisals of threat. 
Muise et al. (2009) therefore argued that Facebook 
use could increase jealousy. They measured 
Facebook elicited jealousy by a scale that asked 
for the likelihood to experience jealousy in ambiv-
alent situations such as “after seeing that your 
partner has received a wall message from some-
one of the opposite sex” and not in actual trans-
gressions (see Table 14.1, left column). This scale 
thus covers mainly anxious jealousy. They also 
assessed people’s general disposition to react 
jealously. Although this disposition predicted the 
largest part of the variance in online jealousy, 
time spent on Facebook explained an additional 
part of variance.
Utz and Beukeboom (2011) built on this work 
and proposed need for popularity as an additional 
predictor of jealousy experienced on SNS. They 
argued that especially people with a high need for 
popularity are attracted by social media because 
their affordances allow them to present an 
idealized version of their self to impress a large 
audience. When the partner endangers the picture 
of a happy relationship, for example, by exchanging 
flirtatious comments with an attractive person, 
the (semi-)public display of this action at least 
within the group of close peers might influence the 
appraisal of severity of the threat to the relation-
ship and thereby increase the feeling of jealousy. 
Research on offline jealousy has found that public 
self-threats are perceived as more severe (Afifi, 
Falato, & Weiner, 2001).
Utz and Beukeboom (2011) aimed to get a 
more comprehensive picture and argued that in a 
similar vein public displays of affection by the 
partner might increase happiness with the relation-
ship because these could be appraised as a sign of 
commitment. SNS happiness was measured by 
mirroring the SNS jealousy items (see Table 14.1, 
right column). The results showed that people in 
general expressed higher levels of SNS happiness 
than SNS jealousy. Need for popularity was 
related to SNS jealousy, especially among low 
self-esteem individuals, indicating that the affor-
dances of social media are interpreted differently 
by people with low vs. high need for popularity 
or self-esteem.
The relationship between need for popularity 
and social media jealousy was replicated in 
another study that compared jealousy on Facebook 
and Snapchat (Utz, Muscanell, & Khalid, 2015). 
In contrast to other social media, messages on 
snapchat are not persistent, but disappear after 
several seconds. Again, this affordance can influ-
ence the appraisal of acts such as communicating 
with an ex-partner. People might become more 
suspicious when the partner uses Snapchat and 
assume that the flirt must be serious if a secret 
communication channel is chosen. In line with 
these predictions, Snapchat jealousy was higher 
than Facebook jealousy.
Table 14.1 Example items from the SNS jealousy scale 
(Muise et al., 2009) and the SNS happiness scale (Utz & 
Beukeboom, 2011)
SNS jealousy SNS happiness
How likely are you to …
…be upset if your partner 
does not post an accurate 
relationship status on the 
SNS.
…become happy if 
your partner posted an 
accurate relationship 
status.
…become jealous after 
seeing that your partner has 
posted a message on the 
wall of someone of the 
opposite sex.
…become happy if 
your partner posted a 
message to your wall 
referring to your 
relationship.
…experience jealousy if 
your partner posts pictures 
of him or herself with an 
arm around a member of the 
opposite sex.
…become happy if 
your partner post 
pictures of him or 
herself with an arm 
around you.
Box 14.4 Questions for Elaboration
What advice would you give platform pro-
viders to increase the well-being of their 
users? What can teachers or parents do to 
reduce the risk that their children experience 
negative emotions after using social media?
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 Facebook and Envy: Application 
to Consumer Behavior
Why is knowledge about the emotions triggered 
by social media use so important? First, emotions 
influence well-being, and it has often been argued 
that reading social media posts leads to envy 
which in turn leads to lowered well-being 
(Verduyn et  al., 2017). Second, emotions also 
influence consumer behavior. The business model 
of most social media platforms is making money 
from selling advertisements. For brands, it is thus 
important to know how purchase intentions of 
customers could be influenced. The default 
approach is often to target ads to specific groups 
(e.g., females aged 21–25 interested in beauty 
and fashion). A smarter way could be to use posts 
from social media friends as triggers for ads.
Research on benign vs. malicious envy has 
found that benign envy motivates people to buy 
the same product as the envied person has, 
whereas malicious envy motivates people to buy 
a different and even superior product to distance 
themselves from the envied target (Van de Ven, 
Zeelenberg, & Pieters, 2010). Lin (2018) 
examined whether this also applies on social 
media. She distinguished between experiential 
and material purchases (Van Boven & Gilovich, 
2003). Material purchases (e.g., an expensive 
watch, jewelry, a car) are bought “to have,” 
whereas experiential purchases (e.g., a weekend 
trip) are bought “to be.” Lin (2018) argued that 
experiential purchases might trigger more benign 
envy because they are often appraised as self- 
relevant and trigger liking of the other person.
To examine how envy triggered by social 
media use influences consumer behavior, Lin 
conducted a survey among 200 active social 
media users (100 females; mean age = 35). The 
majority of respondents (n  =  136) had already 
purchased something after browsing social 
media; most of them had done so several times. 
Purchasing behavior was more frequently 
triggered by posts from friends (58) than by posts 
from brands or ads (31). In the remaining cases, 
the triggers could not be clearly identified. These 
descriptive data already suggest that social media 
posts influence consumer behavior.
Participants read a definition of experiential 
vs. material products and were asked how often 
they encounter posts about these two types of 
purchases in their timeline. On average, they saw 
posts about experiential purchases several times a 
week and posts about material purchases between 
once and several times a week.
Next, they were asked to recall a situation in 
which they experienced envy after being exposed 
to such a post. The vast majority (n = 185) was 
able to recall such a situation, indicating that 
envy about the purchases and experiences of 
others is a common experience. Most purchases 
(120) were experiential in nature, predominantly 
vacations, restaurant visits, or similar events. 
Posts about material purchases (48) were on 
cameras, laptops, cars, or houses.
The type of experienced envy (benign vs. 
malicious) was measured with the scale by 
Crusius and Lange (2014). A sample item for 
benign envy is “I felt inspired to also attain X” 
(X stands for the product/experience mentioned 
by the participant); a sample item for malicious 
envy is “I wished that the person would fail at 
something.” The central dependent variables 
were the purchase intention for the same and the 
purchase intention for a superior product (e.g., 
“It  is very likely that I will buy the same X/a 
 similar but superior product/service”).
People experienced more benign envy than 
malicious envy. Interestingly and in contrast to 
the hypothesis, there was no relationship between 
post type (experiential vs. material) and type of 
envy. Exploratory analysis showed that malicious 
envy was higher when the self-relevance of the 
purchase was high. The pattern for appraisals was 
however as expected: when participants felt that 
the person who has posted the purchase or expe-
rience had not deserved the purchase, just wanted 
to show off, was disliked but also similar to the 
participants, malicious envy was higher. Most 
important, in line with the hypotheses, benign 
envy was positively correlated with purchase 
intentions for the same product, whereas mali-
cious envy was related to purchase intention for a 
superior product.
A limitation of the self-report study is that 
people mentioned more experiential than material 
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purchases, resulting in reduced power to find 
effects for material purchases. The purchases 
also varied widely in price, desirability, and many 
other factors. To get more equal sample sizes, in 
a second study, participants were asked to either 
remember a post about an experiential purchase 
or a post about a material purchase. To control for 
the different types of purchases, a third study was 
conducted in which the same product, a MacBook 
Pro, was framed either in experiential or material 
terms. The post in the experiential condition read 
“My new Macbook Pro makes me enjoy my work! 
#ExploreAndDiscover #DoMore,” whereas the 
post in the material condition read “My new 
Macbook Pro looks just awesome! #ExpensiveBuy 
#MustHave.” The main finding that benign envy 
predicts purchase intentions for buying the same 
product and malicious envy triggers purchase 
intentions for buying an even superior product was 
replicated in both studies.
Taken together, across three studies using dif-
ferent methods, Lin (2018) showed that people 
experience more benign than malicious envy when 
exposed to social media posts about experiential or 
material purchases. The more participants experi-
enced benign envy, the higher also was their inten-
tion to purchase the same product. Malicious envy, 
in contrast, was triggered by the perceived inten-
tion to show off and lead to the desire to purchase 
a superior product.
These results can directly be translated into 
advice for brands. Instead of showing ads to target 
user groups based on demographics and interests, 
brands should (also) post ads next to relevant 
posts. This could be especially interesting for 
travel agencies but also for fashion manufacturers 
or tech companies. Social media platforms would 
need to adapt their targeting services and offer tar-
geted marketing based on relevance of users’ 
posts. Users often provide information about their 
location by using check- ins or hashtags in their 
posts, making it easy to find the appropriate posts 
for restaurants, bars, or hotels. Algorithms are 
also getting better and better in analyzing pic-
tures. Although malicious envy is unlikely to 
occur, searching for hashtags that refer to showing 
off (see, e.g., #richkidsofinstagram) could be an 
indicator of potential malicious envy. This would 
be the place for luxury brands to advertise their 
superior products.
To conclude, this chapter has shown that posts 
on social media trigger emotions in both the peo-
ple who post them and the people who read them. 
Being able to predict the emotions experienced 
by social media users also helps brands because 
emotions experience consumer behavior.
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 Guiding Answers to Questions 
in the Chapter
 1. Q (With Box 14.2) A joy shared is a joy dou-
bled, a trouble shared is a trouble halved. 
Does this proverb also hold for sharing joys 
and troubles on social media?
A: The first part of this proverb corresponds to 
capitalization. Sharing a joy with close others 
intensifies the joy, and this has also been found 
for social media posts. Research on emotional 
contagion showed that readers also become 
happy when their friends share positive expe-
riences. Findings on sharing troubles have 
been less unequivocal; sharing troubles 
might  – at least in the short run  – intensify 
negative emotions.
 2. Q (With Box 14.4) What advice would you 
give platform providers to increase the well- 
being of their users?
A: Platform providers could mainly display 
the positive posts from close friends. Closeness 
can be inferred automatically from frequency 
of private messages, being tagged on the same 
photo, and mutual likes. Posts with hashtags 
that are likely to trigger malicious envy (e.g., 
#richkids) could be displayed less promi-
nently in the newsfeed.
 3. Q (With Box 14.4) What can teachers or 
 parents do to reduce the risk that their children 
experience negative emotions after using 
social media?
A: Teachers and parents could train the media 
literacy of children/adolescents by making 
them aware that people present themselves in 
an idealized way on social media. They could 
teach them to use social media actively for rela-
tionship maintenance, instead of mainly pas-
sively browsing. Strengthening the self-esteem 
provides them also with a buffer against nega-
tive effects of social media posts.
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 Introduction
There is no doubt that we live in a vengeful world. 
But that is not the full story. If, following a hurt, 
vengefulness were the only force to govern our 
social relations, how could this account for Gill 
Hicks, who lost both her legs due to standing next 
to one of the London tube suicide bombers in 2005 
yet lives without hatred and refuses to seek revenge; 
or how come that Bassam Aramin chooses dia-
logue and non-violence as the main means to 
resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, despite an 
Israeli soldier shooting and killing Bassam’s 
10-year-old daughter outside her school; and how 
come that on hearing the tragic news of her 28-year-
old son, an Israeli soldier, being shot dead by a 
Palestinian sniper, the first words that came out of 
Robi Damelin’s mouth were: ‘Do not take revenge 
in the name of my son’? While maybe absent from 
the news headlines, there are many more such 
individuals, like Gill, Bassam, and Robi, around 
the world. You can find out about their real-life 
stories in the work of the London-based charity 
The Forgiveness Project (www.theforgiveness-
project.com, see also www.theforgivenesstool-
box.com), whose aim is to collect and document 
the lived experiences of ordinary people who 
have managed to overcome their hatred and 
resentment towards their perpetrators and to 
develop working relationships or even profound 
friendships with their former perpetrators.
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What is noteworthy is that the individuals 
responsible for the above atrocities neither knew 
their victims personally nor had any prior direct 
interactions with them. What gave rise to these 
atrocities was the fact that the aggressors saw 
their unknown victims as representatives of par-
ticular groups with whom the aggressors had fun-
damental disagreements. It is probably a safe bet 
to assume that part of the motivation that leads 
individuals to harm others is to do with the 
aggressors themselves feeling aggrieved and vic-
timised. Thus, correcting the wrongs victims may 
have experienced directly or vicariously (i.e. see-
ing their fellow ingroup members being harmed) 
can rather ironically cause previous victims to 
become future victimisers and feed the endless 
cycles of revenge. Can forgiveness disrupt such 
destructive cycles?
Although forgiveness has mainly been dis-
cussed and practised in the realm of interpersonal 
relationships, in this chapter, we focus on forgive-
ness and its utility for repairing damaged inter-
group relationships. Specifically, we will analyse 
intergroup forgiveness through the lens of tradi-
tional and recent theoretical frameworks, such as 
the social identity approach and victim beliefs, 
while attempting to formalise the interplay 
between such theorising and their implications for 
societies emerging from ethnopolitical violence. 
We will conclude by highlighting how forgive-
ness can transform fractured intergroup relations 
into peaceful co-existence at a practical level.
 Collective Suffering: Hurting Me 
Versus Hurting Us
Naturally, being hurt means being robbed of con-
trol over one’s life. Indeed, following a hurt, what 
may attract millions of people to revenge is the 
desire to restore their diminished sense of con-
trol. But is revenge the only path to restoring con-
trol? And can forgiveness provide an alternative 
and less explored route to such control restora-
tion? Before discussing the concept of intergroup 
forgiveness, it is important to understand what 
constitutes collective suffering.
Experiences of suffering are heightened to 
the collective level because of the clashing 
group memberships with which the harmdoer 
and his/her victim identify. As detailed by 
Scheepers and Ellemers in this volume (Chap. 
9; see also Tajfel & Turner, 1979), people 
divide the social world into social categories, 
such as religious beliefs, political or sexual 
orientation, race, etc. Individuals form groups 
on the basis of these categories and identify 
with them because such categories can help us 
understand who we are and because these cat-
egories enable us to coact with others, invoke 
solidarity, and provide us with protection 
against different types of threats. Thus, a key 
defining feature of collective suffering is that 
the motivation to harm others was driven by 
the perpetrator’s group membership and his/
her choice of victim was equally determined 
by the victim’s particular group membership 
(Noor et al., 2017).
Another feature of collective suffering is that 
it can affect the target group across several dimen-
sions, including the physical dimension (e.g. 
physical well-being, quality of life, physical inju-
ries, deaths), the material dimension (e.g. destruc-
tion or loss of property, ability to build wealth), 
and the cultural dimension (e.g. threat to one’s 
worldview, cultural continuity, norms, language), 
and each of the forgoing dimensions, by them-
selves or combined, can lead to the psychological 
dimension of suffering (e.g. trauma or distress) 
Definition Box
Collective Suffering: (also referred to as 
collective victimisation) This results from 
collective victimization which involves the 
objective infliction of harm by one group 
against another. The psychological experi-
ence and consequences (e.g., affect, cogni-
tions, and behaviors) of such harm is 
referred to as collective victimhood 
(WHO, 2002, p.  215; see also Noor, 
Vollhardt, Mari, & Nadler, 2017; Vollhardt, 
2012)
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(see Noor, Shnabel, Halabi, & Nadler, 2012; Noor 
et al., 2017, for reviews).
The plethora of ways in which one group can 
harm another gives rise to the third feature of col-
lective suffering, namely, the impact of the suf-
fering extends to group members who did not 
experience the harmdoing directly. In fact, the 
more group members identify with the group, 
the more they feel the impact of the harm vicari-
ously, even though they may have been in differ-
ent geographical locations from the direct 
ingroup victims or born several decades after the 
harmdoing (e.g. Lickel, Miller, Stenstrom, 
Denson, & Schmader, 2006; Noor, Brown, 
Gonzalez, Manzi, & Lewis, 2008; Wohl & 
Branscombe, 2008; Wohl & van Bavel, 2011). 
To illustrate, research investigating how the trau-
matic consequences of collective victimisation 
resulting from the Jewish Holocaust get transmit-
ted across generations found that there was a 
positive correlation between the Holocaust 
descendants’ degree of Jewish identification and 
symptoms of post- traumatic stress disorder. This 
correlation was negative for non-Holocaust 
descendants (Wohl & van Bavel, 2011). That 
said, an important caveat must be highlighted 
here. Identification with a victimised group can 
also serve as a buffer against poor psychological 
well-being. Supporting evidence for this claim 
has been provided by studies examining the 
association between pervasive discrimination of 
target groups (e.g. Black Americans, Latino/
Americans, the elderly) and their psychological 
well-being (Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 
1999; Cronin, Levin, Branscombe, van Laar, & 
Tropp, 2012; Garstka, Schmitt, Branscombe, & 
Hummert, 2004). Interestingly, these studies 
demonstrated that ingroup identification with the 
target groups suppressed the association between 
discrimination and poor well-being. This sug-
gests that identification with a victimised group 
need not always foretell negative outcomes for 
the group members.
So far, we have explored how groups vested in 
their social identities may be motivated to harm 
one another, across multiple dimensions, and 
how readily the suffering can spread to other 
ingroup members who did not experience the 
harmdoing directly. Although understanding col-
lective suffering through the lens of the social 
identity approach offers important analytical 
insights into why some conflicts persist, in the 
next section, we complement these insights by 
drawing attention to the recent theorising about 
victim beliefs – the stories groups tell about their 
suffering – and consider their impact in terms of 
intensifying or reducing conflict.
 Victim Beliefs: The Stories We Tell 
about Our Suffering
Stories are powerful, especially if they are sto-
ries about the collective suffering of one’s own 
group. Such stories enable people to make 
meaning of what happened, remind future gen-
erations of the ingroup’s victimisation, and 
instil a powerful sense of common fate and soli-
darity with their fellow ingroup members. 
Consequently, the stories of a group’s collective 
suffering are representational and can shape the 
group’s identity in general. What is intriguing is 
that people can tell very different stories about 
the same experience. In other words, people can 
construe the same victimhood event very differ-
ently, which in turn can have a differential 
impact on people’s understanding of their col-
lective suffering and who they are as a group, 
but also on how they relate to other groups. 
Recent theorising has reasoned that the way a 
group’s narrative of their suffering is construed 
is partly determined by their victim beliefs 
(Noor et  al., 2012; Vollhardt, 2012, 2015; see 
also Noor et al., 2017).
Definition Box
Victim Beliefs: Subjective interpretations 
of a group’s victimisation (Vollhardt, 2012)
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 Comparative Victim Beliefs
One central set of victim beliefs are the compara-
tive victim beliefs. Such beliefs orient groups to 
think about their suffering by comparing it to 
other groups’ suffering. Unfortunately, given 
groups are prone to compete with one other, 
especially over as sensitive a topic as their suffer-
ing (Noor et al., 2012), such a comparative belief 
has been observed to give rise to groups engaging 
in the phenomenon of intergroup competitive 
victimhood.
Competitive victimhood arises from the 
motivation of conflicting groups to establish that 
the ingroup has suffered more than the outgroup. 
Here, the emphasis is not only placed on the 
quantity of the suffering but also on the unjust 
quality of the suffering. At first glance, such com-
petition over victimhood may appear counter- 
intuitive, especially because the victim status is 
often associated with weakness and humiliation. 
However, when viewing victimhood as a psycho-
logical resource which can serve groups with key 
psychological and social functions, competitive 
victimhood no longer appears counter-intuitive.
To illustrate, assuming the role of the ‘bigger’ 
victim can entitle groups to justify ingroup vio-
lence against other groups (Noor, Brown, & 
Prentice, 2008). From a leadership perspective, 
strategically portraying one’s groups as the 
(greater) victim provides leaders with powerful 
narratives which they can utilise to bolster ingroup 
cohesiveness and identification with the ingroup 
and ultimately mobilise their ingroup to take 
actions against the outgroup. In the post- conflict 
setting, competitive victimhood can enable groups 
to avoid negative emotions for their ingroup 
wrongdoings during the heightened phase of the 
conflict and help them deny responsibility and 
any material compensation. Consequently, an 
inverse relationship can be expected between 
competitive victimhood and forgiveness. That is, 
the stiffer the competition over victimhood among 
conflicting groups, the less likely conflicting 
Box 15.1 Zooming In: Whose Story Counts?
As you can imagine, one controversy around 
victim beliefs is about which group’s story is 
believed or perceived as true. This is in part 
due to the subjective nature of victim beliefs, 
which are asserted by one group and chal-
lenged by their adversarial group. As a 
result, many historical narratives about a 
collective victimisation remain contested 
(Vollhardt, 2012) (e.g. Palestinian vs. Israeli 
stories of suffering, Hammack, 2009). Note 
also that both disadvantaged groups and the 
advantaged groups (e.g. Black as well as 
White Americans) can develop victim 
beliefs. Crucially, another consequence of 
victim beliefs is that sometimes objectively 
true victimisation of one group may be sup-
pressed or ignored (e.g. the Genocide of 
Herero and Nama in Namibia by Germany 
in the nineteenth century, Onishi, 2016), 
while at other times false victim beliefs of 
another group may be fabricated (e.g. Nazis’ 
perceived victimisation, Herf, 2006).
Definition Box
Intergroup competitive victimhood: 
Refers to the effort by group members 
involved in conflict to claim that their 
group has suffered more than their adver-
sarial group (Noor et  al., 2012; Noor, 
Brown, & Prentice, 2008). This competi-
tion can focus on both the quantity and 
quality of suffering. Groups can compete 
over their share of suffering across differ-
ent dimensions, including the physical 
dimension (e.g. death toll or injuries), the 
material dimension (e.g. loss of resources), 
the cultural dimension (e.g. giving up one’s 
way of life and language), the psychological 
dimension (e.g. trauma and poor psycho-
logical well-being), and the moral dimension 
(e.g. perceived illegitimacy of suffering).
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groups are to consider forgiving one another 
(Noor, Brown, Gonzalez, et  al., 2008; see Noor 
et al., 2012, for a review).
The opposing victim belief to competitive vic-
timhood is common victimhood (Noor et  al., 
2012, 2017; Schnabel, Halabi, & Noor, 2013), 
also referred to as inclusive victim consciousness 
(Vollhardt, 2015).
This belief draws both group’s attention to 
their common suffering due to the (regional) con-
flict and thereby succeeds in acknowledging that, 
similar to the ingroup, the outgroup has suffered 
as well, albeit possibly in different ways from the 
ingroup. For example, consider the lives of 
Israelis and Palestinians in the Middle East. 
Clearly, compared to Palestinians, Israelis are in 
an advantageous position militarily, among other 
respects. However, despite such an obvious 
advantage, it is difficult to discard the fact that 
irrespective of their position, Israelis’ quality of 
life has been adversely affected by the regional 
war, be that in terms of mental health, economi-
cally and across other social dimensions. Put dif-
ferently, if the urge to engage in competitive 
victimhood generally arises from the motivation 
to receive sufficient acknowledgement for one’s 
ingroup suffering, common victimhood provides 
such an acknowledgement for both conflicting 
groups right at the outset, thereby potentially dif-
fusing unnecessary competitiveness, tension, and 
hostility between the conflicting groups. As such, 
a positive relationship between common victim-
hood and forgiveness can be expected.
 We Are Our Beliefs
As is apparent from the previous discussion, 
there is an important interplay between a group’s 
victimhood beliefs and their social identity. In 
fact, in part the very beliefs about their victim-
hood may provide the content of groups’ social 
identities, and indeed the level of inclusiveness of 
these identities may vary as a function of such 
(competitive vs. inclusive) victimhood beliefs. 
Specifically, construing one’s ingroup suffering 
through the competitive victimhood mindset 
may indicate that the group is likely to operate 
from a narrower and more exclusive social iden-
tity category, and therefore the group’s focus and 
concerns extend to its fellow ingroup members 
only. By contrast, applying an inclusive victim 
belief to making sense of one’s ingroup suffering 
entails that the group’s awareness of suffering is 
elevated to a superordinate and more inclusive 
social identity category, and therefore the group’s 
Definition Box
Common Victimhood: This belief is based 
on the premise that despite the clash 
between two conflicting groups (e.g. 
Israelis and Palestinians), they can come to 
agree that the conflict involves negative 
consequences for both groups’ lives (inse-
curity, unstable economy, etc.). This belief 
is expected to transform the adversaries’ 
perceptions from rigid and mutually exclu-
sive victim-versus-perpetrator category 
into a more inclusive ‘we’ (i.e. both parties 
are victims of the conflict).
Box 15.2 Zooming In: The Parents  
Circle- Families Forum (PCFF)
The reality and practice of common victim-
hood beliefs are powerfully demonstrated 
by an Israeli-Palestinian NGO The Parents 
Circle-Families Forum (PCFF), which was 
formed in 1995. Crucially, each family has 
endured a loss of an immediate family mem-
ber in the ongoing conflict. Thus, PCFF 
fosters building rare bridges across the 
divide by drawing attention to the similar 
suffering endured by both Palestinian and 
Israeli families. Moreover, PCFF utilises 
these stories of common suffering for educa-
tional purposes in schools, public meet-
ings, etc. Today, PCFF consists of over 600 
Israeli and Palestinian families (visit: http://
theparentscircle.org/en/about_eng/).
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focus and concerns expand beyond seeking 
acknowledgement for the suffering of one’s own 
group and attention is paid to the suffering of the 
outgroup as well.
Having reviewed traditional and recent theoris-
ing about how and why groups’ collective suffering 
may become among the most thorny and divisive 
dimension defining intergroup relations, in the next 
section, we explore forgiveness and its utility for 
transforming seemingly intractable conflicts.
 Intergroup Forgiveness
Notwithstanding the benefits revenge can offer to 
victimised groups (see Box 15.4), there are a 
number of fundamental problems associated with 
revenge. To begin with, all human perceptions 
are subjective and often non-veridical. This is 
especially true when it comes to perceptions of 
suffering and its severity, which systematically 
vary as a function of victim-perpetrator roles 
(Baumeister, 1996; Kearns & Fincham, 2005; 
Zechmeister & Romero, 2002; see also Hornsey, 
Okimoto, & Wenzel, 2017). That is, relative to 
perpetrators, victims often view the suffering as 
intentional and severe. Consequently, the question 
Box 15.3 Zooming In: Hierarchy of Grief in 
Northern Ireland
The violent conflict between the Protestant 
and Catholic communities in Northern 
Ireland is epitomised in the dissensus con-
cerning each community’s desires for 
Northern Ireland’s constitutional future 
(Dixon, 2001; Hewstone et al., 2004). The 
Protestant community, who are the histori-
cally advantaged group, wishes for 
Northern Ireland to remain part of the 
UK. By contrast, the Catholic community, 
who are the historically disadvantaged 
group, desires the reunification of Northern 
Ireland with the rest of Ireland, thus aiming 
to undo the partition which took place in 
1921. As a result of this dispute, a violent 
conflict has been fought for more than three 
decades, claiming almost 4000 lives (Fay, 
Morrissey, & Smyth, 1999). Even in 
today’s post-peace agreement era, Northern 
Ireland is characterised as a divided society 
displaying intermittent episodes of sectar-
ian violence, intergroup distrust, and high 
levels of social segregation (Connolly & 
Healy, 2003; Darby & MacGinty, 2000; 
Dixon, 2001; Hewstone et  al., 2008; 
Schubotz, 2005). Although in theory the 
notion of a common victimhood should 
benefit the conflicting groups in Northern 
Ireland, a recent event triggered by a rec-
ommendation put forward to the Northern 
Irish government reveals the challenges 
when attempting to put the concept of com-
mon victimhood into practice. The recom-
mendation was for the government to pay 
£12,000 in compensation to the families of 
everyone who had lost their lives due to the 
conflict. Crucially, this compensation was 
to be offered to victims from both sides of 
the conflict  – regardless of whether the 
victim was an innocent bystander, a British 
soldier, police officer, or a member of a 
paramilitary organisation. In other words, 
the recommendation was proactively aimed 
at promoting the notion that ‘there is no 
difference in a mother’s tears’ and that 
there can be no ‘hierarchy of grief’ over the 
loss of her loved ones. As well intended as 
such a recommendation was, it entirely 
backfired. Both sides of the conflict were 
outraged by the compensation being 
extended to the ‘other side’, especially to 
their violent members such as paramilitar-
ies or armed forces. Such reactions highlight 
that in certain contexts conflicting groups 
may not easily give up their tendency to 
engage in competitive victimhood in order 
to embrace the notion of common victim-
hood, thereby acknowledging their mutual 
suffering (Anger of Troubles payment plan, 
2009).
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of what might constitute a fair punishment 
becomes rather divisive. Often, victims are likely 
to view the punishment as too lenient, while per-
petrators perceive the same punishment as too 
harsh. The basis for such self- or ingroup-serving 
biases is rooted in perspective divergences that 
tend to give rise to differential causal attributions 
and evaluations between actors and recipients of 
aggressive actions (Mummendey, Linneweber, & 
Löschper, 1984; see also Noor, Kteily, Siem, & 
Mazziotta, 2018). Consequently, such perspec-
tive divergences can contribute to a role reversal 
in that the original perpetrators may feel a pro-
found sense of victimhood as a result of perceiv-
ing the punishment as excessive, while the initial 
victims become bloodthirsty; thereby both parties 
contribute to further harmdoing and deepen their 
initial enmity (Minow, 1998; Noor et  al., 2012; 
Noor & Cantacuzino, 2018).
Revenge also faces the problem of scale, par-
ticularly in contexts of intergroup mass violence. 
That is, societies such as those in Rwanda or 
South Africa are left with hundreds of thousands 
of perpetrators and with an even larger number of 
victims. Such sheer scale of perpetration and 
suffering demonstrates the decreased value of 
revenge as a strategy to break through the chaos 
of intergroup violence and restore order in society 
(Tutu, 2012). Perhaps the most compelling point 
highlighting the futility of revenge is the fact 
that revenge cannot reverse the damage that was 
initially done (Noor & Cantacuzino, 2018).
Given the outlined shortcomings of revenge 
and the catalysing effect of major world events, 
such as the collapse of totalitarian regimes in 
South Africa, Chile, and Eastern Europe and the 
ongoing violent conflicts, new ways of trans-
forming divided societies into peaceful co- 
existing ones are much sought after. Conflict 
transformation also requires finding adequate 
ways to address trauma and loss both at personal 
and collective levels. It is for these reasons that 
attention has been drawn to the utility of forgive-
ness as a strategy to bring about the much desired 
peaceful transformation both in societies with 
ongoing intergroup conflict and in post-conflict 
societies.
Box 15.4 Zooming In: The Benefits of 
Revenge
Taking revenge as a strategy may provide 
victims with a number of advantages: first, 
revenge enables victims to get even. 
Getting even is often about correcting the 
wrong the victims experienced, thereby 
achieving a sense of justice. However, per-
haps more importantly, getting even also 
serves victims in a symbolic way by teach-
ing the perpetrator group a lesson that they 
will not forget (Gollwitzer & Denzler, 
2009), thereby protecting victims from 
future harms. All of the above, psychologi-
cally speaking, can help to restore victims’ 
sense of control and agency which may 
have been diminished by being harmed in 
the first place (Noor & Cantacuzino, 2018).
Box 15.5 Zooming In: When Victims Become 
Killers in the Rwandan Context
One of the most challenging questions to 
answer relates to why those who have 
endured great suffering may become 
involved in harming and indeed killing oth-
ers. ‘When victims become killers’ is part 
of the title of a book by Mahmood Mamdani 
(2001) in which the author attempts to pro-
vide an answer to this question in the con-
text the Rwandan genocide in 1994. Despite 
having endured a mass killing in 1972, the 
Hutu majority killed an estimated 800,000 
of the Tutsi minority and moderate Hutu. 
Mamdani seeks to trace back such tragedies 
to their historical roots such as arbitrary 
land boundaries and racialised status differ-
ences between Hutu and Tutsi introduced 
and nurtured by the European colonisers, 
coupled with a poor economy.
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Although our understanding of intergroup 
forgiveness continues to evolve, recently Noor 
(2016) has embarked on developing an integra-
tive approach to conceptualizing forgiveness. 
Accordingly, the process of forgiveness involves 
making a conscious decision which is determined 
by multiple factors. First, the decision to forgive 
hinges on the extent to which the victimised 
group can regulate their negative emotions and 
thoughts about the perpetrator group. Second, a 
group’s forgiveness is further determined by the 
extent to which the victimised group values their 
relationship with the perpetrator group (Burnette, 
McCullough, Van Tongeren, & Davis, 2012), as 
well as the extent to which they view the perpe-
trator group as a continued source of threat. 
That is, forgiveness is likely to occur when the 
perpetrator group is viewed as a potentially valu-
able partner and perceived as nonthreatening 
(Noor, Shnabel, Halabi, & Doosje, 2015). Finally, 
the decision to forgive may in part also depend 
on the extent to which the victimised group can 
imagine that the perpetrator group is capable of 
changing their hostile traits and behaviours 
(Wohl et al., 2015).
Although this multi-faceted approach to under-
standing intergroup forgiveness demonstrates the 
complexities associated with forgiveness, the dif-
ferent dimensions point to a common denomina-
tor that can be viewed as the key prerequisite for 
forgiveness, namely, forgiveness requires trans-
formation involving (a) how the victimised group 
perceives the perpetrator group; (b) how the per-
petrator group behaves, especially with regard to 
how they treat the victimised group in the future; 
and (c) the contextual factors (e.g. economic dis-
parity) that may have given rise to the initial har-
mdoing (Noor, 2016; Noor & Cantacuzino, 2018). 
Thus, the decision to forgive at the intergroup 
level involves a bigger conversation than in the 
interpersonal context, which necessarily involves 
negotiating with your fellow ingroup members 
and assessing the degree to which forgiveness 
may be consistent with your ingroup moral values 
and norms.
Having described the process involving the 
decision to forgive a group, in the remainder of 
this chapter, we focus on real-life interventions 
based on the theories discussed earlier in this 
chapter. For each intervention, we first outline its 
theoretical rationale, briefly sketch the intergroup 
context, and summarise the major findings of the 
interventions. Although psychological interven-
tions can vary in scale and scope (Paluck & 
Green, 2009), below we report studies that have 
tested psychological models in contexts of past or 
ongoing intergroup conflicts.
Definition Box
Intergroup Forgiveness: The decision for 
a victimised group to suppress their desire 
to seek retaliation against, or to avoid, 
members of the perpetrator group
Box 15.6 Zooming In: Measuring Intergroup 
Forgiveness
Modelled on existing measures of interper-
sonal forgiveness (McCullough et  al., 
1998), Noor et  al. (2008) have developed 
an intergroup forgiveness measure based 
on six items, used in both ongoing and 
post-conflict settings, such as Israel-
Palestine, Northern Ireland, and Chile:
1. ‘I try not to hold a grudge against the 
other group for their misdeeds’.
2. ‘Getting even with the other group for 
their misdeeds is not important to me’ 
(reverse-coded).
3. ‘I am prepared to forgive the other group 
for their misdeeds’.
4. ‘I hold feelings of resentment towards 
the other group for their misdeeds’.
5. ‘I have ill thoughts about the other group 
for their misdeeds’.
6. ‘I am able to let the other group off with 
their misdeeds’.
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 Interventions: How Victim Beliefs 
and Identity Interact
As established earlier, both direct and vicarious 
victimhood episodes are psychologically potent 
experiences and will affect our understanding of 
the self and other groups. More specifically, it is 
plausible that when groups construe their victi-
misation through the comparative lens, it is likely 
to lead to competitive victimhood (‘we have 
suffered more than the outgroup’) among the 
conflicting groups (Noor et al., 2012). Moreover, 
drawing on the social identity theory (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979), it is also plausible to predict that 
such a competitive construal of one’s victimhood 
is likely to strengthen one’s identification with 
the ingroup, because a bolstered ingroup identifi-
cation could serve individuals with protection 
against future threats. Crucially, an emboldened 
and protective bond with one’s ingroup could 
also reduce our propensity to forgive perpetrator 
outgroups.
To test these predictions, a study was con-
ducted in the context of the sectarian intergroup 
conflict between Protestants and Catholics in 
Northern Ireland. Although Northern Ireland has 
enjoyed relative peace over the last decade, this 
conflict has continued to claim lives. To date, the 
death toll is close to 4000 lives in a population of 
1.7 million. In 2008 when the Northern Irish con-
flict was still hot, researchers indeed found 
 evidence in support of the above theorising, using 
cross-sectional data. That is, after considering the 
suffering of their ingroup (relative to the out-
group), both Catholic and Protestant participants 
reported a tendency to engage in competitive vic-
timhood, which in turn predicted positively their 
strength of identification with their respective 
ingroups. In turn, strength of identification pre-
dicted negatively forgiving the outgroup (Noor, 
Brown, & Prentice, 2008). As predicted by the 
social identity approach and victim beliefs, it 
appears that construing one’s groups’ suffering 
through exclusive and competitive victim beliefs 
bolsters ingroup identification. A narrow and 
strong identity in turn suppresses generosity in the 
group and therefore makes forgiving the adver-
sary group for their wrongs less likely. The inverse 
relationship between strength of ingroup identifi-
cation and lack of forgiveness was replicated 
among Catholics and Protestants in Northern 
Ireland in a later study, as well as among the pro-
ponents and opponents of the military regime in 
the post-Pinochet Chile (Noor, Brown, Gonzalez, 
Manzi, & Lewis, 2008, Studies 1 & 2). That is, 
the more individuals identified with their partisan 
ingroup, the less forgiveness they displayed 
towards the outgroup.
Box 15.7 Zooming In: Chile in the Wake of a 
Military Dictatorship
Following the end of Pinochet’s military 
rule (1973–1990), Chilean society was left 
to deal with the legacy of his authoritarian 
regime, a division of the society into those 
with an ideology of the political Right and 
those with an ideology of the Left. The 
political Right, being in support of the 
Pinochet regime, viewed the military inter-
vention by Pinochet as necessary for com-
bating against Communism in Chile. To 
achieve this goal, the military regime 
engaged in systematic political violence 
against its opponents, which did not shy 
away from torture, executions, kidnap-
pings, and other human rights violations. 
Consequently, the Left remembers the mil-
itary regime as destructive of democracy 
and gross violations of human rights in 
Chile (Valenzuela & Constable, 1991). 
However, the regime’s opponents also 
claimed their victims through their cam-
paigns of political assassinations, bomb-
ings, and kidnappings. Even today, there is 
considerable debate about addressing the 
human rights atrocities that marked this 
historical period in Chile. Inevitably, these 
contrasting viewpoints have opened up 
controversial issues relating to the estab-
lishment of the truth, official apologies, 
and requests for forgiveness. To illustrate, 
shortly after receiving the first commission 
report into the human rights violations 
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Providing experimental evidence for the link 
between the different levels of one’s social iden-
tity (i.e. narrow vs. inclusive) and victim beliefs, 
Wohl and Branscombe (2005) examined these 
factors in the context of the Jewish Holocaust 
while focusing on the intergroup relations 
between contemporary Germans and North 
American Jews. Specifically, the researchers 
found that framing the Holocaust in concrete 
(vs. abstract and thereby more inclusive) terms, 
involving concrete group identities of the victim 
and perpetrator, led North American Jews to 
expect today’s Germans to experience more guilt 
for the Holocaust atrocities. Crucially,  partici-
pants were less willing to forgive Germans. 
However, when the Holocaust was framed as an 
example of atrocities that human beings inflict on 
one another (i.e. evoking a social category more 
inclusive than the narrow ingroup category, that 
of all humanity), Jewish participants assigned 
less guilt to contemporary Germans for the 
Holocaust and were more willing to forgive them. 
Although the effects of this rather simple inter-
vention are impressive, one could argue that the 
efficacy of such abstract interventions may be 
due to the lack of intense conflict and relative 
peaceful co-existence between Jews and Germans 
in the contemporary world. In other words, would 
such an intervention work in contexts of ongoing 
and violent conflict?
To answer this question, Schnabel et al. (2013) 
investigated the viability of framing one’s group’s 
victim identity into a more inclusive one as an 
intervention tool to reduce the tensions between 
Israelis and Palestinians as a result of their ongo-
ing conflict in the Middle East. Specifically, the 
researchers wanted to know whether such an 
intervention could reduce both groups’ motiva-
tion to engage in competitive victimhood and to 
foster their intergroup forgiveness attitudes (see 
Box 15.6).
The rationale for Shnabel and colleagues’ 
intervention was to evoke an inclusive identity 
(see Gaertner & Dovidio, 2014; Dovidio, 
Gaertner, & Saguy, 2009; see also Scheepers & 
Ellemers, Chap. 9) that would allow room to 
acknowledge the suffering endured by both 
Palestinians and Israelis due to the regional con-
flict. To do so, these researchers drew the con-
flicting groups’ attention to their shared 
suffering in one experimental condition (i.e. 
common victim identity) by asking participants 
in this condition to read a short article remind-
ing participants that both Jews and Palestinians 
are victims of the prolonged conflict. The article 
justified this perspective by referring to alleged 
recent research concluding that each party had 
experienced substantial individual and national 
losses in human life, property, trust, and hope 
(Schnabel et  al., 2013, Study 1). Alternatively, 
in the control condition, participants read a neu-
tral text about aircrafts that was not related to 
the regional conflict. Finally, the researchers 
created a third condition (common regional 
identity). In this condition, participants read a 
text highlighting recent archaeological research 
revealing that ancient Middle Eastern peoples, 
including Palestinians and Jews, shared a com-
mon primordial culture that is still evident today 
in highly similar traditions, cuisines, and 
mentalities.
Results of this intervention showed that, rela-
tive to the control condition, inducing common 
victim identity among Palestinians and Israelis 
successfully reduced both groups’ motivation for 
competitive victimhood and, crucially, lead to 
increased willingness to forgive. By contrast, 
relative to the control condition, inducing com-
mon regional identity, corresponding to interven-
tions traditionally utilised within the identity 
recategorisation framework (Dovidio et al., 2009; 
Gaertner & Dovidio, 2014), neither lead to the 
reduction of competitive victimhood nor did it 
lead to an increased level of forgiveness among 
the conflicting groups.
during the military regime, Pinochet’s 
elected successor President Patricio Aylwin 
stated, ‘This is why I dare, in my position 
as President of the Republic, to assume the 
representation of the whole nation and, in 
its name, to beg forgiveness from the rela-
tives of the victims’ (Roniger & Sznajder, 
1999, p. 101).
I. Dinnick and M. Noor
231
A number of important insights can be extrap-
olated from the above findings. First, these results 
yet again point to the important interplay between 
identity and victim beliefs. The findings demon-
strate that when collective suffering is framed in 
identities that are inclusive enough to allow 
room for acknowledging both the ingroup’s suf-
fering and that of the outgroup’s, the motivation 
for competitive victimhood can be decreased and 
the propensity to forgive one another can be 
increased. Second, fostering such inclusive vic-
tim identities provides researchers and practitio-
ners with one of the few intervention tools that 
promises to be sufficiently robust and efficacious, 
even in contexts of ongoing and violent inter-
group conflicts. Finally, these results also reveal 
that any such inclusive victim identity interven-
tions must address the pressing needs of conflict-
ing groups for acknowledgement of their mutual 
suffering. Otherwise, as seen in the generic com-
mon regional identity, such interventions may 
have little or no positive impact.
 What Would Third Parties Think 
of Us?
Recent research has further advanced our under-
standing of the boundary conditions of victim 
beliefs, especially of inclusive victim beliefs 
(a.k.a. common victimhood). Specifically, given 
the positive impact of inclusive victim beliefs on 
rival intergroup relations, what might prevent 
groups from utilising this strategy to promote 
peaceful co-existence? Theoretically, we know, 
for example, that one reason why conflicting 
groups may be motivated to compete over their 
share of victimhood is to attract the moral and 
material support from third party groups (Noor 
et  al., 2012). Remember that at times of active 
war, third party’s support and interventions 
increase the likelihood that the supported group 
will win the conflict, at least, militarily (Balch- 
Lindsay, Enterline, & Joyce, 2008). Thus, 
undoubtedly third parties can play a key role in 
intergroup conflicts. To demonstrate this, 
researchers recently investigated the hypothesis 
that one reason why conflicting groups’ may not 
be willing to readily acknowledge the suffering 
of their outgroups may have to do with the con-
flicting groups being concerned that such public 
acknowledgment may reduce the level of support 
they could receive from international third parties 
(Adelman, Leidner, Ünal, Nahhas, & Shnabel, 
2016). Thus, the idea that was tested in this 
research was the extent to which a group’s concern 
over losing a third party’s support may influence 
the group’s willingness to acknowledge the harm 
they had caused the outgroup.
Again, this research was conducted in the 
context of the Israeli and Palestinian conflict 
(Adelman et al., 2016, Study 1). The researchers 
employed an experimental paradigm, whereby 
Israeli participants either read a victimhood nar-
rative highlighting exclusively the suffering of 
Israelis due to the regional conflict (competitive 
victimhood narrative) or a narrative that drew 
attention to the suffering of both Israelis and 
Palestinians as a result of the conflict (inclusive 
victimhood narrative). Interestingly, the way par-
ticipants felt about the conflict and their collec-
tive suffering was revealed by the fact that the 
competitive victimhood narrative resonated with 
participants significantly more than the inclusive 
victimhood narrative.
However, irrespective of participants’ prefer-
ence for the specific narrative, the researchers 
observed several significant interaction effects on 
their key dependent variables, namely, motiva-
tion for competitive victimhood (e.g. ‘Throughout 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Israelis suffered 
more than Palestinians’, Adelman et  al., 2016, 
p.1419) and support for aggressive policies 
against the outgroup (e.g. ‘Israel should withhold 
tax money from the Palestinians if they don’t 
fight terrorism’, Adelman et al., 2016, p. 1419). 
First, for participants who were presented with 
the inclusive victimhood narrative, the less they 
were concerned over losing third party’s support 
due to the ingroup’s acknowledgment of the out-
group’s suffering, the less they were motivated to 
compete over their share of victimhood. By con-
trast, for participants who were presented with 
the competitive victimhood narrative, no signifi-
cant relationship between their concern over los-
ing third party’s support and motivation for 
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competitive victimhood was observed. Regarding 
participants’ support for aggressive policies 
against Palestinians, a similar pattern to the one 
above emerged. That is, among participants who 
were less concerned, the inclusive victimhood 
narrative decreased their support for aggressive 
policies, relative to the competitive victimhood 
narrative.
Taken together, the outlined research provides 
interesting evidence in support of the important 
role of third parties and how they may influence 
conflicting groups regarding what victim beliefs 
they adopt. A broader point to take away from 
this research is that often as researchers we sim-
plify the dynamics of intergroup conflict by 
reducing our analysis to the ingroup and out-
group protagonists only. However, as the present 
research demonstrates, conflict maintenance (vs. 
reduction) is rarely a matter of disagreements 
between two groups in a social vacuum.
 Can They Ever Change?
Victim beliefs can also be influenced by their 
beliefs about the perpetrator outgroup and about 
human nature more broadly. In other words, 
individuals’ beliefs about what their enemy 
group might be capable of can shape how they 
would behave towards such enemy groups. This 
line of reasoning is anchored in the implicit theo-
ries of change (Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Dweck, 
Chiu, & Hong, 1995; see also Bernecker & Job, 
Chap. 12). The underpinning rationale here is 
that people vary in their beliefs about human 
beings’ potential for change. On the one hand, 
you may believe that as human beings we all 
have the potential to change our personal charac-
teristics and behaviours. On the other hand, you 
may  perceive stability in human nature and 
expect that our individual traits and behaviours 
are rather resistant to change. Such differential 
beliefs entail important consequences for how 
you behave towards others, especially towards 
your outgroups.
In a study conducted with Israeli train passen-
gers living in Tel Aviv, Israel, researchers experi-
mentally manipulated participants’ malleability 
beliefs about human nature by presenting them 
with bogus newspaper articles on recent research 
revealing alleged scientific evidence in favour 
(vs. against) such malleability (Wohl et  al., 
2015). To illustrate, in the pro-malleability con-
dition, participants read alleged research find-
ings revealing that the nature of groups in general 
could change, while in the non-malleability con-
dition, the research findings revealed that the 
nature of groups would be fixed. In a purportedly 
unrelated second study, all participants were 
asked to read a bogus outgroup apology offered 
by the Palestinian leadership for the killing of 
innocent Israelis. Finally, participants were then 
asked to indicate the extent to which they were 
willing to forgive Palestinians, as well as the 
extent to which participants endorsed to recipro-
cate the Palestinian apology with one from the 
Israeli side.
The researchers found that they had success-
fully manipulated participants’ malleability 
beliefs about Palestinians in the predicted direc-
tion. Importantly, the results showed that, relative 
to participants in the low malleability condition, 
those who were led to believe that groups’ nature 
is malleable were not only more forgiving of 
Palestinians, but they were also willing to support 
the apology reciprocation (Wohl et  al., 2015, 
Study 2).
What is striking about this intervention is that 
it extends the importance of victim beliefs to 
beliefs about perpetrators, thereby providing fur-
ther intervention strategies for researchers and 
practitioners. Also of note is that the researchers 
observed this positive impact of the beliefs about 
perpetrators’ malleability to also influence par-
ticipants’ willingness to reciprocate the out-
group’s apology. Past literature has pointed out 
that the link between apology and forgiveness at 
the intergroup level is at best a tenuous one 
(Hornsey & Wohl, 2013). Thus, to observe the 
above effect in such a context is indeed very 
promising.
In the forgoing sections of this chapter, we 
were primarily concerned with summarising 
theoretical and empirical evidence to make a case 
in support of the social- and conflict-reducing 
utility of forgiveness. However, no case would be 
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complete without problematizing the limitations 
and unintended consequences of forgiveness, 
which we will address next.
 The Limitations and Unintended 
Consequences of Forgiveness
Often forgiveness is considered as a gift given by 
victims to their perpetrators (Noor & Cantacuzino, 
2018). Although the motivation behind such gen-
erosity may vary across victims, scholars gener-
ally agree that forgiveness tends to lose its power 
when we make it a duty. This is referred to as for-
giveness boosterism, which involves praising and 
pushing forgiveness as a universal prescription 
(Lamb & Murphy, 2002). Clearly, the intention to 
write this chapter and dedicate our research 
careers to studying forgiveness are not served by 
referring to forgiveness as a panacea for resolving 
intergroup conflict.
In fact, forgiveness has been shown to be 
accompanied with some important unintended 
consequences. To illustrate, empirical research by 
Greenaway, Quinn, and Louis (2011) framed the 
atrocities White Australians have committed 
against Australian Aborigines as a common 
humanity tragedy (rather than the outcome of 
concrete hostile intergroup relations) with the 
intention to induce a common humanity identity 
among Australian Aborigines to foster intergroup 
forgiveness (closely modelled on Wohl and 
Branscombe’s research discussed earlier, 2005). 
As predicted, the recategorisation efforts had the 
effect of soliciting intergroup forgiveness. 
However, the research also revealed that this pro-
cess had the effect of reducing the Aborigines’ 
willingness to demand restitution for the injustices 
they have endured at the hands of White 
Australians. Put differently, the same intervention 
that led to increased willingness to forgive also 
suppressed justice demands among Aborigines.
In a similar vein, Wenzel and Okimoto 
(2015) found that, when participants of a 
laboratory- created group were encouraged by 
their fellow ingroup members to forgive an out-
group transgressor, this reduced anger and 
increased sympathy towards the transgressor 
among the participants. Crucially, these forgiving 
participants also perceived less injustice than 
those who were not prompted to forgive.
Although a rigorous test of the causal relation-
ship between forgiveness and justice demands 
has not yet been conducted, the above findings 
point to interventions that, while on the surface 
are aimed at fostering forgiveness, may have seri-
ous sedative effects on justice-related outcome 
variables. Thus, both researchers and practitio-
ners ought to exercise extra caution when pro-
moting intergroup forgiveness and pay particular 
attention to justice concerns, which are consid-
ered key to a meaningful and robust conflict 
resolution infrastructure.
Box 15.8 Question for Elaboration: Is 
Forgiveness Always a Good Thing?
So far in this chapter, forgiveness has been 
framed in terms of its utility at fostering 
peaceful co-existence between groups who 
are either currently engaged in conflict or 
who have a shared history steeped in hos-
tile relations. However, can you think of 
any circumstances when forgiveness may 
not be the best strategy for groups to 
adopt? It might be particularly useful when 
thinking about this question to consider 
the relation between unequal groups in the 
long term. Summary
• The propensity to suffer can transcend 
from the individual to the group level 
when suffering is inflicted as a conse-
quence of one’s particular group 
membership.
• Groups are able to construe such suffer-
ing from discrete and powerful narra-
tives into a shared sense of collective 
victimhood.
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 Guiding Answers to Questions in 
the Chapter
 1. Question with Box 15.8: Is Forgiveness 
Always a Good Thing?
A: The empirical evidence reviewed in this 
chapter demonstrates that when conflicting 
groups are reminded of their common suffer-
ing, such groups are more likely to forgive 
one another, thus fostering intergroup har-
mony. However, such an intervention may 
also reduce the anger and identification with 
one’s own group. Such dispositions are para-
mount when mobilising disadvantaged groups 
to rally for social change in the wake of such 
disadvantage (e.g. see Wright & Lubensky, 
2009; and also Greenaway et  al., 2011). 
Though having a curing impact on fractured 
relations, forgiveness may come at the cost of 
normalising objective group- based inequali-
ties (see Morton & Postmes, 2011). In the 
long run, this is particularly problematic, for 
without the desire for social change, such 
inequalities are given the opportunity to fester 
without the challenge of redress from those 
people who should be most motivated to chal-
lenge the status quo – those in the disadvan-
taged position. This critique of forgiveness is 
touching on a much bigger and unanswered 
question, namely, how does forgiveness relate 
to justice?
• This dynamic (and obstructive) inter-
play between group identity and victim-
hood can act as a barrier to intergroup 
forgiveness.
• When interventions are instigated that 
target mutually destructive suffering 
and focus groups’ attention upon their 
common suffering, intergroup forgive-
ness is more readily endorsed.
• Intergroup forgiveness can be achieved 
and is a viable strategy to impede per-
petuating cycles of revenge. Ultimately, 
this has the effect of reducing the net 
amount of suffering.
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